Brokers, Bureaucrats, and the Quality of Government: Understanding Development and Decay in Afghanistan and Beyond

by
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Abstract

Why do public institutions decay or break down? And why are they often so difficult to put back together? These questions have been the subject of a large body of academic literature in the social sciences, but we still do not have a good theoretical and empirical understanding of *contemporary* institutional development in countries with limited human capital, material resources, and the rule of law. External or internal conflicts often do not motivate governments to develop more robust institutional structures. Ethnic differences do not necessarily given rise to institutional dysfunction or conflict. And ideology frequently does not influence whether a government is able to design and implement policies that benefit the public at large, predictably enforce laws and property rights, or develop a monopoly of control over the national territory.

In order to gain deeper insight into the processes by which contemporary institutions may develop or decay, this research closely examines a longitudinal case of initial institutional improvement and subsequent failure that is not consistent with existing explanations: Afghanistan. In this puzzling case, I show that government institutions became progressively more institutionalized during the early and middle periods of the 20th century but ultimately failed to consolidate these gains, developing a recurrently unstable political system and an unproductive economy.

To make sense of these outcomes, this research proposes an explanation that centers on *organizational capital* and *external coherence*. When institutions are insulated from elite polarization and embedded in society, they are more likely to recruit and promote officials on the basis of merit, to coordinate information more effectively, and to formulate and implement mutually agreeable policies at the grass roots level. Moreover, when external support is aligned between political and development objectives, and coordinated among donor organizations, institutional upgrading in recipient countries is more likely to take place because the costs of programming, monitoring, and objectively evaluating such assistance are lower.

Together, organizational capital and external support help to make sense of the haphazard path of institutional development in Afghanistan. In general, when Afghan elites have been cohesive, as was the case during middle 20th century, they have been able to develop increasingly merit-oriented and productive institutions of government. When elite cooperation began to break down, as happened during the late monarchy, the communist period, and the post-Bonn governments, both the army and bureaucracy became vulnerable to politicization, setting the stage for coups, insurgencies, and institutional dysfunction. External donors have also contributed to institutional outcomes in Afghanistan through the alignment and coordination of

their assistance. Alignment between security and development objectives and relative coordination of foreign aid provided for institutional upgrading of both the army and bureaucracy during the middle 20th century. However, the rise of US-Soviet geopolitical competition in Afghanistan decreased aid effectiveness and produced politicization in government institutions in the final decades of the monarchy, providing the conditions for the republican and communist coups d'état of 1973 and 1978, respectively. The subsequent Soviet and post-2001 interventions in Afghanistan did not resolve this problem of divergent security and development objectives, which impeded the development of government institutions over time.

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This dissertation project took shape over many years. It began with questions about Afghanistan that I had been asking myself as a teenager born and raised in the United States. It developed into vague notions of politics and society in Afghanistan, informed by consuming books and conversations with family members and friends throughout my undergraduate years. But it was only until I began to develop and research this work that I began to find my puzzle. In doing so, this dissertation clarified old questions that initially animated my interest in Afghanistan, and new ones that I accumulated along the way. While this research was, at times, solitary, it would not have been possible without the financial, intellectual, and emotional support of many institutions and individuals.

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Abbreviations

AF	Asia Foundation
AP3	Afghanistan Public Protection Program
AGSA	Department for Safeguarding the Interests of Afghanistan (*Afghanistan da Gato da Saatane Adara*)
AIA	Afghan Interim Administration
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANAP	Afghan National Auxiliary Police
ANLF	Afghan National Liberation Front (*Jabha-ye Nejat-e Melli Afghanistan*)
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy
ATA	Afghan Transitional Administration
BPHS	Basic Package of Health Services
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COMISAF	Commander of International Security Assistance Force
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSO	Central Statistics Office (Afghanistan)
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
DDR	Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration
DOD	US Department of Defense
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HAVA	Helmand and Arghandab Valley Authority
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force

JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB)
JI	Jamiat-e Islami
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KHAD	State Information Services (*Khidmat-e Aetela'at-e Dawlati*)
KSU	Kabul Student Union
LDI	Local Defense Initiative
MOD	Ministry of Defense (Afghanistan)
MOE	Ministry of Education (Afghanistan)
MOF	Ministry of Finance (Afghanistan)
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Afghanistan)
MOI	Ministry of Interior Affairs (Afghanistan)
MOP	Ministry of Planning (Afghanistan)
MOPH	Ministry of Public Health (Afghanistan)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council (US)
NVA	Nangarhar Valley Authority
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
NDS	National Directorate of Security (*Riasate- Amniat-e Melli*)
NWFP	Northwest Frontier Province
OECD	Organizational for Economic Cooperation and Development
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (*Hezb-e Demokratik Khalq-e Afghanistan*)
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SN	Supervisory Council (*Shura-ye Nazar*)
SNTV	Single nontransferable vote
SRAP	Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
UF	United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (*Jabha-ye Muttahed-e Islami-ye Melli bara-ye Nejat-e Afghanistan*)

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
US	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USFOR-A	United States Forces-Afghanistan
USOM	United States Overseas Mission
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WAD	Ministry of State Security (*Wizarat-e Amniyat-e Dawlati*)
WHO	World Health Organization

1 Introduction

Why do public institutions decay or break down? And why are they often so difficult to put back together? These questions have been the subject of a large body of academic literature in the social sciences. Various studies of government institutions in both developing and developed economies have provided a useful set of insights into the causes of institutional development over time. We know that centuries of war-making in Europe and China contributed to the development of relatively strong government institutions in these areas today.[1] We also now understand that urban class conflict gave rise to relatively powerful states in Southeast Asia, whereas episodic rural violence did not.[2] We know that different ideas,[3] skills,[4] geographies,[5] and colonial practices[6] have either enabled or otherwise constrained institutional consolidation in different contexts, generating a rich set of explanations for why we see such diverse institutional outcomes in the world today.

Despite these important contributions, we still do not have a good theoretical and empirical understanding of *contemporary* institutional development. In several contemporary cases, government institutions have not responded to various causal factors that had strengthened states in other geographic areas and periods of time. External conflicts involving Iraq and Iran, India and Pakistan, and Armenia and Azerbaijan have apparently done little to augment institutional capabilities in these countries. Popular protests in Cairo, Bangkok, Karachi, and other urban centers have not dramatically changed the quality of their respective government institutions. Governments characterized by ethnic cooperation and moderate worldviews have often not been

[1] Tilly 1990; Hui 2005.
[2] Slater 2010.
[3] Gorski 2003.
[4] Ertman 1997.
[5] Herbst 2000.
[6] Mamdani 1996; Lange 2009; Mahoney 2010.

able to build up institutions capable of enforcing laws, collecting taxes, and enhancing economic development.

Furthermore, the conditions under which various causes of institutional development had worked in the past may no longer hold. Extremely violent and protracted war-making between states is less common than in the past, in part because political geography and norms have made external conflict more costly,[7] while technology has made it more efficient.[8] Revolutionary and counter-revolutionary ideologies, while perhaps on the rise once again, are not as prevalent as they were during the Cold War. And the expansion of international commerce and democratic procedures and ideas have limited the extremely violent tactics that centralizing rulers had used in earlier periods of time.

There is little disagreement about the bundle of characteristics that tend to describe capable institutions, even if these features are difficult to measure. Strong institutions tend to have meritocratic recruitment and retention procedures, make and implement policies that benefit the public at large, predictably enforce laws and property rights, and possess a monopoly of control over the national territory. There is also little question that institutions matter for important economic and political outcomes. While the magnitude of the impact of institutional quality on economic prosperity remains a matter of debate,[9] there is extensive evidence that government institutions play an important role in long run processes of economic growth,[10] political stability,[11] and levels of public goods provision.[12]

What is not well understood are the specific processes by which countries acquire or drift away from characteristics of institutional strength in contemporary settings. This research explicitly studies these processes by examining a longitudinal case of initial institutional improvement and subsequent failure: Afghanistan. This case is important not simply because Afghanistan is a paradigmatic example of a weak state. More importantly, it is useful because it exhibits varying outcomes over time. Afghanistan offers a case of a government that became progressively more

[7] Fazal 2011.

[8] Bennett and Stam 1996.

[9] One study finds that governance may not be straightforwardly associated with growth outcomes. See Kurtz and Schrank 2007.

[10] Acemoglu, Johnson, and J. A. Robinson 2001; For more detailed historical evidence linking institutional reform with growth, see, for example, Wade 1990.

[11] Walter 2014.

[12] Dell and Parsa 2016.

institutionalized during the early and middle periods of the 20th century but ultimately failed to consolidate these gains, developing a recurrently unstable political system and an extremely unproductive economy, as shown in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1. *Changes in Institutional Quality by Time Period, Afghanistan*

Time Period	Regime	Capabilities	Reach	Effects
1929-1953	Monarchy (early)	**Moderate expansion**	**Large expansion**	**Increasing stability**
1953-1963	Monarchy (middle)	**Large expansion**	**Moderate expansion**	**Increasing stability**
1963-1978	Monarchy + Republic (late)	**Minimal expansion**	**Moderate expansion**	Decreasing stability
1978-1986	PDPA (Taraki, Amin, Karmal)	Large contraction	Large contraction	Decreasing stability
1986-1992	PDPA (Najibullah)	Large contraction	Moderate contraction	**Increasing stability**
2001-2008	Post-Bonn (early)	**Moderate expansion**	**Moderate expansion**	**Increasing stability**
2009-2014	Post-Bonn (late)	Minimal contraction	Moderate contraction	Decreasing stability

Note: Positive changes in dimensions of institutional quality are bolded.

The early and middle periods of the monarchy made large gains in institutional capabilities, reach, and effects (for more details about these terms, see Section 2.3.3) through the expansion of the army and provincial administration throughout the territory, as well as the promotion of increasingly capable economic planners and technical specialists into the bureaucracy. These gains continued into the late period of monarchy, but soon gave way to increasing conflict over the composition and objectives of government institutions in Afghanistan, culminating in the coups of 1973 and 1978. The subsequent PDPA-led administration experienced an almost immediate decline in institutional capabilities as the April 1978 revolution gave way to widespread antigovernment violence, human capital flight, military desertion, and the collapse of the agricultural economy. The ascendance of Dr. Najibullah did not reverse institutional decline, but temporarily averted the collapse of the government through the selective allocation of Soviet-supplied patronage. The post-2001 experience saw an initial expansion in institutional capabilities and territorial reach, but these gains were hamstrung by personalist forms of recruitment, retention, and promotion practices. While personalist institutions led to increasing stability in the years immediately followed the international intervention (2001-2006), it created the conditions for growing

instability in later years, as government corruption or incompetence contributed to instability at the national and local levels.

Figure 1.1. *GDP Per Capita, in Purchasing Power Parity 1972 Afghanis, 1935-1975*



Sources: Fry 1974; United Nations Statistical Division 2014; *The Maddison-Project* 2013; author's calculations.

Note: GDP per capita figures were computed using the real GDP time series from Fry (1974) for 1935 to 1973, and the real GDP time series from the UN Statistical Division (2014) for 1974 to 2013. Given the high level of measurement error in the UN real GDP estimates during much of the PDPA and civil-war periods, I estimate changes in real GDP (from the UN time series) by smoothing out real output changes from 1981 to 1994.

This institutional variation has had important implications for standards of living in Afghanistan relative to other South Asian countries, as seen in Figure 1.1. The populations of colonial India and Afghanistan were equally poor in 1935, and both populations experienced a similar decline in per capita output as a result of World War II. Afghanistan and the post-colonial successor states of India and Pakistan recovered in similar ways after the conclusion of the war and experienced comparable increases in standards of living during the 1950s and 1960s. When we extend the

time period into the final decades of the 20th century, as shown in Figure 1.2, the divergence in economic outcomes becomes clearer. India, while still a country with significant economic and political problems, has continued and accelerated the growth process since the adoption of various economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s; Pakistan has not experienced a sustained pickup in growth in part because of the inability of government institutions to address sources of domestic conflict throughout the country. And Afghanistan has experienced large swings in its economic fortunes in ways that clearly correlate with political stability. The gradual consolidation and spread of government institutions and planning in Afghanistan during the middle-20th century corresponded with a modest rate of growth in per capita income, particularly in the cities and adjoining rural areas where development activity was concentrated. The rapid decline in the capabilities, reach, and effects of government institutions that followed the PDPA coup of April 1978 produced a long-lasting contraction of the economy that gave way to further declines with the collapse of the communist regime in 1992 and extended into a period of civil war. This changed after the international intervention in 2001, which generated large levels of aid expenditure in physical and human capital, and with it, gains in standards of living. But the post-2001 period did not produce durable and merit-oriented institutions of government or development planning in Afghanistan, putting the current economy at serious risk of long-term contraction as foreign aid expenditure declines.

Figure 1.2. *Normalized GDP Per Capita, 1950-1995 (1950=100)*



Sources: Fry 1974; United Nations Statistical Division 2014; *The Maddison-Project* 2013; Author's calculations.

Note: Vertical red lines demarcate the Daoud coup in July 1973, the PDPA coup in April 1978, and the fall of the PDPA regime in 1992. GDP per capita figures were computed using the real GDP time series from Fry (1974) for 1935 to 1973, and the real GDP time series from the UN Statistical Division (2014) for 1974 to 2013. Given the high level of measurement error in the UN real GDP estimates during much of the PDPA and civil-war periods, I estimate changes in real GDP (from the UN time series) by smoothing out real output changes from 1981 to 1994.

The variation in institutional outcomes in Afghanistan and its implications for political stability and economic prosperity open up a series of research questions that this dissertation will address. Each of these questions are specific to different government regimes in Afghanistan, but together they help to shed light on the larger question of why durable institutions of government have been so elusive in this country. They also can help us to understand the institutional trajectories of other countries facing similar constraints—limited human and material capital, a weak or non-existent rule of law, and a high level of social diversity.

1. Why did government institutions grow more capable during much of the monarchical

period and why did they ultimately decay, culminating in the coups of 1973 and 1978?

2. Why is it that government institutions disintegrated so rapidly after the PDPA took power, and why was the PDPA regime able to survive despite seemingly insurmountable problems of widespread antigovernment violence, human capital flight, military desertion, and the collapse of the agricultural economy?

3. How do we explain the haphazard trajectory of institutional development in Afghanistan after 2001? Why is it that, despite an unprecedented level of domestic and foreign participation in Afghan institutions, the government has made institutional gains in some areas, but less in other important areas—notably the security sector?

This dissertation proposes a common set of answers to these questions: organizational capital and external coherence. In each of the time periods covered by this dissertation, institutional development has depended on the extent to which these institutions can organize elites and information in service of achieving government priorities. It has also been influenced by the alignment of donor political and economic objectives and the coordination of their efforts. A brief introduction of these variables and how they explain institutional trajectories is presented below.

1.1 Summary of Argument and Methods

Why do some institutions decay under conditions of limited accountability and human and material capital, while others become more capable? In the following chapters, I propose and evaluate the argument that institutional development depends on the *organizational capital* available to government institutions and the *external coherence* of donor countries and organizations that support them. Organizational capital describes how government institutions relate to two key constituencies: elites and local social communities. First, institutions depend on the degree of *elite cooperation*. Whether the result of robust party building or common social and political experiences, elite cooperation insulates institutions from politicization and enable them to coordinate information more effectively. When elites cooperate, they are more likely to tolerate or actively develop institutions that pursue compatible agendas and that recruit and evaluate cadres on the basis of merit. By contrast, when elites are highly polarized, then government institutions

are highly politicized and tend to hire personnel based on loyalty or factional identification. This type of elite organization also tends to produce institutions that do not frequently share information and, in more extreme circumstances, actively undermine one another. Second, the *social embdeddedness* of bureaucratic and military personnel determines the ability of these institutions to implement policies and programs. When government institutions are rooted in surrounding society, they are more capable of formulating and carrying out policies suitable for the areas to which they are applied. Embedded institutions possess personnel that are relatively informed, responsive, and locally accepted, allowing them to effectively carry out simple and complex development interventions and cultivate information about potential threats. Unembedded institutions, by contrast, are unable to collect basic information about the areas in which they operate and are treated with suspicion, impeding development programming and implementation as well as the establishment of security. These two dimensions of organizational capital give rise to four categories of institutions shown in Figure 2.5.

Figure 1.3. *Dimensions of Organizational Capital*

Social Embeddedness \ Elite Cooperation	**Contentious**	**Cooperative**
Embedded	*Peak Coalitional*	*Encompassing*
Unembedded	*Atomized*	*Elitist*

For each combination of elite cooperation and social embeddedness, we have a different prediction about the type of institutions that will prevail. *Encompassing* institutions are relatively meritocratic, informed, and administratively competent, and are capable of performing complicated development and military interventions inside of the national territory. *Elitist* institutions are relatively meritocratic but lack information and relationships with local social communities. As a result, they can selectively accomplish temporary, large scale economic and security inter-

ventions, but are unable to prevent, resolve, and follow through on routine development and military challenges. *Peak coalitional* institutions are capable of collecting information and effectively administering programs in local areas, but are often vulnerable to politicization and gridlock stemming from elite conflict. Finally, *atomized* institutions are highly politicized structures that lack the capacity to understand and respond to basic development and security challenges.

While organizational capital provides a domestic source of institutional development, the coherence of foreign support, often but not exclusively in the form of economic assistance, can serve as an important external driver of institutional capabilities. I argue that two types of characteristics of external support matter. First, the level of *resource alignment* determines whether the economic and institutional development goals of donors countries and organizations are consistent with the political objectives that they may possess in a recipient country. This characteristic describes whether donors design and carry out development assistance in a way that is compatible with the political objectives in the recipient country. In general, when donors align their development and political objectives in a recipient country, these objectives and the strategy behind them can be unambiguously evaluated, consequently making aid more effective. In these circumstances, donors can readily identify their end goals and evaluate whether the inputs and processes that underlie them are working. When donor development and political objectives are not aligned, then the ultimate objectives and strategies of their development assistance are unclear. Second, the level of *donor coordination* describes whether donors can jointly orchestrate individual aid programs so as to prevent or mitigate duplication, aid siphoning, and conflicting development priorities and strategies. If aid is coordinated among major donors, then donors are more able to track one another's aid programming and expenditure, making costly duplication, patronage, and incompatible aid programming less likely at the aggregate level. If external support, however, is poorly coordinated, then the resulting absence of information about the formulation and allocation of development assistance at the aggregate level makes duplication, patronage, and incompatible development assistance more likely. These two dimensions of external support give rise to four types of development assistance shown in Figure 2.6.

If major donors possess aligned development and political objectives and coordinate their assistance programs, then external support is *developmental*. Developmental aid is expected to increase the institutional capabilities of the recipient country. If donors have aligned development

Figure 1.4. *Dimensions of External Support*

Resource Alignment	Donor Coordination: Coordinated	Donor Coordination: Uncoordinated
High	*Developmental*	*Stovepiped*
Low	*Directionless*	*Detrimental*

and political objectives but do not coordinate their aid, then external support is *stove-piped*. In this situation, donors have an identifiable and coherent set of objectives, but their assistance programs are exposed to corruption and redundancy. If donor objectives are not aligned but aid programs are coordinated, then external support is *directionless*. While donors can efficiently deploy assistance in this situation to accomplish short-term development objectives, they are unable to solve the larger problem of specifying an achievable end state and charting a path to it. Finally, when donors' development and political objectives are not aligned and their assistance programs are not coordinated, as is the case in contemporary Afghanistan, then external support is *detrimental*, with external support oriented toward short-term objectives and vulnerable to duplication and corruption.

External coherence interacts with organizational capital. While external assistance cannot develop institutions without organizational capital, different types of external support can reinforce the impact of organizational strengthening or decay. Misaligned external support and donor fragmentation can accentuate the negative impact of declining organizational capital by increasing opportunities for corruption and concealing poor individual and departmental performance from close scrutiny. Likewise, aligned and coordinated donors can augment the positive effect of increasing organizational capital by prioritizing the institutional objectives that have the greatest possibility and rewarding the individuals and departments that are most able to carry them out. External support, however, is unlikely to be able to reverse the effects of organizational consolidation or decay. Where organizational capital is minimal, no degree of donor alignment and coordination is going to be able to significantly improve the quality of the bureaucracy and

military. And where organizational capital is quite high, misaligned and uncoordinated external support will remain manageable because domestic institutions in these cases can bundle and allocate aid toward high development objectives.

To test this theory, I use two empirical strategies. First, I carry out a deeply researched set of case studies from Afghanistan. These case studies are primarily intended to gain theoretical *depth*. As discussed above, these historical episodes provide favorable conditions—unexplained variation in institutional quality and exogenous turnover of ruling coalitions—for ruling out existing explanations and developing new ones. More specifically, the cases will try to answer why the monarchy led by Nadir Khan and his relatives became incrementally more capable over the course of the 20th century, but became increasingly exposed to urban conflict; why the institutional capabilities inherited by the PDPA regime declined so rapidly, and why the regime stayed in power longer than most observers expected; and why reconstructed government institutions in post-2001 Afghanistan failed to develop independent institutional capabilities in the military and economic fields, despite receiving extraordinary levels of assistance and diverse participation from the international community. Together, answering these puzzles helps to calibrate the theory presented in this chapter.

Second, I conduct a series of cross-country statistical tests of the argument outline above. These tests attempt to separately identify the effects of organizational capital and external alignment on institutional quality. These statistical analyses test the theory developed and evaluated in the case studies on a set of country-level panel data between 1975 and 2014. Specifically, I conduct two sets of tests, each separately centered on the organizational capital and external coherence variables. Because both of these explanatory factors are highly endogenous, each set of tests attempts to identify the exogenous variation in the explanatory factor. I first estimate the long run impact of organizational capital on institutions drawing on a cross-section and a panel dataset of developing countries from 1975 to 2014. I then attempt to identify the effect of aid fragmentation (as a measure of external coherence) on institutional development *conditional* on the preceding level of organizational capital, drawing on an instrumental variables two-stage least squares (IV 2SLS) strategy.

1.2 Contributions to Theories of Institutions and Studies of Afghanistan

As suggested earlier, existing understandings of institutional development are often situated in specific historical and geographic settings. In much of the existing comparative politics and political economy literatures, institutions were born out distinct initial conditions and historical experiences of warmaking, internal conflict, or colonialism. This research *does not* attempt to revisit these findings. Rather, it evaluates whether these theories can be used to explain an important contemporary case, Afghanistan, and addresses their shortcomings by specifying an understudied set of internal and external characteristics that can cause institutions to become more capable over time. In doing so, it makes five types of contributions to the existing study of institutions and of Afghanistan.

First, this research suggests that conventional explanations of institutional development need to be more critically examined when evaluating institutional performance in contemporary developing countries. In particular, it shows that the conditions that *supply* institutions are just as important for institutional development as those that generate *demand* for them. The case studies demonstrate that shocks of various kinds—external threats, internal insecurity, economic malaise—do not necessarily generate tax mobilization, elite cooperation, or other forms of self-help behavior that the existing body of literature expects. In Afghanistan, only those governments with organizational capital have been able to develop institutions for sustained periods of time, and as soon as this source of institutional strength eroded, so did government institutions with it. At the same time, when external powers have adopted a consistent set of political and economic objectives that are coordinated with one another, as was the case during the middle 20th century, then foreign assistance has significantly improved government institutions in Afghanistan. When these external conditions have not been in place, such as during the late monarchy or post-2001 period, foreign aid has either been ineffective or even undermined institutional development. As shown in Chapter 6, these inferences may carry over to a wider set of cases, suggesting that demand-side explanations of institutional development such as external or internal crises need to be adapted to take into account the conditions that make institutional development less costly in the first place.

Second, this research suggests that ethnic diversity might not necessarily be a barrier to insti-

tutional upgrading. While Afghanistan has experienced ethnically-motived conflict, particularly during the civil-war era, a close look at the empirical record shows that institutions have exhibited inter-ethnic diversity and cooperation in most (but not all) areas of government activity during periods of both institutional consolidation and decline. This finding is important because much of the literature continues to emphasize ethnic fractionalization as an important determinant of institutional outcomes, even when contemporary evidence indicates that homogenous populations do not provide for political order. This can be clearly seen in Egypt, Libya, and other areas of the Middle East, where conflict and relatively ethnically homogenous populations have not produced highly effective institutions.

Third, it shows that conceptual models of institutional development associated with Max Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy have somewhat limited descriptive and explanatory value in many developing contexts. In the case of Afghanistan, interpersonal relationships and foreign aid have at times been used to *initially* enhance institutional capacity and promote greater meritocratization, despite *eventually* generating problems of political instability and poor tax mobilization. While these non-Weberian sources of institutional development clearly do not provide the basis for institutional upgrading in the long run—as seen in Chapter 3—interpersonal relationships have provided organizational capital in Afghanistan, and foreign aid has contributed to partial economic development in the urban and peri-urban areas of the country. These non-Weberian sources of institutional strength may apply to other contexts. In the case of China, Yuen Yuen Ang shows that personal connections provided the initial basis for the development of the bureaucracy and, later, the integration of China into international markets.[13] David Kana shows that specific forms of crony capitalism contributed to the growth of the South Korean economy by reducing transaction costs and making long-term agreements more efficient, even as these arrangements concentrated wealth in the hands of leading business families.[14] Together, these results suggest that there are multiple paths to greater institutionalization, even if these paths are not necessarily sustainable or ethical.

Fourth, this research adds to the study of Afghanistan by examining this important case in the context of the comparative study of institutions. In recent decades, Afghanistan has been

[13] Ang 2016.
[14] Kang 2002.

the domain of historians, anthropologists, and area specialists. While these perspectives have greatly improved our understanding of the history and society of Afghanistan, they have not identified how this case fits into existing explanations of institutional development.[15] This has not only restricted our understanding of what has mattered more or less in the specific case of Afghanistan—it has also limited what comparativist perspectives can learn from this country. As we will see in the case studies, a common set of political and economic variables helps to account for institutional development and, more often, decay across monarchical, communist, and post-2001 governments. Institutional development has so often foundered in Afghanistan because political coalitions have either failed to organize around specific ideas of governance or create the rules for such a system to take root, and because foreign assistance has often been motivated by incoherent political and development objectives. The fall of the monarchy and subsequent republican regime, for example, was attributable to the absence of institutional mechanisms that could resolve elite conflicts, which in turn emerged as a result of a growing prevalence of the educated classes in the bureaucracy and military. This problem has persisted into the PDPA and post-2001 periods, systematically obstructing government stability and performance.

Fifth and finally, this study informs the literature on international intervention. It is well known that many coalition interventions, and to a lesser extent, UN interventions in the developing world have not been successful.[16] But it is not clearly understood why some interventions are relatively successful while many are not. Existing explanations tend to explain the dearth of successful interventions in terms of culture: intervening states or organizations do not know enough about the country in which they get involved.[17] Specifically, foreign countries or organizations do not understand indigenous institutions, customs, and historical legacies, and, as a consequence, they often devise or implement policies in ways that further destabilize the target country. This study suggests that this line of reasoning has very little validity in the case of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union and United States, for example, had little knowledge about the details of Afghan society and politics. In both instances, however, decision-makers understood the critical causes of intervention failure to be problems as they materialized, yet temporarily

[15]For an important exception, see Shahrani 2002.

[16]For a comprehensive perspective of these interventions see Dobbins, S. G. Jones, et al. 2005; Dobbins, McGinn, et al. 2003.

[17]For example, see Stewart and Knaus 2011.

ignored them until they had become insurmountable. This does not mean that intervention can necessarily work in the future. But, as will be demonstrated in the case studies, it implies that when intervening powers enter a target country without identifying a minimal set of ending conditions and a strategy of getting there, the outcome is usually failure. When intervening organizations have adopted discrete objectives and devised a realistic strategy of obtaining them, as has typically been the case with UN-led campaigns, intervention has usually resulted in relative stabilization and reconstruction of the target country.[18]

1.3 Contributions to Practice

This dissertation is also relevant to practices of international intervention and development. It generates three separate sets of implications. First, this study suggests that effective external institution building depends on the reconciliation of security and development interests that major donors, especially the United States, possess in the recipient country. This is clearly visible in Afghanistan, where each of the Soviet Union and the United States did not identify an end state for Afghanistan before or immediately after intervening in the country. As a consequence, both powers pursued security and development aims that were fundamentally incompatible with one another. Moscow pursued a peacetime economic strategy in Afghanistan while engaging in a heavily coercive war and supporting a party at war with itself. A decade after the fall of the PDPA regime, Washington would pursue a selective counter-terrorism mission in Afghanistan while ignoring the development of indigenous institutional capabilities and long-term economic priorities in the initial years of the post-Bonn period. The major implication of all of this is that any intervention should be preceded by the identification of an end goal and the external and internal impediments to achieving donor objectives. External interveners improvise more than is commonly appreciated, and when they improvise they tend to fail.

Second, this study shows that external sponsors can be most effective when they proactively support the development or continuation of political alignments that cut across ethnicity, region, or political affiliation. These alignments are usually possible for only limited windows of time. Under conditions of partial meritocratization in 1950s and 1960s Afghanistan, the decision to

[18] Dobbins, S. G. Jones, et al. 2005.

forestall the formation of political parties backfired because it obstructed the regulation of elite competition and identification of critical national objectives. Five decades later, limited international engagement in the years that immediately followed the ouster of the Taliban contributed to AIA chairman Karzai's decision to pursue personalist governance over a more programmatic set of policies. In both of these instances, the observed outcomes were not inevitable, and international engagement in proactively shaping and promoting programmatic coalitions or policies would likely have increased the probability of such an outcome.

Finally, the study generates insight into the mechanisms by which foreign aid can be more or less effective for developing recipient country institutions. This research shows that the costs of politically motivated, uncoordinated aid can come at the expense of recipient country institutions, especially in aid recipients that are least likely to possess capable institutions. On the one hand, politically motivated and fragmented assistance correlates with greater resources, which may provide real benefits in the form of increased household consumption, government spending, and the transfer of skills. But it also limits the effectiveness of aid, while also increasing opportunities for corruption where the rule of law is already limited. The implication of this finding is, therefore, that donor cooperation in programming, monitoring, and evaluating aid would exhibit extremely high institutional returns in the most weakly institutionalized countries. The precise contours of such an arrangement are clearly beyond the scope of this dissertation. But cooperation among donor organizations would provide for greater donor credibility when working with poorly performing recipients, for improved donor learning, and for the minimization of common costs across donors.

1.4 Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized as follows:

Chapter 2 lays out existing explanations of institutional trajectories and identifies the shortcomings of these explanations. It then outlines a prospective argument that highlights *organizational capital* and *external coherence* as important but understudied determinants of contemporary institutional development. Finally, it proposes a research design that can measure these key variables

and evaluate their prospective impact on institutional outcomes.

Chapter 3 presents the first case study covering the monarchical period of 1929 to 1973 and the republican regime that briefly followed it from 1973 to 1978. This case study shows that the competencies, territorial presence, and control of government institutions expanded significantly during the early and middle monarchical period. However, even as the competencies and territorial presence of Afghan institutions expanded over time, political control over institutions of government began to decline after the 1950s. It then examines changes in elite networks and patterns of foreign assistance to evaluate the main argument of this dissertation. Finally, the chapter includes an assessment of alternative explanations of external warmaking, internal conflict, and ethnicity.

Chapter 4 introduces the second case study of the communist period of 1978 to 1992. This chapter shows that the performance of the PDPA-led bureaucracy and army declined almost immediately after the April 1978 coup d'état. The administration of Dr. Najibullah did not reverse this institutional decline, but temporarily stabilized the political system through the employment of Soviet-supplied patronage. To explain these outcomes, the chapter examines intra-PDPA relations and the role of Soviet resourcing of Afghan civilian and military institutions. It also evaluates alternative arguments of state policy and ideology.

Chapter 5 presents the third and final case study covering the post-Bonn period from 2001 to 2014. This chapter shows that newly reconstructed bureaucratic and security institutions grew in territorial reach and (to a lesser extent) capability during the post-2001 period, but these institutions were were almost immediately hamstrung by personalist forms of recruitment, retention, and promotion practices. It then shows how the post-Bonn coalition politics and the organization of international assistance explain this outcome. Alternative explanations of domestic culture, foreign ignorance, foreign occupation, and political exclusion do not account for institutional outcomes after 2001.

Chapter 6 widens the aperture of this study by quantitatively examining institutional quality

across countries and time, measured using an indicator of public corruption collected by the Varieties of Democracy project. This chapter presents the results of two sets of statistical tests, each separately focused on the organizational capital and external coherence variables. One set of tests examines the impact of organizational capital on institutional quality using cross-sectional and panel data. A second test estimates the impact of donor fragmentation *conditional* on organizational capital.

Chapter 7 concludes the study. This chapter reviews the dissertation's main findings and discusses future avenues of research. It also presents the implications that these findings hold for the future of Afghanistan and for the involvement of the US and the international community in the country. It also discusses broader implications for the future of international intervention and the practice of foreign aid.

2 Understanding Contemporary Institutional Development

The study of institutions is vast. The question of why societies produce government structures more or less capable of making rules, regulating behavior, and enabling economic development has generated a large and complex body of social science research. Along the way, a series of related terms—*state formation*, *political development*, *political order*, *governance*—have originated, all of them effectively concerned with the quality of government institutions. A variety of schools of thought have also developed around this problem, sometimes imperfectly organized into *structural-functionalist*, *rationalist*, *culturalist*, and *institutionalist* approaches to institutional change. Numerous explanations of institutional development and decline have also been introduced, covering much of human history and geography. As a consequence, the present state of knowledge about the causes of contemporary institutional performance across regions and countries is both insightful and bewildering.

This chapter attempts to reduce this complex literature into a much more wieldy set of proximate explanations of institutional development and identify how existing understandings can be improved. It identifies the shortcomings of these explanations and motivates a prospective argument that identifies *organizational capital* and *external coherence* as important but understudied determinants of institutional development in contemporary countries with limited human and material resources. It then outlines a research design that can measure these key variables and evaluate their prospective impact on institutional outcomes.

2.1 Explanations of Institutional Development

This section introduces and evaluates leading explanations of institution building in the comparative politics and political economy literatures. These literatures provide a promising set of answers. However, most of the explanations that they offer are generally limited because they emphasize the demand for institutions—the conditions under which governments are motivated to build capable and efficient military and bureaucratic institutions. However, we largely lack a good theoretical and empirical understanding of the factors that makes institution building less costly and therefore more likely to succeed. This is particularly relevant for contemporary countries that possess limited material and human capital, in which historical causes of institutional strengthening—external warfare or colonialism, for example—no longer occur at the same intensity, while other causes—internal conflict, ideology, ethnicity—do not have the same effects everywhere and at any time. To better understand the possibilities and limitations of the current literature, this section briefly reviews existing explanations of institutional development.

It is important to note that many of these explanations do not fit neatly or exclusively into one or another category. Some studies acknowledge and even emphasize the importance of very different sets of causal factors. But almost all of them privilege some explanations over others. The purpose of this review is to differentiate these explanations from one another while remaining attentive to the various nuances that bring them together.

External Warfare. A prominent body of literature identifies warfare as a leading cause of institution building. This line of research is perhaps most associated with Charles Tilly, who made the argument that external warfare gave rise to the formation of national states in Europe. Tilly showed that warfare motivated medieval European rulers to accumulate greater coercion and capital, producing powerful and enduring military and bureaucratic institutions.[19] A number of other scholars modified Tilly's thesis or extended his analysis to other contexts. These studies found that the impact of military competition on institutional development was contingent on prevailing conditions, including the establishment of university education and constitutionalist practices in medieval Europe,[20] as well as differing strategies of interstate competition adopted by

[19] Tilly 1990; Also see Strayer [1970] 2005.
[20] Ertman 1997.

European and Chinese rulers.[21]

Figure 2.1. *Battle Deaths Per 100,000 People by Conflict Type, 1946-2008*



Source: Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; author's calculations.

While external warfare has been shown to be a powerful determinant of institutional consolidation in some of the most capable contemporary states—China and the European nation-states—its applicability in many contemporary low- and middle-income countries is much more limited. In large expanses of Latin America and Africa, external conflict has either been relatively infrequent or has been associated with institutional decay because it has been accompanied

[21]Hui 2005.

by destructive internal conflict, external intervention, or unfavorable geography.[22] As seen in Figure 2.1, interstate conflicts have become much less common and deadly over time. Since 2001, only two major interstate wars—India-Pakistan and Ethiopia-Eritrea—have occurred. In neither of these cases does it appear that warfare has improved institutional outcomes. In fact, the India-Pakistan conflict has likely made both countries worse off, and in different ways: in India, by diverting attention and resources away from significant development challenges, and in Pakistan, by servicing a military that has made alliances with domestic and external extremist groups, undermining internal security.[23]

Noting the deficit of recurring warfare in large expanses of the developing world, some "bellicist" perspectives have amended the external warfare hypothesis by suggesting that the *threat* of interstate war can effectively catalyze state revenue extraction.[24] However, threat explanations fail to make sense of contemporary countries that face high levels of internal conflict and are situated in "bad neighborhoods." This is clearly the case in Afghanistan, where successive political regimes have faced external or internationalized threats, yet government institutions have not responded favorably by increasing the tax effort, controlling corruption, or prioritizing merit over patronage in government appointments. In fact, cross-national data suggest that interstate rivalry can attenuate state power in the face of civil war. For instance, Thies' findings indicate that, conditional on the prevalence of a civil war, external threats are associated with lower tax ratios.[25]

Internal Threats. Another set of explanations identify internal threats as a determinant of institutional development. These arguments make different predictions about the responses of elites to internal threats. David Waldner argues that the timing of vertical linkages established between political elites and populations is critical. In this account, elite conflicts over the relationship of the state to the economy motivate some sections of the elite to mobilize popular support in favor of their political programs. When state transformation coincided with this process of popular mobilization, as it did in the Middle East, the result was a set of relatively distributive institutions; when state transformation occurred before the need to mobilize popular support, as in East Asia,

[22] Centeno 2003; Herbst 2000.
[23] Nadiri 2014.
[24] Thies 2005, 2007.
[25] Thies 2005, p. 461.

institutions of government became productive.[26] Dan Slater adapts this approach in arguing that the incidence and timing of horizontal linkages among elites determines subsequent institutional trajectories. Drawing on cases from Southeast Asia, Slater argues that the development of urban class conflict before the formation of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes motivated elites to form "protections pacts" that strengthen both regime and government institutions.[27] This resulted in very different institutional trajectories in Southeast Asia. Urban class conflict in 1960s Kuala Lampur, for example, led the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) government to simultaneously consolidate power in state and party institutions, creating durable authoritarian rule; in the Philippines, by contrast, rural rebellions did not directly threaten Manila-based elites, making it easier for "provincial economic elites to handle unrest through local mechanisms of social control—rather than a strengthened central state."[28]

While both of these internal threat accounts make compelling sense of the cases that they aim to explain, they do not specify why elite cooperation emerges in the first place or changes over time, and whether external factors can encourage or constrain elite cooperation. Furthermore, these accounts cannot make sense of cases like Afghanistan, where political elites did not fully pursue popular sector mobilization in response to intra-elite conflict (as in Waldner's account) and where broad and resilient protection pacts did not form (as in Slater's explanation) in response to increasing urban disorder during the turbulent 1960s, when communist and Islamist ideological currents took hold among the university students and other educated classes of Kabul. Internal conflict arguments also do not appear to make much sense of institutional outcomes in contemporary countries with high levels of political violence, as shown in Figure 2.2. Most of these conflicts involved international powers, potentially constraining the ability of elites to cooperate with one another. In internationalized conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, external patronage has shaped the domestic political incentives of elites in ways that have (further) obstructed the possibility of protection pacts. In many cases that have not involved substantial international participation, political violence has destroyed substantially all formal institutions of government (Liberia, Somalia), making credible and comprehensive elite bargains extremely difficult. And in other cases, longstanding, deep seated conflicts over identity

[26] Waldner 1999.
[27] Slater 2010.
[28] Slater 2005, p. 100.

and territory (Sri Lanka, Israel, Myanmar/Burma) may be so intractable that internal conflict arguments may not be relevant.

Figure 2.2. *Cumulative Battle Deaths Per 1,000 People, Internal Conflicts After the Cold War (1990-2008)*



Source: Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; author's calculations.

Ideology. Many social scientists explicitly or implicitly cite ideology, or shared beliefs about politics, society, and economy, as a causal determinant of institutional performance.[29] These accounts argue that ideology can either provide a set of rules that can regulate the behavior of government agents or otherwise provide a set of common ideas that bind together government agents. Ideological explanations identify different types of beliefs—religious, nationalist, class—as important sources of institutional performance. For instance, Philip Gorski argues that Protestant Calvinist beliefs encouraged institutional development by establishing self-discipline within individual believers and enabling institutions of surveillance through which the wider population could be monitored and controlled.[30]

There are a number of problems with the ideology explanation. First, there is some evidence that ideology does not matter in high risk circumstances, when we should expect it to matter

[29]See, for example, Remington 1988; Mann 2012.
[30]Gorski 2003.

more. Shils and Janowitz, in their well known study of the Wehrmacht in World War II, found that "the fighting effectiveness of the vast majority of soldiers in combat depends only to a small extent on their preoccupation with the major political values which might be affected by the outcome of the war.[31] Second, it is not clear how shared ideas, by themselves, influence institutional performance in the more mundane or technical areas of government activity that are critically important to administering territory and formulating effective public policy.[32] Finally, ideology is probably endogenous to the (positive or negative) reactions it generates in society. One can readily see this in Afghanistan, where the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was incrementally watered down in response to the violent resistance that it generated.

State Policy. State policy explanations emphasize the choices and behavior of state institutions. According to these explanations, states can formulate or implement policies that can alternatively transform social relations and identities[33] or generate violent backlash.[34] Eugen Weber vividly demonstrates how state policy can work by showing how the Third Republic reshaped a series of autonomous and heterogenous communities into "Frenchmen" through schooling, road construction, and military service.[35] Other state policy arguments highlight a darker side of state actions. Jeff Goodwin, for instance, shows how states can leave "no other way out" than violent resistance when they engage in arbitrary repression or sponsor unpopular social, economic, and cultural institutions.[36]

Although there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that governments can choose policies that advance or obstruct greater security and economic prosperity, state policy arguments are probably underdetermined. This is because the outcomes of these decisions partly depend on their capacity to implement them. While policy choices are clearly endogenous, similar policies can exhibit different outcomes within and across countries. Land reform is a good example of this. Redistributive land reforms in Taiwan and South Korea during the 1940s and 1950s were

[31] Shils and Janowitz 1948, p. 284.
[32] A good example of this is census administration. One empirical study shows that institutional quality can be measured by the the accuracy of national population censuses, see M. Lee and Zhang 2013.
[33] Miguel 2004.
[34] Baruah 2005; Scott 1998.
[35] Weber 1976.
[36] Goodwin 2001.

relatively successful, whereas repeated efforts to redistribute land ownership in the Philippines have been regarded as failures.[37] Farther afield, in Afghanistan, the attempt to redistribute land holdings in Afghanistan produced a violent backlash not only from interests that stood to lose from the reform (landlords), but also from those in a position to benefit (landless peasantry). The more important question (and the subject of this dissertation), then, is which conditions increase the capacity to carry out substantial reforms.

Ethnicity. Yet another set of explanations identify ethnic composition or polarization as an important predictor of institutional development. These arguments cite the well established negative cross-sectional association between ethnic diversity or polarization, on the one hand, and institutional quality[38] and interpersonal trust, on the other.[39] By restricting cooperation and, at times, directly contributing to conflict, ethnic diversity is thought to limit cooperation within political institutions.

While there is some evidence to suggest that ethnic diversity correlates with weak institutions and limited interpersonal trust across countries, a closer look at this relationship suggests that it is neither precisely measured nor deterministic. Quantitative studies of ethnicity often use time-invariant fractionalization or polarization indices as measures of ethnic difference. These measures are not only of questionable cross-sectional value because of inadequate measurement, but more importantly they fail to capture the many ways in which ethnicity may change in salience across time. This is problematic because there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that ethnic salience is an outcome, not a cause, of the quality of government. William Easterly, for example, finds that ethnic diversity does not correlate with poor growth or economic policies at relatively high levels of institutional quality[40]. Others have shown that cross-ethnic coalition building can correlate with increased public expenditure in poorly institutionalized settings.[41] Existing measure of ethnic diversity are even more problematic if ethnic identities are themselves endogenous to institutional quality: more autonomous, impersonal, and competent government institutions can change the definition of different ethnic identities over time. For example, An-

[37] You 2014.
[38] Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Alesina and Ferrara 2005.
[39] Habyarimana et al. 2009.
[40] Easterly 2001.
[41] Gibson and Hoffman 2013.

dreas Wimmer finds that ethnic diversity is spuriously correlated with public good provision across countries; both contemporary ethnic heterogeneity and low public goods provision are the historical legacy of weakly developed institutions inherited from the past.[42] Likewise, Weber's study of the Third Republic also shows that institution building eroded localist ethnic identities in France over time.[43]

Figures 2.3 and 2.4 provide suggestive evidence that the relationship between ethnicity and institutional quality is relatively tenuous. We can see in Figure 2.3 that ethnic diversity is not a good predictor of ethnic violence: countries with high levels of ethnic diversity frequently do not exhibit violence, whereas in some countries with relatively low levels of ethnic diversity but changes in ethnic polarization across time (for example, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Sri Lanka), governments have either engaged in ethnic violence or have been unable to contain it.

One can also see in Figure 2.3 that institutional quality confounds the relationship between ethnic diversity and violence: almost all cases of ethnic violence have taken place in low-income countries with poor institutions. A closer look at countries that have not experienced ethnic violence indicates, moreover, that the relationship between ethnic diversity and institutional quality is not deterministic. Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of countries, rank-ordered by ethnic diversity, that have not experienced ethnic violence. One can see, here, that while ethnic heterogeneity appears to coincide with poor government, ethnically diverse countries can and often do exhibit high levels of institutional quality.

Colonialism and Geography. Yet another set explanations highlight the long-run impact of colonial legacies and geography on institutions. Studies of the impact of colonialism often find different results across colonizing powers and colonies. Some of these studies find that foreign control undermined the capacity of post-independence states (particularly in Africa),[44] while others studies show that colonialism enhanced the institutional capabilities of successor states

[42] Wimmer 2015; On a related issue, the impact of democracy on ethnic salience, see Reynal-Querol 2002.
[43] Weber 1976.
[44] Mamdani 1996; Young 1994.

Figure 2.3. *Ethnic Fractionalization and Violence, 1990-2008*



Source: Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; author's calculations.

Figure 2.4. *Distribution of Ethnic Fractionalization in Countries Without Ethnic Violence, 1990-2009*



Source: Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; author's calculations.

(especially in East Asia).[45] Yet other studies of colonialism highlight the variable effects of foreign control. Where colonial powers established administrative structures that were extractive, mercantilist, or controlled through intermediaries, they created the conditions for patrimonial successor states; where external powers put in place institutions that were developmental, directly administered, or that exhibited limited mercantilist penetration, relatively accountable and bureaucratic states emerged.[46] Geography arguments take a somewhat similar approach to colonial legacy explanations in their emphasis on long run, cross-sectional effects. These studies explain institutional expansion in terms of the costs of physically regulating territory that is inaccessible and sparsely populated—mountainous terrain, desert regions, and marshlands, for example. When most of the national territory is characterized by inhospitable geographic conditions, governments are less likely develop far-reaching physical and administrative infrastructure.[47]

Both of the colonialism and geography arguments offer plausible explanations for static differences in institutional quality across countries, or for the pace of institutional development over time. Negative colonial legacies and bad geography can effectively constrain countries from taking off or lock them into cycles of political instability and economic underdevelopment. But these explanations clearly cannot explain how institutions develop from one decade to the next—across different government administrations and local and international economic environments. While difficult geography and colonial rule have undoubtedly influenced successor states in durable ways, both of these time-invariant factors are unable to fully account for temporal changes in institutional development after colonialism and geography are taken into account.

2.2 Developing Institutions: Organizational Capital and External Alignment

A number of recent and prominent studies have sought to explain why some government institutions generate prosperity over the long run, while others do not. One study by Douglass North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry Weingast (NWW), distinguishes between "natural states,"

[45] Kohli 2004; Yang 2004.

[46] See Acemoglu, Johnson, and J. A. Robinson 2001; Lange 2009; Lange, Mahoney, and Vom Hau 2006; Mahoney 2010.

[47] Carneiro 1970; Herbst 2000.

in which a dominant coalition of elites restricts access to valuable resources and activities, and "open access orders," where resources are generally available to all citizens.[48] Open access orders tend to be more prosperous because they consistently provide for peaceful political and economic competition in the face of shocks of various kinds—relative prices, demographics, growth, and technology, for example. In another recent work, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (AR) make a distinction between "extractive" and "inclusive" states.[49] In a somewhat similar vain to NWW, AR make the argument that inclusive economic and political institutions provide incentives and opportunities for growth through broad participation and public goods. Both of these descriptive accounts are useful because they identify which kinds of institutions are expected to generate growth and the broad historical forces that have tended to produce these institutions. However, as Francis Fukuyama observes, they do not indicate which specific components of institutions matter more or less, and how these components might be able to influence economic and political outcomes.[50] As a consequence, we do not have a clear idea of which specific kinds of developments (changes in the rule of law, political participation, for instance) among which constituencies (political elites or the middle classes, for example) should matter for improving institutional performance.

If these explanations do not make sense of much of the empirical record of contemporary institution building, or otherwise do not identify specific institutional outcomes (or determinants) that we can observe and measure, then which factors can explain contemporary changes in institutional quality? Before doing so, it is useful to identify two basic reasons why developing minimally effective government institutions in contemporary developing contexts is so difficult. One reason is that governments have lower capacity in some geographical and issue areas than others, as suggested above. In some territories, usually those that are sparsely populated and far from urban centers, governments have less information and resources available to establish security or carry out development programs. This is especially the case for issue areas that involve a great deal of information and effort.

Second, and perhaps more problematically, the political elites that manage and operate gov-

[48] North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009.

[49] Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson 2012**footcite** , 2006.

[50] Francis Fukuyama, Acemoglu and Robinson on Why Nations Fail, *The American Interest*, accessed on January 18, 2016.http://www.the-american-interest.com/2012/03/26/acemoglu-and-robinson-on-why-nations-fail.

ernment institutions are faced with the dilemma of self-regulation, particularly when the rule of law is limited or non-existent. As John Padgett observes, "[t]he contradiction, in state building or in any organization, is between judge and boss: founders cannot be both at once."[51] While political elites are occasionally able to develop institutions that can carry out complex security or development interventions, they are much less frequently capable of managing themselves. Political leaderships have strong incentives to undermine or suppress rival elites, often through the politicization of government institutions, through the recruitment and retention of loyalists, and the distribution of preferential public goods and policies to allies.

How, then, can we understand the conditions under which institutions can become more capable in the absence of the rule of law, and when faced with limited human and material resources, uneven territorial control, and strong incentives to distribute offices, contracts, and services to political allies? I argue that institutional development depends on the *organizational capital* available to government institutions and the *external coherence* of the donor countries and organizations that support them. The ability of government institutions to manage elites and information has a significant impact on the performance of institutions. When institutions are insulated from elite polarization and embedded in society, they are more likely to recruit and promote officials on the basis of merit, to coordinate information more effectively, and to formulate and implement mutually agreeable policies at the grass roots level. Organizational capital, in turn, interacts with external support to determine whether resources can upgrade institutions over time. When external assistance is allocated in service of an achievable end state in the aid receiving country, and when it is coordinated among different external sponsors, there is a greater probability that political elites will commit these resources to stated goals and that this assistance can be monitored for effectiveness by external sponsors. Below, I separately explain why and how organizational capital and external alignment affect institutional development.

2.2.1 Organizational Capital

The characteristics of interpersonal networks are a key determinant of many different social, political, and economic outcomes. Social or political networks, for example, have shaped whether

[51] See Padgett and Ansell 1993, p. 1260.

individuals participate in "high risk" activism,[52] whether insurgent groups stick together or fall apart,[53] and whether welfare states contract or expand.[54] In the economic realm, interpersonal networks matter for finding employment, for transmitting peer effects in education,[55] and for encouraging spillover development effects on neighboring geographical areas.[56] A growing body of literature has found that the characteristics of political networks have also been important for processes of institutional development. Atul Kohli found that the internal structure of state parties was an important determinant of their effectiveness in reducing poverty,[57] and Gerald Easter showed that close interpersonal relationships were an important determinant of state building efforts during the early Soviet era.[58]

While we know that network features matter for institutions, we do not know which specific features are relatively important for institutional outcomes, and how they influence these outcomes. This section outlines a key variable, which I call *organizational capital*, defined as the ability of government institutions to organize elites and information in service of achieving government priorities.[59] As will become clear, organizational capital describes the relationships between government institutions and two key political constituencies: political elites and local social communities. These relationships correspond closely with the "autonomy" and "embeddedness" characteristics that David Evans cites as important predictors of institutional performance.[60] Organizational capital can emerge and evolve through mechanisms such as party organizations, military campaigns, and even kinship and friendships. These mechanisms do not fit neatly into the Weberian ideal type of development, but they can establish the basis for capable institutions by minimizing costly efforts to gather information and make decisions across large groups of ordinary and educated classes of people, and by reducing incentives to place loyalists

[52] McAdam 1986.
[53] Staniland 2014.
[54] C.-S. Lee 2012.
[55] Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou 2009.
[56] Acemoglu, Garc/'ia-Jimeno, and J. A. Robinson 2015.
[57] Kohli 1989.
[58] Easter 2007.
[59] As this definition suggests, organizational capital is not the same concept as *social capital*. While definitions of social capital vary, they share in common an emphasis on connections between individuals, not necessarily between government structures and political constituencies. Robert Putnam, in his well known work on social capital in modern Italy, defines the concept as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions." Francis Fukuyama takes a similar approach: "social capital is an instantiated informal norm that promotes co-operation between two or more individuals." See Fukuyama 2001, p. 7; Putnam 1994, p. 167.
[60] See Evans 1995.

at multiple levels of the government. While the origins of organizational capital can vary across countries, it is ultimately a necessary determinant of institutional development in settings of limited rule of law and human and material resources. This is because governments with organizational capital can coordinate information and reduce the necessity to distribute political positions and targeted economic policies to allies.

How can one compare the degree of organizational capital across countries? I argue that organizational capital varies mainly along two dimensions. First, *elite cooperation* insulates institutions from politicization and enables them to to coordinate information more effectively. When elites cooperate with one another—whether because of robust party building, common social and political experiences, or other mechanisms of consultation—they are more likely to tolerate or actively develop institutions that pursue compatible agendas and that recruit and evaluate cadres on the basis of merit. By contrast, when elites are highly polarized, then government institutions are incapable of arriving at decisions and tend to hire personnel based on loyalty or factional identification. This type of elite organization also tends to produce rival government institutions that do not frequently share information and, in more extreme circumstances, actively undermine one another.

Second, the *social embdeddedness* of bureaucratic and military personnel determines the ability of these institutions to implement policies and programs. When government institutions are rooted in surrounding society, they are more capable of formulating appropriate policies and of collecting information about the constraints to implementing such policies. Embedded institutions tend to possess personnel that are relatively informed, responsive, and locally accepted, allowing them to carry out simple and complex development interventions effectively and cultivate information about potential threats. Unembedded institutions, by contrast, are unable to collect basic information about the areas in which they operate and are treated with suspicion, impeding development programming and implementation as well as the establishment of security.

These two dimensions of organizational capital give rise to four categories of institutions shown in Figure 2.5. For each combination of elite cooperation and social embeddedness, we have a different prediction about the type of institutions that will prevail. When political elites tend

Figure 2.5. *Dimensions of Organizational Capital*

SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS	ELITE COOPERATION: Contentious	ELITE COOPERATION: Cooperative
Embedded	*Peak Coalitional*	*Encompassing*
Unembedded	*Atomized*	*Elitist*

to cooperate with one another and government personnel are embedded in society, then institutions are *encompassing*. In countries with encompassing institutions, elite cooperation provides for relatively meritocratic and autonomous institutions, and embedded government personnel enable institutions to be more informed, responsive, and administratively competent. In these cases, civilian institutions are able to perform complicated development interventions and armies monopolize the use of force. If political elites tend to work together through institutional or non-institutional mechanisms, but government bureaucrats and military personnel possess relatively weak ties with society, institutions are *elitist*. In cases with elitist institutions, elite cooperation enables increasingly meritocratic institutions, but government officials lack information and relationships with local social communities. These institutions are capable of selectively accomplishing temporary, large scale economic interventions or overcoming major military challenges, but lack the ability to proactively prevent, resolve, and follow through on routine development and military challenges. If political elites consistently fail to cooperate with one another but civilian and military personnel are deeply rooted in society, then institutions are *peak coalitional*. Peak coalitional institutions are capable of collecting information and effectively administering programs in local areas, but are often vulnerable to politicization and gridlock stemming from elite conflict. Finally, when elite relations are contentious and the bureaucracy and military do not possess strong roots in society, then institutions are *atomized*. Atomized institutions are highly politicized structures that lack the capacity to understand and respond to basic development and security challenges.

If organizational capital matters, then it has to explain changes in institutional quality across

time. How, then, does organizational capital evolve? The sources of organizational change are clearly rooted in histories that are idiosyncratic across developing countries. Varying combinations of endogenous factors (colonial legacies, geography, capital accumulation, mass education, political leadership, learning, etc.) as well as exogenous shocks (military conflict, economic crises, natural disasters) provide for different historical legacies, and it is therefore very difficult to make any generalizations about the sources of organizational capital across countries. However, we will see that organizational capital in Afghanistan, when it has emerged, has developed through political brokerage using familial and other interpersonal ties. In most other contexts, however, it is often political parties that can organize different interests into coherent political programs, reducing the costly effort of coordinating information and placing loyalists in political offices. Nonetheless, as the subsequent chapters show, one dynamic that is likely to be common across multiple contexts has been the emergence of young, newly empowered elite into the political system. The problem of how to incorporate new generations of elites is one that confronts familial networks, political parties, and other organizations, presenting a new set of organizational possibilities for government institutions.

2.2.2 External Coherence

While organizational capital provides a domestic source of institutional development, external support, often but not exclusively in the form of economic assistance, can serve as an important outside driver of institutional capabilities. In South Korea, perhaps the most impressive example of aid effectiveness, external assistance accelerated rapid institutional and economic gains made in the 1960s. In more recent examples, including postwar Mozambique and El Salvador, aid has exerted a positive albeit less exceptional impact on development outcomes. However, in several other countries that received relatively high levels of foreign assistance, including Afghanistan, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, aid expenditure has often been wasteful (whether because of poor aid programming or limited human and physical capital) or has provided opportunities for patronage or corruption (primarily because of limited mechanisms of accountability).[61]

A number of studies try to resolve these divergent outcomes by conditioning aid on the poli-

[61] See for example, Hemmer and Grinstead 2015, *UPI* "EU Questions Aid Effectiveness for DRC," October 1, 2013.

cies and institutions of aid receiving countries.[62] The problem with these studies is that they treat recipient country institutions or policies as an exogenous factor in the process that links aid and growth. In doing so, they ignore the potential effects of aid on recipient country government institutions themselves. A small but growing section of the aid literature takes a different approach by explicitly making recipient institutional quality endogenous. These studies examine the effect of foreign aid on various dimensions of institutional performance or related outcomes such as civil conflict, but taken together the findings raise more questions than answers. In some of this research, aid correlates with less corruption,[63] improved governance,[64] and a lower incidence of civil conflict,[65] although some these effects appear to be short-lived and depend on the initial conditions of the aid recipient. In other studies, aid attenuates the quality of government institutions[66] and in specific circumtances can *increase* the incidence of conflict.[67] These divergent results are not due to a differential allocation of aid across countries with varying institutional quality: countries with corrupt governments do not receive less foreign aid than those with relatively strong institutions.[68]

One line of research attempts to resolve these contradictory findings by explicitly conditioning aid on the motivations and practices of donors (usually based on donor motivations during or after the Cold War),[69] the quality of government institutions of recipients, and the type of aid expenditure.[70] Simone Dietrich, for example, finds that donors differentially bypass recipient governments in favor of nongovernmental organizations, multilateral organizations, and private development contractors,[71] potentially improving immediate development outcomes while cre-

[62] For notable examples, see Denizer, Kaufmann, and Kraay Forthcoming; Rajan and Subramanian 2007; Burnside and Dollar 2000; For a useful overview of the aid-growth literature, see Mekasha and Tarp 2013; Arndt, S. Jones, and Tarp 2010.

[63] Tavares 2003; Busse and Gröning 2009; Okada and Samreth 2012.

[64] Aronow, Sovey Carnegie, and Marinov 2012; S. Jones and Tarp 2016, Jones and Tarp are more concerned with "institutional inputs or rules of the game (e.g., democracy, rule of law)...than "institutional outputs such as bureaucratic efficiency, regulatory capacity and corruption." The outcome variable in this study is consequently not the capabilities of bureaucratic or other government institutions, but rather levels of democracy, the number of veto players over political decisions, executive constraints, political terror, and judicial independence.

[65] Nielsen et al. 2011; Savun and Tirone 2012.

[66] See, for example, Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Knack 2001.

[67] Nunn and Qian Forthcoming.

[68] Alesina and Weder 2002.

[69] Several studies find that the effect of aid on growth and democratization increased substantially after the conclusion of the Cold War, likely because bilateral donors could more credibly threaten to reduce their assistance if recipient countries did not pursue economic and political reform. See Bearce and Tirone 2010; Dunning 2004.

[70] For a useful review, see J. Wright and Winters 2010.

[71] Dietrich Forthcoming.

ating parallel aid delivery structures. Similarly, Stephen Knack and his co-authors demonstrate that bilateral and multilateral donors vary dramatically in terms of their level of recipient specialization, alignment with recipients' national development strategies, selectivity of aid recipients, their use of ineffective channels (tied aid, food aid, and technical assistance), and other characteristics that have implications for aid effectiveness.[72] Among recipients, aid effectiveness also varies widely. In developing democracies, the impact of aid on public goods provision varies with recipient characteristics, including the degree of personalism in executive institutions[73] and natural resource wealth.[74] Notably, there is evidence that aid effectiveness does not depend on regime type. In both autocracies[75] and developing democracies[76] foreign aid has been associated with greater patronage provision, indicating that external assistance can be used to extend leadership or government survival. Yet it is not clear which factor or combination of factors makes some recipients, whether autocratic or democratic, more or less likely to use foreign aid as patronage.

While the foreign aid literature offers useful insights into the factors that make development assistance more or less effective, there is clearly a great deal that we do not know about the specific donor and recipient conditions under which aid is expected to positive or negatively affect government institutions. We also do not have much information about the specific mechanisms that connect aid to outcomes. As Francois Bourguignon and Mark Sundberg argue, the "causality chain [linking aid flows to development outcomes] has been largely ignored and as a consequence the relationship between aid and development has been handled mostly as a kind of 'black box.'"[77] Given what we already know about one potential recipient-related cause of institutional performance, organizational capital, how then can we systematically think about what donor-related factors matter for aid effectiveness? I argue that two types of donor characteristics matter.

First, the level of *resource alignment* indicates whether the economic and development goals of donors countries and organizations are consistent with the political and security objectives that they may possess in a recipient country. This characteristic describes whether donors design

[72] Knack, Rogers, and Eubank 2011; Also see Easterly and Pfutze 2008.
[73] J. Wright 2010.
[74] Girod 2011; This line of research relates to the larger literature on "rentier states." See Beblawi and Luciani 1987.
[75] Ahmed 2010.
[76] Briggs 2014.
[77] Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007, p. 316.

and carry out development assistance in a way that is compatible with the political objectives in the recipient country. In general, when donors align their development and political objectives in a recipient country, these objectives and the strategy behind them can be readily reconciled, consequently making aid more effective. In these circumstances, donors can identify their end goals and evaluate whether the inputs and processes that underlie them are working. When donor development and political objectives are not aligned, then the ultimate objectives and strategies of their development assistance may be working at cross purposes, and therefore cannot be easily resolved.

Second, the level of *donor coordination* describes whether donors can jointly orchestrate individual aid programs so as to prevent or mitigate duplication, aid siphoning, and conflicting development priorities and strategies. If aid is coordinated among major donors, then donors are more able to track one another's aid programming and expenditure, making costly duplication, patronage, and incompatible aid programming less likely at the aggregate level. If external support, however, is poorly coordinated, then the resulting absence of information about the formulation and allocation of development assistance at the aggregate level makes duplication, patronage, and incompatible development assistance more likely. These two dimensions of external support give rise to four types of development assistance shown in Figure 2.6.

Figure 2.6. *Dimensions of External Support*

Resource Alignment	Donor Coordination: **Coordinated**	Donor Coordination: **Uncoordinated**
High	*Developmental*	*Stovepiped*
Low	*Directionless*	*Detrimental*

If major donors possess aligned development and political objectives and coordinate their assistance programs, then external support is *developmental*. Developmental aid is expected to increase the institutional capabilities of the recipient country. If donors have aligned development

and political objectives but do not coordinate their aid, then external support is *stove-piped*. In this situation, donors have an identifiable and coherent set of objectives, but their assistance programs are exposed to corruption and redundancy. If donor objectives are not aligned but aid programs are coordinated, then external support is *directionless*. While donors can efficiently deploy assistance in this situation to accomplish short-term development objectives, they are unable to solve the larger problem of specifying an achievable end state and charting a path to it. Finally, when donors' development and political objectives are not aligned and their assistance programs are not coordinated, as is the case in contemporary Afghanistan, then external support is *detrimental*, with external support oriented toward short-term objectives and vulnerable to duplication and corruption.

Given these different forms of external support, how do external resources interact with organizational capital? Organization is an indispensable source of institutional development, and no form of external support can develop institutions without it. However, different types of external support can reinforce the impact of organizational strengthening or decay. Politically-motivated and fragmented external support can accentuate the negative impact of declining organizational capital by increasing opportunities for corruption and concealing poor individual and departmental performance from close scrutiny. Likewise, development-oriented and coordinated donors can augment the positive effect of increasing organizational capital by prioritizing the institutional objectives that have the greatest possibility and rewarding the individuals and departments that are most able to carry them out. External support, however, is unlikely to be able to reverse the effects of organizational consolidation or decay. Where organizational capital is minimal, no degree of donor alignment and coordination is going to be able to significantly improve the quality of the bureaucracy and military. And where organizational capital is quite high, misaligned and uncoordinated external support will remain manageable because domestic institutions in these cases can bundle and allocate aid toward high development objectives.

2.3 Case Selection, Methods, and Data

This dissertation evaluates the impact of organizational capital and external coherence on institutional quality. Like almost all correlates of institutional quality, organizational capital and

external alignment are highly endogenous—the processes by which they develop are likely correlated with other causal factors (observed and unobserved), and may also be shaped by prior realizations of the outcome variable, institutional quality. This is problematic because it makes it difficult to disentangle the independent effect of any causal factor from other relationships involved in the process by which these data are generated. This is especially the case when analyzing the "big structures, large processes, huge comparisons" that underlie institutional change. Institutions are influenced by initial conditions, feedback effects, and exogenous shocks of various kinds.[78] To more reliably evaluate the effects of organizational capital and external coherence, this dissertation triangulates between two methodological strategies, one focused on gaining theoretical *depth* and the other on empirical *breadth*. First, the dissertation will draw on a series of historical episodes from single country, Afghanistan, in order to develop and closely evaluate the proposed argument developed above along with alternative explanations of institutional development. Second, it tests the theory on a wider set of observations, drawing on country-level quantitative data between 1975 and 2014.

2.3.1 Case Selection, or Why Afghanistan?

It is important to first explain why Afghanistan, instead of other cases, is the primary country of study for this project. In many ways, Afghanistan is not typical of other weakly institutionalized developing countries. Unlike many contemporary developing states, Afghanistan is a former imperial country that increasingly lost territory over time, eventually developing into a buffer state located between the Russian and British empires during the 20th century. It has experienced one of the longest series of internationalized conflicts in modern history, involving both great powers and regional states. And over the past century, it has been ruled by a particularly wide variety of regimes, including a traditional monarchy, a revolutionary socialist regime, an Islamist movement, and the present day dispensation of former royalists, mujahideen leaders, and PDPA figures, as well as a series of expatriate technocrats.

Nonetheless, there are at least three strong reasons to study Afghanistan. First, Afghanistan has experienced significant changes in the quality of its institutions, even if the upper bounds of its institutional development never reached the level of a contemporary middle-income country.

[78] Tilly 1984.

Figure 2.7. *GDP Per Capita, 1950-1995*



Sources: Fry 1974; United Nations Statistical Division 2014; author's calculations.
Note: Vertical red lines (approximately) demarcate Daoud coup in July 1973, the PDPA coup in April 1978, and the fall of the PDPA regime in 1992. GDP per capita figures were computed using the real GDP time series from Fry (1974) for 1935 to 1973, and the real GDP time series from the UN Statistical Division (2014) for 1974 to 2013. Given the high level of measurement error in the UN real GDP estimates during the PDPA period, I estimate changes in real GDP (from the UN time series) by smoothing out the amount of real output destroyed under PDPA rule for the period of 1981 to 1994.

One can see this in the long run trend of per capita income in Afghanistan, which serves as an imperfect but informative proxy for its institutional development. As shown in Figure 2.7, per capita income in Afghanistan advanced incrementally throughout the 20th century, but rapidly reversed in response to the internal and external political shocks that came to fruition in the middle 1970s. After the coup of April 1978, income rapidly declined to a relative low during the collapse of the state apparatus in 1992 and ensuing civil war. And after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, political institutions in Afghanistan made some initial gains, largely because of high aid expenditure, but did not produce durable and merit-oriented institutions of government or development planning in Afghanistan. Today, the state of the government and economy are highly dependent on the quality and quantity of foreign aid.

As will be seen in the case studies, the time variation in per capita income in Afghanistan generally coincides with changes in the quality of its institutions, as summarized in Table 2.1. Under monarchical rule, the upper echelons of the bureaucracy became increasingly capable and the military would ultimately establish a monopoly over the use of force over the national territory. However, as Afghan government institutions increased in capability and reach, their capacity to plan and implement development programs, manage personnel, and contain urban conflicts declined. After the Saur coup of April 1978 brought to power the Soviet-aligned People's Democratic Power of Afghanistan (PDPA), the incremental institutional gains of the prior century rapidly eroded. Faced with declining security, the exodus of much of the intelligentsia, and intra-PDPA infighting, Afghan institutions would undergo a severe contraction in capability and reach, while generating instability in urban and rural society through unpopular redistributive policies and highly indiscriminate forms of coercion. And after 2001, reconstituted bureaucratic and military institutions expanded substantially in capabilities and territorial reach, but were hamstrung by personalist forms of recruitment, retention, and promotion practices. This development created the conditions for growing instability after 2006, when increasing patronage appointments began to generate a pronounced level of government corruption and incompetence.

Table 2.1. *Changes in Institutional Quality by Time Period, Afghanistan*

	Potential Explanations					Institutional Outcomes		
Time Period	External Threats	Internal Threats	Compatible Ideology	Compatible Policy	Ethnic Cooperation	Capabilities	Reach	Effects
1929-1953	◓	◓	●	●	●	**Moderate expansion**	**Large expansion**	**Increasing stability**
1953-1963	●	◓	●	●	●	**Large expansion**	**Moderate expansion**	**Increasing stability**
1963-1978	●	●	●	●	●	**Minimal expansion**	**Moderate expansion**	Decreasing stability
1978-1986	●	●	○	○	◓	Large contraction	Large contraction	Decreasing stability
1986-1992	●	●	◓	◓	◓	Large contraction	Moderate contraction	*Temporary stability*
2001-2006	●	●	●	◓	◓	**Moderate expansion**	**Moderate expansion**	**Increasing stability**
2007-2014	●	●	●	◓	◓	Minimal contraction	Moderate contraction	Decreasing stability

Second, as seen in Table 2.1, existing explanations do not make sense of institutional development in Afghanistan, suggesting that it constitutes a deviant case. As will be shown in the following chapters, warfare, internal conflict, ideology, state policy, and ethnicity did not make sense of the trajectory of Afghan institutions. This absence of satisfactory explanations provides the opportunity for theory development. As Jason Seawright and John Gerring emphasize, deviant cases can be used to develop "probe for new—but as yet unspecified—explanations"[79] and "discover new information about causal pathways connecting the main independent with the main dependent variable."[80]

Third, each of the regimes studied in this dissertation began with sudden, plausibly exogenous shocks, reducing the problem of reverse causality. Because each of these regimes rapidly formed with new or reshuffled political actors and external sponsors, the subsequent development of government institutions can be attributed to the two causal factors of interest here. This an advantageous set of historical circumstances because it does not need to rely on the identifying assumption that organizational capital and external alignment strongly depended on prior institutional development.

2.3.2 Research Design

The research design of this dissertation consists of two components. First, it includes a deeply researched set of case studies from Afghanistan. These case studies are primarily intended to gain theoretical *depth*. As discussed above, these historical episodes provide favorable conditions—unexplained variation in institutional quality and exogenous turnover of ruling coalitions—for ruling out existing explanations and developing new ones. More specifically, the cases will try to answer why the monarchy led by Nader Khan and his relatives became more capable over the course of the 20th century at the same time as they became more exposed to urban conflict; why the institutional capabilities inherited by the PDPA regime declined so rapidly, and why the regime stayed in power longer than most observers expected; and why reconstructed government institutions in post-2001 Afghanistan failed to develop independent institutional capabilities in the military and economic fields, despite receiving extraordinary levels of assistance and diverse

[79]Seawright and Gerring 2008, p. 302.
[80]Seawright 2016, p. 504.

participation from the international community. Together, answering these puzzles helps to calibrate the theory presented in this chapter.

The case studies follow a similar format. First, I describe the trajectory of government institutions that perform two general sets of functions: security provision and development planning. In doing so, I focus on three features of institutional quality that are described in greater detail below: the human and material *capabilities* of security and development institutions, the territorial *reach* of these institutions, and the stabilizing or destabilizing *effects* of these institutions on the societal communities with which they interact. Next, I evaluate the two hypothesized determinants of institutional quality outlined above, organizational capital and external coherence. Finally, I assess whether the more plausible alternative explanations described in this chapter can make sense of the institutional trajectories taken in Afghanistan during each of the time periods covered in the case studies.

Second, the research design includes a series of cross-country statistical analyses of the effects of organizational capital and external alignment on institutional quality. These statistical analyses test the theory calibrated in the case studies on a set of country-level panel data between 1975 and 2014. Specifically, I conduct two sets of tests, each separately centered on the organizational capital and donor fragmentation variables. Because both of these explanatory factors are highly endogenous, each set of tests attempts to identify the exogenous variation in the explanatory factor. I first estimate the long run impact of organizational capital on institutions drawing on a cross-section and a panel dataset of developing countries from 1975 to 2014. I then attempt to identify the effect of donor fragmentation on institutional development *conditional* on the preceding level of organizational capital, drawing on an instrumental variables two-stage least squares (IV 2SLS) strategy.

2.3.3 Measurements

In this section, I define how the key variables are measured and identify the sources of data for these variables and other information that appears in the dissertation. I pay special attention to defining the outcome variable, institutional quality, which has been used in a variety of contexts and has consequently come to suggest a number of different characteristics. I then proceed to outline how I measure organizational capital and external support.

Institutional Quality. Institutional quality has been measured in many different ways. Social scientists have measured institutional capacity in terms of bureaucratic quality,[81] taxation,[82] extent of direct rule,[83] property rights protection,[84] economic freedom,[85] and political instability.[86] One reason for these discrepant approaches is that institutions are inherently multifaceted.[87] Government institutions are complicated organizations that follow different procedures, draw on different capabilities, and generate many types of output. For most contemporary countries, government institutions are present in almost every aspect of modern life, so it is not surprising that social scientists think about and measure them in different ways.

It is nonetheless important to identify a common set of criteria that will allow us distinguish more from less capable institutions. As a starting point, I define institutional capacity following Michael Mann's concept of *infrastructural power*: "the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm."[88] Importantly, this definition is strictly concerned with the ability of government institutions to execute programs and policies, not the degree to which these institutions are accountable to society—what Mann calls *despotic power*.[89] This dissertation is therefore not concerned with explaining the expansion of political participation, or another important correlate of institutional development—the rule of law. Both of these outcomes of democracy and rule of law are clearly related to institutional development. The quality of government frequently coevolves with and responds to political participation and legal accountability, making it difficult to disentangle the effects of these correlates from that of the causal factors studied here—organizational capital and foreign aid. Democratization, for example, can influence the quality of government in negative or positive ways. Greater political participation can undercut the autonomy of government institutions when politicians place demands on the staffing decisions of government agencies and

[81] Rauch and Evans 2000.
[82] Thies 2004.
[83] Lange 2009; Lange and Balian 2008.
[84] Acemoglu, Johnson, and J. A. Robinson 2001.
[85] Goldsmith 2001.
[86] Barro 1991.
[87] Fukuyama 2013.
[88] Mann 1984, p. 113; Fukuyama uses a similar definition when he defines institutional capacity as the "government's ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not. Fukuyama 2013, p. 350.
[89] Specifically, despotic power is the "range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups." Mann 1984, p. 113.

beneficiaries of government programs. Alternatively, greater political participation could potentially improve channels of accountability, compelling government institutions to address causes of underperformance. Greater adherence to the rule of law can also clearly influence the performance of institutions, for example by inhibiting government corruption or expropriation.

While this research is strictly concerned with explaining the development of institutional capabilities, it nonetheless considers the impact of greater political participation and legal accountability where these factors intersect with organizational capital in particular. The role of political participation is especially relevant for the monarchical and post-2001 periods. We will see that the development of informal political parties under monarchy presented a unique challenge to the capacity of the Afghan leadership (royal and otherwise) to rationalize and regulate differences among political elites, particularly those of moderate orientation. We will also see that democracy interacts with organizational capital in the reconstruction of government institutions after 2001. Specifically, the design of the electoral system generated incentives to organize politics around politicians, especially AIA chairman (later president) Hamid Karzai, instead of around shared objectives. This had a perverse downstream impact on institutional development (and the rule of law), as personal connections came to dominate merit in staffing security and development institutions at both the central and provincial levels.

How, then, do we go about measuring infrastructural power? Hillel Soifer provides a useful description of three different dimensions of infrastructural power: *capabilities*, *reach*, and *effects*.[90] The capabilities approach describes the fiscal or military resources available to central institutions for implementing development and military interventions in society, while the reach approach measures the presence and activity of government institutions across the national territory. The effects approach is less straightforward. Under this approach, government actions that influence the behavior or even identities of societal actors provide evidence of institutional capacity. This includes intentional government efforts to influence society—examples include the impact of Tanzanian educational institutions on the formation of national identity in Tanzania[91] or the effects of rural roads on the technology adoption behavior of farming households.[92] Just as importantly, the effects approach includes the *unintentional* consequences of government institutions on soci-

[90] See Soifer 2008.
[91] Miguel 2004.
[92] Aggarwal 2015.

Table 2.2. *Case Study Measurements*

Dimension	Observable Implications
Institutional Capabilities	• Quantity and quality of revenue raising, administrative, and military capabilities • Importance of merit in recruitment, retention, and performance evaluation
Institutional Reach	• Presence and quality of government personnel and services across key provincial centers • Political and military authority of government institutions in rural territories of key provinces and border areas
Institutional Effects	• Intended effects of institutions on the behavior of societal actors • Unintended impacts of institutions on society and economy

etal actors. Some institutions, for example, may be able to carry out large and effective military and economic interventions, but if they are unable to contain intense conflicts within major urban centers, then they are clearly less skillful than these interventions by themselves might suggest. For other, more dysfunctional institutions, corrupt or discriminatory practices can generate large-scale rebellions that may drain these institutions of the people and economic resources that they require. These unintentional effects are especially relevant in countries with less visible sources of institutional weakness.

I qualitatively measure institutional quality using each of the capabilities, reach, and effects approaches. These measurements, shown in Table 2.2, are relatively straightforward. With respect to institutional capabilities, I evaluate the quantity and quality of key government functions such as taxation, administration, and military activities. To measure institutional reach, I assess the performance of civilian and military institutions across territory. And when evaluating institutional effects, I study the intentional and unintentional impacts of institutional developments or actions on society and the economy. This entails qualitatively examining the intentional effects of government institutions on the perceptions and behavior of societal actors and on economic per-

formance. It also includes studying the unintended consequences of government institutions—for example, rural rebellions against the government, urban conflicts within the educated classes, ineffective development interventions, and other unanticipated (and largely negative) outcomes of government actions.

Organizational Capital. As defined in Section 2.2, organizational capital is defined by two dimensions: elite cooperation and social embeddedness. These are inherently difficult characteristics to observe and evaluate. Interactions between political elites tend to take place behind closed doors and often become observable only during crises. Meanwhile, embeddedness is difficult to reliably observe—a partial reading of the evidence might indicate that government institutions are more or less connected with societal actors or communities than exists in reality. Both of these problems would result in measurement error of organizational capital, potentially biasing the assessment of its relationship with institutional development toward zero.[93]

This suggests that any assessment of organizational capital ought to be treated carefully. The research design minimizes the measurement error problem by comparing sources carefully selected for their attention to historical evidence. It compares assessments of elite relations and social embeddedness by a wide variety of primary and secondary sources, detailed in Section 2.3.4, that take differing perspectives toward the historical record in Afghanistan. To measure elite cooperation, I examine relationships between elites in the social (marriages, school co-attendance, friendships, cultural associations), political (informal political relationships and formal ties including parties and movements), and economic (business relationships) arenas. To evaluate social embeddedness, I examine the geographic distribution of government offices and physical facilities, and the intensity of interaction between officials and citizens. I also rely on assessments of government-society relations by contemporary observers.

External Coherence. External coherence is relatively observable: foreign political and economic assistance is extensively documented in aid databases, news accounts, and accounts from foreign and domestic observers in the recipient country. External coherence varies on the basis of political-economic alignment and donor coordination. To measure alignment, I examine the

[93]For a classic statement of this "errors in variables" problem, see Griliches 1974.

degree of convergence between the political and security activities of major donors and their development assistance programs. Regarding coordination, I quantitatively examine the number and concentration of donors and projects in Afghanistan at the aggregate and sectoral levels.[94] Qualitatively, I evaluate the the degree to which bilateral and multilateral donors as well as major nongovernmental organizational formulate and coordinate across security and development sectors.

2.3.4 Data Sources

This dissertation makes use of a variety of primary sources. Original information comes from three types of materials described below.

1. *Archival sources and other primary sources*: For the case studies covering the monarchical and communist periods, I consulted archival materials from repositories inside and outside of Afghanistan. The National Archives (*Arshif-e Melli*) of Afghanistan included useful descriptions of major initiatives and biographies of high-level political appointments, as well as various *Survey of Progress* statistical handbooks prepared by the Ministry of Planning between the 1950s and 1980s. The collection of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) offered documentation of the strategic assessments and the diplomatic and development objectives of American policymakers covering Afghanistan. The *Afghanistan Strategic Intelligence* volumes provided a similar set of materials for the British view, which was especially useful for the early years of the Naderi monarchy. And primary source materials documenting the observations of key Soviet participants came from the *Cold War History Project*. These materials, including accounts by Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy (Russian military historian Deputy Director of the USSR Defense Ministry working group in Afghanistan under General Valentin Varennikov from 1987 to 1989) and Vasili Mitrokhin (former KGB archivist), covered the years prior to and during the PDPA regime. Other primary sources include Annual Yearbook of Afghanistan (*Salnamah-e Afghanistan* in Farsi, *Da Afghanistan Kalanay* in Pashto), the *Anis* and *Kabul Times* periodicals, development project reports, and a number of memoirs by Afghan and international diplomats, politi-

[94] For more detail, see Chapter 6.

cal elites, aid workers, and government officials.

2. *Interviews*: Each of the case studies, primarily the post-Bonn case study, draws on information collected from interviews with decision-makers and observers involved in key events or issue areas that affected institutional outcomes. The monarchy and PDPA cases draw on semi-structured 6 and 4 interviews, respectively, with former government officials (or their close relatives) involved in the diplomatic, development, and security arenas. The post Bonn case study draws on over 25 semi-structured interviews with Afghan, American, and European decision-makers involved in institution building efforts since 2001. In order to encourage the exchange of information, the interviews were conducted by the author on the basis of anonymity. All of these interviews were cross-referenced with public statements and a variety of secondary sources.

3. *Quantitative datasets*: In Chapter 6, I draw on a series of existing quantitative datasets to evaluate the theory across a wider set of observations. Three repositories provided the key indicators for this analysis. First, I use data on the range of elite consultation, political party branches, and political corruption as respective indicators of elite cooperation, social embeddedness, and institutional quality from the *Varieties of Democracy* project.[95] Second, I gathered development assistance data from the *AidData* repository, an aid database that includes project-level information from members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and non-OECD donor countries such as Brazil, South Africa, and China.[96] Third, I collect a range of additional data on country-level economic and political characteristics from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators*, the Maddison Project database, and other sources. For more details, see Chapter 6.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the problem that motivates this dissertation and the theory that stemmed from it. It also described the methods that will be used to evaluate the theory. In the following

[95] Coppedge et al. 2016.
[96] Tierney et al. 2011.

chapters, the goal will be to evaluate the theory in three in-depth case studies from Afghanistan. These chapters will closely scrutinize the trajectory of government functions within and across the monarchical, communist, and post-2001 time periods in Afghanistan, and explicitly evaluate plausible explanations for observed institutional outcomes. Next, a series of cross-country statistical tests evaluate the effects of organizational capital and external coherence on a wider universe of cases.

3 The Rise and Fall of the Naderi Monarchy, 1929-1978

> [T]he Royal Family can lay down the burden of a generation and let the Afghan educated class run the government.
>
> Zahir Shah, King of Afghanistan (r. 1933-1973)[97]

On October 13, 1929, Nader Khan and his brothers assumed power in Kabul under conditions of political uncertainty. Assisted by the British Indian government and tribal levies recruited from areas on both sides of the Durand Line,[98] Nader Khan and his family captured Kabul from Habibullah Kalakani,[99] a Kohistani Tajik who had risen to power in January 1929 and had quickly become the object of opposition by displaced political elites, including the Nader Khan family. After a brief but intensely violent period of internal war, the public treasury was depleted[100] and government buildings as well as private property had been subject to unauthorized and extensive looting by the same tribesmen recruited to take the capital.[101] External trade

[97] L. Dupree 1963.

[98] The Durand Line was a territorial demarcation agreed to in 1893 by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, foreign secretary of British India, and amir of Afghanistan Abdul Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901). This agreement indicated the respective spheres of influence of Kabul and New Delhi and remains a *de facto* border between Afghanistan and the successor state of Pakistan today. However, its legal status has remained a point of controversy, and current Afghan governments do not officially recognize the Durand Line as an international border.

[99] The scope and extent of British Indian government support for Nader Khan remains a matter of historical dispute. While it is clear that the British Raj allowed Nader Khan and his brothers to organize a military campaign against the Kalakani government from British Indian territory, the type and level of British assistance provided to them remains unknown. See Gregorian 1969.

[100] See ibid., p. 280.

[101] The Waziri tribesmen that captured Kabul looted several embassies, especially that of the French mission, as well as private homes in the days leading up to Nader's arrival in the city. This episode followed an earlier round of looting by Kalakani's forces after they took Kabul. Over the course of 1929, much of Kabul's intellectual and cultural infrastructure, including "[l]aboratories, libraries, palaces, and the royal museum" were seized by Kalakani partisans. See ibid., pp. 275, 285-286.

had dried up and two sets of currencies were in circulation, both of which retained little value.[102] Much of eastern and northern Afghanistan had received large numbers of arms and munition in the mobilizations against the prewar administration of Amanullah Khan and, subsequently, against the Kalakani government.[103] Most importantly, the ascendant brothers that took Kabul did not possess a standing army or intact bureaucratic structure with which to govern core urban areas and outlying regions.

How did Nader Khan and his newly installed government attempt to consolidate authority in Afghanistan over the following decades, and to what degree were they successful? How did the level, form, and territorial extent of this authority change during the Naderi period of rule?[104] How did Afghan institutions of government evolve over the course of the Naderi regime, and why? And why did the system unravel in the 1970s? In this chapter, I show that that the capabilities, reach, and effects of government institutions increased substantially during the Naderi period. In order to explain this pattern of institutional development, I demonstrate that the expansion of institutional strength under the monarchy originated in (1) kinship and other personal ties centered around the royal court and (2) the employment of external assistance by the government to enhance human capital and develop integrated lines of production in key export areas. Personal relationships grew dramatically around the royal court over the course of early 20th century, extending to include increasingly distant members of the royal clan and eventually, the urban intelligentsia and other social groups originating in communities outside of the royal lineages. The expansion of the monarchical network provided the organizational basis for institutional upgrading by incrementally incorporating capable figures into senior administrative positions without threatening the familial cohesion that underpinned monarchical rule. At the same time, monarchical governments increasingly drew on foreign aid to enhance the capabilities of the bureaucracy and army. This allowed the government to extend its administrative reach to new territorial and functional areas in Afghanistan. Together, the expansion of the monarchical network and foreign aid contributed significantly to the increase in institutional capabilities.

[102]The prewar paper currency and coinage issued by the administration of Amanullah Khan were replaced in 1929 with overprinted notes and newly struck coins by the Kalakani government. See H. Hamidi and M. Hamidi 1967, p. 2.

[103]See, for example, Gregorian 1969, pp. 264-265.

[104]Many accounts use the descriptor "*musahiban*" to refer to Nader Khan and his brothers. I do not use this term because most sources in Afghanistan make no reference to it. I instead use "Naderi" or "Yahyakhel" to describe the extended family of Nader Khan and his brothers.

However, even as the competencies and territorial presence of Afghan institutions expanded over time, political control over institutions of government began to decline after the 1950s. The growing number of commoner figures incorporated into government institutions—most with meritocratic paths to higher government—and the expansion of the government's presence and basic capabilities made the patrimonial nature of the monarchy untenable. This contradiction between familial rule and increasingly meritocratic government became acute by the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in persistent instability within the educated classes that constituted the political elite. At the same time, geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union gave way to growing politicization of the army and bureaucracy, and increasingly political considerations in allocating and programming assistance, causing a decline in aid effectiveness. Together, declining organizational capital and resource competition established the conditions for the military coups of 1973 and 1978.

This chapter is organized as follows. The next section charts the historical antecedents to Naderi rule, beginning with the assumption of power by Abdul Rahman in 1880. Section 3.2 documents the changes in institutional development across four periods of Naderi rule, and Section 3.3 evaluates the validity of the hypothesized causal factors, organizational capital and external resources. Section 3.4 evaluates alternative explanations for institutional development under the monarchy. Section 3.5 concludes.

3.1 Lineages of the Mohammadzai Monarchy

This section briefly describes the initial development of government institutions in Afghanistan under Mohammadzai rule,[105] from the emergence of centralized absolutism under Abdul Rahman to the tumultuous civil war of 1929. The events of the 19th century and early 20th century had a lasting impact on the organization of government and its relationship with society. In particular, the century prior to Naderi rule saw the incremental rise of distinct patterns of centralization and modernization, forces that increasingly grated against the traditionalist-patrimonial rule that characterized much of prior Afghan political history. The brief historical account presented below are, by necessity, incomplete. The main objective in this section is to briefly describe the

[105] The Mohammadzai are a branch of the Abdali (later renamed Durrani), a tribe originally from the Kandahar area. Various Mohammadzai leaders ruled Afghanistan between 1826 and 1978.

key features of government institutions and practices leading up to Naderi rule.

Abdul Rahman and the Inauguration of Centralized Absolutism. Prior to the late 19th century, government in Afghanistan was primarily a family affair. A ruling monarch distributed government offices to close kin, and political survival depended on his ability to fend off bids for power from competing relatives or families. In this recurrent pattern of dynastic competition, rival families mobilized kinsmen and resources to capture political power from the ruling lineage.[106] While this type of politics generated a series of powerful, expansive empires based in Afghanistan, it also obstructed the development of basic institutional capabilities. Ruling houses could assemble large expeditionary armies through sufficient charisma and patronage, but lacked governing organizations that could transfer power to successors, regulate the distribution of responsibilities among kin, and function effectively without the personal effort and capabilities of the ruling monarch. When a ruling family was unseated by a competing lineage, most occupants of government offices (and the characteristics that they possessed) went with it. In the decades leading up to Amir Abdul Rahman's reign (r. 1880–1901), Afghan politics proceeded in incremental steps from this traditionalist-patrimonial system of dynastic rule to a more bureaucratic administration in which the autonomy of political kin was partially contained. Beginning with the reign of Abdul Rahman's grandfather, Dost Mohammad Khan (r. 1826–1839, 1842–1863) and continuing under the rule of his half-uncle, Sher Ali Khan (r. 1863–1866, 1868–1879), government administration became increasingly specialized while provincial offices were increasingly extended to non-kin.[107]

Abdul Rahman's rise to power conspicuously advanced this trend of administrative centralization.[108] As amir, Abdul Rahman pursued a project of "internal imperialism,"[109] that extended

[106]For political histories of Afghanistan prior the 19th century, see L. Dupree [1973] 2002; Farhang 1988; Noelle 1997.

[107]See M. H. Kakar 2006.

[108]Abdul Rahman's ascent was far from direct. His respective father and uncle, Mohammad Afzal Khan and Mohammad Azam Khan, had been rivals of his half-uncle Sher Ali Khan for succession to the Afghan throne. After Sher Ali Khan succeeded Amir Dost Mohammad Khan as heir apparent, Abdul Rahman along with his father and uncle successfully deposed Sher Ali and briefly ruled Kabul. Sher Ali Khan's forces eventually took back the throne in September 1868 and Abdul Rahman fled to Samarqand, where he lived on a Russian pension for almost eleven years. When Sher Ali Khan passed away in February 1879 during the events of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, Abdul Rahman amassed a large military force in northern Afghanistan and captured Kabul with both Russian support and British Indian arms and capital. While the origins of Abdul Rahman's centralizing tendencies remain somewhat unresolved, his familiarity with the negative consequences of dynastic conflict and colonial intervention could explain his governing behavior. For more information, see Adamec 1975; M. H. Kakar 2006.

[109]L. Dupree 1977.

government authority over all autonomous territories designated as areas of Afghan influence under arrangements settled with Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary of British India, in 1893.[110] As a consequence of these developments, the pattern of "political fusion and fission"[111] that characterized much of preceding Afghan history largely came to an end by the 19th century.

Abdul Rahman's administration departed from those of his predecessors in several important respects. First, his administration employed the use of regimented military force to expand and maintain direct control over autonomous communities. Drawing on an officer class that consisted of non-kin Pashtun military notables and a diverse conscript force, Abdul Rahman mobilized large and highly coercive military expeditions into the Ghilzai-populated areas immediately south of Kabul, the northern region of Afghan Turkestan, the central highlands of Hazarajat, and the geographically remote, polytheistic area of eastern Afghanistan known by non-inhabitants as Kafiristan.[112] While the circumstances of Abdul Rahman's numerous military conquests differed from one another, all of them served to expand and centralize the administrative power of the Amir and, by extension, the government.

Second, Abdul Rahman employed exclusive Islamic legitimation to consecrate his authority and therefore justify the expansion of government power. While prior Afghan amirs had defined their rule in terms of Islam,[113] Abdul Rahman expanded its role by making decrees that explicitly appealed to divine recognition as the basis for his authority,[114] bringing the *ulama*-controlled *awqaf* (religious trusts) under the control of the central government, and enlisting or otherwise subjugating the clergy in the process.[115]

[110]This settlement came to be known as the Durand Agreement. For more detail, see M. H. Kakar 2006, Ch. 10; Gregorian 1969, pp. 158-160.

[111]L. Dupree 1977, p. 152.

[112]As part of Abdul Rahman's campaign, inhabitants of the region were converted to Islam under varying levels of coercion. However, Islamic belief was not fully imbued in the Kafiristan region until the reign of Abdul Rahman's son, Habibullah Khan. This region was given the name of Nuristan ("land of light") by Kabul to mark its accession of Islam. See Nuristani 1994.

[113]Amir Dost Mohammad, Abdul Rahman's grandfather, adopted the title of *amir al-mu minin*, or "commander of the faithful" in his confrontation with the the Sikh Empire of Ranjit Singh. More generally, however, the title imbued his reign with an encompassing form of religious legitimacy that was not possible under lineage-based competition, while differentiating his administration from the secular title of *shah* used by the discredited Saddozai ruler Shah Shuja.

[114]Abdul Rahman's administration, for example, distributed pamphlets invoking divine right as the basis for his rule. See, for example, H. K. Kakar 1979.

[115]Much of the ulama in Afghanistan possessed significant influence over the political choices of their communities, and consequently served as both potential symbolic and political obstacles to state rule. For example, Abdul Rahman gradually sidelined the prominent mullah Sayyid Mahmud Pacha, whose influence was centered in the Kunar valley, and compelled him to channel revenue to Kabul. When the mullah launched a rebellion against Kabul, Abdul Rahman defeated him and sent him into exile in India. See Adamec 1997, p. 273.

Third, Abdul Rahman elevated the practice of bureaucratic specialization in his administration, particularly in military and judicial affairs. This involved the development of a centralized system of police courts (*kotwali*) and internal espionage,[116] the introduction of an elite cadre of bonded court servants (*ghulam bachagan*, or "slave boys"),[117] as well as the diminished practice of distributing important offices to kinsmen. While the Kabul Mohammadzais remained a critical base of the Amir's rule, particularly after the uprising of Ghilzai Pashtuns in 1886, his administration had scaled back the manorial tradition of government that ruling lineages had practiced in previous decades.

Finally, Abdul Rahman transferred large sections of the population, political enemies and allies alike, in order to strengthen his domestic position and reinforce the border territories claimed by Kabul. The Ghilzai Pashtun communities that had rebelled against Abdul Rahman were forcibly resettled in predominantly non-Pashtun areas and provided substantial tracts of farmland, diminishing their territorial influence and instilling in them greater dependence on a Pashtun-led state. At the same time, the Amir opened up unsettled areas of northwest Afghanistan to Durrani nomad (*maldar*) families of Farah, Herat, and Kandahar.[118] While these resettlements successfully degraded the autonomy of the southern tribes, it paved the way for economic and political conflicts between resettled Pashtun and indigenous non-Pashtun communities for years to come.

Habibullah and the Politics of Consensus. The death of Amir Abdul Rahman in 1901 gave way to the royal accession of his son and the heir-in-waiting (*wali'ahd*) Habibullah, marking the first peaceful transfer of power in Afghanistan since 1772.[119] Habibullah's reign marked a pe-

[116]See Tarzi 2003.

[117]See L. Dupree and Albert 1974, Kakar observes that Abdul Rahman "introduced the system of *ghulam bacha* in Afghanistan to create a group of civil and military officials loyal to his dynasty and the state rather than to the tribes and regions. They were recruited not only from among the slaves in Chitral, Badakhshan, and Kafiristan (now Nuristan) but also from among the sons of senior officials and some influential Muslim, mainly non Pushtun, families. They were trained in public affairs and the jihad and, after acquiring some practical training in the durbar, they were given high civil and military posts. For the first time in its history, the court was supplying the state with trained personnel. During the reign of Amir Habibullah, the *ghulam bachagan* were among the first to take keen interest in social and political problems, to read foreign journals that were received in the durbar, and to get in close touch with democratic circles outside the durbar."

[118]See Tapper 1973.

[119]Like most amirs in Afghanistan up until that period, Amir Abdul Rahman had many consorts. One of them, Asal, was the daughter of Jahandar Shah, an ethnic Uzbek and former ruler of Badakhshan who had become an ally of Abdul Rahman's father. Asal was married to Abdul Rahman during his exile in Samarkand and later gave birth to Habibullah.

riod of gradual but significant change. Among them were the consensual, less absolutist content and style of Habibullah's reign, and the expansion of close personal and marital ties between the royal family and diverse elements of Afghanistan's social and political elite. Habibullah chose to establish closer ties with elite constituencies that his father had sidelined, including groups that represented opposite ends of the Afghan political elite. The Amir developed close personal ties with Mahmud Beg Tarzi, the patriarch of a prominent Mohammadzai lineage and a leading advocate of social and political reform in Afghanistan. Educated in exile in India and Damascus, Tarzi became a major proponent of modernization, Afghan nationalism, and social liberalization during the subsequent rule of Habibullah's son, Amanullah. The Amir also established strong ties with conservative members of the clergy or *ulama*, and the familial representatives of the Naqshbandi and Qadiriyyah Sufi networks in Afghanistan, sometimes known as the *mashayekh*. The latter group included Fidai Masum Mojadidi, representative of the leading Naqshbandi Sufi lineage in Afghanistan, and Sayyid Hasan Gailani, the Baghdad-born descendent of the Qadiriyyah Sufi founding lineage. The Gailani and Mojadidi families later became instrumental in bringing down the project of political modernization formulated by Mahmud Tarzi and carried out by Habibullah's son and successor, Amanullah.

Another important development was Habibullah's introduction of systematic educational and professional instruction for the children of elite families.[120] Under the Habibullah administration, foreign professionals were invited from Europe (particularly the United Kingdom), British India, and the Ottoman Empire to build up Kabul's administrative and military capabilities.[121] Some time between 1904 and 1906, Habibullah's administration established the Royal Military College (*madrasa-ye harbi-ye serajiya*), directed (as of 1907) by the Turkish colonel Mahmud Sami, to develop a regular and professional officer class.[122] The student body, composed predominantly of the sons of Durrani Pashtun notables, was introduced to a curriculum of "study of the Quran; courses in arithmetic, mensuration, geometry, and military logistics; and gymnastics and drill," in addition to "the Persian and English languages, general and Afghan history, and geography."[123]

[120]This was not entirely new. Prior, ad-hoc efforts to educate court-based children in administration and military affairs had been undertaken under the administration Habibullah's father, Abdul Rahman. See Gregorian 1969, pp. 150-151, 184.

[121]Adamec 1974, p. 12.

[122]Azimi 2000.

[123]Gregorian 1969, p. 184.

Habibullah's government also established the first secondary school institution in Afghanistan, Habibia College, in 1904. Drawing on a predominantly Indian Muslim faculty and a diverse curriculum of arts, sciences, and Perso-Islamic subjects, Habibia quickly became the training ground for the royal court and government administrators.

A third development concerned Afghanistan's external relations. With the inception of World War I, Afghanistan's internal politics increasingly came into tension with British Indian control over its external relations. While prior Anglo-Afghan agreements obliged Afghanistan to remain neutral in World War I, the conflict was seen by many Afghan elites as an opportunity for aligning with the Ottoman Empire, then the center of Islamic power, and achieving full independence from British control. Among both elite and popular sections of Afghan society, there was significant pressure to permanently separate Afghanistan from the British Raj. Nonetheless, despite briefly entertaining the possibility of a foreign policy realignment, Habibullah decided by early 1916 that Kabul would stay out of the war, with the expectation that this decision would be rewarded with British recognition of Afghanistan's independence. This move created opposition among the "war party" at the royal court, which included his son Amanullah and brother Nasrullah,[124] especially after British recognition was not forthcoming. The decision to remain neutral had fateful consequences three years later. During a hunting expedition in Laghman in February 1919, Habibullah was shot dead in his sleep, in what was widely interpreted to be a palace coup.[125]

The Rise and Fall of Amani Reform. The assassination of Amir Habibullah opened up a brief period of political uncertainty, in which his son, Amanullah, and his brother, Nasrullah, were the leading contenders for the throne. Rumors circulated widely that Amanullah or Nasrullah had a hand in the Amir's death, given their political differences with his foreign policy and their proximity to the throne. Nader Khan, one of the elder brothers of the Yahyakhel family, was also a suspect because he had been responsible for the Amir's personal security. Because Amanullah initially enjoyed support in the Afghan Army and, as governor of Kabul province, was located near the royal palace during the assassination, he was able to take control over the throne and the public treasury. Nasrullah was subsequently imprisoned under Amanullah's order, and was

[124]L. Dupree 1988, p. 146.
[125]See Adamec 1974, pp. 42-46.

later mysteriously killed while still in prison, while Nader was detained for a brief period before being released and invited to rejoin the Army leadership. Amanullah was proclaimed Amir in late February 1919.

The Amani period has been the subject of an extensive body of historical research,[126] in part because it deviated significantly from the prevailing pattern of incremental political development preferred by Habibullah Khan. In particular, two major characteristics of the Amanullah administration distinguish it from preceding periods. First, Amanullah sought to achieve full independence from British paramountcy, an objective his father had sought and failed to obtain. Shortly after Amanullah assumed power, his administration demanded the withdrawal of British Indian control over Afghanistan's foreign relations, which was rejected. This development gave rise the Third Anglo-Afghan War in May 1919, a brief conflict that was concluded in a ceasefire less than a month after it began when it became clear that Kabul lacked the military capacity to wage an extended war and that the British commitment to holding Afghanistan had dissipated. By August 1919, negotiations between Kabul and British India resulted in full Afghan independence,[127] boosting Amanullah's domestic and international standing, particularly in the Islamic world.

Second, Amanullah along with Mahmud Tarzi (Amanullah was married to Tarzi's daughter Soraya) pursued a project of national reform rooted in the currents of secular modernization and nationalist anti-colonialism then beginning to emerge in the Third World. Amanullah sought to reproduce in Afghanistan the capabilities and practices of Western states by advancing a series of sweeping economic, political, and social reforms. Amanullah's administration expanded military conscription, established telegraphy and telephone communication, upgraded the urban education system, promulgated the country's first constitution, and rationalized customs and property taxation.[128] Under Amani rule, the central government also advocated the unveiling of women and established greater control over the clerical establishment. These reforms were seen with hostility by more traditional elements of Afghan society. In clerical circles and among the traditional communities east and north of Kabul, Amanullah was viewed as an apostate ruler who

[126]See, for example, Gregorian 1967; Nawid 1999; L. B. Poullada 1973; Ruttig 2011.

[127]The Anglo-Afghan negotiations, however, also resulted in the removal of the British subsidy to Kabul and Amanullah's acceptance of the Indo-Afghan frontier as recognized by his father.

[128]Gregorian 1969, pp. 252-254; Guha 1967; L. B. Poullada 1969, pp. 126-129.

threatened to change their social and economic ways of life.[129] The Amani reforms contributed to or precipitated two major episodes of rebellion, one unsuccessful attempt carried out by the Mangal and Jaji tribes of the Khost area (March 1924-January 1925), and a second bid initiated by Shinwari tribesmen (November 1928-January 1929) that ultimately resulted in the downfall of the Amanullah administration. Initially limited to the Jalalabad area, the Shinwari received support from clerical circles and expanded to include other Pashtun tribes and the Tajik areas north of Kabul, eventually overtaking Amanullah's army.

In the end, the predominantly Tajik forces based in the northern areas of Kohistan and Kohdaman chose this moment to attack the capital, briefly placing Habibullah Kalakani in power until the Naderi lineage took control in 1929. While the causes of the downfall of the Amanullah administration were complex, the Amani period offered a straightforward lesson for subsequent rulers in Afghanistan: that rapid reform without political and military preparation would ultimately backfire. Perhaps nobody recognized this lesson more than Nader Khan and his brothers.

The Origins of the Naderi Dynasty. The emergence of the Yahyakhel family as the dominant lineage in Afghanistan was a relatively recent phenomenon. The family belonged to the extended lineage of Dost Mohammad Khan,[130] placing it at the highest levels of the social hierarchy in Kabul, but it was one of many families that belonged to the royal elite. The beginnings of the Yahyakhel family as an independent clan can be identified in the life and circumstances of *sardar* Mohammad Yahya, a well known notable and nephew of Dost Mohammad Khan.

Yahya was born in the early 1820s and raised in Peshawar, where his father served as Amir Dost Mohammad Khan's governor while the city and its region were still under Afghan rule. Yahya's political prospects were, however, less bright during the successive reign of his cousin, Sher Ali Khan. His relationship with Sher Ali was acrimonious, in large part because of the close personal and political ties to the Amir's rival and eldest son, Mohammad Yaqub Khan.[131] Yahya left Afghanistan for Kashmir in 1876, returning after the death of Sher Ali and the beginning of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). His prospects in Kabul were now much more promising. Yahya's ally and son-in-law, Yaqub Khan, had become the new amir of Afghanistan.

[129]Notably, the communities that initiated the rebellions against Amanullah had very little contact with his modernization program. See L. B. Poullada 1969, pp. 112-113.

[130]Yahya's father, *sardar* Sultan Mohammad Khan, was an elder brother of Dost Mohammad Khan.

[131]Yahya's daughter was married to Yaqub. Adamec 1975, pp. 264-265.

Soon Yahya would become the governor of Kabul and a key advisor to the new amir.

However, the accession of Yaqub, and by extension Yahya, was fraught with risk. Yaqub had risen to the Afghan throne as British Indian troops were occupying key military forts and urban centers, including Jalalabad and Kandahar. Under British Indian pressure, Yaqub signed the Treaty of Gandamak, which relinquished Afghan foreign affairs to British India, agreed to receive a permanent British envoy in Kabul, and allowed British Indian forces to control the main passes into Afghanistan from the south.[132] However, in the political tumult that followed, a series of Afghan army regiments mutinied against the British Indian mission to Kabul in September 1879, massacring almost all of its personnel residing in the Bala Hissar. As British Indian troops made their way to Kabul in response to the massacre, Yaqub abdicated the throne, agreeing to a life of exile in British India.[133] The British Indian authorities suspected Yahya of having been involved in the attack on the Bala Hissar, and eventually sent him to Ajmer, Rajasthan, as a political prisoner. After some time, Yahya and his family joined the former amir in the Indian city of Dehradun. The Yahya family would quietly spend the next 19 years in Dehradun, socially and politically estranged from Afghanistan, and under surveillance by the Raj.

It was in Dehradun that the future political leadership of Afghanistan spent their formative years. Nader and his younger brothers, including Shah Wali, Hashem, Shah Mahmud, and Aziz were born and raised in exile, situated in a region geographically and culturally remote from their country of familial origin. In Dehradun, Yahya's son grew up in a relatively closed household, where they primarily interacted with family and private tutors, as well as the occasional visitor from Afghanistan. The fate of the family, however, changed rather abruptly in 1900, when Abdul Rahman (one year before his death) invited Yahya and other Afghan exiles to come back to Kabul. Accepting the offer, Mohammad Yusuf and Mohammad Asef brought the extended family back to Afghanistan and settled in the capital city. In Kabul, Yahya quickly reconstituted the family as a key participant in elite circles. Mohammad Yusuf and Mohammad Asef were appointed Privy Councillors (*musahiban-e khas*) to Abdul Rahman's son and royal heir, Habibullah, who ascended to the throne in 1901. This role came to be associated with Yahya's lineage, leading

[132] Adamec 2011.

[133] Yaqub's forces did nothing to prevent the massacre at the Bala Hissar. Most historians of this period believe that Yaqub had hoped the English would be motivated to leave Afghanistan after the massacre.

some observers to call it the "musahiban" family.[134]

Nader Khan and his brothers were now well situated. Because of their relative competence and good relations with the amir, they rose quickly in government. Amir Habibullah appointed Nader a brigadier general in 1906. He accompanied the amir on diplomatic tours to India and domestic visits to Herat, and commanded forces that defeated a Mangal uprising in 1912. He eventually rose to the position of commander-in-chief of the armed forces (*sepah salar*) in 1914 and, after the accession of Amir Amanullah, became Minister of War, during which time he became the primary figure in charge of managing the frontier provinces of Afghanistan. Nader's brothers experienced similar career trajectories. Shah Mahmud and Shah Wali rose in the ranks of the military. Hashem Khan, who quickly developed a reputation of cruelty, was appointed to a number of increasingly important military and governorship positions. Nader and his brothers also became deeply involved in the social circles of the court. Shah Wali and Shah Mahmud married daughters of Amir Habibullah, placing them in the upper echelon of the political elite.

The Yahyakhel family, however, had developed differences with Amanullah over his modernization program.[135] Nader and his brothers believed that the pace and substance of Amanullah's reforms were becoming increasingly destabilizing. Conservative *mullahs* and Pashtun tribesmen were denouncing the Amani reforms as contradictory to *shariat*. Notables from eastern Afghanistan also disapproved of his efforts to institute greater government authority over military conscription and administrative affairs at the local level. Nader's opposition to the Amani reforms resulted in his demotion and exile to France, where he served as Afghan Ambassador from 1924 to 1926. Because of poor health and continued disagreements with Amanullah, Nader resigned from his post in 1926 and retire to Grasse, where he was joined by two of his brothers, Hashem Khan and Shah Wali Khan. After the downfall of Amanullah and accession of the Habibullah Kalakani government in January 1929, the brothers decided in Grasse to take Kabul and build a new government. By February 22, 1929, the Yahyakhel brothers had arrived in Bombay and made their way toward Peshawar. The brothers entered Afghanistan via Kurram on March 7, and after reuniting with brother Shah Mahmud in Khost, began their campaign against the Habibullah government.

[134] I do not use this term because most historical or contemporary sources in Afghanistan do not themselves make reference to it.

[135] See Gregorian 1969, p. 282.

3.2 Mapping the Dependent Variable

As Section 3.1 showed, by the time Nader Khan and his brothers had assumed power in Kabul, three distinct traditions of rule had emerged in Afghanistan—Abdul Rahman's absolutism, Habibullah's consensualism, and Amanullah's reformism. Each of these legacies represented very different trajectories of political development. Given these legacies of the past, how did institution building proceed during the Naderi era? This section charts the ways in which government institutions evolved after the inauguration of Naderi rule in 1929. Focusing on institutional capabilities, reach, and effects, this section attempts to document how civilian and military institutions changed over the course of the early and middle 20th century.

3.2.1 Resource Accumulation in the Early Naderi Period

For Nader Khan and his brothers, achieving administrative and military control over Kabul and other key areas of Afghanistan was not assured. In the capital city and Kandahar, a small but influential network of Amanullah loyalists posed a challenge to Nader's claim to the throne, while in the outlying areas of Kohistan and Kohdaman, the deposed Habibullah Kalakani maintained pockets of popular support. Political conditions in the regional centers had stabilized but also remained highly uncertain. Notables, civil servants, and religious elites carefully observed how the nascent government had begun to form in the regional centers and their outlying localities. Meanwhile, areas of the east were largely autonomous from the central government, and had been militarily mobilized as result of the short but divisive civil war of 1929.

The territorial expansion of the the nascent regime proceeded sequentially, and depended critically on the interaction of its foreign and domestic political relationships. The Naderi administration capitalized on political recognition by British India and the Soviets, early shows of force, and the establishment of a *modus vivendi* with conservatives and uncommitted elites to incrementally consolidate control over the capital and its environs before establishing direct authority over the major regional centers of political and economic power—Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Mazar-e Sharif. The Naderi brothers concentrated their initial efforts on assuming control over Kabul and its surrounding territories, particularly the strategically important areas of Maidan Wardak, Ghazni, and Kohistan, in addition to Kandahar and Jalalabad.

This process was particularly contentious in Kohistan and Kohdaman, not only because of the political and military weaknesses of the nascent regime but also because of the fresh political wounds generated by the fighting of 1929. Located north of Kabul, these areas had backed Habibullah Kalakani during the war but had largely withdrawn support for his rule when it became clear that he could no longer maintain his hold on power without wider bloodshed.[136] Months after the Naderi brothers assumed power, a sizeable insurrection had commenced in Kohistan and Kohdaman areas, originating in grievances by the predominantly Tajik population against their treatment by the new government. Unable to suppress the insurrection through the regular armed forces, the Naderi government enlisted the support of the eastern tribal forces who had participated in the civil war. These irregular forces violently suppressed the rebellion, seizing property and, in some instances, women from Kohistani and Kohdamani villages.

The Naderi government also dispatched senior figures to assume control over the largely autonomous regions of Afghan Turkestan and Herat. In the northern provinces, establishing external sovereignty was particularly important for the Naderi government. Since 1917, northern Afghanistan had served as a base of operations for the anti-Soviet Turkestani resistance originating in the former khanate territories of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand, and quietly supported by both the Amanullah and Habibullah Kalakani administrations. Adopting the name of *beklar hareketi* but called *basmachi* by the Soviets,[137] the Turkestani resistance movement had reached its greatest intensity during the late 1910s and early 1920s. By the late Amanullah period, however, Soviet consolidation in Turkestan had significantly weakened the resistance movement, pushing remaining cadres into northern Afghanistan. Endorsed by the exiled Emir of Bukhara, who had fled to Afghanistan in 1921, and organized by the Uzbek Lokai military leader Ibrahim Beg, Turkestani fighters carried out cross-border raids from sanctuaries in northern Afghanistan into Garm, Ferghana, and other Soviet Turkestani political centers. By June 1930, these cross-border attacks had prompted the Soviet Army to enter northern Afghanistan in hot pursuit of a Turkestani raiding force.[138] The Soviet incursion, in turn, led Nader Khan to dispatch Shah Mahmud Khan, his brother and the provisionally appointed Minister of Defense, to oversee a successful expeditionary Afghan Army operation to eject Ibrahim Beg and take control over

[136]See Adamec 1974, p. 172.
[137]The term *basmachi* comes from the Turkish verb *basmak* (to plunder). See Olcott 1981.
[138]See Ritter 1985; Adamec 1974.

Afghan Turkestan in December 1930.[139]

In the west, Herat presented a politically distant zone that was endowed with rich cultural, material, and human resources. During the chaotic events of 1929, the region of Herat had come under the political control of Abdul Rahim, a former general in the armies of Amanullah and Habibullah Kalakani. A Kohdamani Safi and brigadier general (*ghund mishar*) in the Afghan Army under Amanullah, Abdul Rahim defected to Habibullah Kalakani's administration after Amanullah abdicated the throne.[140] In May of 1929, Abdul Rahim captured Herat on behalf of Habibullah Kalakani, although his personal loyalty to Kalakani was, from the start, questionable.[141] By the time the Yahyakhel *sardars* had assumed control of Kabul, Abdul Rahim had developed a firmly ensconced political base in Herat, establishing a quasi-republican administration that drew on progressive and conservative strata of Herati society.[142] The Yahyakhel brothers was consequently unable to immediately dislodge him from his position, nor were they able to readily secure his public support. Only after successfully completing the Mazar-e-Sharif expedition of 1931 was the central government able to secure Abdul Rahim's public allegiance. The province remained under Abdul Rahim's stewardship for over three years, when Nader Khan and his brothers were able to bring him to the capital as the Minister of Public Works. In Kabul, he was progressively reassigned to less prominent political offices, including the Office of the First Deputy Prime Minister and, subsequently, that of Second Deputy Prime Minister. Abdul Rahim was thrown in jail in 1946 on suspicion of subversion against the government of Mohammad Hashem.[143]

After this initial period of territorial expansion, Nader Khan and his brothers focused their efforts on consolidating control over urban centers and strategic territories. For the Yahyakhel brothers, the chaotic circumstances of Kabul and Afghanistan at the end of 1929 underscored the importance of building a regular army capable of securing greater Kabul and garrisoning the provincial centers. The construction of a conscript mass military was, however, an uncertain and expensive process. Conscription was a highly contentious issue, while the availability of basic skills, training, and equipment among recruits was extremely limited. The Yahyakhel sar-

[139] L. Dupree [1973] 2002, pp. 460-461.
[140] During the civil war, Abdul Rahim had captured Mazar-e-Sharif, Maimana, and Herat on behalf of Kalakani.
[141] Adamec 1974.
[142] See Boyko 2010.
[143] Adamec 1997, p. 13.

dars abandoned the policy of lottery-based military recruitment established by Amanullah Khan, having seen the opposition it had generated just a few years earlier.[144] Instead, the Naderi government reinstated the pre-existing *hasht nafari* system of military conscription through community elders.[145] Drawing on this less stringent recruitment practice and incorporating the soldiers who had served in Amanullah's army, the regular personnel of the Afghan Army, at approximately 12,000 in 1929, increased to between 60,000 and 70,000 soldiers by the mid-1930s (see Figure 3.1). The growth in the regular armed forces continued, albeit at a lower rate, over the next decade. By 1940, the government of Hashem Khan had reinstated a universal draft,[146] but this move was not fully enforced given limited government authority in rural areas. By 1948, Afghan Army manpower is estimated to have reached a size of between 75,000 and 90,000. These troops were organized into army corps (*qul-e urdu*) and garrisoned in regional centers and strategic enclaves, including Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Matun (the primary district of the frontier province Khost), Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif.[147] The Naderi government also positioned military detachments in other border areas, including the Badakhshi provincial center of Faizabad and the fort village of Dakka, situated northwest of the Khyber Pass.

While the Afghan Army served as Kabul's primary instrument of territorial expansion (see Section 3.2.1), civilian police and paramilitary forces carried out the day-to-day tasks of ensuring security. Poorly equipped and often untrained civilian police units were stationed in district centers, where they were charged with intervening in only major disturbances. In the border provinces, a gendarmerie force was responsible for countering cross-border and internal threats, as well as securing major transportation routes and interdicting contraband. Organized as a paramilitary service, the gendarmerie was comprised of mobile borderland units capable of challenging collective threats of minor or medium salience. A separate, but important, component of Kabul's security apparatus was its intelligence service, *Riasat-e Zabt-e Ahwalat* (Department of

[144]In 1924, Amanullah Khan altered the conscription system from one in which community elders selected one out of eight of all able-bodied males between the ages of twenty-two and twenty-seven for military service (*hasht nafari*) to a modified version in which conscripts were selected by secret lottery. See L. B. Poullada 1969, p. 138.

[145]For a discussion of this policy change, see Gregorian 1969, p. 371.

[146]Grassmuck, Adamec, and Irwin 1969.

[147]Adamec 1997, p. 58.

Figure 3.1. *Afghan Army Manpower, 1929–1978*



Sources: Gregorian 1969, pp. 296-298, 370-374; Ghobar 1967, p. 62; A. A. Jalali 2002, p. 77; Adamec 1997, p. 59; Sykes 1940, p. 162; ASI Volume 4, 5/40/416/M.A., p. 4; Central Statistics Office; Lieberman 1980, p. 19; Smith et al. 1973, p. 396; L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995, p. 151; L. Dupree 1986.

the Record of Information).[148] Reporting directly to the Office of the Prime Minister,[149] *Zabt-e Ahwalat* was charged with countering internal threats against state authority, particularly those originating from urban-based elites or political interests affiliated with neighboring powers.

Nonetheless, while the quantitative and spatial growth of the armed forces increased substantially, improvements in the quality and equipment of the Afghan military was comparatively slow-going. The royal workshops of Kabul that had manufactured arms and equipment since the 19th century had fallen into disrepair under Habibullah Kalakani's short period of rule. With military materiel extremely difficult to obtain domestically, the Naderi regime procured modest shipments of arms and military vehicles from abroad, although persistent shortages of spare parts and fuel limited the durability and efficient usage of mechanized assets. In its first two years of power, the Naderi monarchy acquired at least 36,000 rifles of varying make, quality, and vintage from British India, France, and Germany. In subsequent years, the Naderi government received arms shipments from additional sources, including Italy and the Czechoslovak Republic.[150] In 1937, the fledgling Afghan Air Force purchased 8 Hawker bomber aircraft from the British Raj and 24 reconnaissance and trainer aircraft from Italy (although all of these aircraft ceased to function by the mid-1940s). The next year, it acquired additional Hawker bombers from Britain, and took delivery of 12 Avro Anson bombers in 1947.[151] The Afghan Army also added a number of tank and military transportation units to its materiel. Still, arms, equipment, and other military materiel were in short supply during the early Naderi period, and access to future supplies depended on access to Pakistani ports:

> [T]here is a shortage of modern arms and equipment in provincial formations, supply, transport, and medical services are inadequate, there are no factories in Afghanistan for the production of war material, and almost everything, including motor vehicles, arms, and equipment, medical stores, ammunition, and S.A.A. and petrol, etc. have to be imported from abroad through Pakistan. Unless the Afghan Government opens up new supply routes through Russia or Persia, the Afghan army could not

[148] *Zabt-e Ahwalat* was established under the rule of Abdul Rahman Khan, although it did not become a formal, permanent government organization until the Naderi period, under the government of Hashem Khan. The intelligence service was later renamed Masuniyat-e-Milli (Department of National Security), during Dr. Mohammad Yusuf's brief tenure as Prime Minister (1963-1965). Masuniyat-e-Milli subsequently become a powerful instrument of political control during Daoud's republican government (1973-78).

[149] And after the establishment of Daoud's republican government, to the Office of the President

[150] Gregorian 1969, p. 371; Grassmuck, Adamec, and Irwin 1969, p. 274.

[151] ASI Volume 4, 5/40/416/M.A., p. 4

remain in the field for more than a very short period.[152]

At the same time, solidarity and specialization in the officer corps and the rank and file of the armed forces remained limited. Many of the military specialists remaining in Afghanistan at the inception of the Naderi monarchy held varying degrees of solidarity with multiple parties to the civil war of 1929. Some had served as major generals (*firqa mishar*), brigadier generals (*ghund mishar*), and battalion commanders (*kandak mishar*) in the Afghan Army under Amir Habibullah and Amir Amanullah, and demonstrated significant commitment to the preservation of the royal line under Amanullah. Other commanders had defected to the side of Habibullah Kalakani during the events of 1929. The Naderi regime arrested or exiled those commanders perceived to be personally or politically close to Amanullah and Kalakani, and sidelined the less committed. The remaining cohort of senior military officers was, by consequence, numerically small, comprised of trusted but inexperienced members of the extended Mohammadzai clan, military allies from Nader Khan's campaign against Habibullah Kalakani, and a small assemblage of relatively apolitical professional military officers. Junior military officials, by contrast, had not been as involved in the events of 1929. Belonging almost exclusively to the Mohammadzai lineage, these officers lacked military experience but possessed strong familial and marriage solidarities with the royal family. To make up for their limited military competency, junior officers and non-commissioned officers (*khurdzabitan*) were sent to British India or Turkey for general and specialized weapons, transport, and medical training, or received instruction in Afghanistan from foreign military officer in technical subjects including signals work.[153] Many of the officers trained abroad were subsequently appointed as staff officers or instructors at the Military Academy and other military schools in Kabul.[154]

Among the conscript rank and file, basic skills and equipment were extremely scarce. The continuous need for conscript manpower under the *hasht nafari* system, combined with limited resources available for training, supplying, and compensating conscripts, produced a disadvantaged and incapable rank and file force. While conscript soldiers in the Kabul garrison began to enjoy new clothing and improved barracks and messing facilities by 1948, the rank and file force

[152] ASI Volume 4, B/22/4/48, p. 9
[153] ASI Volume 4, B/22/4/48, p. 9
[154] ASI Volume 4, B/22/23/48/Annexure A, p. 18

received extremely low compensation. Afghan Army conscripts received a monthly salary and allowance of 30 Rupees and 48 pounds of flour, respectively, a level of compensation well below the cost of subsistence.

Capital Concentration and the Economic Disembedding of Kabul. In the economic sphere, Kabul exhibited a similar pattern of resource accumulation. Critical to this process of economic concentration was the Afghan Joint Stock Company (*Sherkat-e Sahami-e Afghan*) established in 1932 by the leading trader Abdul Majid Zabuli and chartered as a commercial bank under the name of the National Bank (*Bank-e Melli*) in 1934. Established as a public-private partnership, the Afghan Joint Stock Company and its successor organization, *Bank-e Melli*, served as an investment and export promotion vehicle for key agricultural products. The company was founded with a capital base of 2.5 million *afghanis*—of which 68% was government-subscribed—which it used to sponsor and operate regional monopolies in areas of ready export potential, including wool and karakul lambskin processing, cotton ginning, oil extraction, textiles, dried fruit, and sugar. Poullada illustrates the scope of the *Bank-e Melli's* operations:

> There were educational, health, welfare, and other social components to [Abdul Majid Zabuli's] projects. For example, the northern cotton growing areas were provided with small but modern hospital facilities—theretofore unknown in Afghanistan. Schools and roads were built which benefitted not only the *shirkat* employees, but the population of the entire region, and served as an example for the government to extend these services nationwide.[155]

By the late 1940s, the *Bank-e Melli* commanded much of the country's domestic capital, generated most of the business income in the kingdom, and "controlled about 80 percent of the export-import trade.[156] The bank had opened domestic branches in Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-e Sharif, Khanabad, Jalalabad. It had also established offices or correspondents across the Durand Line in Quetta and Peshawar and farther afield in Karachi, Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, London, Paris, and Berlin.[157] In 1947, the bank held a portfolio of 50 large companies or *sherkats*—notably, the Jabal-ul Seraj Textile Company in 1937, the Baghlan Sugar Factory in 1938, the Kunduz Oil Exploration Company in 1939, and the Kandahar Electric Factory in 1943.[158] In what could

[155]L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995, pp. 165-166.
[156]Brant 1974, p. 93.
[157]Gregorian 1969, p. 314.
[158]Interviews with former *Bank-e Melli* (March 2014) and Ministry of National Economy officials (April 2014).

be called Afghanistan's first complex development intervention, the *Bank-e Melli*, in cooperation with the Governor of Qataghan and Badakhshan Sher Khan Nasher and major trader Abdul Aziz "Londoni,"[159] played an important role in the settlement, draining, irrigation, and cultivation of the sparsely populated malarial swamps that covered the Kunduz river valley.[160] The ecological transformation of the Kunduz area made it one of the most productive agricultural areas in subsequent decades. Poullada and Poullada report the overall impact of *Bank-e Melli* operations in the Kunduz area:

> The *shirkat* system controlled by the *Banki Milli* developed a flourishing integrated cotton industry in northern Afghanistan. Land was cleared; swamps drained; malaria stamped out; modern textile machinery and oil presses were imported; cotton-seed oil, soap and other by-products were processed; foreign grading experts and other technicians were hired; while young Afghans were sent for training abroad. Germany and Britain provided the Bank with credits for the purchase of machinery, and the profits began to flow in.[161]

The expansion of development activity in Afghanistan could also be seen in the development of roads and communications. Capital intensive physical infrastructure—roads and telecommunication lines—incrementally linked Kabul with the urban administrative centers of the provinces. In the years following the ascent of the Naderi regime, the Kabul-Khyber Pass road was resurfaced and the conditions of the Kabul-Kandahar road were improved.[162] In 1933, the central government also completed construction of a northern route linking Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif via the Shibar Pass.[163] By 1946, the road system had doubled in size, spanning 5,536 kilometers of motorable road that connected Kandahar, Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, Maimana, Herat, and Farah in a semi-circular route, and extended east from Kabul to Jalalabad (see Figure 3.2a). New telegraph and telephone lines were established to replace the communications network destroyed during the 1929 war, connecting Kabul with the cities of Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Kandahar, and the

[159]Abdul Aziz was a major trader largely responsible for developing Afghanistan's karakul industry during the early 1920s. Descending from a trading family of Kashmiri descent, Abdul Aziz began trading karakul skins in regional markets and, eventually, in London, after which he became known as "Londoni." L. Dupree [1973] 2002.

[160]Most of the farmers that were settled in Kunduz (some voluntarily, others by force) were ethnic Pashtuns from southern and eastern Afghanistan, as well as Tajik and Uzbek refugees from the Soviet Union. The demographic changes brought about by these resettlements would later become problematic during and after the communist period, when ethnic differences in the Kunduz area became highly politicized. ibid., pp. 472-474.

[161]L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995.

[162]Gregorian 1969, p. 312.

[163]Grassmuck, Adamec, and Irwin 1969, p. 273.

cross-border trading centers of Peshawar and Termez.[164] The Kabul communications network was later expanded with the addition of several thousand telephone lines in the early 1950s (also see Figure 3.2b).[165] These early steps provided for the expansion of telephones, numbering only 50 in 1932, to a size of 2,382 by 1951. In 1937, the construction of Marconi transmitters in Kabul, Khanabad, Khost, and Maimana led to the first cross-provincial government broadcasts by Radio Afghanistan two years later.

[164]Gregorian 1969, p. 312.
[165]Ministry of Communication & Information Technology 2013.

Figure 3.2. *Transportation and Communications Infrastructure, 1928–1978*

(a) *Motorable Roads, 1929–1978*



(b) *Communications*



Source: Fry 1974, p. 15.

In spite of Kabul's early military and economic gains, the presence of the government was limited in a number of other areas. Human capital in the administrative, medical, and technical fields was relatively scarce. In 1950, there were 378 state primary and secondary schools (up from an extremely low base of 22 schools in 1930) in Afghanistan with a total student body of 94,000 (see Figure 3.3a), covering a very small section of Afghan society. University education, concentrated exclusively in the faculties of Kabul University, was much less visible. In 1955, no more than 800 students were in attendance of Kabul University, as shown in Figure 3.4. University students were typically fully funded by the government, and almost exclusively joined a government agency after graduation. Of these early faculties, including those of Medicine (1932), Law and Political Science (1938), the Natural Sciences (1941), and Literature (1944), educators in the medical field made a noticeable, if incremental, impact on urban society by introducing new and relatively modern health services to the Kabul population.

Still, early investments in human capital tended to pay off. By 1950, recent medical graduates typically worked in one of the 50 government-administered hospital facilities and clinics located in the cities and towns, supplementing their modest salaries with fees earned from private practice.[166] Having been sponsored by the government, graduates of the medical faculty were obligated to provide any medical service that may be requested by the Ministry of Health for a period 10 years.[167] With financing and technical assistance from the World Health Organization, the Ministry of Health and its cohort of medical doctors carried out a number of successful anti-disease interventions in the 1950s. These included a campaign against malaria, one of the most prevalent diseases in Afghanistan. By 1948, malaria was endemic in many provinces—the proportion of children with enlarged spleens and with malaria parasites in their blood films were as high as 76% and 24%, respectively, in some provinces. These levels of endemicity presented not only significant health risks, but also economic costs. In Pul-e Khumri, for example, a malarial outbreak had been causing high levels of absenteeism among workers in the textile factory. To combat the disease, the WHO and Ministry of Health officials established a Central Malaria Institute in Kabul that trained Afghan entomologists, laboratory workers, and technicians that were eventually deployed to three regional headquarters and 23 offices in endemic areas. In a

[166]Cutler 1950.
[167]P. Robinson 1956, p. 18.

Figure 3.3. *Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Enrollment, 1929–1978*

(a) *Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Enrollment, 1929–1978*



(b) *Tertiary Enrollment, 1955–1978*



Source: Fry 1974, p. 14; Rubin 1991, p. 79.

multi-province campaign of eradication and consolidation, anti-malaria squads were deployed to endemic areas, where they identified parasite reservoirs in households (after some initial difficulty in obtaining permission to enter people's homes) and applied DDT over an extended period of time.

Table 3.1. *Malaria Outcomes, Pre- and Post-Malaria Campaign (1948-1953)*

Place or province	Spleen rate (%)			Parasite rate (%)		
	Pre-Campaign	Campaign Year	Post-Campaign	Pre-Campaign	Campaign Year	Post-Campaign
Pul-e Khumri	76.0	1948	11.0	14.2	1948	0.55
Baghlan	74.7	1951	24.7	23.5	1951	3.3
Khanabad	47.6	1950	20.5	9.9	1951	1.7
Taloqan	60.3	1951	14.6	8.1	1951	0.0
Laghman	76.2	1949	9.0	18.5	1949	0.0
Kandahar	46.0	1952	22.0	13.1	1952	9.3
Khost	65.6	1952	19.5	?	1952	3.1
Kabul	21.0	1951	10.0	13.4	1951	0.55
Sarobi	58.0	1951	10.0	22.5	1951	1.6

Source: Fischer 1968, p. 101.

Note: "Campaign year" column shows the year in which the malaria treatment was carried out. All post-treatment indicators are from 1953.

As shown in Table 3.1, the anti-malaria intervention was generally successful. Spleen and parasite rates declined substantially between pre- and post-campaign, including extremely large reductions in the endemic areas of Pul-e Khumri and Laghman. In 1962, fourteen years after the campaign had been started, German tropical physician Rudolph Fischer observed that "the total number of malaria cases reported in the country was 661. . .In 1965, 33 [cases] of malaria were recorded. . .and at the time of my last visit to Afghanistan in the autumn of 1964, malaria appeared to have died out in all the endemic areas I saw—as for example in Sarobi, Laghman, Kunar, Pol-e Khumri, and in the Heri-Rud valley, but particularly in the formerly highly infected area of Kunduz."[168] Successful health interventions were not limited to the anti-malaria campaign. The WHO and Afghan government were successful in greatly reducing outbreaks of other serious diseases, including, typhus and cholera, in large part because of the "development of the *health service* and the *medical profession*, as well as the establishment of *institutes* and the *university*

[168]Fischer 1968, p. 101.

[medical faculty]."[169]

The reach of government institutions was nonetheless quite limited in rural areas. Small contingents of provincial bureaucrats were stationed in urban centers and semi-urban towns, where they periodically oversaw conscription, modest taxation, and the adjudication of major communal conflicts.[170] Beyond these periodic supervisory and extractive tasks, the government was a relatively marginal participant in the administration of rural life. At the village level, political legitimacy and regulatory capacity were primarily vested in traditional, informal, and autonomous sources of authority—elders, notables, landowners—who typically sought to insulate their respective communities from the government.[171] While Kabul maintained a system of formally recognized village intermediaries, carrying titles that varied across region—*arbab*, *beg*, *malek*—these positions were powerful solely because they offered instrumental access to the government. It was only when influential notables occupied state offices that there was there an alignment of symbolic resources and governmental power in peripheral areas. As Andreas Wilde notes in a study of political networks in northern Afghanistan, rural notables who also held government positions tended to use government resources for protecting the communities they represented while also growing their personal reputations.[172]

Furthermore, the revenue raising capabilities of the government remained very limited in rural areas. The share of revenue raised from the rural sector, through taxation on land and livestock, was already extremely small during the early Naderi period. In 1948, taxes on land and livestock constituted only 26 per cent of domestic revenue.[173] To pass budgets, the Naderi regime needed the formal and informal consent of the parliament, which was largely comprised of landlords and rural notables. As a consequence, it consistently declined to increase or vigorously enforce taxation on land and livestock. Kabul also lacked reliable tax assessments, capable provincial revenue collectors, and a common set of *de facto* revenue raising rules across provinces. One contemporary assessment observed:

> Each of the 28 provinces has its own out-dated system for the enforcement and collection of revenues. The system is based on past practices and custom without regard

[169]Fischer 1968, 130. Emphasis in the original.
[170]See Barfield 1981, pp. 162-164.
[171]L. Dupree 1974.
[172]Wilde 2013.
[173]United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 1952, p. 65.

Figure 3.4. *Revenue and Expenses, 1955–1978*



Source: Fry 1974, p. 14.

> to present day needs and existing legislation. Knowledge of the provisions of law is practIcally non-existent. This applies equally to land, income or business taxes.[174]

The primary sources of domestic revenue were located in the foreign trade sector and the merchant banking activities of the *Bank-e Melli*. These sources of domestic revenue were lucrative and relatively inexpensive to tax. Import duties on valuable essential and non-essential goods were relatively large, ranging from 22% to 40%. Earnings for most export types were also subject to substantial foreign exchange controls, in which the government raised revenue by keeping the difference between the free market rate of exchange and a government-fixed rate of exchange.[175] These exports in cotton, karakul, and wool were a primary driver of growth in the urban sector and generated the majority of government revenue.

While the presence of government institutions in much of Afghanistan was territorially uneven, it would be a mistake to assume that government influence was non-existent in the provinces. Despite Kabul's limited presence in the the rural areas, the central government was

[174]Fry 1974.
[175]Kayoumy 1969.

Figure 3.5. *Patterns of Protest, 1929–1978*



Sources: Various, including Adamec 1997; Azimi 2000; Ghobar 1967; A. A. Jalali 2002; Giustozzi 2008a; L. Dupree and Albert 1974; Shahrani and Canfield 1984; Emadi 2001; Halliday 1978.

increasingly seen as an influential and intimidating organization that was able to attract, dissuade, or coerce provincial populations and elites skeptical or antagonistic of the government. Institutions of government did not enjoy widespread popular affection, but they were nonetheless able to secure consent on the part of the Afghan population because of a perception of both basic legitimacy and a monopoly of power in Afghanistan. In spite of the significant material and non-material deficiencies of the Afghan government in peripheral locales, Kabul was able to crush or deter political threats in such areas.

Confronted with distinct sources of political opposition—Amanullah partisans, eastern Pashtun communities opposed to government influence, and non-Pashtun communities that resented heavy-handed treatment by government functionaries. As seen in Figure 3.5, the monarchy faced eight separate rural-based insurrections in its first five years of existence, including those arising from Kohdaman (November 1929–June 1930), Shinwari territory (February 1930), the North-

ern Province, from where Ibrahim Beg and the "*basmachi*"[176] staged operations against areas of Soviet Tajikistan (November 1930–April 1931), the Ghilzai regions of the south (1931), Darre Khel territory (November 1932), and several others. Rural opposition to government influence remained substantial in the following half-decade, during which another eight insurrections took place, notably among the Sulaimankhel followers of the Shami Pir in 1937 and partisans of the Faqir of Ipi. On occasion, Kabul organized political actions meant to demonstrate and extend the influence of the government. This included, for example, "shows of accountability" that the regime undertook in order to control corrupt or unpopular provincial officials. In one instance in Parwan province, for example, an especially unpopular district governor was arrested and marched in public to the provincial capital, summarily ending his career.

3.2.2 The Rise of Daoud and the Expansion of Government Institutions

While the avuncular period exhibited incremental growth in institutional reach and capabilities, the following two decades of Naderi institution building involved an unprecedented enhancement in government capacity, although it also produced new divisions over how these institutions were to be used. This new phase of institutional development began with the decade-long prime ministership of Mohammad Daoud Khan (1953–1963).

The tenure of Daoud as prime minister marked an important generational shift in power, confirming the rise of the second generation of the Naderi lineage.[177] Along with Daoud, a number of other second-generation Mohammadzai *sardars*, including Mohammad Naim (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Daoud's brother), Mohammad Aref (Minister of Defense), Sayyid Abdullah (Minister of Justice), and Abdul Ahad Malikyar (Minister of Interior) were promoted to senior positions in the Afghan government. A number of well-regarded commoner figures were also appointed to senior cabinet positions, most notably Dr. Abdul Zahir and Dr. Yusuf—both future prime ministers. This period was also marked a significant expansion in the capabilities and reach of government institutions, although these gains were attended by the beginnings of polarization within the elite. During Daoud's tenure, Kabul's resources and territorial presence increased sub-

[176] A term derived from the Turkish verb *basmak* (to oppress or violate), and used by the Soviets to describe the anti-Soviet Turkestani movement.

[177] The only remaining member of the Naderi "old guard" in the Daoud cabinet was Ali Mohammad, a Badkhshani who was appointed Deputy Prime Minister after having served as Foreign Minister for 13 years.

stantially. The Afghan Army began to emerge as the most powerful source of organized military power in Afghanistan. Drawing heavily on Soviet assistance, the military acquired sophisticated heavy assets, including anti-aircraft weapons, weapons repair facilities, and armored vehicles.[178] The armed forces also developed greater competency in military weaponry and strategy, with increasing numbers of Army and Air Force officers receiving military training in the Soviet Union and United States. Trained to handle new techniques and equipment, the officer class began to evolve into a more regimented and specialized professional group.[179] At the same time as the government's military capabilities expanded, the reach of government personnel, communications, and transportation assets also increased. Kabul established new provinces and transferred bureaucrats to provincial administrative centers, with the objective of increasing the (extremely limited) concentration of government personnel in the provinces while dividing larger regional communities such as Hazarajat or Afghan Turkestan into smaller parts.[180] During Daoud's premiership, the first asphalt and concrete roads were constructed. Moreover, the size of the telecommunications and postal systems began to accelerate by the late 1950s. Transport construction during this period had far-reaching economic and political effects. Highways connected all major urban centers by a day's drive, producing a sharp reduction in transportation costs between the 1950s and 1960s. During this period, import prices fell by 40 per cent while export prices rose by 15 per cent.[181] As observed by economist Maxwell Fry, the "resulting 80 per cent improvement in the commodity terms of trade was due in considerable part to the fall in transport costs though these are still high," while the United Nations estimated that the improvement in income terms of trade during the 1960s added approximately one per cent annually to real national income.[182] The number of telephones, present almost exclusively in Kabul and other major cities, doubled between 1956 and 1961, while the postal system expanded by nearly 25% during the same period. Louis Dupree illustrates how these technological improvements enhanced Kabul's capacity to counter rebellions:

[178]Central File: Decimal File 789.00, Internal Political And National Defense Affairs., Afghanistan, Political Affairs And Conditions. Elections. Political Parties And Groups. Political Refugees. Defectors. Amnesty. Revolutions, Riots, Disturbances. Civil War., January 2, 1963 - January 31, 1963.

[179]Whereas military officers were almost exclusively defined by familial or service ties with the royal family during the avuncular period, military elites increasingly took on an additional identity of technical competence and access to sophisticated military machinery under the Daoud government. See Roy 1988, p. 48.

[180]See Cervin 1952, pp. 406-408.

[181]Fry 1974, p. 57.

[182]Nations 1971, p. 38.

> When I first went to Afghanistan, in 1949, the Safi Pathans north of Jalalabad were in revolt. Owing to lack of communications the government in Kabul did not realize that a revolt was taking place until the Safi had practically invested the old fort at Jalalabad. But when in 1959 two small revolts occurred—one in the Mangal country and one in Kandahar—the Russian trained and equipped Afghan army arrived on the scene within twenty four hours and smashed these revolts, which otherwise might have developed into a large-scale disaster. Today any small official in the provinces can pick up the telephone and immediately call the capital, Kabul, to request assistance if he needs it. Roads, too, have improved, and most can support tanks and lorries.[183]

The Daoud government sought to increase its control over economic capital. Under Daoud, the government sought to displace private capital by restricting the investment activities of the *Bank-e Melli* and the private merchant community more generally. Motivated by an étatist perspective of economic development and a concern that the *Bank-e Melli* was not investing enough in the Pashtun-majority southern areas, the new government removed or offset many of the privileges extended to the bank in previous decades. The central government obligated *Bank-e Melli* to reduce its majority ownership in several portfolio companies, including the Northern Cotton company and the General Electric Company, set price floors for inputs purchased by *Bank-e Melli* corporations, and extended foreign exchange controls to proceeds from signature *Bank-e Melli* products, including karakul, wool, and cotton.[184] These new measures brought a large share of Afghanistan's industrial production under the control of the government, effectively crowding out private investment activity. The impact of government intervention was almost immediatelt felt:

> The impact on business volume and public opinion was such that Banke Millie shares, once scarce at 1,000 afghanis, were now available at 500 afghanis. Moreover, the Bank could no longer obtain ready cash from its shareholders to defray the local cost of the Gulbahar textile plant, thus delaying the plant's completion. The bank's dividends were reduced to 5 percent in 1954, and prospects for 1955 seem dark.[185]

While Kabul's capabilities and reach grew sharply during the Daoud period, it was unable to contain increasing forms of urban opposition to the government. During the late 1940s and 1950s, new, informal political parties began to take shape among the educated class. One of them was the Awakened Youth (*Wekh Zalmayan*). Founded in 1946, the *Wekh Zalmayan* was at its

[183]L. Dupree 1965, p. 22.
[184]See Franck 1956, pp. 47-49.
[185]Ibid., p. 49.

founding an ethnically diverse group of intellectuals that sought incremental reforms in Afghan society and economy. As the organization became more overtly political, however, many of its Pashtun nationalist leaders began to adopt an agenda increasingly concerned with the political expression of ethnic identity. This section of the *Wekh Zalmayan* leadership advocated for greater usage of Pashto in government offices and the establishment of an independent Pashtunistan comprising the territories of Afghanistan and the Pashtun areas of northwest Pakistan. As a consequence, many of the Persian-speaking intellectuals that initially affiliated with *Wekh Zalmayan* formed new literary and political outlets, most notably the *Hezb-e Khalq* and *Hezb-e Watan* organizations. These parties drew on educated figures dissatisfied with the illiberal nature and narrow composition of the monarchical state.[186] Other early political opposition groups took a more radical approach to politics. The Kabul University student union served as the locus of youth activism on the campus of Kabul University and included multiple future PDPA leaders. At the student union, an emerging radical youth developed relationships "with political circles, the free press, and the leftist faction of the parliament."[187] Other political formations combined communal and religious politics with social democracy. The Secret Unity Party (*Hezb-e Seri Ittehad*), drawing primarily but not exclusively on Shia figures,[188] sought to overthrow the monarchy and establish a republican government that guaranteed political rights and economic opportunity for ethnic and religious minorities.[189] Yet another group was formed in 1957 around political Islam. At the Faculty of Shari'at, Ghulam Mohammad Niazi, the dean of the Shari'at Faculty at Kabul University, along with professors Borhanuddin Rabbani, Ghulam Rasul (later known as Abdul Rab Sayyaf), and Sayyid Musa Tawana organized a group of scholars and students inspired by the Islamist ideology of the international Muslim Brotherhood.[191] In its early years, this group held relatively small and intermittent meetings in the Kabul area but, like all of the political currents described above, it expanded in size and influence during the subsequent constitutional period in

[186] For more information, see Section 3.3.

[187] Ghobar 1967, p. 215.

[188] Adamec 1975; Bezhan 2012.

[189] While *Hezb-e Seri Ittehad* drew primarily on Shia Hazara and Qizilbash members, like many networks in Afghanistan it was not socially uniform. The party was led by Sayyid Ismael Balkhi, a well-traveled Shi'a cleric from Balkh,[190] and Khwaja Mohammad Naim, a Sunni Kabuli and the *kotwal* (police commander) of Kabul. Moreover, the Shi'a membership of the *Hezb-e Seri Ittehad* was diverse, drawing on both religious figures and secular notables. See Bezhan 2012.

[191] Other figures close to the *Sazman* included Abdul Ahad Ashrati (who became a senior advisor in Ministry of Justice during the New Democracy period), Wafiullah Sami (a future Minister of Justice in the final years of the Daoud republic), and Abdul Hadi Hidayat.

Afghanistan.

3.2.3 Pluralism and Conflict in the New Democracy Period

After nearly ten years of running the government, Daoud had been credited with greatly enhancing the capabilities and reach central government institutions. Under Daoud's tenure, the government had acquired the capacity to selectively and discretely intervene against rural rebellions and oversee large development projects. Nonetheless, members of the royal family were increasingly dissatisfied with the economic and political dislocation caused by Daoud's Pashtunistan policy, which had resulted in the sustained closure of the border ports between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and had brought Afghanistan closer to the Soviet Union (for more information, see Section 3.4). At the same time, King Zahir Shah and a growing number of royal and commoner figures close to him sought a more substantive role in the governance of the country. In March 1963, King Zahir accepted Daoud's resignation from the government,[192] opening up a new phase of politics in Afghanistan. This period became known as "*demukrasi-ye naw*" (New Democracy), marking the second attempt to install democratic reforms after the initial experiment in democratic change ("*demukrasi-ye awwal*" or First Democracy) under the liberal parliament of 1949 to 1952. After accepting Daoud's resignation, the King established an interim administration (March 1963 - October 1965) led by Dr. Yusuf that was charged with drafting a new constitution and establishing a new elected legislative body.

This period began with a great deal of hope. The 1964 Constitution declared Afghanistan to be a constitutional monarchy and laid out rights of citizenship, including free expression, peaceful assembly, and due process. It also barred the royal family from participation in political parties, cabinet portfolios, parliament, or the Supreme Court. Notably, the definition of the royal family included Daoud, and therefore excluded him from participating in politics.[193] Nevertheless, in most quarters of the government and society, the opening up of the political system was expected to bring political participation and economic prosperity to urban and rural Afghanistan alike. Government ministries were now managed by experienced administrators without patrimonial

[192] Whether or not Daoud voluntarily resigned from the government remains a subject of debate. For more information, see B. Jalali 2006, p. 171.

[193] The royal family was defined as "the sons, the daughters, the brothers and the sisters of the King and their husbands, wives, sons and daughters; and the paternal uncles and the sons of the paternal uncles of the King.' *Assasi Qanun*, 1343.

ties to the royal family and operated by growing numbers of doctors, accountants, engineers, and other specialists. However, the hopeful expectations of the New Democracy period almost immediately gave way to urban conflict, economic malaise, and more complicated dynamics of Cold War and internal politics in Afghanistan.

The New Democracy period saw an acceleration in the the reach and capabilities of government institutions. The number of specialists in the areas of health, communications, and transportation increased more rapidly than in previous years, financed by extremely high levels of Soviet and American development assistance. The Faculty of Medicine at Kabul University trained expanding cohorts of physician candidates, reaching an annual class size of over 200 students by the early 1970s, while Nangarhar University established its own medical faculty in 1963. New hospital facilities were constructed in Kabul, Lashkar Gah, Kunduz, Logar, and Paktia, staffed by physicians employed by the Ministry of Health (see Figure 3.6).[194] While few Afghan physicians were able or willing to develop their careers outside of urban centers, the spatial expansion of medical doctors in the provincial towns nonetheless brought health services much closer than before to the neediest communities.[195] Kabul University underwent a consolidation and expansion that located previously dispersed faculties onto a single campus and added new classrooms, laboratories, and dormitories for the growing student body.[196] The state telecommunication network grew by 22% each year, while the number of letters delivered by the postal service increased by 6% per annum. Kabul added approximately 1,900 kilometers of paved road between 1956 and 1971—including the Soviet sponsored Karez-e Khushk-Herat-Qandahar highway and the American constructed Kabul-Kandahar-Spin Boldak road, the largest single US aid project in Afghanistan in 1962, as seen in Figure 3.7.[197]—and increased the unpaved road network by 140% over the same period.

As Dupree observed, "development of an infrastructure (roads, airfields, river ports) made it

[194]See Fischer 1968, pp. 88-89.

[195]Very few physicians practiced medicine in rural areas, both because they preferred the dense social interaction of urban life and because private practice, which was necessary for most physicians to earn a subsistence income, was only feasible in the towns. See Goodman 1966.

[196]Edwards 2002, p. 201.

[197]Central File: Decimal File 789.00, Internal Political And National Defense Affairs., Afghanistan, Political Affairs And Conditions. Elections. Political Parties And Groups. Political Refugees. Defectors. Amnesty. Revolutions, Riots, Disturbances. Civil War., January 2, 1963 - January 31, 1963.

Figure 3.6. *Public Health Infrastructure and Capabilities, 1930–1970*

(a) *Hospital Facilities and Beds*



(b) *Hospital Facilities and Medical Doctors, 1930–1970*



Source: Fry 1974, p. 14.

Figure 3.7. *American and Soviet Road Building in Afghanistan, 1960*



Source: L. Dupree 1960, p. 19.

possible for the government to penetrate all zones in Afghanistan except those of geographic extremes in the high mountains and low deserts, and there are still many of these."[198]

The equipment and training of the Afghan Army also continued to improve. The Soviet Union remained the primary external supplier of equipment and hardware of the Afghan Army and Air Force. Over the course of the 1960s, the Afghan armed forces took delivery of a fresh tranche of military orders, including armored personnel carriers, short range air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and combat, transport, and reconnaissance aircraft.[199] Meanwhile, hundreds of Army and Air Force officers were dispatched to the Soviet Union and United States for military training. Afghan Army officers were sent to Fort Leavenworth in Kansas for advanced military education, while Afghan Air Force officers received airpower training at Air University

[198]L. Dupree 1977, p. 165.
[199]Stockholm n.d.

in Alabama.[200] The social composition of the Afghan Army officer corps also became somewhat more diverse during the New Democracy period. Whereas the ranks of the officer class had almost exclusively comprised of Pashtuns of elite lineages in previous decades, the upper echelons of the armed forces began to include non-Pashtuns in the constitutional period. Poullada and Poullada, for example, cite a US military report indicating that a non-trivial share of senior generals, approximately 20%, were of non-Pashtun background. They also found that approximately half of the senior Pashtun officers did not belong to elite Mohammadzai and Popalzai lineages.[201] Clearly, the composition of the Afghan Army leadership remained overweighted toward Mohammadzais in particular and Pashtuns in general (because no reliable census has been completed in Afghanistan, by how much is unknown), but it had become more diverse than it had been in previous decades, when the officer class was almost exclusively comprised of Mohammadzai Pashtuns.

Even as the reach and capabilities of government institutions expanded, the capacity of institutions to plan and implement development programs, manage personnel, and contain urban conflicts declined. There were five different governments during the ten year period of New Democracy, including the interim administration led by Dr. Yusuf. These governments differed from one another in terms of ministerial composition, leadership, and the specific conditions that they faced, but they shared a common inability to resolve or even manage tensions with the legislative branch or between the left- and right-wing groups so active in politics at that time. Successive New Democracy governments were unable to carry out commitments identified in previous national development plans: increases in fixed government salaries to attract better talent at the central and provincial levels, the establishment or reorganization of banks that could provide credit and advisory services to agriculture at the provincial level, the encouragement of private industry and increased efficiency of state owned enterprises, and increased resource mobilization from agriculture. These problems persisted despite a serious drought and rising food prices between 1970 and 1972. A 1969 World Bank report observed that the Afghan government had been unable "to prepare suitable projects and provide some assurance that these form part of a coherent development program."[202] Two years later, the World Bank reported that the

[200] L. Dupree 1988, p. 149.
[201] L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995, p. 151.
[202] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1969, p. 4.

government was unable "to provide sound economic management or to devise and follow a strategy of development. . .[s]pecifically the government finds it exceedingly difficult to identify and prepare high priority investment projects and to manage their efficient execution."[203] Without attention to the agricultural sector and other production areas, the revenue raising capabilities of the Afghan government became even more heavily weighted toward the urban sector. The government abolished the livestock tax in in 1966 and unsuccessfully attempted to extract more revenue from landholding through a higher marginal land tax rate. As a consequence, revenue from land and livestock declined in absolute value during the 1960s while taxes on foreign trade became an even more important component of domestic revenue. By 1972, the contribution of land and livestock tax revenue to total domestic revenue had declined to 1% from 26% two decades earlier.[204]

Unable to identify and address the key constraints to economic development in Afghanistan, the New Democracy government allocated most of its development budget, a majority of which was financed through foreign aid, to infrastructure projects of variable quality. These projects were politically expedient because they generated domestic and (for donor countries) external prestige and did not require the type of cross-sectoral planning that was increasingly untenable during the New Democracy period. As a result, large, "white elephant" development projects recurrently received greater priority than those that had the highest potential for generating employment and increasing productivity in Afghanistan's smallholder agrarian economy. Without a consistent and coherent means of planning for development, standalone power and airport projects usually took priority over projects that required long-term intra-governmental planning. These projects were usually selected based on political criteria. The construction of the Kandahar International Airport, for example, provided prestige and employment for an important political constituency in Afghanistan, but was not justified by international or domestic demand for air travel to or from southern Afghanistan. The Mahipar power project, designed to supply 66 megawatts of power, lacked the personnel to keep it fully operational—as a result, it sat idle for much of the year, and when it was operational, it produced a maximum of 44 megawatts for six months of the year. And many of the New Democracy projects experienced large cost overruns.

[203]International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1971, p. i.
[204]Fry 1974.

Approximately 57 percent of public investment during the Third Plan (1967-1972) period paid for costs of incomplete projects carried over from the Second Plan (1962-1967).[205]

The capacity of government institutions to manage emerging urban conflicts was also inadequate. Indeed, the earliest events of the New Democracy period were emblematic of this dynamic. On October 25, 1965, the newly inaugurated government of Dr. Mohammad Yusuf became embroiled in a serious crisis when Afghan Army soldiers fired on a student-led demonstration in front of the prime minister's residence. This event would become known by *sewwum aqrab*, the third day of the solar Hijri calendar month *aqrab* on which it occurred.[206] The initially peaceful demonstration was organized in opposition to the parliament's decision to hold a closed confirmation session for the first permanent cabinet of the New Democracy period. Encouraged by a small but vocal leftist parliamentary faction—including future *Parcham* leaders Babrak Karmal and Dr. Nahid Anahita Ratebzad—a small core of highly politicized students descended on the parliament building and refused appeals to leave. Over the course of the day, this initial group of leftist student groups expanded to include 1,000 to 2,000 additional students and civil servants that eventually relocated to the prime minister's residence.[207] After clashes broke out and some of the protestors began throwing stones at the police, reportedly killing at least two police officials, the army was mobilized primarily under the direction of chief of Central Forces Abdul Wali. In the resulting confrontation, the soldiers opened fire on the demonstrators, killing or injuring scores of students.[208]

The events of *sewwum aqrab* portended a more intense period of urban agitation over the ends and means by which government institutions were to be used. Student protests and worker strikes became increasingly common features of political life in Kabul and other urban centers in Afghanistan. Over the course of 1968, for example, more than 30 worker or student strikes took place across Afghanistan, including in the areas of Kabul, Baghlan, Parwan, Kandahar, Kunduz, Paktia, and Shibirghan.[209] While workers and university students represented an extremely small

[205] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1969.

[206] For accounts of the *sewwum aqrab* crisis, see L. Dupree 1966; Reardon 1969.

[207] Dupree notes that the maximum number of participants in the *sewwum aqrab* demonstrations, 2,000 individuals, represented a small proportion of Kabul's 20,000 student population. See L. Dupree 1966, p. 6.

[208] The precise number of casualties on *sewwum aqrab* is unknown. Government figures indicate that three individuals were killed, while other sources claim that as many forty students were killed. See L. Dupree 1966; Emadi 2001; Reardon 1969.

[209] Emadi 2001.

proportion of the population, their capacity to collectively disrupt the political status quo was considerable. Describing patterns of student protest in the 1960s, Baqui Yousefzai observes that:

> For a decade preceding the recent coup d'état (July 17, 1973) the serenity of Kabul streets and bazaars was disturbed by the protesting youth of Kabul University. A month did not go by without a demonstration of one kind or another initiated or supported by students. Students have disrupted the normal flow of traffic, frightened the shopkeepers about the safety of their merchandise, bewildered the man on the street, puzzled the police, frightened the rich, antagonized the government, infuriated the royal family, and tried the patience of the king. Their behavior became the subject of great concern to everyone in Afghanistan.[210]

Urban protest was not restricted to leftist groups. Conservative *mullahs* and university students in urban centers regularly engaged in public demonstrations, primarily in opposition to leftist political interests. A prominent example of rightist protest began in April 1970, when the *Parcham* newspaper (published by the PDPA faction that would become known as "Parcham") published a poem written by its editor, Bareq Shafi, hailing Lenin with the invocation *dorud*, a eulogistic salutation customarily reserved for the Prophet Mohammad. The poem sparked a month-long organized protest that brought together several hundred conservative Kabuli *mullahs* and their provincial counterparts at the Pul-e Kheshti mosque of central Kabul. Initially organized by Kabuli *ulama*[211] demanding that the government arrest Shafi and take other measures against the leftist parties, the demonstration quickly took on additional demands: "banning of alcohol, compulsory return of the *chadari* (veil), punishment of women wearing the miniskirt, abolition of secular education, and total acceptance of religious instead of secular laws."[212] The protest quickly expanded in size and included a larger proportion of provincial *mullahs*, bringing together the urban and rural clergy: "[m]en of the cloth continued to gather at the mosque, and both in the mosque and the streets, to attack the government bitterly. . .During this period, reports of religiously-inspired disorders in the provinces were numerous, and the flow of *mullahs* and villagers from the provinces into the capital, a movement which had begun in late April, increased

[210]Yousefzai 1974, p. 167.

[211]Most notably, Sebghatullah Mojadiddi and other members of the Mojaddidi family. Mojadiddi made speeches denouncing *Parcham* at the Pul-e Kheshti mosque and Parliament during the early days of the protest; he also actively organized his extensive network of Kabuli *mullahs*. See NA / RG 59 / SN 70-73 / Pol 23-8 AFG. Also involved in the protests were future mujahideen leaders Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi and Mohammad Yunus Khalis. See Rubin 2002, pp. 210, 212 214.

[212]H. Kakar 1978, p. 204; See also L. Dupree 1971.

rapidly."[213] When the protests emboldened the more antagonistic *mullahs* to drop the name of the king from the Friday *khutba*, the government ordered the army to physically remove the *mullahs* (or any bystander resembling a *mullah*) from Kabul and did not permit them to reenter the city for several days.[214]

The urban protests at Pul-e Kheshti mosque set off smaller disturbances in the provinces, including in Jalalabad, where "a mullah-led mob sacked a number of collective buildings," and "in several other provincial centers, notably Laghman and Ghazni." One of the very few instances of genuinely rural collective action during the constitutional decade also stemmed, in part, from the Pul-e Kheshti demonstrations. In May and June 1970, sections of the Shinwari tribe southeast of Jalalabad initiated a relatively small revolt against the government over land reclaimed by the Soviet-assisted Nangarhar Valley Authority. This protest was carried out in conjunction with the prevailing anti-communist protests at the Pul-e Kheshti mosque. The uprising, however, was quickly and decisively subdued by the military in a matter of days. The Shinwari incident underscored just how ineffectual one-off rural uprisings had become. Rural rebellion, when it did occur, was easily suppressed by the government.

Another strand of religious mobilization emerged out of the intensely ideological environment of Kabul University. At the Faculty of Shari'at, professors Ghulam Mohammad Niazi, Borhanddin Rabbani, and Musa Tawana organized a political Islamic student group inspired by the ideology of the of the international Muslim Brotherhood. This group became known as the Organization of Muslim Youth (*Sazman-e Jawanan-e Musulman*). These faculty and university students evolved from a Quranic reading group to a mobilized organization by 1965.[215] By the early 1970s, Muslim Youth members regularly clashed with both *Sho'la-yi Jawed* (a Maoist group and *Parcham*. Conservative *mullahs* and university students also engaged in violent attacks on women who chose not to observe *purdah* (female seclusion), including shootings and acid attacks.[216] These and other incidents of violence touched off separate demonstrations in April and October of 1970 by relatively large numbers of urban female students and professionals, involving as many as five thousand participants.

[213]See NA / RG 59 / SN 70-73 / Pol 23-8 AFG.
[214]H. Kakar 1978, p. 204.
[215]Edwards 2002, p. 203.
[216]L. Dupree [1973] 2002, p. 665; N. H. Dupree 1984, pp. 309-310; H. Kakar 1978, p. 203; N. H. Dupree 1984.

3.2.4 The 1973 Coup and the End of Monarchy

On July 17, 1973, Daoud led a coup that abolished the constitutional monarchy. Carried out with limited resistance,[217] the coup substantially reorganized the structure and composition of government in Afghanistan. One day after the coup, a Central Committee of the Republic of Afghanistan assumed power, dissolved the constitutional monarchy, and declared Afghanistan a republic. The Central Committee elected Daoud to multiple portfolios in the republican government—the Presidency, Prime Ministry, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By the end of July, Daoud had declared a state of emergency, abrogated the 1964 constitution, and disbanded the parliament; no parliament was in existence between 1973 and 1977. The republican government annulled and transferred the authority of the Supreme Court to a Council of Justice chaired by the Minister of Justice.

Scores of senior government officials serving in the New Democracy governments were demoted, either placed in inferior positions or stripped of substantive responsibilities and told to await instructions that would never arrive. In their place, a coalition of Daoud loyalists and *Parcham* leaders took control over the government. Close associates of Daoud assumed control over a series of important cabinet portfolios, including Sayyid Abdulellah as Minister of Finance, Abdul Majid as Minister of Justice, and Wahid Abdullah as Deputy Foreign Minister. Senior members of *Parcham* also assumed senior positions in the republican government. The military officers who carried out the coup on behalf of Daoud were primarily *Parcham* partisans or sympathizers,[218] but also included a number of *Khalq* supporters.[219] At least half of the republican cabinet portfolios were held by *Parcham* supporters, although most of these portfolios were relatively unimportant. Perhaps more significantly, the *Parcham* military officers who had a role in the coup were promoted to sensitive positions in the security forces, while hundreds of *Parcham* partisans were appointed to bureaucratic offices at the central ministries.[220]

[217]The standard portrayal of the 1973 coup was that it was unequivocally bloodless. However, in a meeting one week after the coup, Daoud had informed US Ambassador Neumann that "in the brief fighting only three gendarmes and four-five soldiers had been killed." See NA / AF00090 / "Meeting with President Daoud, July 22" / July 23, 1973.

[218]These included Colonel Abdul Qader and Brigadier Pacha Gul Wafadar of the Air Force, and Faiz Mohammad, Colonel Ghulam Sarwar Yuresh, and Abdul Hamid Mohtat of the Army. Nematullah Pazhwak, the Minister of Interior under the New Democracy government of Musa Shafiq, was a *Parchami* sympathizer who had participated in the coup.

[219]Several *Khalqi* Army officers, including Captain Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, Sher Jan Mazdooryar, and NCO Sayyid Mohammad Gulabzoy, also participated in the coup.

[220]Saikal 2006, p. 175.

Despite the upheaval at the highest levels of the government, the government bureaucracy and army exhibited higher performance in the years following the coup. Army recruitment picked up. Output in key agricultural exports grew rapidly, aided in large measure by a series of good harvests and ample rainfall between 1972 and 1976. Revenue extraction improved by approximately 18% between 1973 and 1977.[221] Government agencies were able to instill greater discipline in state owned enterprises (SOEs), increasing their operating efficiency.[222] And systematic development planning became a key feature of Daoud's cabinet. The government placed a priority on key constraints to development, including prospective efforts to increase agricultural productivity such as the training of semi-skilled agriculturalists and the development of minor-scale irrigation and an initiative to educate skilled industrial and production managers. Notwithstanding these institutional improvements, the Afghan government was increasingly unable to regulate conflict within the new regime. One of the more dramatic episodes of intra-regime conflict occurred in its earliest months. After returning to Kabul from a trip abroad, former Prime Minister Maiwandwal (1965-1967) was arrested on charges of plotting a counter-coup against the republican government. Along with Maiwandwal, the former Minister of Defense General Khan Mohammad and more than 40 other military officers and former government officials were detained in connection with the counter-coup charges. Maiwandwal and many of the other accused mysteriously died while in prison. It is not known with certainty whether the charges were true or what happened to Maiwandwal and the other detained officials in prison. However, most analysts believe that *Parcham* or Soviet operatives framed and assassinated Maiwandwal and the other detainees because of their generally anti-communist views.[223] Another high-profile assassination occurred several years later. In November 1977, Minister of Planning Ali Ahmad Khorram, a close confidante of Daoud, was assassinated outside of his office by a figure, Muhammad Marjan, of unknown affiliation but widely believed to be a PDPA member. Most accounts attribute the assassination to Daoud's foreign policy shift away from the Soviet orbit toward the West. As planning minister, Khorram intended to implement this policy by shifting the balance of foreign

[221] See Kavalsky et al. 1977, pp. 30-31.

[222] Ibid.

[223] Most of the detained figures and especially Maiwandwal enjoyed close personal relationships with Daoud and Naim. Early in his career, Maiwandwal was considered to be a protégé of Naim, who he worked with closely while the latter was the Ambassador to the United States. Saikal 2006; The individuals most frequently implicated in the torture and killing of Maiwandwal were police official Abdul Samad Azhar and Minister of Interior Faiz Mohammad, both Parcham members and, according to Mitrokhin, Soviet agents. Mitrokhin 2002, pp. 23,148; M. H. Kakar 1997.

assistance from the USSR to the US and allied donor countries. His assassination was reputedly carried out at the behest of the Soviet Union.[224]

Both the Khorram and Maiwandwal killings suggested a struggle within the new government for influence over domestic and foreign policy. Naim indirectly referenced this possibility in a meeting with US Ambassador Theodore Eliot, as reported by Ambassador Eliot in a cable to Washington. Naim remarked that:

> 'There are however, people, young people in particular, in Afghanistan who are imbued with leftist ideas and who in order to promote themselves attempt to stir up difficulties between Afghanistan and the US.' (Comment: This was one of the clearest admissions I have had that Daoud and Naim have not yet brought the young firebrands in their regime fully under control.) He [Naim] said that these people do this even though the Soviets have made clear to the GOA that they want harmony and stability in this region. Naim said that he hoped I would take the problem of these people into consideration in judging the actions of the GOA.[225]

In private, Daoud indicated he did not intend for *Parcham* to be a full partner in governing major internal and external matters. In a meeting with US Ambassador Neumann shortly after the 1973 coup, Daoud described himself as a "nationalist" and disavowed communism as an internationalist ideology.[226] The new republic actively sought the assistance of both the Soviet Union and the United States to "help us [Afghanistan] yes; but never to accept dictation."[227] Internally, Daoud ultimately sought to construct an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian political system. As stated to Ambassador Neumann, Daoud expected the establishment of a one-party state and, eventually, a parliament "perhaps under two-party system which he [Daoud] added must be controlled."[228]

It soon became clear that Daoud had (temporarily) come out on top of the power struggle emerging within the republican regime. By 1975, Daoud had begun to purge scores of middle-level Parchamis from the security forces, particularly the Ministry of Interior, and the civilian agencies, while demoting others or shifting them to provincial posts. Several *Parchami* cabinet officials were reappointed to less important portfolios and sub-cabinet roles. Senior *Parcham*-affiliated military officers were handled more carefully. Daoud quietly and incrementally fired

[224]Adamec 1997, p. 255; M. H. Kakar 1997.

[225]FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume E-8, Documents on South Asia, eds. Paul J. Hibbeln and Peter A. Kraemer (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 11. `https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d11` [accessed November 8, 2014]]

[226]NA / AF00090 / "Meeting with President Daoud, July 22" / July 23, 1973.

[227]NA / AF00090 / "Meeting with President Daoud, July 22" / July 23, 1973.

[228]NA / AF00090 / "Meeting with President Daoud, July 22" / July 23, 1973.

or demoted these officers for missteps, while transferring others to embassies abroad. A small core of *Parcham*-affiliated officers remained, including Watanjar, Gulabzoy, and Mazdooryar—incidentally, all of these officers would participate in the April 1978 coup that brought down the republican regime. In the international arena, Daoud redirected Kabul's foreign relations away from the Soviet Union and toward the United States and allied countries as well as regional powers. Daoud's government pursued a policy of engagement with Islamabad, particularly after Pakistan hosted and trained many of the early members of the Organization of Islamic Youth, who unsuccessfully sought to overthrow the republican government in a 1975 rebellion across multiple provinces. Daoud also increased the number of military officers sent abroad for advanced training to India, Egypt, and the United States, and negotiated a new training program for air force officers with Turkey.[229] In the diplomatic arena, Kabul turned to Western-allied countries for development assistance. In October 1974, Kabul and Tehran reached an agreement under which Iranian assistance would finance industrial and transportation projects valued at $2 billion, mainly to build a railroad linking the northeastern Iranian city of Mashhad and the seaport of Bandar Abbas with Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar, and Herat.[230] Daoud concluded a $500 million assistance package with Saudi Arabia for hydroelectric development, as well as other aid agreements with China, Kuwait, OPEC, and the Islamic Bank for Development.[231] By 1976, Daoud and his close aides were quietly requesting assistance from the United States on intelligence matters. Daoud was concerned about threats of internal and external subversion, and asked US Secretary of State Kissinger for help in identifying these threats before they materialized. Kissinger responded affirmatively, agreeing to provide "what we know about possible military positions on your borders and what we know about any possible internal threats to your security."[232]

However, Daoud's efforts to steer the Afghan government out of the Soviet orbit were too late. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, the *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions of the People's

[229]Cordovez and Harrison 1995, p. 21.

[230]The Shah of Iran later walked back the size of the Iranian pledge. The ultimate contours of the aid agreement would never be seen because the Daoud government would be overthrown before a final agreement could be concluded. Bradsher 1985, p. 62; Rubin 2002, pp. 74-75.

[231]Cordovez and Harrison 1995, p. 21; Bradsher 1985, p. 62.

[232]FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume E-8, Documents on South Asia, eds. Paul J. Hibbeln and Peter A. Kraemer (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 27. `https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d27` [accessed November 8, 2014]]

Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) would carry out a coup in April 1978, bringing down the Naderi dynasty and Mohammadzai rule. While the success of the PDPA coup in April 1978 was not guaranteed, it had become much more plausible than in previous years. Government institutions had undergone significant gains in capabilities and territorial reach over the prior decades: an army that had established a monopoly of force across the territory, and civilian agencies that had achieved selective successes in organizing large-scale development interventions. But these institutions were also unable to contain an unintended but threatening development in Kabul and other Afghan cities—the mobilization and advance of radical movements within the educated classes. They were also unable to effectively grow and tax the agricultural economy. Institutions of government had grown increasingly politicized, and they were now unable to contain or resolve conflict emerging within them, giving way to the April 1978 coup.

3.3 Organizational Capital and Aid in the Naderi Monarchy

How does one make sense of the rise and subsequent decline of Naderi-era government institutions? The argument proposed here emphasizes two causes of initial institutional development. First, the cohesion of the monarchical network in the early Naderi period served to enhance the capabilities and reach of government institutions by organizing the government around trusted family and personal relations while also incorporating capable figures into senior administrative positions without threatening familial cohesion. Second, foreign aid during this time enhanced government institutions because it was not motivated by high-stakes geopolitical competition.

This section also explains the subsequent destabilization of government institutions in terms of organizational capital and foreign aid. Beginning in the 1950s, significant elite divisions developed over the composition and objectives of government institutions, resulting in greater levels of urban conflict and institutional dysfunction in development planning. At the same time, geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union gave way to growing politicization of the army and bureaucracy, and the emergence of political considerations in allocating and programming assistance, causing a decline in aid effectiveness. In short, the mixed system of patrimonial and meritocratic rule that characterized mid-century Afghanistan was poorly equipped to contain conflict within the middle and upper classes, and to absorb geopolitical com-

petition between the United States and Soviet Union.

3.3.1 The Rise and Fall of Organizational Capital

The early years of the Naderi regime presented a distinct political challenge for the Yahyakhel family. Nader Khan and his brothers were confronted with a small but divided group of elite constituencies. Partisans of Amir Amanullah Khan saw Nader Khan and his brothers as usurpers of the throne who had risen to power by cooperating with the British and appeasing conservative elements of Afghan society, including the *ulama* and eastern Pashtun tribal groups that had helped them to seize Kabul. And the conservative constituencies sought to reap the rewards of their support for Nader Khan: a rollback of Amanullah's social reforms and his efforts to rationalize and strengthen government in Afghanistan.

Supporters of Amanullah were among the more educated figures in Kabul and could be found in the ranks of the bureaucracy and elite schools. Much of the early opposition to Nader Khan revolved around the Charkhi household, a prominent family from Charkh in the province of Logar.[233] The Charkhi brothers Ghulam Nabi and Ghulam Jilani were ardent supporters of Amanullah Khan,[234] and were targeted soon after returning to Afghanistan from diplomatic posts abroad. Nader Khan executed both of them for unspecified subversive activities and imprisoned their families,[235] inflaming the opposition of the Amanullah partisans. In June 1933, Sayyid Kemal, an Amanullah supporter and graduate of the Nejat secondary school, assassinated Mohammad Aziz, the Ambassador to Germany and one of Nadir Khan's brothers (and father of Daoud), in Nazi Berlin. Although Kemal did not have any known links to the Charkhi family, he claimed that the act was a "protest against the predominance of British influence in Afghanistan and against the betrayal of the frontier tribes by the Afghan government."[236] Not long after, in September 1933, another Nejat student Mohammad Azim attempted to assassinate the British Ambassador in Kabul. And most notably, in November 1933, the son of a Charkhi family ser-

[233] Earlier generations of the Charkhi family had served in the governments of Abdul Rahman Khan and Habibullah Khan.

[234] Ghulam Nabi had been Ambassador to Turkey at the time of Amanullah's abdication, and Ghulam Jilani was the Ambassador to the USSR at that time. In the weeks leading up to Amanullah's resignation, Nabi led a force of Afghan cadets who had been studying in Turkey into northern Afghanistan in support of the Amani government. Nabi's force eventually occupied Mazar-e Sharif, but gave up the effort after learning of Amanullah's abdication. Adamec 1975, pp. 147-148,149-150.

[235] "Charkhi" 2010, For a first-hand account of the imprisonment from a member of the Charkhi family, see.

[236] Gregorian 1969, p. 339.

vant and another Nejat student, Abdul Khaleq, assassinated Nader Khan himself at a graduation ceremony for the Kabul secondary schools in the garden of the royal palace.

The royal family addressed these and other pressures, in part, through plain coercion. They arrested or executed members of the Khaleq families, for example, as well as the principal of the Nejat secondary school, a pro-Amanullah mainstay. Later, other critical intellectuals (including, most notably Ghobar and Khalili) were jailed or sent into internal exile for many years. Nonetheless, despite their impact on intellectual currents in Afghanistan, the early educated opposition represented a relatively small section of urban society at this point in time. For other members of political elite, the Yahyakhel family employed personal relationships to incorporate political support or skills. In more technically-oriented ministries and at the level of the deputy minister or below, the Yahyakhel family appointed Amanullah relatives and supporters with whom it shared close relations. Ali Mohammad, a relative by marriage with Amanullah's family and Minister of Commerce during his reign, became the Deputy Prime Minister and later the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ghulam Yahya Tarzi, a nephew of Mahmud Tarzi who had served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Amanullah, became a senior official in the foreign office and, later, Minister of Public Health. The Naderi government also included figures close to the religious establishment. The Ministry of Justice became a domain of the Mojaddidi family. Ghulam Faruq Osman, a brother-in-law of the Mojaddidi family and husband of Daoud's sister, became a Deputy Minister of Interior (later Minister of Interior) and governor of several border provinces. By way of his extensive family connections to the royal and Mojadidi families, Osman had developed ties with several provincial leaders in Afghanistan.[237]

The new government sought to secure control over the capital before establishing direct control over the major regional centers of political and economic power—Herat, Mazar, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. In order to consolidate political and military control over Kabul, Nader Khan drew on the participation of a dense network of individuals with familial and service ties to the Yahyakhel family and other Mohammadzai clans. Most critical to the consolidation of power during the early Naderi rule was the core familial network of brothers and first cousins, who typically occupied state security offices and diplomatic posts. Mohammad Hashem, Nader's

[237]Interestingly, one of Osman's sons (by way of a Hazara woman from Mazar-e Sharif, the writer and intellectual Akram Osman, became a prominent critic of monarchical government in later years.

half-brother, became Prime Minister (as well as, for a brief period, Interior Minister), while his youngest full brother, Shah Mahmud, was in charge of the Ministry of Defense. Faiz Mohammad Zikria, a member of the Naderi familial core, headed up the Foreign Ministry, while two additional brothers, Shah Wali and Aziz, were posted abroad as envoys to Afghanistan's key European donors, the United Kingdom and Germany, respectively. Patrimonial relations extended to the next generation of the royal family, which was groomed for higher political appointments in subsequent years. Zahir Shah, Nader's son and the crown prince (*wali'ahd*), was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense in 1933, while Mohammad Daoud, the King's nephew, became the commanding general of the Nangarhar *qul-e-urdu*, or garrison. Mohammad Naim, another nephew and brother to Daoud, was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs under Faiz Mohammad Zikria. Other close relatives with prior diplomatic experience in the Amanullah administration, including Sultan Ahmad Sherzoy and Ahmad Ali Sulaiman, took up positions in the foreign ministry.

Trusted contacts helped the new regime establish control over the provinces. One of these aides, Mohammad Ghaus, served under the brothers Hashem Khan, Shah Wali Khan, and Shah Mahmud Khan as a member of the royal bodyguard during the tenure of Amir Habibullah, and later served under Nader Khan during the Khost rebellion of 1925. The Yahyakhel family relied on their personal history with Ghaus and his military skills in defeating the Kohdaman revolt of July and August 1930 and the military operations to expel Ibrahim Beg from northern Afghanistan. The second generation of the Yahyakhel family later employed Ghaus' son, Rasul Jan, in another important security position. Under the Daoud prime ministry, Rasul Jan would be appointed the chief of *Riasat-e Zabt-e Ahwalat*.

Candidates for positions in the key security ministries were vetted by the Department of the Record of Information (*Riasat-e Zabt-e-Ahwalat*), the domestic intelligence agency (established by Amir Abdal Rahman Khan) and a critically important instrument of regime durability. Controlled directly by the Office of the Prime Minister, the intelligence service was charged with countering internal threats against state authority, particularly those originating from political elites or interests affiliated with neighboring powers. An important aspect of this mission was reviewing the personal and familial records of low- and middle-level candidates for security institutions (upper-level candidates were typically members of the core royal family). These background

investigations centered on the perceived loyalty, integrity, and reputation of the candidate's family, especially the patrilineal line of descent. In the context of the small pool of candidates from which the government recruited, this line of inquiry could convey an extraordinary level of information about the reliability of a relatively unknown candidate, even if the recruitment pool was biased toward prominent families.

In less politically sensitive middle-level positions, the Yahyakhel family enlisted educated but inexperienced kin descending from the set of elite lineages that maintained ties with the royal family, as well as Kabul-born professionals and bureaucrats. These officials could be found in various departments in the central ministries, particularly in the diplomatic, economic, and technical areas, where they developed the experience and relationships necessary to attain higher positions in the government. In revenue raising and commercial matters, the Yahyakhel family relied on ties to prominent merchant families and relatives who could act as brokers between the government and economic elites. One of these brokers was Mirza Mohammad Yaftali, a Badakhshani and brother-in-law of Amir Abdal Rahman, Amir Habibullah, and close Yahyakhel family confidante Ali Mohammad. Yaftali had a long professional record of establishing trade links between Afghanistan and markets in Russia, Europe, and the United States on behalf of the Afghan government. On the basis of his close ties to the Yahyakhel family and experience in commercial matters, Yaftali was appointed Minister of Trade in 1930, followed by concurrent appointments as Minister of Finance in 1933 and Minister of Commerce in 1936. In 1932, Yaftali oversaw the construction of the first northern road through Darra-e Shikari, linking Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif, and was one of the leading figures, along with Zabuli and Londoni, behind the formation of the predecessor company to the *Bank-e Melli*, the Afghan Joint Stock Company. With the assistance of Yaftali and other economic brokers, Nader Khan and his brothers established a council comprised of wealthy merchant families, known as the National Council for Assisting Reconstruction (*majles-e emdadiya-ye melli*),[238] to reconstruct the damage to the capital city infrastructure caused by the 1929 civil war. These families also made contributions to the reorganization of the Afghan Army.[239] By the 1930s, members of the royal clan were among the primary private shareholders in *Bank-e Melli*. The investments in the *Bank-e Melli* portfolio brought the political elite into close

[238] *Islah*, November 11, 1929.
[239] Gregorian 1969, p. 297.

contact with Zabuli, Londoni, and the Herati and Kabuli merchant families that had invested in the early operations of the Afghan Joint Stock Company.[240]

The relationships at the core of the early Naderi governments began to expand during the middle 20th century to include younger, educated cohorts. In general, these graduates were recruited on the basis of merit.[241] The establishment of the Kabul University faculties in the early 20th century and the elite high schools of Kabul had, by the 1940s and 1950s, generated an educated cohort with training in specialized fields of study.[242] The vast majority of this cohort—many of whom were members of elite Mohammadzai families—entered government service, significantly increasing the capabilities of public institutions.[243] Graduates of the well-reputed Faculty of Medicine at Kabul University (established in 1932 with the support of Turkish, and later, French medical professors) entered the Ministry of Public Health or staff one of the state-owned hospital facilities in Kabul and other urban centers; alumni of the Faculty of Law and Political Science (created in 1938) were usually found at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, or Ministry of National Economy; degree holders of the Faculty of Engineering (founded in 1956 with USAID assistance) usually joined the the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Communications, the Ministry of Mines and Industries. University graduates with degrees in economics or engineering often took up jobs at one of the public-private banks[244] or industrial monopolies. The most talented high school graduates were sent abroad to receive higher education. First established by Amanullah, this program was reinstated during the Naderi period, first as a private initative sponsored by Abdul Majid Zabuli and later as a government program. The four or five high school graduates with the highest average marks would be sent to European and American universities to gain knowledge in fields that could be useful to the government. The

[240]Ghobar 1967; L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995.

[241]It should be noted that meritocratic norms were not a new phenomenon in Afghan cities and towns. While professional occupations were often transferred inter-generationally within families, the practice of apprenticeship and the presence of competitors contributed to the importance of merit in urban labor markets. Afghan political rulers had long relied on professional treasurers (*mustaufi*), administrative secretaries (*munshi*), market inspectors (*muhtaseb*), and judges (*qazi*) to fulfill the everyday functions of city and town government. In Afghan society, specialized professions were also well established. In urban and peri-urban areas, young men trained to become artisans (carpenters, potters, later iron-workers), musicians, and merchants (*bazaaris*) through apprenticeships and specialized education, even if such opportunities were largely made available through familial networks. In rural areas, specialization was for the most part limited to the *ulama*

[242]The elite high schools include Habibia College (founded in 1903), Lycée Istiqlal and Najat School (1923), and Lycée Ghazi (1926).

[243]Roy 1988.

[244]Notably *Bank-e Milli* that effectively served as a de facto central bank until the establishment of the publicly owned *Da Afghanistan Bank* in 1938.

award of these scholarships was, in general, merit-based, and therefore the majority of scholarship winners were individuals of commoner backgrounds, including Tajik and Hazara Kabulis.[245] Poullada describes the impact of this program: "One of Majid's most successful undertakings was the program he instituted of sending bright, promising young men abroad to study, principally to Germany, on scholarships. An influential group of Afghans received training in management, finance, and banking, as well as technical skills through this program. Eventually, the government felt compelled to initiate a foreign scholarship program of its own. Most of Afghanistan's modern intellectuals are the product of these programs."[246] By the 1950s and 1960s, this new generation of civil servants had entered the social, economic, diplomatic agencies of the monarchical state. The Afghan government, in the words of one analyst, had become a "moderate meritocracy" that recruited and promoted individuals on the basis of merit, but still took into account their loyalty to the monarchy and, later, the republican regime.[247]

In the early Naderi period, trusted relatives often headed technical government agencies for which they did not have specialized education and experience.[248] This began to change by the 1940s, when the first cohorts of graduates from Kabul University and graduate programs abroad began to enter the government. By the 1950s, Dr. Abdul Majid (a Ph.D. in bacteriology from the University of California at Berkeley, who had been Rector of Kabul University) was leading the Ministry of Health and, later, Education.[249] Ahmad Ali Popal, who held a Ph.D. in psychology from a German university, entered the government as the Director of Teachers Training College in the 1940s, eventually leading the education ministry in the 1957. Akbar Reza, the Minister of Agriculture in 1963, was an MIT-educated civil engineer with who had authored the first inventory of water resources in Afghanistan. Hussain Messa, a petroleum engineer with an education from the University of Houston, ran the Ministry of Public Works in 1967. Dr. Mohammad

[245] Interviews with various scholarship winners. For examples, see Ansary 2012, p. 139; Anwar 2004.

[246] L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995, p. 166.

[247] Giustozzi defines moderate meritocracy as a "system where appointments and promotions are done by taking merit and capability into account, but in combination with other considerations, such as political loyalty. Typically in moderate meritocracies the promotion or appointment system is open to political interference, but the latter is constrained (for example by oversight of some kind) or self-constrained (for example by the awareness of the political authority that too much is at stake for incompetent people to be staffing key." Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2011.

[248] For example, Yahya Tarzi and Ahmad Ali Sulaiman. While both figures were experienced diplomats with general educations from Kabul's lycées, they did not have a background in education (Sulaiman became Minister of Education in 1933) or in public health (Tarzi was appointed Minister of Public Health in 1934).

[249] World Bank, Records of the Office of the President, Records of President Robert S. McNamara, *Travel Briefings: Afghanistan*, WB IBRD/IDA 03 EXC-10-4540S.

Anas, an educated bureaucrat from a Mohammadzai family and a longtime education official and Rector of Kabul University, was appointed Minister of Education in 1964.

Meritocratic practices could also be seen in the admission procedures for higher education during this time. Until 1966, Kabul University operated on an open enrollment basis, in which formal qualifications for admission were not required.[250] In that year, the university instituted the *concours* general entrance examination (or *kankor* in Farsi transliteration). The introduction of standardized examination became an important component of university admission, and therefore had a significant effect on the composition and quality of the university student body. In 1966, when the first set of *kankor* exams were administered, both the son of Dr. Abdul Zahir, then President of the Wolesi Jirgah, and the daughter of General Khan Mohammad Khan, the Minister of Defense, failed the entrance examinations and were automatically denied admission to Kabul University. Dr. Zahir inquired whether future opportunities for university entrance were available, while the Minister of Defense "applied pressure" on the university, but both decisions remained unchanged.[251] By May 1968, at the height of leftist agitation, two thousand high school students went on strike because they had failed the Kabul University entrance examinations.[252] The decisions were apparently not reversed, suggesting both state adherence to the use of standardized examination along with the significance of university admission for urban youth.

Increasing meritocracy could be seen in studies of government bureaucrats selected to study abroad. Drawing on application files from the United States Overseas Mission (USOM), University of California Berkeley sociologist Wolfram Eberhard documented the educational and social backgrounds of 442 Afghan civil servants selected by the USOM to receive graduate training in the US between 1952 and 1960.[253] The resulting sample provided evidence of (1) the overrepresentation of Kabul-born individuals in government recruitment and (2) upward mobility within the government. Specifically, the results showed that almost 70% of the elite sample were born in Kabul. Furthermore, a large proportion of the individuals in Eberhard's elite sample came from modest backgrounds. Of 230 students (a subsection of the sample for which such data was available), approximately 30%, 24%, and 18% were the sons of lower or medium government officials,

[250] See L. Dupree 1966; Williams 1981.
[251] L. Dupree 1966.
[252] L. Dupree [1973] 2002, p. 620.
[253] Eberhard 1962.

farmers, and individuals involved in business, respectively. Only 12% of students in this sample were the children of high government officials, who could be assumed to have close ties to the royal clan. In the sample, almost half of the scholarship recipients (45%) had received their highest degree at a vocational school—a marker of an urban middle-class background. Hans-Henning Sawitzki finds a similar pattern of merit orientation in a survey of students at Kabul University, the majority of whom pursued careers in the government or in government-sponsored commerce. He finds that over half of the sample deemed "objective performance" to be a positive professional characteristic, while a quarter of the surveyed students considered it to be a negative criterion.[254] Conversely, "traditional values" were seen as a positive quality by 6.5% of the sample, while a quarter of respondents characterized it as negative characteristic.

The increasing prevalence of merit can also be seen at the highest levels of the government. Figure 3.8 shows an annual time series of the aggregate number of ties between government leaders (ministers and deputy ministers) that were patrimonial and non-patrimonial, where a patrimonial tie is defined as the presence of a kinship or marriage tie between two individuals. With few exceptions, leaders with patrimonial ties to one another are directly or indirectly connected to the leading Mohammadzai families that descended from Sardar Painda Khan (father of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan). These families are shown in Table 3.2.

The resulting time series shows that the early monarchical period had a slightly higher number of patrimonial ties than non-patrimonial ties, where patrimonial relationships were concentrated in the most important government portfolios: head of government, foreign affairs, defense, and interior. During the 1930 and 1940s, both patrimonial and non-patrimonial ties increase modestly as commoners are gradually incorporated into the senior leadership. But the growth rate in non-patrimonial relationships picks up in the mid-1950s, when the first cohort of graduates from the Kabul high schools, university faculties, and foreign universities comes of age. Interestingly, there is a sharp increase in Mohammadzai ties during the latter years of the Daoud prime ministry—primarily attributable to the elevation of close Daoud associates of Mohammadzai descent to the cabinet, including Sayyid Abdullah, Abdullah Malikyar, and Ghulam Mohammad Sherzad, as well as Daoud's assumption of multiple cabinet portfolios as head of government. But non-patrimonial ties, and in particular ties between figures who had risen

[254]Sawitzki 1972.

Table 3.2. *Leading Mohammadzai Lineages*

Patriarch	Family
Mohammad Azim	Aziz
Nawab Assadullah	Nawabi
Sultan Mohammad "Telai"	**Yahya Khel**
Sultan Mohammad "Telai"	Yunusi
Sultan Mohammad "Telai"	Zikria
Sultan Mohammad "Telai"	Etemadi
Amir Mohammad	Rafiq
Amir Dost Mohammad	Ziai
Amir Dost Mohammad	Seraj-Enayat
Amir Dost Mohammad	Naser-Zia
Rahm Dil	Tarzi

Note: Royal family in bold.

in government based on educational achievement, previous experience, and raw ability began to increase rapidly during the New Democracy period and into the republican government. While certain years show sharp changes in the number of patrimonial and non-patrimonial ties, a local regression line shows a long run trend toward non-patrimonial relationships in government, particularly after 1950. Nevertheless, members of the royal family ultimately remained in charge of the direction of the country even after the middle 1950s. This disjunction between increasing meritocracy in government and monarchical rule, as discussed in greater detail below, provided the conditions for institutional dysfunction in subsequent years.

By the mid-1950s, a relatively small but diverse class of educated figures in Kabul and other cities also began to politically organize. Like much of the educated class, these figures were a product of government-sponsored institutions and consequently possessed direct or indirect ties to elite circles—through professional contacts, schooling networks, the parliament, and kin or friendship ties to prominent political families. At the same time, the educated class developed differing preferences about the role of government in society and the means of realizing them. Most, but not all, members of the intelligentsia held in common a preference for a transition toward a more broadly participatory political system.[255] One section of the educated class supported

[255] One notable exception was the National Democratic Party (*Hezb-e Demokrat-e Melli*), sometimes known as the National Club (*Klup-e Melli*), which was established by Daoud and Zabuli to mobilize support for the Naderi regime. While this group did not succeed in building up substantial popular support, critics of the monarchy argue that it was

Figure 3.8. *Patrimonial and Non-Patrimonial Ties, 1929–1978*



Source: Adamec 1975, 2008; interviews with former monarchical government officials; author's calculations.
Note: Smoothed lines plotted using a LOWESS function with a smoother span of 0.5.

a "quiet revolution" that emphasized a smooth transition to a multi-party democracy that emphasized Islamic values and retained a symbolic role for the monarchy.[256] Established by Prime Minister Hashem Maiwandwal as Progressive Democracy (*Demokrat-e Mutaraqi*), this group drew on political elites that had occupied the highest echelons of monarchical government.[257]

Other platforms emphasized a somewhat more rapid and significant break from monarchical rule. One of these platforms was articulated by the social democratic *Hezb-e Watan* (Fatherland Party),[258] which included figures as diverse as Mir Mohammad Siddiq Farhang, Abdul Hai Aziz, and Faruq Etemadi and was led by the historian and activist Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar.[259]

effective in dividing the educated class of Kabul.

[256]Saikal 2006, p. 158.

[257]Partly for this reason, it was criticized by more left-leaning intellectuals as a "government" party. Magnus 1969, p. 62.

[258]Not to be confused with the *Hezb-e Watan* party name adopted in place of the PDPA by Dr. Najibullah in 1990.

[259]Farhang was an official of the *Bank-e Milli* and Ministry of Mines and Industries who was indirectly related to the royal Enayat-Seraj family. Aziz was a member of a prominent Mohammadzai family and married to another Mohammadzai. Became Minister of Planning in 1963. Etemadi was a member of the Mohammadzai clan and married

Another was *Hezb-e Khalq* (People's Party),[260] a somewhat more left-leaning party that was led by Abdul Rahman Mahmudi and included Abdul Hamid Mobarez and Abdul Ahad Rashidi as members.[261] Other members of the educated class took a more radical path despite emerging out of elite schools and organizations. Babrak Karmal and Hasan Sharq, both future leaders of the *Parcham* faction of the PDPA, were students of law and medicine at Kabul University, respectively. During their university years, they participated in the leftist agitation emerging out of the KSU. Nur Taraki, the future *Khalq* leader, and Abdul Rauf Benawa, an independent who would later cooperate with the PDPA, were founders of the *Wekh Zalmayan*.

Increasing differences in the political programs of the intelligentsia and educated were compounded by demands from rural interests within the parliament. The legislature was traditionally a body without any real power. Of the thirteen parliaments that existed between 1931 and 1973, the "first 11...were simply appointive and rubber-stamp, with the exception of the so-called 'Liberal 7th.'"[262] The period of New Democracy, however, provided both greater formal and informal power to parliamentary members in the authorization legislation and cabinet positions.[263] This development was important because it accentuated the institutional dysfunction of the New Democracy period. The 1964 Constitution had called for the legalization of political parties and the establishment legislative bodies at the provincial and municipal levels in during Dr. Yusuf's interim administration (1963-1965), but legislation was not drafted until several years later. When a law establishing political parties was passed by both houses of parliament in 1970, King Zaher Shah declined to sign it (along with laws establishing provincial councils and municipal councils). As a consequence, members of parliament were elected on the basis of their personal characteristics—they did not (and could not) possess a party or organizational affiliation. A World Bank report noted that:

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to a well-known champion of women's rights, Saleha. Ghobar was an ardent opponent of the Naderi dynasty, but was nonetheless a well established member of Kabuli society. He had served in a number of administrative and diplomatic posts throughout his early career and was elected to parliament as an activist member in 1950. Within two years, he had run afoul of the government and spent the remainder of his life under house arrest or in internal exile.

[260]Not to be confused with the *Khalq* splinter group that emerged from the PDPA, founded in 1965.

[261]Mahmudi belonged to a Kabuli family that had been exiled by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan and invited back to the capital city by Amir Habibullah. Mahmudi attended Habibia high school and enrolled in Kabul University as one of the first students of the medical faculty. Mobarez was a member of the Kandahari branch of the extended royal family and a future provincial governor and Ministry of Information and Culture official during the monarchical and post-2001 periods. Rashidi was a director in the Ministry of Planning.

[262]L. Dupree 1974, p. 8.

[263]Weinbaum 1977.

> Cooperation between the legislative and executive branches of the government is still partial, and the King retains de facto a great deal of power. The failure to permit the organization of political parties has meant that the legislature has functioned without a genuine national focus. Representatives have tended to react to proposals in terms of the narrowest interests of their districts and their personal followers.[264]

In the words of one contemporary Afghan analyst, the absence of political parties meant that "[d]uring elections, campaigns centered around personalities rather than political party platforms."[265] As a body without any formal political ties to the executive, the parliament spent much of its time debating and ultimately obstructing legislation unless they served the parochial interests of most of its members.

While the moderate urban intelligentsia—including *Demokrat-e Mutaraqi*, *Hezb-e Watan*, and even *Hezb-e Khalq*—exhibited differences in leadership and specific political agendas, it held in common an orientation toward political reform, in which parties could mobilize and organize interests in multiparty elections, and the enhancement of merit and accountability in government institutions. Many of the leading government and opposition figures of the New Democracy saw a gradual assumption of power by elected non-royal figures (and the withdrawal of the royal family from political life) as a natural progression from the mixed system of patrimony and meritocracy that characterized the political system at that time. Despite these commonalities, however, elite cooperation rapidly declined during and after the New Democracy period. Under the 1964 constitution, the king possessed the authority to appoint a prime minister as head of government, and the prime minister had the power to form a cabinet. The cabinet, in turn, was expected to work with the parliament and the King to pass legislation that it would ultimately implement. While this arrangement placed greater power in the hands of educated commoners (who dominated the cabinet) than ever before, it systematically disabled the successive New Democracy governments from making both small and large decisions. In effect, the government faced vetoes from both the King and the parliament. A 1971 World Bank describes the gridlock of the New Democracy period in greater detail:

> The main product of the parliament was endless speeches and almost no decisions. The King could have intervened legally but seemed reluctant to do so. Even such a

[264]International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1971, p. 2.
[265]Zekrya 1976, p. 37.

> relatively non-controversial issue as the bill to establish an Industrial Development Bank took five years of procrastination and debate before it was approved. In 1969/70 for example, the only bill passed by the parliament was the acceptance of an interest free loan.[266]

In this context of "vetocracy,"[267] elite cooperation was almost impossible. Despite the common objectives, substantial capabilities, and largely moderate orientation of the leading figures of the educated classes, the New Democracy governments were unable to address key challenges, including an ongoing drought, political agitation from the radical left and right, and the detrimental impact of rigid bureaucratic salaries on promoting talent. Describing the efforts of the New Democracy elites to meet these immediate challenges, contemporary observer Patrick Reardon notes: "[T]he coalition of democratic forces under Kayeum and Yousuf was caught in a crossfire between the monarchy and the leftists led by Babrak. With the balance of power favoring it, the monarchy was able to take the initiative in maneuvering designed to reassert its absolute control."[268]

The 1973 coup did not change this long-term problem of decreasing elite cooperation. Daoud's republican government dissolved the parliament and gradually established a coherent domestic and foreign policy agenda, removing many of the day-to-day obstacles to policy formulation and implementation that afflicted the New Democracy governments. Daoud sought to sideline much of the political elite and build his own base of popular support in a single party system.[269] This strategy allowed the government to prioritize and implement key development objectives, notably the improvement in the performance of state owned enterprises, agricultural productivity, and revenue mobilization.

But the coup did not address the critical issue of absent institutional mechanisms for efficiently rationalizing and regulating differences among political elites, particularly those of moderate orientation—it was clearly not meant to cohere differences within the political elite. Moreover, instead of appointing more experienced, competent figures in key cabinet positions, Daoud tended to place loyalists of questionable ability in positions of power. According to then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Samad Ghaus, "[t]here was considerable pressure on Daoud from

[266]Kavalsky et al. 1977, p. 22.
[267]Fukuyama 2014, pp. 488-505.
[268]Reardon 1969, p. 178.
[269]Daoud's Party of National Revolution (*Hezb-e Enqelab-e Melli*), the only legal party in Afghanistan under the republican government, was established in July 1977 and was underdeveloped at the time of the April 1978 coup.

various quarters to drop [Minister of Finance] Abdullellah, [Minister of Interior] Kaddir, and even [Minister of Defense] Rasooli" because of "the general view was that they were corrupt and grossly mismanaged their ministries," but Daoud "stood steadfast at their side."[270] Daoud could count on the loyalty of Rasouli and Abdullellah, who were members of his NRP Central Committee, as well as former police commandant Qadir Nuristani—these three figures were part of the "inner Cabinet" in the final year of the republican government.[271] However, both Rasouli and Nuristani clearly failed to anticipate the April 1978 coup, and were poorly organized once the coup set into motion. Furthermore, despite having purged many *Parchami* officers from the armed forces, Rasouli failed to detect *Parcham* and *Khalq* officers that remained in sensitive positions of the military. In fact, Rasouli mistakenly considered one of these (*Khalq*) officers, Aslam Watanjar, to be a trusted confidant. Rasouli reportedly "considered [Watanjar] as a son and gave him free access to his house."[272]

Just as problematically, Daoud's comeback had demonstrated that a military coup was a potentially more reliable path to political power than merit. It convinced the political left that, despite a popular base of probably no more than 12,000 members,[273] it could impose its preferences through force. Having played a key role in the coup, *Parcham* members of the republican government "openly boast[ed] of being 'king makers' and the 'power behind the throne,' capable of protecting and promoting their proteges," according to then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Samad Ghaus.[274]

By 1978, Daoud's growing reliance on "friends, sons of friends, sycophants, and even collateral members of the deposed royal family" had generated tensions within his own cabinet.[275] Alarmed by Daoud's growing dependence on loyalists, six cabinet members "sent in letters of resignation but withdrew them at the personal request of the President.[276] Daoud's brother and closest advisor, Naim, also expressed his disagreement with Daoud's elevation of loyalists within

[270]Ghaus 1988, p. 191.

[271]L. Dupree [1973] 2002, p. 770.

[272]Broxup 1983, p. 105.

[273]This figure includes both the *Parcham* and *Khalq* membership. Given that leftist participation in the 1973 coup mainly came from the *Parcham* faction, the number of individuals that could be counted as active coup supporters was certainly smaller.

[274]Ghaus 1988, p. 187.

[275]L. Dupree [1973] 2002, p. 770.

[276]These six figures included Wahid Abdullah (Minister of State for Foreign Affairs), Dr. Wafiullah Sami (Justice), Ghausudin Faeq (Public Works), Azizullah Wasifi (Agriculture), Abdul Karim Attayee (Communications), and Dr. Abdullah Omar (Public Health) ibid., p. 770.

the cabinet. But by early 1978, Daoud had reconciled with Naim and the dissenting ministers. He had also began to consider a series of political and administrative reforms:

> President Daoud finally seemed to recognize the seriousness of the opposition by early April 1978, and family members were able to effect a reconciliation between Daoud and Naim. On 17 April the President told his family that he planned to announce new administrative reforms, broaden the base of power in the [NRP] Central Committee, and establish a new Cabinet of technocrats that would include leftists. Ten days later the concept of reforms became academic, and 150 years of Mohammadzai domination (with few exceptions) of Afghan politics met a bloody end in a military coup d'éat.

These potential changes were clearly too late, and they were probably too little. It was unlikely that a long term increase in elite polarization in Afghanistan could be suddenly reversed by a cabinet reshuffle or a change in party recruitment. It was also open to question whether Daoud could have organized a more diverse political base (to the extent that was possible) around a coherent domestic policy and independent foreign policy without triggering a coup event.

While it is impossible to observe the counterfactual outcome, it is much more clear that elite polarization had provided the conditions for the events of 1978. Government institutions in Afghanistan had made significant strides in capabilities and territorial reach throughout the monarchical period, but the problem of elite polarization had exerted a lasting impact on the functioning and organizational integrity of institutions by the 1970s.

Yet another important cause of institutional weakness in Afghanistan was the limited embeddedness of institutions in Afghanistan. Despite major changes in the composition of the political elite during the Naderi monarchy, the relationship between government institutions and much of rural Afghan remained limited. The upper and middle classes that staffed government institutions were almost exclusively urbanized. With few exceptions, government bureaucrats and soldiers lived and worked in Kabul, major urban centers, or otherwise small towns for their entire lives. The individuals that staffed the government had very different life experiences than members of rural society: they had undergone formal schooling and had been exposed to ideas and information that came from the Western world. They also did not interact intensively with rural Afghanistan. Provincial personnel visited or interacted with rural communities in exceptional circumstances—community-level conflicts over land, major crimes, and rebellions—but

otherwise refrained from getting involved in communal affairs.

The relationship between government institutions and society can, in part, be seen in the geographic distribution of communication, automobile traffic, and infrastructure facilities in Afghanistan. It is easy to see that substantially all postal and air service flowed through Kabul, and these services were exclusively based in cities or towns. Automobile traffic in 1968 was concentrated on the ring road that connected Kabul to the regional centers and border towns, particularly Hairatan (bordering the Uzbek SSR) and Torkham (bordering British India, later Pakistan). This traffic became more evenly distributed by 1973, in part because of the construction of feeder roads and improvement of major highways, but the roadways connected to Kabul continued to exhibit the heaviest traffic. The preeminence of Kabul, as the center of government and the home of most of the country's political elite, can also be seen in the geographic distribution of various forms of infrastructure. The vast majority of the country's hospital beds were located in Kabul. Telephones, most of which were owned by government agencies in Kabul, connected the capital city with regional centers and security posts throughout the country.

The limited interaction between institutions and society meant that government personnel did not need to expend substantial effort in regulating rural areas. But it also substantially reduced the revenue raising and development planning capabilities of the government. Despite significant foreign assistance, Kabul was unable to develop provincial administrative capabilities and pave the political foundations for greater revenue collection in the provinces. It was also clearly unable to identify and carry out small-scale rural development. Even large-scale rural development programming, notably the irrigation and electrification efforts implemented by the Helmand and Arghandab Valley Authority (HAVA) and US-based Morrison-Knudsen company, did not initially take into account the physical and social constraints to the project's potential effectiveness. The HAVA project almost immediately experienced schedule delays and cost overruns while ultimately achieving modest results because government planners failed to take into account the heavy salt deposits underneath the project land and the waterlogging that often resulted from irrigation of this land, salinizing the land tracts. Government planners also failed to properly understand the social complications that came with settling several hundred *kochi* families on land reclaimed by the government.[277] The "The kochis were not trained irrigation

[277] The *kochi* are Pashtun nomad shepherds, and therefore do not generally have a great deal of experience in irrigation

Figure 3.9. *Flow of Communication and Traffic Toward Kabul, 1968 and 1973*



Source: De Planhol 1993, p. 665.

A. Postal service, ca. 1968 (less than 10,000 letters and parcels not shown): 1. 10,000 letters and parcels. 2. 20,000 letters and parcels. 3. 30,000 letters and parcels.

B. Domestic air travel, ca. 1968: 1. 5,000 passengers. 2. 1,000 passengers.

C. Road travel, ca. 1968: 1. 50,000 vehicles per yeai 2. 10,000 vehicles per year.

D. Road travel, ca. 1973-74. 1. more than 1,000 vehicles per day. 2. 500-1,000 vehicles per day. 3. 200-499 vehicles per day. 4. 100-199 vehicles per day. 5. 50-99 vehicles per day. 6. 20-49 vehicles per day. 7. fewer than 20 vehicles per day.

Figure 3.10. *Afghanistan, Distribution of Urban Infrastructure in 1968*



Source: De Planhol 1993.

A. Hospital beds. 1. 10 hospital beds. 2. 50 hospital beds. 3. 100 hospital beds.

B. Telephone networks. 1. 100 telephones. 2. 200 telephones. 3. 100 telephones. 4. Less than 100 telephones. 5. Telephone lines in 1967.

C. Air traffic in 1967. 1. Less than 2,000 passengers on domestic flights. 1. 2,000 passengers on domestic flights. 3. 5,000 passengers on domestic flights. 4. 10,000 passengers on domestic flights. 5. 100 international flights. 6. 500 international flights. 7. 1,000 international flights.

farmers, and bad farm practices on marginal lands only aggravated the salt problem. The Government further augmented the problem by forcing different tribal groups to live in the same village."[278] As a result, "within a few years 300 kochi families had departed."[279]

Government officials, in general, had limited knowledge about the conditions of local communities. The upper- and middle-level officials that staffed government institutions were usually reasonably well informed about their home villages or districts, but they often lacked specific insight into others. These officials had spent much of their careers in Kabul or other administrative centers, and as a consequence often did not possess the degree of information about local conditions necessary to make frequent and complex interventions, particularly those that could have increased agricultural productivity and revenue mobilization.

3.3.2 External Sponsorship

A second determinant of institutional development under the Afghan monarchy was the alignment and coordination of external aid. Prior to the 1950s, foreign assistance was largely determined by the specific development needs identified by the government in cooperation with *Bank-e Melli*. Despite enormous deficits in human and material capital, the government and private industrialists sought foreign assistance to fill technical and capital gaps in completing key projects or development priorities. Beginning with the Daoud government (1953-1963), however, foreign assistance became a largely political activity. Geopolitical competition between the US and USSR generated large sums of foreign assistance that enhanced the capabilities of government institutions in some areas, notably in road building and military modernization, but either failed to develop or even undermined capabilities in other areas. After the 1950s, increasing geopolitical competition meant that political considerations often outweighed economic criteria in aid programming. This compounded the absence of coherent development planning within the Afghan government and contributed to the polarization of the political elite. While the Afghan government had certainly made poor programming decisions before the 1950s—notably, decisions relating to the Helmand and Arghandab Valley Authority project—geopolitical competition in the aid arena contributed to incoherent development planning in subsequent decades.

farming.

[278] Baron 1972.

[279] Ibid.

As described in Section 3.2, government institutions underwent important gains during the early Naderi period. This period saw the development of key export industries and the upgrading of the army. It also saw very limited foreign assistance. In the economic sphere, almost all foreign aid came in the form of advice provided by technicians from the mid-European countries, primarily France and Germany—in the words of the British Ambassador to Afghanistan in 1950, this pattern followed the "general rule that in order to avoid compromising themselves with one or other of their powerful neighbours the Afghans employed mid-European, and mainly German, experts."[280] Small-scale industries used locally available resources, capital, and labor, and the Afghan government sourced foreign machinery and advisors to address physical and human capital constraints, respectively. These ventures, by all accounts, generated high economic and social rates of return. They generated foreign currency earnings, some of which were reinvested into new enterprises and allocated to the government. They also produced a small but growing entrepreneurial class that could operate in extremely uncertain circumstances.

> Majid made the Banki Milli into more than a banking institution. It served as a focal point for investing available private and government capital in joint holding companies called sherkats. The government often granted these sherkats monopolies in such commodities as matches, motor vehicles, petroleum products, and export monopolies in karakul (erroneously called "Persian lamb" in the West), sugar, etc. These measures assured their profitability and their capacity to generate more capital to reinvest in growth or new ventures. The Banki Milli opened branches in foreign trading centers abroad such as London, Berlin, Bombay, and later in New York, in order to avoid using foreign agents through whom Afghanistan had been purchasing its imports and selling its exports.[281]

Bank-e Melli and other business houses were critically dependent on access to world markets, so the onset of World War II had a sizable negative impact on their commercial operations. Trade contracted dramatically, and with it much of the business income of small-scale industry. Here, the government and *Bank-e Melli* cooperated effectively to consolidate and rationalize the small-scale industrial sector, as illustrated by longtime observer of the Afghan economy Peter Franck:

> The capital accumulation process, well launched by 1939, was set back by the war and the attendant uncertainty in world markets, the cutting off of capital equipment deliveries from Central Europe, and a severe business dislocation. Some *shirkats*

[280] ASI Volume IV, p. 296.
[281] L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995, p. 164.

> fell apart, others became mere facades for proprietary business activities, promotion schemes, and outright profiteering. Government control over prices and essential supplies of food and cloth were not effective enough to curb black markets. To halt the growing disintegration of the country's business organization and the ensuing inflation, Banke Millie curtailed business newcomers, induced traders with idle funds to invest them in sound projects, and assumed more control over the remaining *shirkats* through amalgamation and joint management boards. By the end of 1947 the new policy had largely succeeded, and today most industrial, utility and service enterprises, as well as the bulk of foreign trade, are again in the hands of well organized *shirkats*.[282]

In the military realm, the Afghan government pursued a similar strategy of allocating assistance to needs. In order to build up an officer corps, the new administration initially sent military students to France and Germany for instruction. In subsequent years, officers were also sent to India, the USSR, Italy, Japan, and Turkey for further training. And to exercise greater control over and continuity of military education after the start of World War II, the Naderi administration re-established the prior practice of placing Turkish officers in charge of military training. The United Kingdom, which had assisted Nader Khan conquest of Kabul, provided an interest-free loan of 175,000 pounds, 10,000 rifles, and 500,000 cartridges. Germany provided another 5,000 rifles and half a million cartridges as part of a leftover credit to Afghanistan during the Amani period. Kabul later purchased another 5,000 rifles from the UK and 16,000 rifles and 1.8 million cartridges from France.[283]

These early military investments were modest, but they provided the inputs necessary to reconstitute the regular armed forces. They also occurred in an international environment with compatible interests in Afghanistan. Although the early Naderi administration faced a series of imminent and developing challenges with major and regional powers—wary governments in the USSR, Iran, and Turkey (which had enjoyed close relations with Amanullah) and deepening divisions within Europe—donor countries had limited and largely consonant interests in Afghanistan. Most external powers were content with a government in Afghanistan that could guarantee internal stability and adhere to a policy of neutrality.

The stakes in Afghanistan, however, rapidly increased with the development of the Cold War. The increase in US-Soviet competition in Afghanistan during the 1950s contributed to

[282] Franck 1949, p. 432.
[283] Gregorian 1969, p. 297.

poor and redundant development planning in Afghanistan. US-Soviet competition, for example, led to the construction of the Kandahar International Airport, a project that was not justified on economic grounds. USAID had designed the airport at Kandahar for use by piston engine planes at great expense, but by the time the airport had been completed in 1963, long distance jets had come into use. As a consequence, the Kandahar airport failed to " attract any international airlines for stopover,"[284] especially when the international airport Karachi offered a more modern and centrally located alternative. Poullada illustrates how the specter of Russian influence in Afghanistan figured into the decision to construct the Kandahar airport:

> From the beginning many difficulties plagued the American aid program. In order to preempt the civil aviation field from the Russians, American negotiators had to agree to subsidize the purchase of 49 per cent of the stock of the Afghan airline by Pan American Airways and to construct a major international airport in Kandahar against the advice of aviation experts. Later the rationale was forgotten by Afghans and Americans and this cold war "white elephant" was criticized by both. It is now an excellent base for projecting Soviet air power into the Persian Gulf-perhaps a fair trade for Berbera?[285]

By 1961, Afghanistan had become an "economic Korea," in the words of US Ambassador Henry A. Byroade (see Figure 3.11).[286] Byroade recognized that this model of joint Soviet and American resourcing carried its own risks—detecting changes in the policy preferences of the Afghan leadership would be difficult because of the "slow and nondramatic nature" of incremental institutional development—but he largely discounted the impact that joint economic resourcing could have on the quality of institutions themselves.[287] Both the US and USSR had come to view the other's foreign assistance program in highly political and threatening terms. From the perspective of both superpowers, a small foreign assistance program with few large-scale, physically impressive projects would inevitably provide a political opportunity for one's rival. Herbert Hoover Jr., then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, noted in June 1955 that in "Afghan situation most important single present consideration is need for preventing Afghans falling under Soviet control."[288] This political consideration came to dominate American aid decisions.

[284]Zekrya 1976, p. 91.
[285]L. B. Poullada 1981, p. 185.
[286]Byroade 1961, p. 22.
[287]Ibid., p. 22.
[288]FRUS, 1955-1957, South Asia, Volume VIII, eds. Robert J . McMahon and Stanley Shaloff (Washing-

When the HAVA project was running into technical difficulties, the United States sought to increase its involvement in the project without closely examining its merits. To justify the increased commitment, a joint US-Afghan committee produced a report that "projected income from the Helmand and Arghandab areas to the year 2050...but any substantive analysis was egregiously lacking."[289] A primary American consideration in increasing the American commitment without further study was its political standing in Afghanistan. As US Ambassador Byroade stated in a March 1962 cable to Washington,"[w]ith this [HAVA] project, the American reputation in Afghanistan is completely linked."[290]

The Soviet Union was also primarily concerned with denying American influence rather than the content of its aid program. In a revealing comment in 1956, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev underscored that he viewed American assistance to Afghanistan as an essentially political program that required Soviet aid to counter it: "It was clear to us that the Americans were penetrating Afghanistan with the obvious purpose of setting up a military base... The amount of money we spent in gratuitous assistance to Afghanistan is a drop in the ocean compared to the price we would have had to pay in order to counter the threat of an American military base on Afghan territory."[291] Soviet economic advisor Valerii Ivanov also highlighted the political nature of Moscow's assistance to Afghanistan:

> [W]e never approached the issue from crudely commercial positions, we acted on the basis that this was a neighboring country with which we had had very long relations... And naturally, as I understand it, from a political point of view we wanted Afghanistan to be closer to us than to anyone else... The only strategy was to have friendly relations with this country, because they were our neighbors. And God forbid that there should be some crisis or war there.[292]

The Soviet preference for Afghanistan to be closer to the USSR than any other country in part motivated it to select projects not entirely on economic criteria. Beginning in 1960, the

ton: Government Printing Office, 1987), Document 92. `https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d92` [accessed October 7, 2015].

[289]The committee was chaired by an official from the US International Cooperation Administration and included officials from the Helmand Valley Authority (then the Afghan government organization responsible for the project), the Export-Import Bank, and Morrison-Knudsen representatives. It also included participation from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the US embassy in Kabul. Baron 1972, p. 21.

[290]Department of State, "Elements of U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan," March 27, 1962, p. 17, *Declassified Documents Reference System.*

[291]Khrushchev 1970, pp. 560-562.

[292]Paul Robinson and Dixon 2013.

Figure 3.11. *Major Aid Allocations by Donor, 1929–1978*



Source: Franck 1960; Horvath 1970; U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) n.d.; author's calculations.

Notes: Aid allocations only include amounts that were ultimately disbursed. The timing of aid allocations is based on the year in which the allocation was committed, not received by the Afghan government.

Soviet Union began construction on a large power and irrigation project in Kabul and Nangarhar provinces. The Nangarhar Valley Authority (NVA) project, as it became known, included the construction of dams and hydroelectric power stations on the Kabul River at Naghlo (eastern Kabul province) and Darunta (western Nangarhar). While Moscow had developed a record of efficient and pragmatic project implementation,[293] like the United States it occasionally designed projects that were politically promising but were not, at the outset, justified on purely economic grounds. Dupree notes that the NVA project was "plagued with as many problems as the H.A.V.A." because of a lack of initial planning. Moscow, for example, did not thoroughly inspect the Darunta dam site prior to construction: "the dam site at Darunta, selected by the Russians, had unstable strata and had to be grouted. Russian engineers still keep their technical

[293] Horvath 1970.

fingers crossed."[294] Afghan planners, who were responsible for selecting and vetting development projects in the first place, did little to scrutinize or amend project plans designed by Soviet and American administrators. And planners in Kabul were easily impressed by the size of such large infrastructure projects. In the observation of one contemporary scholar, Afghan government officials were "mainly concerned with the size of the development projects and programs and did not pay enough attention to the viability or the management of these programs so as to optimize their impact on production, income, and employment. Few examples of these type of projects. . .[include the] Helmand and Nangarhar Valleys projects and Kandahar International Airport."[295]

Geopolitical competition did not always result in poor aid outcomes, particularly when development projects were carefully programmed and sustained by Afghan planners. The Afghan leadership, for example, successfully integrated the Soviet and American construction plans of the Kabul International Airport, a flagship project that it had developed, prioritized, and followed across time. Kabul appointed General Khwazak Zalmai, a military engineer and commanding officer in the Labor Corps (*quwa-ye kar*),[296] to plan, coordinate, and oversee the Soviet technicians that constructed the runways and terminal building by April 1963 and the American engineers that installed the electronic equipment by February 1966.[297] The construction of the ring road linking Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif, was another joint Soviet-American development project that was prioritized by Kabul. With unanimous and sustained support from Kabul, the Soviet Union (from the north) and United States (from the south) jointly photographed construction areas, established common benchmarks, and coordinated project development at a level of detail that specified where Soviet and American engineers would meet. Dupree described this process in greater detail:

> In addition, the Soviets and Americans complemented each other in the areas of development. The Soviets aerially photographed the northern one-third of Afghanistan, and the Americans (under a Fairchild contract) did the same for the southern two-thirds. Common bench marks had to be established so the maps could overlap. Joint US-USSR-Afghan teams established the appropriate bench marks. The Soviets built

[294] L. Dupree [1973] 2002, p. 640.

[295] Zekrya 1976, p. 213.

[296] The Labor Corps was a section of the Afghan Army responsible for constructing large-scale infrastructure projects and providing support services for combat units.

[297] Ruiz 2013, p. 209.

> roads from the Soviet border, the Americans built roads from the Pakistan border, and these two segments had to meet somewhere. Again, joint teams oversaw the meeting points.[298]

Nonetheless, Soviet and American resourcing during the 1960s often resulted in dysfunctional development planning. By this time, both superpowers had their own teams present in the Ministry of Planning, where they selected projects on the basis of potential political impact—"relatively large projects in the public sector"[299]—not economic promise. A World Bank study reports, "Afghanistan received relatively large amounts of foreign assistance during the 60s and there can be little doubt that this was in part motivated by the cold war rivalries between the USA and the USSR, the two major donors. The rivalry extended even to technical assistance and for much of the period both countries had teams in the Planning Ministry. Inevitably in these circumstances, the selection of projects often bore little relation to their economic viability."[300] The Afghan government, in turn, was eager to take advantage of US-Soviet competition in programming aid for Afghanistan, but given its own inability to prioritize and plan development needs, was not particularly concerned with the quality and feasibility of aid projects proposed by either superpower.

> Both Cold War camps virtually forced loans and grants on the Afghans, who, it must be stated, accepted them with alacrity and without apprehending the end results. But neither the Afghans nor the donor nations understood the implications of the massive influx of foreign assistance. The Cold War adversaries merely wanted to gain friends and influence people (if we accept some altruism for one side, we must also for the other); some Afghans genuinely saw foreign aid as a means of rapid, relatively painless development; other Afghans simply wanted to benefit in one way or another from the aid.L. Dupree [1973] 2002

By the 1970s, US-Soviet détente was exerting an adverse effect on the operations of large-scale development projects planned in Afghanistan during the prior decade. These projects had "been dictated as much by strategic or ideological considerations as economic ones, and most projects [had] needed heavy ongoing commitments of finance and manpower both for capital and current expenditures to realize even their modest returns."[301] American interest in Afghanistan, and to

[298]L. Dupree 1988, p. 148.
[299]International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1969, p. 11.
[300]Kavalsky et al. 1977.
[301]International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1971.

lesser extent that of the Soviet Union, had declined considerably. This was a problematic development for large, long-dated projects that needed ongoing technical assistance and financing to cover operations and maintenance. In the words of longtime Afghanistan observer Leon Poullada, the American assistance program "lacked steadfastness. As the global Soviet threat shaded off into detente, the program lost momentum and received declining appropriations."[302] Projects like HAVA that experienced costly technical and administrative problems in their early years were beginning to generate noticeable returns in human capital and production, but by the 1970s such projects experienced funding shortfalls in meeting maintenance costs and supporting the rapid agricultural growth in adjoining areas. The World Bank, a critic of the HAVA project, noted that "[w]hatever the past failings, the Helmand Valley now makes an important contribution to the national economy, notably in supporting a rapidly growing cotton/textile complex and providing a substantial surplus of wheat."[303] Even relatively successful economic interventions like road construction experienced funding shortfalls in the 1970s. The highway system required follow-on maintenance and improvements as automobile traffic increased, but assistance was not forthcoming despite the promise of outsized economic returns to upgrading these roads.[304] With a comparatively low ratio of road to cultivated land of 0.354 km/km^2, Afghanistan needed a higher number of rural roads if it was to develop its agricultural economy. The World Bank reported that the "principal need is to improve certain existing sections and to upgrade their maintenance. The secondary and tertiary roads linking the rural provinces, small towns, villages and farms with the major highways, are generally substandard to handle traffic at reasonable cost. In many cases, they constitute real bottlenecks to the economic development of their hinterlands."[305] Instead of pursuing relatively promising projects such as rural road infrastructure, donors instead proposed "low priority projects" for the government's 1976 development strategy that would take a relatively long time to complete—a copper smelter, a steelmaking factory, and

[302]L. B. Poullada 1981, p. 186.

[303]Kavalsky et al. 1977, p. 66.

[304]Fry reports that a detailed analysis prepared by advisory firm Kampsax "estimated the following returns from improving roads to the next grade: overall return to all proposed work, 33 per cent; improvement from B2 to Bl roads 41 per cent, from C to B2 roads 31 per cent and from D to C roads 33 per cent. On a geographic breakdown, highest returns were expected in the eastern region. One proposed improvement was expected to yield an internal rate of return of 73 per cent. For the initial selection of roads, a discount rate for future direct user benefits of 20 per cent was used. This rate was chosen because Ministry of Public Works' projects generally yielded a return of this magnitude and funds allocated were known to be insufficient to cover all improvements yielding more than 20 per cent. Fry 1974, pp. 205-206.

[305]Kavalsky et al. 1977, p. 140.

a fertilizer plant—and would require substantial upkeep once constructed.[306]

3.4 Alternative Explanations

The rise and fall of government institutions during the monarchical period in Afghanistan could be explained by other factors. This period saw different types of threats become more salient across time—notably an external conflict with Pakistan over the status of the Pashtun and Baluch areas of western Pakistan, and an increasingly active internal threat from the political left. It was also characterized by increasing ethnic and class diversity in government institutions: the predominantly Mohammadzai-led monarchy of the 1930s (even then, most of the government apparatus was staffed by ethnic Tajiks and Persian-speaking figures of non-Tajik descent) had become much more ethnically and economically diverse by the 1960s. Can these alternative factors of external threats, internal conflict, and ethnicity explain the trajectory of government institutions during the Naderi monarchy and the successive republican government? This section evaluates these explanations in turn.

3.4.1 External Threats

External threat explanations usually make the argument that outside threats or rivals motivate governments to develop more capable government institutions. These approaches, however, make little sense of the trajectory of institutions in prewar Afghanistan. Early Afghan governments sought to expand the reach of military institutions into Herat, Afghan Turkestan, and other regional areas governed by pre-1929 administrations in order to reintegrate them into the national territory. These areas were historically under the sovereignty of the Afghan monarchy, and the Naderi government sought to preserve the territory that previous Afghan governments had directly ruled. As a result, the Naderi monarchy were much more concerned with preserving the existing national territory than confronting neighboring powers. For example, the June 1930 incursion of Soviet forces into Afghanistan led the nascent Naderi government to take control over the northern provinces, paving the way for a long-term military presence in Mazar-e Sharif, Nahrin (a central-north district of Baghlan province), Maimana (Faryab province) and Faizabad

[306] Kavalsky et al. 1977, p. viii.

(Badakhshan province).

Furthermore, the external rivalry with Pakistan over the Pashtunistan issue made government institutions in Afghanistan *worse off as a result*, and in three separate ways.[307] First, the military rivalry with Pakistan, which became most intense during Daoud's tenure as Prime Minister and as President of the post-coup Republic, served to exacerbate political divisions within Kabul. The demand for Pashtunistan increased the divide between Daoud loyalists and emerging PDPA figures, who sought to coerce Pakistan into recognizing Pashtunistan as an autonomous entity or as a part of Afghanistan, and Zahir supporters and most of the bureaucracy, which preferred a more pragmatic, diplomatic approach toward Pakistan. The latter group had become increasingly alienated from Daoud and his leftist allies after observing the consequences of his confrontational strategy toward Pakistan during his tenure as Prime Minister.

Second, military rivalry generated substantial economic costs for Afghanistan by leading to four distinct episodes of closure or semi-closure of the Torkham and Chaman transit points of entry into Pakistan.[308] In 1948, when Afghanistan voted against the admission of Pakistan into the United Nations, Islamabad responded with a partial blockade of goods in transit to Afghanistan, negatively affecting both small-scale farmers and large government projects.[309] In 1950, amid a growing propaganda war between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Pakistani government blockaded the import of petroleum products and other goods in transit. The trade blockade remained in place for approximately three months, effectively immobilizing the Afghan Army.[310] Cross-border conflict emerged again in 1953, resulting in another informal Pakistani blockade of Afghan trade.[311] And on March 27, 1955, when Pakistan controversially announced that it would centralize the administration of its western provinces (then West Pakistan), the two countries came close to war and the Afghan economy disproportionately suffered as a consequence.[312] Pakistan's "One Unit" policy prompted a strong denouncement from Daoud and mob incursions of the Pakistan

[307]This rivalry was centered on the status of the Pashtun and Baluch areas of western Pakistan, which Afghanistan claimed as its own, or otherwise an independent political entity.

[308]This is not to suggest that the Pakistan's posture toward Afghanistan has always been natural, or even logical. For an assessment of Pakistan's foreign policy behavior toward Afghanistan since 2001, see Nadiri 2014.

[309]L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995, p. 99.

[310]L. B. Poullada 1982; Ramazani 1958; Compounding the dispute was the fact that the Afghan and Pakistani ambassadorial positions in Karachi and Kabul, respectively, were left vacant between 1949 and 1954. See Qureshi 1966, p. 500.

[311]Wilber 1962, p. 270.

[312]L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995.

missions in Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. Encouraged by the Afghan government, the Kabul mob ransacked the embassy premises and burned the Pakistani flag. The Pakistan government responded in kind with mob attacks on Afghan consulates in Quetta and Peshawar,[313] leading both countries to close their respective embassies and consulates, and begin to mobilize the armed forces for a military confrontation.[314] Aiming to topple Daoud, Pakistan unsuccessfully sought US support to pressure Zahir into dismissing Daoud or to raise a rebellion against him. The crisis was eventually resolved in September 1955, only after informal diplomatic efforts by the US and formal mediation efforts by Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. The five-month crisis was over, but with little closure for either Afghanistan or Pakistan.

A fourth, much larger and longer confrontation between the two countries developed in late 1960. In Pakistani-administered Dir, a territorial dispute between the Nawab of Dir (together with his son the Khan of Jandol) and the Khan of Khar had attracted the interest of Kabul and Islamabad. Prompted by the political unrest, Daoud dispatched several thousand Afghan irregulars and Afghan Army soldiers dressed as tribesmen to the neighboring Bajaur area in September 1960 to support the Nawab and his son against the Pakistan-sponsored Khan of Khar. The Afghan contingent were repulsed by forces supporting the Khan of Khar, but the dispute did not end there. In the months that followed, Radio Kabul and Radio Peshawar exchanged barbs over the affair, and in May 1961, a second round of violence in Bajaur had begun. A larger contingent of civilian-clothed Afghan troops entered Bajaur, but were met by the Bajaur Scouts, a locally-recruited paramilitary unit, the First Punjab Regiment, and Pakistani air support.[315] By August 1961, Pakistan had closed its consular offices in Afghanistan and demanded that Afghanistan close down

[313]Pakistan also sought the removal of Daoud from the prime ministry. In a meeting with US Ambassador to Pakistan Horace Hildreth on May 6, 1955, the Pakistani civilian leadership stated that it was "cabinet policy" to pursue the "removal of GOA Prime Minister Daud." Hildreth's reporting is worth quoting at length: "I got five-minute separate talks with Foreign Office Secretary Baig, Finance Minister Chaundhri Mohamad Ali, Minister Interior Mirza and Prime Minister. Asked each what real crux of problem with Afghanistan was and each gave same firm reply, essence of which was 'removal of GOA Prime Minister Daud'. I asked each Minister separately if this was Cabinet policy or their personal opinion and each answered 'cabinet policy'. Each also said with varying degree of emphasis, however, that if Daud removed as GOA Prime Minister GOP would back down fast on its demands and start a new chapter in the book of GOP/GOA relations. Mirza and Baig said I was welcome to tell Ward they hoped he would make this reasonably clear to King and Royal family." FRUS, 1955-1957, South Asia, Volume VIII, eds. Robert J . McMahon and Stanley Shaloff (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1987), Document 89. `https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d89` [accessed October 7, 2015].

[314]L. B. Poullada 1982, pp. 104-105; L. Dupree [1973] 2002, pp. 538-539.

[315]The First Punjab Regiment was quickly withdrawn from the area after the Bajauris "violently objected to the presence of the regular Pakistan army. See L. Dupree [1973] 2002, p. 540; For an account of Pakistani decision-making during the Bajaur incident, see Khan 1993, pp. 105-108.

its Pakistan-based consular posts and trade agencies—shutting down much of the transit trade to and from Afghanistan via the Pakistan border. Kabul responded with an ultimatum in September 1961 demanding that Pakistan reverse its decision or else Afghanistan would recall its diplomatic mission in Islamabad. When Pakistan refused, both countries cut off diplomatic relations and activity across the border came to a virtual standstill. After repeated American diplomatic efforts failed to resolve the dispute, it took the intervention of US President Kennedy and the Shah of Iran, along with major changes in Afghan and Pakistani domestic politics (including the resignation of Daoud and the replacement of Ayub's hard-line Foreign Minister, Manzur Qader) to end the conflict in 1963.

Finally, the rivalry with Pakistan exposed Afghanistan to Soviet influence in ways that ultimately worked against the autonomy of Afghan institutions.[316] The rivalry with Pakistan, *combined with* American reluctance to provide military assistance to Afghanistan, led Kabul to develop closer military links with Moscow in the middle 1950s. By 1950, Pakistani border closures had already led Kabul to develop a commercial corridor through its northern border with the Soviet Union, which was followed by an Afghan-Soviet transit treaty and $100 million Soviet aid package in 1955.[317] And after Afghan requests for military assistance from the United States were repeatedly rejected,[318] Kabul began to develop closer military links with Moscow. In August 1956, Daoud announced the signing of an eight-year $25 million credit of military aid from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and East Germany). The Soviet Union also used the Pashtunistan dispute to differentiate itself from the United States in the diplomatic arena. While Soviet support for Pashtunistan was largely superficial,[319] it appealed to sections of the army and bureaucracy that were stridently opposed to Pakistan or supportive of Pashtunistan.

The growing military relationship with Moscow arrangement clearly enhanced the military capabilities of the Afghan government—it provided the fledgling Afghan Army access to jet aircraft, Soviet Ilyushin-14 planes, helicopters, and other military hardware that allowed the force

[316]L. Dupree 1960.

[317]L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995, pp. 106-108.

[318]Kabul had sought military assistance from the United States since 1944 as a counterweight to Soviet influence, with little success. See L. B. Poullada 1981.

[319]Moscow backed Afghanistan's demand for a plebiscite in the Pashtun areas of (then) West Pakistan in 1955, but its support was mainly rhetorical. The Soviets, for example, never supported the issue in the United Nations or included it in its public agenda. L. Dupree 1960, p. 10.

to defeat a variety of internal threats—but it also created patterns of long-term military dependence on Moscow. As Louis Dupree observed, "[m]ilitary arms and equipment are followed by instructors and spare parts. Pilots and mechanics must be trained to fly and maintain aircraft; infantrymen must learn the intricacies of their new equipment." Soon the Turkish military officers that had trained or advised the Afghan army since 1907 were replaced with Soviet advisers.[320] By the 1970s, the Afghan leadership had become extremely concerned with Soviet involvement in the Afghan military. In a meeting with US President Ford, Daoud's brother and special envoy, Naim, stated that "a number of our military people [sent to the Soviet Union for training] have not only been trained in arms but have received political indoctrination. Numerically they don't represent a significant percent, but they are mostly in jobs which are critical."[321]

In a revealing meeting one day earlier with Secretary of State Kissinger, Naim laid out how the rivalry with Pakistan and the subsequent US refusal to provide arms had led Kabul into Moscow's embrace. Naim's remarks are worth quoting at length:

> There was a time in the recent history of world politics when emphasis was placed on the formation of military alliances. At that time, there were tensions with Pakistan. During that period, I was Ambassador to the U.S. In view of the tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, we thought that our defenses had to be improved. We presented a request to the State Department for very limited arms. This request was refused by the U.S. Afghanistan was cornered in a situation where the people expected the government to do something and the question of Afghanistan's security was widely discussed. A decision was finally made to seek help from whatever source to ease the country's security problems. That is why Afghanistan began contacts with the Soviet Union. The Soviets were prepared to give Afghanistan arms. This then led to economic cooperation which brought with it people and technicians from the Soviet Union. I remember well my first visit with the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul many years ago. I told him that we wanted to be good neighbors but that we have a different ideological outlook from that of the Soviet Union. I said that if the Soviet Union intended to have a continuing good relationship with Afghanistan aid and ideology must be separated. I was, of course, expressing views of only one Afghan. In the first few years they tried to control the ideological and political side of our relationship. The situation, however, changed afterwards. The former regime in Afghanistan brought about an anarchical situation with a new constitution. The Soviet Union then found it easy to forget what had been said before.[322]

[320] B. Jalali 2006, p. 63.

[321] FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume E-8, Documents on South Asia, eds. Paul J. Hibbeln and Peter A. Kraemer (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 26. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e8/96863.htm [accessed November 8, 2014]]

[322] FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume E-8, Documents on South Asia, eds. Paul J. Hibbeln and Peter A. Kraemer (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 24. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/

Naim, who had long been seen an advocate of Pashtunistan (although less so than Daoud), concluded that the territorial dispute had contributed to the politicization of institutions in Afghanistan. While the Pashtunistan issue enjoyed support from many sections of Afghan society, the antagonistic approach taken by Afghan governments in earlier years, notably during the Daoud prime ministry, had come to threaten the survival of government institutions several decades later.

3.4.2 Internal Conflict

Yet another potential explanation for the record of institutional development in monarchical Afghanistan could be the type and intensity of internal conflicts that developed within the country. According to this explanation, internal conflicts that are intense, and urban are expected to produce more effective and durable institutions, particularly "under relatively pluralistic political forms – i.e., weak states and unstable democratic regimes."[323] Yet this argument does not clarify the Afghanistan case. The New Democracy period, for example, contradicts the expectations of the internal conflict arguments: severe and persistent urban conflict under pluralism produced decidedly weaker institutions. As Section 3.2.3 shows, urban, class-oriented protests paralyzed the government and made national planning more difficult. This was because the political elite, including the king, Daoud, and the successive governments during the New Democracy period had different threat perceptions of leftist agitation and divergent responses to it. In general, King Zahir generally adopted a more circumspect approach toward the leftist groups, and likely for this reason attempted to block these parties from gaining an ultimately negligible number of seats in the 1965 parliamentary elections—including an attempt "to block the campaign activities of Dr. Anahita [Ratebzad], a woman candidate from Kabul and a Marxist."[324] Daoud, on the other hand, quietly but actively cooperated with the leftist groups during this time as a way of indirectly influencing Afghan politics. And the non-royal elite that participated in the New Democracy governments was "caught in a crossfire between the monarchy and the leftists led by Babrak [Karmal]."[325] Leftist agitation, then, failed to create a "protection pact" among politi-

`frus1969-76ve08/d24` [accessed November 8, 2014]]

[323]Slater 2010, p. 14.

[324]Reardon 1969, p. 175.

[325]Ibid., p. 178.

cal elites during the New Democracy period, contradicting the expectations of internal conflict arguments.

3.4.3 Ethnicity

Institutional development in Afghanistan is often examined in terms of ethnic difference. Given the well established cross-national correlation between ethnic diversity and institutional weakness, Afghanistan's multiethnicity is often thought to be a explanation for the eventual downfall of the Naderi state. It has been established here and elsewhere that ethnicity clearly did play a role in Afghan politics during the Naderi era. Nader Khan and his family were members of the Pashtun Mohammadzai clan, and the vast majority of appointees to senior political and security positions descended from the Mohammadzai lineage during the early Naderi period. However, a closer examination reveals a series of cross-cutting linkages and cleavages that made ethnicity of increasingly limited relevance during the Naderi period. First, the Mohammadzai families of Kabul shared much in common with prominent Kabuli familes of different ethnic backgrounds. Having settled in Kabul in the late 18th century, the Mohammadzai lineages had been socialized into the unique culture and language of the capital city. Members of the Mohammadzai lineages went to the same lycées, participated in similar occupations, and shared the same cultural markers as a wide range of prominent Kabuli families of different ethnic backgrounds. As a consequence, allies and opponents of the Mohammadzai dynasty tended to view it through the prism of class and ideology, not ethnicity. Second, a substantial number of cabinet positions (almost 50%) and a majority of central sub-cabinet positions were occupied by non-Pashtuns (primarily ethnic Tajiks) native to the Kabul area. While certain monarchical elites—notably, Hashem Khan[326]—had explicitly articulated the view that the Pashto language and other elements of Pashtun culture should be promoted within the government, these efforts were quickly abandoned because the vast majority of government officials, including ethnic Pashtuns, were native Kabulis and were therefore unwilling to adopt a different regional identity. Finally, many of the prominent Mohammadzai families had married into other non-Pashtun families, diminishing the salience of ethnic and regional origin in the capital city.[327]

[326]Maillart 1940.

[327]For more general description of this process, see Nadiri and Hakimyar 2017.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter showed that the traditional conflict in Afghanistan between center and periphery was largely resolved during the middle 20th century. The period of the Naderi monarchy saw the rise of a military and bureaucracy that had defeated rural rebellions, undertook complex economic and development projects, some of them highly successful, and had developed channels of training and recruiting talent for the government. However, the struggle between center and periphery that traditionally characterized state-society relations in Afghanistan increasingly became replaced by conflicts within the political elite over the composition and objectives of government institutions. This chapter showed that the consolidation and then polarization of the political elite in Afghanistan along with the rise US-USSR competition over resourcing help to explain this outcome.

In the next chapter, we will examine how the April 1978 coup dramatically changed the course of government institutions in Afghanistan and how the Soviet Union sought to salvage the PDPA regime. We will also see that organizational dysfunction, albeit in much more intensified form than during the monarchical period, would once again erode the military and bureaucracy in Afghanistan in spite of Soviet military intervention and increased foreign assistance to the PDPA regime.

4 Revolution and Institutional Breakdown, 1978-1992

> Lenin emphasized that a revolution could be worth anything [only] if it knew how to protect itself. This great mission can be fulfilled only if the PDPA acts as a united and closely-knit political organization held together by one will and a common goal.
>
> Advice from USSR Central Committee to Hafizullah Amin[328]

The coup d'etat carried out by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) on April 27 and 28, 1978 abruptly altered the relationship between government and society in Afghanistan. Celebrated as a revolution by pro-coup partisans, the PDPA takeover of the government apparatus drew on an ideology, Marxism-Leninism, that had very limited roots in Afghan society and would also require an unprecedented level of government control over society if it was to be realized. The PDPA government expanded the surveillance and detention of urbanites directly or indirectly connected to the *ancien régime* or opposition groups, while seeking to rapidly expand the limited physical infrastructure and industrial capacity of the country. It also sought to reorganize economic and social relations in the countryside through land redistribution and the formation of village cooperatives. The largely unfamiliar ideology and policies of the PDPA would almost immediately become an obstacle to the stability of the political system in Afghanistan.[329] Large numbers of educated professionals fled or defected against what was perceived to be an unworkable form of government in Afghanistan, greatly reducing the stock

[328]Morozov, A. "Between Amin and Karmal." *New Times*, no. 38 (1991): 36-39.

[329]It should be noted that the actions of the Afghan Marxists were not entirely unprecedented. Senzil Nawid draws parallels between the policies of the PDPA and Amir Amanullah Khan, but also highlights fundamental differences in ideology and foreign relations. See Nawid 1993.

of human capital in and outside of the government. Meanwhile, the Marxist character of the regime leadership and policies gave rise to violent opposition fronts across Afghanistan, generating persistently high costs of insecurity and agricultural dislocation in the rural areas of the country.

But while the ideas and objectives of the PDPA regime were self-defeating, other factors played a role in the initial destabilization, subsequent survival, and ultimate fall of the PDPA system. This chapter makes the argument that organizational dysfunction within the PDPA played the leading role in the rapid deterioration of Afghan government authority prior to the Soviet invasion, and that Soviet economic and military support provided a concentrated but largely directionless meanss of managing conflict within the PDPA. More specifically, it argues that conflicts within the PDPA consumed a substantial level of regime resources, while also creating incentives for factional leaders to award patronage on the basis of loyalty instead of competency. It also makes the argument that Soviet support, in the form of military equipment, economic aid, technical assistance, and direct firepower, largely kept the regime together by providing a direct and concentrated flow of economic and military assistance to Kabul. However, Soviet support did not by itself address the organizational organizational dysfunction within the PDPA regime. This conundrum was never fully resolved. By the late 1980s, Moscow had effectively abandoned efforts to build up institutions in Afghanistan, instead seeking to use patronage to keep the PDPA-led government in power long enough to outlive the insurgency. Soviet assistance became indispensable to the day-to-day survival of the PDPA regime. As a consequence, when the Soviet Union itself disintegrated, the PDPA government fell apart with it.

In the following sections, I first describe and then attempt to explain the institutional development of the PDPA regime. In the next section, I briefly describe the composition of the PDPA and its rise to power. In Section 4.2.1, I outline the development of the security sector and economy in Afghanistan under PDPA rule. In Section 4.2.2, I evaluate the organizational and resourcing explanations for these outcomes. In Section 4.4, I briefly assess alternative arguments. I conclude in Section 4.5.

4.1 New Leadership

The April 1978 coup was ostensibly carried out by a single organization—the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan—but in fact it was a cooperative effort between military officers and political leaders affiliated with the *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions of the Afghan Marxist-Leninist movement.[330] The coup drew primarily on the military leadership of Abdul Qader (*Parcham*-affiliated Chief of Staff of the Air Force), Mohammad Rafi (*Parcham*-affiliated tank officer and Lieutenant Colonel in the army), Mohammad Aslam Watanjar (Chief of Staff of the 4th Armored Brigade and a *Khalq* follower), and Sayyed Mohammad Gulabzoy (a *Khalq*-affiliated Air Force officer). With approximately 600 military personnel, 50 to 60 tanks, and 20 warplanes, a relatively small group of *Parcham*- and *Khalq*-affiliated military officers carried out the coup in less than 24 hours, from 6 a.m. on April 27 until the following morning.[331]

Internal PDPA cooperation, however, had been a recent phenomenon at the time of the coup. The PDPA had split in 1967, only two years after its formation,[332] into a group that followed Nur Mohammad Taraki, founder of the *Khalq* ("Masses" in Pashto and Persian) newspaper, and one that followed Babrak Karmal, who was editor of the *Parcham* ("Flag") periodical. These two groups remained rival claimants to the PDPA for much of the decade prior to the April 1978 coup, in part because their respective leaderships represented different strands of urban society

[330]While there is a substantial body of scholarship on the causes and consequences of the April 1978 coup, there remains a number of outstanding questions as to its precise mechanics. First, we do not fully know the extent to which the civilian PDPA leadership (particularly Hafizullah Amin, who was deeply involved in cultivating *Khalq* affiliates in the Afghan army prior to the coup) was involved in directing the *Parcham*- and *Khalq*-aligned military officers that executed the coup. Former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin claims that a deputy of Amin, "Figir," was involved in organizing the military formations that participated in the coup. Bradsher, however, suggests that the military officers that carried out the coup were acting on their own. These officers announced a "revolutionary council of the armed forces" on the evening of April 27, but this council was replaced by a civilian-led Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on April 30. In the following months, a regular cabinet took over governance of the country. Bradsher 1985, pp. 76-84; Second, the precise role of the Soviet Union in the coup remains unclear. The USSR was intimately involved in the formation and development of the PDPA and had received advance warning of the plot against Daoud from (*Khalqi*) Sayyed Mohammad Gulabzoy and (*Parchami*) Mohammad Rafi. Furthermore, some of the 350 Soviet military advisors in Afghanistan during the coup were observed as having participated in its execution. However, Moscow may not have been involved in directly planning and coordinating the coup. According to former KGB archivist Mitrokhin, "had little knowledge of the situation in the country, misinterpreted the situation and were hedging against the possibility that the attempted coup would not succeed." What is clear is that the Soviet Union had prepared the way for a possible coup in Afghanistan throughout the middle 20th century, and aided the coup once it was set into motion. For more information on Soviet participation, see Bradsher 1985, pp. 82-84; Broxup 1983; Mitrokhin 2002, p. 26.

[331]Hyman 1992, p. 75.

[332]The PDPA was officially founded on January 1, 1965, but the organizational work that led to its formation began in mid-1963. These organizational activities in turn, grew out of regularly held discussion groups among urban intellectuals beginning in 1956. See Arnold 1983, p. 25.

in Afghanistan in terms of class, personality, ethnicity, and strategy. The principal figures of the *Parcham* faction were largely comprised of upper-class professionals from educated commoner families that had resided in Kabul or other urban centers for several generations. *Parchami* leaders attended the same schools and participated in many of the same social functions as the royal clan and other leading families of Kabul. Perhaps as a result, the leadership of *Parcham* favored a more incremental path toward achieving socialism, based on the belief that class consciousness, industrialization, and urbanization would need to be developed before a socialist revolution could be realized. Until the conditions for revolution were in place, cooperation with non-socialist groups would be possible so long as it served the long-term objective of achieving socialism in Afghanistan.[333]

In contrast to Parcham, the *Khalq* faction had deeper roots in rural Afghanistan. The leading figures in the *Khalq* group had resettled from their native villages to Kabul and other urban centers during their formative years to pursue high school education and employment. It was in the cities that they first encountered the machinery of government, which they (mistakenly) saw as an exceptionally powerful but under-employed instrument of social change. In the eyes of the *Khalqis*, who primarily occupied the junior ranks of the civil service and military, the royal family and other upper classes obstructed the urban middle classes and peasantry from actively pursuing social and economic development in Afghanistan. It was also in the cities that the would-be *Khalqis* developed an especially strong sense of class consciousness. Among the rural-origin recruits of the *Khalq* faction, the message of revolution resonated because they were on the margins of the political elite, which was dominated by educated commoners and and Mohammadzai families that had lived in Kabul for generations.

In part because of the differing class basis of the *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions, the division between the two groups took on an ethnic dimension. The upper classes from which *Parcham* recruited were primarily composed of Persian speaking Tajiks or "Persianized" non-Tajiks—mainly Pashtuns who had adopted Persian as their primary language. By contrast, the *Khalq* faction

[333]Parcham's urban composition, establishment connections, and evolutionary political strategy left it open to criticism from the more zealous *Khalqis*, especially after *Parcham* elected to participate in Daoud's coup and subsequent republican government. Dupree noted that "many urban Afghans believed that a connection existed between the ruling 'establishment' and Parcham, which they jokingly, but pointedly, called the 'Royal Communist Party."' See L. Dupree 1979, Parcham's heterodox approach to achieving socialism were viewed favorably by the Soviet Union, which saw the revolutionary policies of the Taraki and Amin period as poorly suited for the conditions of Afghan society.

primarily drew on the growing rural-to-urban population of Pashtuns and other ethnic communities in Kabul patronized under the Mohammadzai monarchy. Like most political groups in Afghanistan, *Parcham* and *Khalq* recruited through preexisting social networks. Babrak Karmal and other leading *Parchamis* identified potential recruits through the elite Kabul lycées—Habibia, Esteqlal, Ghazi, Nejat—which they had attended and the upscale neighborhoods in which they lived. The *Khalqis* selected recruits through the Pashto language boarding schools of Kabul—Rahman Baba, Khushhal Khan, and Ibn-e-Sena—where a number of *Khalqi* leaders either taught or attended school.[334]

Soviet planners clearly saw these divisions as counterproductive. Moscow sought to influence government policy in Afghanistan in the years leading up to the April 1978 coup, and divisions within the Afghan communist movement were clearly an obstacle to this objective. By the middle of the 1970s, moreover, Soviet influence over the republican Daoud government was rapidly in decline. Daoud had dismissed several senior *Parcham* members from his cabinet, and had initiated a rapprochment with the American regional allies Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Henry Bradsher argues that, by 1976, the Soviet Union had initiated efforts through the Communist Party of India (CPI) to restore the organizational unity of the PDPA. In May 1976, an article appeared in the CPI journal *Party Life* appealing for PDPA unity. The author, CPI Secretary-General N.K. Krishnan, sent copies of the article to Taraki and Karmal, and both leaders sent their representatives to New Delhi for consultations. The CPI subsequently invited *Khalq* and *Parcham* representatives to India in 1977 for a "detailed discussion of their internal dissensions."[335] The talks in India gave way to a March 1977 agreement that reunified the *Khalq* and *Parcham* factions into a single PDPA organization.

Reunited, the PDPA was still a very small organization. The party was likely comprised of approximately 12,000 members in 1978, although some analysts estimate a membership base as low as 4,000 and as high as 18,000.[336] This party base included approximately 2,000 members of

[334]Hassan Kakar describes how Hafizullah Amin was responsible for recruiting nearly the entirety of the Pashtun Sangokhel lineage, a section of the Shinwari tribe, through some of his Sangokhel students when he was the principal of Ibn-e Sena school. M. H. Kakar 1997, p. 178.

[335]As recounted to Henry Brasher by a senior CPI figure who declined to be identified. See Bradsher 1985, p. 70.

[336]Halliday and Tanin 1998, p. 1360; For a low estimate, see Bradsher 1985, p. 71; Citing on English- and Russian-language sources, Giustozzi reports a higher estimate Giustozzi 2000, p. 253.

the military.[337] Compared to a Kabul and national population of approximately 675 thousand and 13 million,[338] respectively, the party constituted a tiny section of Afghan society almost exclusively concentrated in the capital city. Notwithstanding the small size of the PDPA, the party was able to mobilize young and extremely vocal crowds of supporters in the streets of Kabul, lending it greater weight than its relative size would indicate.

The *Khalq* and *Parcham* factions soon went public with their reunification. In a joint conference in July 1977, the organizationally restored PDPA "adopted a decision on the organizational reunification of the factions and on the development of a program of joint action...[and] considered the question of the removal of the dictatorial regime of M. Daoud."[339] Less than one year later, this question would be answered when *Khalq* and *Parcham* conducted a successful, if technically flawed,[340] military takeover of the capital and the elimination or detention of most senior officials in the *ancien régime*. The leadership and followership of both PDPA factions publicly celebrated the April 1978 coup as a joint effort and the beginning of a revolution that would spread from Kabul to Afghanistan's rural areas. However, as the following sections demonstrate, the PDPA was unable to carry out a revolution from above. In government, the PDPA neither operated as a cohesive organization nor was able to provide basic security and economic development beyond the major urban centers and without extraordinary Soviet involvement and assistance.

4.2 Revolution From Above

The PDPA regime had inherited a government army and bureaucracy that, while constrained by limited human and material capital, had nonetheless become the dominant military force within the country and was capable of carrying out successful, if selective, development interventions. However, as this section shows, the revolutionary government would see these capabilities decline almost immediately after the April 1978 coup. Skilled professionals in the bureaucracy and military fled in large numbers, while increasing violence against the new regime severed lines of internal trade and attenuated the security forces. This section documents the trajectory of security and development planning institutions during the PDPA period.

[337] Sarin and Dvoretsky 1993.
[338] Nadiri and Hakimyar 2017.
[339] Rostislav A. Ulyanovskiy in Bradsher 1985, p. 69.
[340] For a discussion of the role of chance in the success of the coup, see ibid., pp. 76-77.

4.2.1 Security after Saur

This section traces the development of the security forces in Afghanistan after the April 1978 coup. Drawing on both primary and secondary sources, I show that the capabilities of the armed forces under PDPA rule deteriorated almost immediately after the Saur Revolution. Soon after April 1978, the army and other security institutions had become politically divided organizations afflicted by high levels of desertion. At the same time, the armed forces rapidly became faced with multiple, small scale opposition fronts across all parts of the country. Under the *ancien régime*, the armed forces had been capable of defeating sizable but territorially concentrated rebellions. However, the introduction of numerous contemporaneous rebellions across large sections of territory during the PDPA period was a relatively new phenomenon.[341] The dispersed nature of these opposition fronts gradually wore down the morale and territorial control of the armed forces.

For much of predominantly rural Afghanistan, the coup of April 1978 was not initially seen as a watershed event. In Nazif Shahrani's words, the initial reaction to the government takeover comprised of "jubilation on the part of the leftists, dismay on the part of the Islamic activists, and little reaction from the majority."[342] But the takeover in Kabul began to generate tremors throughout Afghanistan. Within a few months of the coup, a series of uncoordinated uprisings began to emerge, along with a number of mutinies among army garrisons in both remote and core areas of the country. Together with other factors, the deterioration of the security in Afghanistan provided the basis for the Soviet invasion in December 1979.

While most areas of Afghanistan reacted with indifference to the events of April 1978, in subsequent months a small but growing number of communities took up arms against the new PDPA regime.[343] In June 1978, the arrest of two elders in the town of Ningalam set off one of the first incidents of antigovernment violence against the PDPA regime; this episode escalated into a sustained, more generalized uprising by Safi and Nuristani villagers against the PDPA regime

[341] The closest comparison to this situation occurred during the rule of Amir Amanullah, who faced simultaneously faced rebellions from Shinwari tribesman of the eastern region and the forces of Habibullah Kalakani north of Kabul.

[342] Shahrani and Canfield 1984, p. 159.

[343] The causes of rebellion against the PDPA government varied from one community to another, and depended on differing local (proximity to urban centers, economic and social structure) and international (proximity to neighboring countries) circumstances.

in Kunar province.[344] In the following months, uprisings emerged in Hazarajat (October 1978, spring 1979), northern Badakhshan (winter 1978), Baghlan (early 1979), Kabul city (June 1979), Paktia (summer 1979), and Darra-e Nur of Nangarhar (winter 1979). While small in scale, the geographic scope of these uprisings rapidly began to overwhelm the predominantly urban and peri-urban government apparatus, especially in the more remote areas of resistance.

An ill-timed national census conducted in June and July of 1979 reflected how quickly the PDPA government had lost ground (Figure 4.1).[345] While the geographical coverage of the northern and southern provinces was relatively good, much of the northwest, central, and eastern provinces were inaccessible because of insecurity. Geographer Daniel Balland noted various problems encountered during the administration of the census:

> Of 10,000 census takers—all teachers specially trained for the project—about eighty were killed by rebels. There were reported instances in which the filled-out questionnaires were destroyed before they reached Kabul; most notable was the destruction of the entire set of data sheets for Bādḡīs province. It is estimated that the census was almost complete in urban areas but only 40 percent complete for the settled rural population and 15 percent for the nomads.[346]

The administration of the 1979 census marked a significant change from that of demographic efforts that had taken place not long before the Saur coup. In 1972 and 1973, the Ministry of Health and the Afghan Family-Guidance Association had conducted a national survey of more than 20,000 households covered 34 urban centers and 352 villages across Afghanistan in every province of the country. Notwithstanding significant limitations in the demographic capabilities of the Afghan government, the 1972/73 survey was conducted without incident.

The April 1978 coup in Afghanistan also set off a crisis within the Afghan armed forces. By early 1979, low morale and (in some instances) ideological opposition to the PDPA regime in the Afghan army produced a series of individual- or unit-level desertions across the country (see Figure 4.2).[347] In March 1979, the entire 17th Infantry Division stationed in the Herat garrison

[344]Edwards 2002, p. 128.

[345]This was the first national census ever to be conducted in Afghanistan, and had been in preparation since 1975. See Daniel Balland, "CENSUS ii. In Afghanistan," *Encyclopaedia Iranica.*

[346]This was the first national census ever to be conducted in Afghanistan, and had been in preparation since 1975. See Daniel Balland, "CENSUS ii. In Afghanistan," *Encyclopaedia Iranica.*

[347]Giustozzi suggests that fighting and other material conditions played a larger role in motivating desertion than ideology. See Giustozzi 2000, pp. 84-86.

Figure 4.1. *Reliability of the First National Demographic Census of Afghanistan.*



Source: Daniel Balland, "CENSUS ii. In Afghanistan," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*.

Note: Enumeration reliability colored by district.

1. Fully enumerated district. 2. Partly enumerated district. 3. District not enumerated.

defected from the PDPA government. Soon after, a number of garrisons mutinied in the Jalalabad area, in Kunar province, and in the Khost region of Paktia province.[348] Five months later, in August 1979, a mutineering group of soldiers sought to take over the Bala Hissar, the symbolically and strategically important fortress overlooking Kabul city.[349] A mutiny by the 7th Infantry Division, located on the outskirts of Kabul city, in the summer and fall of 1979 was one of the last major incidents of antigovernment activity before the Soviet invasion in December 1979. By the end of 1979, the manpower of the Afghan army had contracted from a pre-coup level of between 100,000 to 120,000 soldiers to approximately 40,000 men,[350] while the *sarandoy*[351] amounted to 50% of its prewar level of 16,000 men.[352]

As a result of desertion within the armed forces and the rise of opposition groups, Kabul lost control over a majority of the rural areas of the country by the end 1979, and would not regain authority over these areas throughout the course of the PDPA regime. In the provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, and Laghman, eighteen districts and sub-districts were no longer under government control; much of the Hazarajat was entirely independent of Kabul. The centers of several geographically remote but strategically significant areas, including Kunar, Khost, and Uruzgan, were effectively surrounded by opposition forces. By the end of 1979, 17 out of 28 provinces, half of the district centers, and a majority of villages were out of government control. An internal report by the Soviet Embassy painted a grim portrait of the security environment in Afghanistan in the final months of 1979:

> The Afghan opposition has considerably expanded its social base, strengthened its ranks, and created a base of operations on Pakistani territory. Anti-government uprisings have taken place as a result of the counterrevolution's influence on the personnel of a number of garrisons, predominantly those far from headquarters. For example, mutinies occurred in the 30th Mountain Infantry Regiment (Asmar), the 36th Infantry [Regiment] (Naray), the 18th Infantry [Regiment] (Khowst), and other units which were isolated from their superior headquarters and which have received no support for a long time... The appearance of new IOA and IPA formations has

[348] See Gibbs 1987; Lyakhovskiy 2007.

[349] U.S. diplomat Bruce Amstutz reported that some Afghan observers believed that a "Bala Hissar unit launched the mutiny, but that the backup forces the mutineers had depended upon subsequently chickened out." The mutiny was reportedly suppressed only with extensive tank and helicopter gunship fire. *An Initial Evaluation of the Bala Hissar Mutiny*, August 6, 1979.

[350] Notably, opposition forces commanded, in aggregate, a comparable number of men.

[351] *Sarandoy* (scout in Pashto) had become the designated name for the gendarmerie during the Daoud republic, and remained in use during the PDPA period.

[352] See Fukuyama 1980; Giustozzi 2000, p. 67.

Figure 4.2. *Desertions in the Afghan Armed Forces*



Source: Giustozzi 2000, p. 260; author's calculations.

> been noted in the provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Paktia, Kapisa, Ghazni, Zabol, Kandahar, Ghowr, Badghis, Bamian, and Herat. About 70% of Afghan territory in which more than 10 million people live is under opposition control (or outside government control), practically the entire rural population...[353]

Conflict within the PDPA had also become increasingly contentious throughout 1979. A personal and political rivalry between *Khalqi* leaders Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin had become uncontainable, as did Soviet differences with Amin's reputed contacts with the United States, the increasing personalism of his rule, and his perceived preference for a less Soviet-dependent foreign policy. With Soviet support, Taraki planned to remove Amin from his position as Prime Minister and replace him with *Parcham* leader Babrak Karmal in a unity government.[354] After three days of political intrigue and violence between the two *Khalqi* camps,

[353]The acronym IOA stands for Islamskoe Obshchestvo Afganistana (The Islamic Society of Afghanistan or Jamiat-e Islami. The acronym IPA stands for Islamskaya partaya-krylo Khalesa (The Islamic Party - Khales Wing or Hezb-e Islami-Khales Lyakhovskiy 2007.

[354]It remains unclear whether or not Taraki had planned to remove Amin by force or non-violent pressure. The

Amin's forces detained and eventually executed Taraki.[355]

Fearing a consolidation of power by an increasingly mercurial Amin or a precipitous collapse of the PDPA regime and takeover by opposition forces, the Soviet Union deployed combat forces in the final days of 1979 to replace Amin and his followers and reinforce the PDPA regime. During the first week of December, two Soviet battalions were quietly flown into Bagram air base, laying the groundwork for the larger Soviet intervention two weeks later. In the early hours of December 25, 1979, a Soviet airborne division landed in Kabul and Soviet ground forces crossed into Afghanistan via Termez (then in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic) and Kushka (Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic), from where they proceeded to take control over all major urban and military centers (See Figure 4.3). On the evening of December 27, Soviet regular and special forces seized all major party, military, and communication centers.[356] The primary Soviet mission, named "Operation Shtorm-333," was the capture of the Tajbeg palace (then the presidential office building and residence) and the assassination of Amin.[357] Under the command of the KGB, three units of special forces (drawn from the KGB and Soviet Ministry of Defense) stormed Tajbeg and assassinated Hafizullah Amin.

Shortly after Amin's assassination, the Soviet Union installed a joint government comprised of *Parcham* figures that had been jailed or sent into exile, and *Khalqis* who had actively cooperated with Taraki against Amin or remained relatively neutral in the intra-Khalq split.[358] Under this

dominant theory is that Taraki, along with Sarwari, Gulabzoy, Watanjar, and Mazdooryar, arranged to have Amin assassinated. According to this explanation, Amin was set to receive Taraki at the airport upon the latter's return from a state visit to Havana and stopover in Moscow. Sarwari, who was chief of the intelligence service (AGSA) at the time, had directed his operatives to eliminate Amin when he arrived at the Kabul International Airport, but Amin learned of the plot through Daoud Tarun (an Amin partisan and Taraki's aide de camp) and possibly an Amin loyalist in AGSA. According to Hassan Kakar, Amin reportedly took "control of the airport, replacing its personnel with persons loyal to him. He himself wore an armored shield under his clothes. On that occasion no incident occurred." For more information, see M. H. Kakar 1997, p. 38; Arnold 1983, p. 90; Lyakhovskiy 2007.

[355]Like the plan to remove Amin from his position as Prime Minister, this event is also subject to dispute. The dominant account is that Taraki, with Soviet support, had arranged to assassinate Amin but the plot had backfired. According to this view, Amin had accepted an invitation by Taraki to the presidential palace, having received assurances of his safety from Soviet Ambassador Puzanov and possibly other Soviet officials. This was reputedly a ruse. Upon his arrival at the palace, the presidential guards fired on Amin, who managed to escape the attack. In the subsequent confusion, Amin was able take control of the Ministry of Defense and organize a successful siege on the presidential palace. Taraki was detained. By Amin's order, Taraki was suffocated to death two weeks later, against the wishes of the Soviets. Arnold 1983, p. 90.

[356]Specifically, Tajbeg palace, the PDPA Central Committee building, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Communications, the General Staff, the headquarters of the Central Army Corps, the military counterintelligence building, the Pul-e Charki prison, the radio and television center, the central post office, and central telegraph office.

[357]Lyakhovskiy 2007, p. 41.

[358]These and other key post-invasion PDPA figures were smuggled into Kabul by Soviet forces prior to the Soviet intervention. On December 7, Group "A" of the USSR KGB 7th Directorate smuggled Babrak Karmal and Dr. Anahita

Figure 4.3. *Soviet Invasion Routes and Territorial Occupation*



Source: The Russian General Staff 2002.

new dispensation, the *Parcham* enjoyed a numerical advantage over *Khalq* in the PDPA Central Committee, with 55 and and 16 members, respectively. *Parcham* also held some of the most important positions in the government, with Babrak Karmal as President and a number of *Parchami* leaders appointed to the Politburo and the cabinet.[359] The new dispensation also included a number of pro-Taraki *Khalqi* leaders in key positions, most notably the "Gang of Four"—Asadullah Sarwari, Mohammad Gulabzoy, Aslam Watanjar, and Sherjan Mazdooryar.[360] While the *Parchamis* held the balance of power in the Politburo and cabinet, *Khalqi* figures occupied especially important cabinet positions. Gulabzoy was appointed as the head of the powerful Ministry of

Ratebzad into Afghanistan via Tashkent on a Tu-134 aircraft. Another group of special forces unit was responsible for safely transporting several other PDPA leaders—Nur Ahmad Nur, Aslan Mohammad Watanjar, Said Mohammad Gulabzoy, and Asadulah Sarwari (all pro-Taraki *Khalqis*)—into Afghanistan in preparation for the installment of a new government dispensation in Kabul. Lyakhovskiy 2007, p. 30; Some of these political figures participated, in some form or another, in the intervention itself. The *Khalqi* leaders Gulabzoy, Sarwari, and Watanjar assisted Soviet military forces in the execution of the invasion. Lyakhovskiy 2007, pp. 52, 56, 68-69.

[359]Several Karmal allies were appointed to the Politburo, including Nur Ahmad Nur, Shah Mohammad Dost, Sultan Ali Keshtmand, and Zahoor Razmjo. Key *Parchami* cabinet appointments included Shah Mohammad Dost to Foreign Affairs, Major General Mohammad Rafi to Defense, and Abdul Wakil to Finance.

[360]This was a group of *Khalqi* leaders of varying influence, all with military backgrounds, that allied themselves with Taraki and Moscow in their opposition to Amin. All of these figures were appointed to the Politburo under Karmal.

Interior Affairs, which controlled the *sarandoy* and was responsible for appointing all provincial and district governors. Watanjar, meanwhile, was assigned to the Ministry of Communications, a post that was usually considered to be a key mechanism of regime control and maintenance in Marxist-Leninist settings.

While the invasion of the Soviet Union produced tolerable, if uneasy, alliance between the *Parchamis* and pro-Taraki *Khalqis*, it also dramatically altered the security situation in Afghanistan. The Soviet intervention initially increased the rate of desertion within the armed forces and expanded the scale of opposition violence against government forces, even as it stabilized the PDPA regime in Kabul. During the first half of 1980, three regiments of the Bagram-based 20th Infantry Division disintegrated. The 11th Infantry Division ceased operating during the same year, and was not able to resume activities until 1982. Antonio Giustozzi estimates that the annual rate of desertion reached a high of 21.9% in 1981, a development that was exacerbated by an especially low level of recruitment in the years immediately following the Soviet invasion.[361]

The installation of the Karmal-led government in December 1979 did not yield immediate gains in the capabilities of the PDPA armed forces and government. Karmal had sought to build a "new model army" staffed by a larger proportion of officers from the lower classes, presumably more capable of working cooperatively with the rank and file. But the Soviet intervention yielded only incremental gains in the capabilities of the armed forces, and this occurred after 1983, when Soviet military support and a reinvigorated focus on the Afghan army and *sarandoy* began to have a positive effect on the performance of the Afghan security forces. Successful joint Soviet-Afghan military offensives (primarily Soviet-led until 1986) and the attrition that resulted from it had a positive effect on the morale of the Afghan armed forces. The responsibilities of the armed forces became more rationalized after 1985, when the *sarandoy* became primarily responsible for the protection of economic assets, freeing up the Afghan army to conduct large-scale offensive operations, particularly in the areas around Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, and Farah. But the improved performance of the Afghan armed forces relied critically on Soviet firepower. Independent Afghan offensives and counter-offensives began in earnest in 1986, and these operations either required Soviet backup or were not sustained over the long-term—allowing re-infiltration by mujahideen forces.

[361] Giustozzi 2000, p. 260.

While the Afghan armed forces recovered incrementally through the middle 1980s, the PDPA regime was increasingly confronted with the specter of a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan after the inauguration of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985. Gorbachev desired a prompt withdrawal of Soviet combat forces and a political resolution to the Afghan conflict that kept the PDPA regime in power. Within one month of his inauguration, Gorbachev informed the Soviet military leadership and the Afghan government that they had one year to change the course of the war.[362] By October 1985, Gorbachev explicitly communicated to the PDPA regime that the Soviet Union was preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan.[363] Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev, foreign policy advisor to General Secretary, recorded Gorbachev's account of his remarks to Karmal:

> That is why I had to express myself with the utmost clarity: by the summer of 1986 you will have to learn how to defend your revolution yourselves. We will help you for the time being, though not with soldiers but with aviation, artillery, equipment. If you want to survive you have to broaden the regime's social base, forget about socialism, share real power with the people who have real authority, including the leaders of bands and organizations that are now hostile towards you. Restore Islam to its rights, [restore] the people's customs, lean on the traditional authorities, find a way to make the people see what they are getting from the revolution. And turn the army into an army, stop with the Parchamist and Khalqist scuffle, raise the salaries of officers, mullahs, etc. Take care of private trade, you will not be able to establish a different economy for a long time yet. And so on in this vein.[364]

At the same time, Soviet confidence in Karmal's ability to improve the effectiveness of the military and civilian agencies was flagging. In May 1986, Moscow replaced Karmal with Dr. Najibullah, a longtime *Parchami* and head of the Ministry of State Security.[365] Najibullah entered office acutely aware of the impending withdrawal of Soviet combat forces and of the need to fill the void with pro-government forces that could mobilize local populations and contest mujahideen forces in Afghan villages. Despite an extraordinary allocation of manpower, weaponry, and aid to Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had reached a military stalemate with the various mujahideen

[362] Cordovez and Harrison 1995, pp. 187, 245.

[363] The Soviet Union had been exploring the possibility of a diplomatic settlement to the Afghanistan conflict as a precursor for withdrawal by early 1981. It was not until October 1985 that the Politburo voted to support efforts to stabilize the PDPA regime before withdrawing Soviet combat forces from Afghanistan. See Kalinovsky 2009.

[364] Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev, October 17th, 1985, National Security Archive, available at `http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB192/Chernyaev_Diary_translation_1985.pdf`, accessed July 13, 2015.

[365] In January 1986, the intelligence service KHAD was upgraded to ministry status and renamed the Ministry of State Security (*Wizarat-e Amniyat-e Dawlati* or WAD).

fronts located distributed throughout the country. Dr. Najibullah sought to address this strategic problem in January 1987 by launching a National Reconciliation policy, with Moscow's encouragement, that would share power with the armed opposition groups.[366] Both Soviet and Afghan figures criticized the policy on the grounds that it would empower counter-revolutionary groups and would accelerate, not slow, the demise of the PDPA-led central state by signaling defeat. It soon became clear, however, that Dr. Najibullah's National Reconciliation policy was intended to share provincial offices and resources, not central power. By sharing power with amenable mujahideen forces at the local level, Dr. Najibullah sought to both maintain the survival of the state and further consolidate his authority over the central government—reconciled mujahideen fronts came under the direct purview of Dr. Najibullah's office. In this way, the government could reduce the threat posed by amenable mujahideen fronts while also freeing up time and resources to improve the performance of the military and central ministries. Seeking to improve the morale of the Afghan Army, the government doubled the salaries of junior officers and increased the pay for ordinary soldiers by seven to eight-fold, but military units continued to surrender and desert in large numbers.[367]

Dr. Najibullah also took a series of steps, albeit largely superficial in nature, to demonstrate greater political inclusion on the part of the PDPA regime. In June 1987, the "Democratic" denomination was dropped from the official name of the republic. The Revolutionary Council, the appointed legislative and representative branch of the PDPA-led political system, was replaced by an elected National Assembly (*Jirgah-e Melli*). By June 1990, at the Second PDPA Congress, the Najibullah government formally renamed the PDPA as the Homeland Party (*Hezb-e Watan*). Najibullah's government also reduced the prevalence of Soviet ideology in the universities, removed government monopolies in selected sectors, appointed non-party members to senior positions,[368] and approved the participation of opposition parties, albeit under extremely restrictive circum-

[366]See Mohammad Najibullah 1988; National Reconciliation was not an entirely new idea. As early as 1980, Soviet specialists had sought to develop contacts with some of the mujahideen groups. Giustozzi 2000, pp. 120-121; In November 1985, Babrak Karmal announced a "ten point thesis" that explicitly advocated the incorporation of non-PDPA forces into the government and the resolution of conflicts through political means. *Babrak Karmal's Theses, Declaration of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Revolutionary Council* 1985.

[367]Giustozzi 2000, p. 107.

[368]For example, Haji Mohammad Chamkani, a former member of parliament during the monarchical period, was promoted from Vice President to President of the DRA Revolutionary Council in November 1986. Fazel Haq Khaleqyar, a notable during the monarchical period, was appointed Prime Minister in May 1990 after serving as a PDPA-appointed governor. While Chamkani, Khaleqyar, and other senior non-party officials maintained contacts with non-PDPA circles, they had nonetheless long served in PDPA governments and were sympathetic to PDPA ideas.

stances. Under Najibullah, nearly half of the senior positions in the government were occupied by non-PDPA members, and a majority of the Revolutionary Council was comprised of independents.[369] Core state positions, however, were primarily occupied by senior members of the PDPA.

As part of National Reconciliation, the PDPA government also sought to enlist both unaffiliated communities and amenable opposition groups as pro-government militias. Militias had been a component of the PDPA security apparatus since the earliest months of the PDPA regime,[370] but the scale of recruitment and local authority accorded to them increased substantially under Dr. Najibullah's rule.[371] Militia recruitment during the Najibullah era centered on two sets of irregular forces: first, the Border Militia (*Milishia-ye Sahard*), an irregular force established in 1980 that recruited from the eastern tribes and was tasked with closing the mujahideen infiltration routes; and, more significantly, a Tribal Regiment or Regional Forces (known variously as *Ghund-e Qaumi* or *Kandak-e Qaumi*), a force created as early as 1980 responsible for establishing control over local areas, securing the highways, disrupting the movement of armed opposition groups, and recruiting new members. According to data collected by Giustozzi, government efforts to recruit militia forces, particularly Tribal Regiment forces, were quite successful. Between 1986 and 1988, the Regional Forces nearly tripled in size from 17,000 to 42,000 men.[372]

The Najibullah government was particularly successful in recruiting militia commanders that could secure large expanses of territory abutting the major highways that connected the Soviet Union to the cities of Afghanistan. From the Soviet border crossings at Termez and Kushka, convoys of trucks—protected by tanks, armored personnel carriers and helicopter gunships—carried food aid, economic assistance, and military equipment to Kabul and other major urban

[369]Rubin 2002, p. 129.

[370]During the pre-coup period, irregular forces constituted a state-sanctioned but negligible component of the security apparatus. Many, if not most, of these irregular forces demobilized or disbanded after the coup.

[371]Earlier militia groups were either small in size or could not scale up because of their composition or role. The Soldiers of the Revolution (*Sepayan-e Enqelab*), established in 1980, were comprised of young and urban PDPA and Democratic Youth of Afghanistan (DYOA) members recruited from Kabul who had limited roots in the provincial towns and rural areas in which they served. The Revolution Defense Groups (*Gruha-ye az Defa-ye Enqelab* or GDR), also formed in 1980, had more than 30,000 members at the time of National Reconciliation. While GDR cadres (comprised of middle class youth in the towns and cooperative members in the rural areas) were somewhat effective in the countryside, they were limited in scale because they were primarily motivated by compensation and rarely strayed away from static positions. Yet another militia force known as the Self-Defence Groups (*Gruha-ye Defa-ye Khodi*) were non-ideological and part-time formations restricted to protecting fixed assets.

[372]Giustozzi 2000, p. 285.

centers.[373] These critical ingredients of regime survival made their way along expanses of territory controlled by influential pro-regime military commanders including Abdul Rashid Dostum (northern zone and other areas),[374] Sayyid Mansur Naderi (in the strategically important areas immediately north of the Salang Pass),[375] Esmat Muslim (in the southern province of Kandahar),[376] Jabar Qahraman (in the southwestern area of Helmand),[377] and Juma Khan Andarabi (in the areas abutting the Jamiat stronghold of Panjsher).[378]

Despite the departure of the Soviet Union between May 1988 and August 1989, Dr. Najibullah's policy of National Reconciliation appeared to be somewhat effective, at least more so than many had expected.[379] The militias were able to secure the highways, providing a transport lifeline for the regime and freeing up the army and other formal security forces to hold the cities. While the day-to-day level of threat from mujahideen forces had not declined as a result of National Reconciliation, the government was able to to more effectively secure the major urban centers. Beginning in the summer of 1988, a number of provincial towns and garrisons had been lost to mujahideen forces, although many of them were either retaken by the government or were not critical to regime survival.[380] Notably, when several mujahideen parties, under the

[373]See, for example, Jonathan S. Landay, "Government convoy trucks arrives in Kabul," *UPI*, April 18, 1989.

[374]Dostum was a *Parcham* military officer who began his career in the Afghan army. He subsequently joined a self-defense unit for the state natural gas company, eventually commanding a large mobile force primarily responsible for guarding the gas fields in his home province of Jowzjan and other areas of northern Afghanistan. Dostum's Jowzjan militia rapidly expanded to a whole division (53rd division) in 1988 with small but functional air and armored forces. By 1991, Dostum led 40,000 men in operations both inside the northern region and farther afield, notably in 1998 when his forces deployed to Kandahar "to replace the departing Soviet garrison and thwart coup plans involving Durrani mujahidin and army officers."[160]

[375]Naderi was born in Kayan, Baghlan province in 1936 into a leading Ismaili family led by Sayyid Nader Shah. The Naderi family played a prominent role in private and public life during the monarchical period: the family owned a joint stock company, and the Naderi's elder brother Nasir served as a member of parliament. Naderi was jailed for some time during the republican and the *Khalqi* periods. During Najibullah's rule, he commanded a force of between 13,000 and 18,000 men.

[376]Muslim had been a Major in the Afghan army at the time of the 1978 coup. He subsequently led a mujahideen front primarily comprised of fellow Achakzai Pashtun men in the Kandahar area, before defecting to the government in 1984. By 1988, he was fielding at least 4,000 men, with some sources estimating a force of 10,000 men.

[377]A *Khalqi* supporter, Qahraman was a Major General in the Afghan army who led a small but cohesive militia based out of Lashkargah, Helmand province.

[378]Andarabi was a local notable who joined *Hezb-e Islami* in 1979, in part because of his rivalry with Ahmad Shah Massoud, the *Jamiat-e Islami* commander based in the neighboring Panjsher valley. He later defected to the government in April 1984, prompted by a large-scale Soviet offensive against Panjsher.

[379]It was widely believed in the United States and allied countries that, absent the support of Soviet combat forces, the Najibullah government would fall in a matter of months. Barnett Rubin, for example, observed in 1989 that "Washington, Islamabad and the [Peshawar] Alliance ... confidently expected that the Kabul regime would soon fall [after the withdrawal of Soviet combat forces in early 1989]. They were supported in this expectation by nearly all Western academic and government specialists on the region (including this author). Some Soviet analysts, including a prominent general who had served as a military adviser in Kabul, shared this view." Rubin 1989, p. 424.

[380]Notable exceptions include the eastern town of Khost (taken in March 1991) and the military garrison of Khoja Ghar in Takhar (overran in June 1991).

advice of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), initiated a major offensive against the eastern city of Jalalabad in March 1989, they were decisively defeated (despite initial signs of success) by government airpower and an influx of army and militia forces.[381]

While National Reconciliation provided the Najibullah government with the tactical benefit of much diminished opposition violence, it did little to address Kabul's near exclusive dependence on Soviet economic and military aid. Soviet assistance was being distributed as patronage to powerful militia commanders in exchange for regime support. But it also provided the commanders with large areas of exclusive territorial control, degrading government influence. As Giustozzi notes, "some commanders of these units were in the process of becoming de facto rulers of large portions of Afghanistan. Abdul Rashid Dostum, for example, controlled the provinces of Jowzyan, Balkh, Samangan and Sar-i Pul, Sayyed Naderi controlled the province of Baghlan, Rasul Pahlawan ruled over the province of Faryab, Abdul Samad controlled the northern part of the province of Takhar and Jabar Khan controlled the central part of Helmand."[382]

National Reconciliation also did not deter regime insiders from aligning with opposition forces to overthrow the government, which could no longer rely on the day-to-day political and military support of the Soviet Union. Throughout 1989 and early 1990, there had reportedly been five separate coup attempts against the Najibullah government.[383] In March 1990, a sixth and much more serious coup d'etat attempt developed. Minister of Defense Shahnawaz Tanai, a hardliner *Khalqi*, along with 127 regime military officers (including the *Parcham*-affiliated Abdul Qader) attempted to overthrow Dr. Najibullah's government, allegedly with the support of Hezb-e Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. When the coup failed, Tanai and many of the other participants fled to Pakistan and announced an alliance with Hekmatyar. Other alliances between regime military officials and opposition fronts took shape in a much less conspicuous fashion. In an interview with journalist Sandy Gall, the Jamiat-e Islami commander Ahmad Shah Massoud

[381]The Jalalabad offensive was nominally undertaken by the Afghan Interim Government (AIG), a coalition of the various exile mujahideen parties formed in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. On February 10, 1989, a *shura* of at least 420 figures (estimates range from 420 and 439 individuals) selected an AIG "cabinet" led by Sebghatullah Mojaddidi as President and Abdul Rab Sayyaf as Prime Minister. The *shura* (and therefore AIG) was dominated by party leaders and officials living in exile, with limited representation of field commanders based in Afghanistan. There was also minimal or non-existent representation from the Tehran-based Shia parties or the prominent families associated with the *ancien régime*. The Jalalabad offensive was primarily carried out by *Hezb-e Islami Khales* and *Mahaz-e Melli*. See Khalilzad 1991.

[382]Giustozzi 2003.

[383]M. H. Kakar 1997, p. 271.

stated that his organization had "penetrated the [PDPA] regime very deeply" in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal.[384] Massoud's *Shura-ye Nazar* had developed links with senior army officers in key border garrisons, most notably General Abdul Rashid Dostum and General Momin Andarabi,[385] and in the Kabul area, including General Essa,[386] General Baba Jan,[387] and General Abdul Razaq.[388]

These regime-opposition relationships intensified in early 1992 when the post-Soviet government of the Russian Federation, led by Boris Yeltsin, withdrew all support for the Najibullah regime. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 had effectively ended the contractual bargain that had supported the Najibullah regime in the years after the Soviet withdrawal, while also activating the regime-opposition connections that had developed in previous years. As it became clear that the Najibullah government could not count on support from Moscow, Dr. Najibullah sought to retain control over the government by heading off a formal break with the militias, which were particularly strong in the north. This meant exploiting a growing ethnic rift within the PDPA faction between Pashtun military officers, on the one hand, and northern military leaders of Tajik or Uzbek descent. In January 1992, Dr. Najibullah directed Juma Atsak, the commander of the Northern Zone[389] and an Achakzai Pashtun "known for his Pashtun chauvinist views" to replace Momin with General Rasul, a Pashtun *Khalqi* with a particularly brutal reputation as commander of Pul-e Charkhi prison under Taraki's rule.[390] The personnel move prompted Dostum, Momin, and other northern military officers to break from the Najibullah regime and establish a council of former pro-government military leaders and opposition forces named the Movement of the North (*Harakat-e Shamal*)[391] These former regime officers, along with the Ismaili militias under the control of the Naderi family, entered into a temporary alliance with their former mujahideen opponents present in the north—*Jamiat-e Islami* and *Hezb-e*

[384]Gall 1994.

[385]Dostum led the 53rd division out of his base in Shiberghan. Andarabi was the commander of the 70th Division at Hairatan, a garrison located on the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border, but also commanded troops in Kabul. According to Rubin, Momin had "long been diverting aid to Dostum and passing intelligence to Massoud." Rubin 2002, p. 269; Dostum and Momin later became leading figures in the formation of the Junbesh party in 1992. Giustozzi 2005.

[386]Commander of the 10th army division based in Qargha.

[387]Commander of the Kabul garrison.

[388]National Guard officer in charge of security at the Kabul airport.

[389]In 1988, the Najibullah government had established a region-wide political and military administration for the northern provinces, governed by a regional Deputy Prime Minister and military supervisor.

[390]Rubin 2002, pp. 269-270.

[391]This multi-ethnic, regional council later evolved into the predominantly Uzbek party Junbesh-e Melli led by Dostum. Giustozzi 2005, pp. 1-2.

Wahdat. Within weeks, Dr. Najibullah announced his resignation and allied forces of former *Parchami* officers and mujahideen groups took Mazar-e Sharif and, subsequently, the capital city, with opposition primarily coming from *Khalqi* forces and pro-Najibullah military units.

4.2.2 From Reform to Patronage

The April 1978 coup was seen by the PDPA leadership as an opportunity to rapidly reorganize economic relations in the industrial and agricultural sectors. The new government took office seeking to expand the role of the state in industrialization and redistribution, but soon found that its expectations about the state of the economy were either incorrect or its objectives were unworkable for the society and economy of Afghanistan. In the urban centers, the new government sought to take majority ownership of the extremely small industrial and service sectors. However, it quickly discovered that much of the secondary and tertiary economies were already wholly owned by the government. State-owned enterprises operated substantially all formal economic activity in the banking,[392] mining, large manufacturing (cement plants and textile mills), power generation, and aviation sectors.[393] As a consequence, when the PDPA took control in 1978 there were no large private enterprises left to be nationalized.

The capabilities of the bureaucracy had declined dramatically within the early months of the PDPA regime. Much of the upper- and middle-level cadres of the bureaucracy had been dismissed or executed, and many others had fled abroad. The remaining staff members of the civilian institutions were either inexperienced or otherwise did not dare to make decisions that would lead to demotion, dismissal, or capital punishment. As Amstutz describes, the "machinery of government was nearly at a standstill. During the Taraki-Amin period several thousand government officials had been executed. Many more bureaucrats, along with many members of the educated and professional classes, had fled abroad."[394]

The PDPA government also aimed to reorganize social and economic relations in the rural areas through a series of sweeping marriage and land reforms promulgated throughout 1978.

[392] In 1975, the republican government of Mohammad Daoud had nationalized the two remaining semi-private banks, National Bank (*Bank-e Melli*) and the Industrial Development Bank of Afghanistan (*Bank-e Sanati-e Afghanistan*), bringing the entire banking sector under government control.

[393] Private ownership was more common in agriculture, retailing, basic services, small hotels (large hotels were mostly state owned), and small industry

[394] Amstutz 1986, p. 52.

These reforms established a minimum age for marriage, mandated the free consent of both matrimonial parties, and abolished the customary matrimonial practice of bridewealth. The PDPA reforms also aimed to restructure land rights and ownership. The government proclaimed the prohibition of all private loans and mortgages, and established agricultural cooperatives managed by elected officers that would govern collective affairs at the local level. In perhaps its most consequential decree, the PDPA-led government mandated the redistribution of land plots greater than 30 hectares (*jeribs*) without compensation to peasant households. Taken together, the PDPA marriage and land reforms were been radical in scope. If implemented, the reforms would have transformed state-society relations by making the government, instead of traditional sources of authority, as the primary arbiter of social and economic relations at the local level.

The reforms, however, were an unqualified failure. The marriage reform had little impact on matrimonial practices in rural Afghanistan. And the land reforms, which began to be implemented in January 1979, effectively reduced access to capital, seeds, and draft animals for most farming communities. The land reforms prohibited private credit and removed access to seeds and draft animals, typically provided by landowners, without offering alternative sources of agricultural inputs. As a consequence, the reforms not only failed to alleviate problems of inequality and poverty in the rural sector, but it generated opposition from those who stood to potentially benefit from land reform. Amin Saikal describes the consequences of the land reform for the peasantry:

> The poorest elements were given allotments which could not be sold, divided, bequeathed, mortgaged or otherwise alienated, and, moreover, water supply arrangements were not changed; eventually they began refusing to accept allotments and even returning them to their previous owners. The middle strata suffered from a lack of capital in the wake of the moneylenders' expulsion and the state's failure to provide credits, seeds and machinery. Large landowners, amongst whom were higher ranking members of the officer corps, state bureaucracy, and religious establishment, received no compensation for the lost land."[395]

By the spring of 1979, smallholder and landless peasants had joined more natural opponents of redistribution—large landowners and the *ulama*—in opposing the land reforms.[396] The PDPA

[395] Saikal 2006, p. 191.

[396] Many members of the *ulama* had declared land redistribution and the prohibition of private loans to be contrary to Islamic law, much as they had during Amir Amanullah's efforts to abolish private agricultural loans in Afghanistan.

regime declared the reform to be a success, reportedly redistributing reclaimed land to 329,767 families by 1986. In reality, the reform was barely implemented. In a 1987 party conference, then Prime Minister Sultan Ali Keshtmand reported that substantially none of these households had taken up the reform.[397]

The deteriorating security environment after the Saur Revolution and the policies of the new regime had an extremely negative impact on human capital and labor supply in Afghanistan. Between 1978 and 1984, the number of primary schools, middle schools, and high schools declined by 82%, 78% and 73%, respectively, because of destruction or discontinued operation.[398] The quality and quantity of the faculty at Kabul University also languished, not only because many of the brightest academics in Kabul were either imprisoned or had fled Afghanistan, but also because the PDPA-era faculty were under "constant observation" and "intense pressure to join the Communist Party," such that party membership "replaced academic qualification as the requisite for appointment to the teaching faculty."[399] Hundreds of thousands of villagers also escaped growing instability in rural Afghanistan by migrating to Kabul and other urban centers or fleeing the country altogether. By the end of 1979, 400,000 Afghans had fled to Pakistan and another 200,000 had escaped to Iran. One year later, the total number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran had risen to 1.9 million, and by 1990, the refugee population had reached a maximum of 6.2 million people—nearly half of the estimated prewar population of 13 million.[400] Light industry, a small but important source of export and commercial knowledge, contracted dramatically as a consequence. The flight of skilled professionals and workers from Afghanistan, combined with the disruption in internal trade resulting from rebel attacks, brought almost all new industrial projects to a halt. In March 1982, PDPA General Secretary Babrak Karmal offered a sampling of industrial operations that had come to a stop: "the cement factory in Herat, the textile mills in Herat and Kandahar, sugar factories, and irrigation establishments."[401]

Increasing opposition violence also destroyed much of the country's physical infrastructure. At the outset of the conflict, rebel forces effectively cut off the cities from internal trade and power

[397]Rubin 2002.
[398]Amin 1987.
[399]Ibid., p. 321.
[400]Colville 1997.
[401]U.S. Department of State. *Afghanistan: Three Years of Occupation*, Special Report No. 106, December 1982, p. 3-4.

generation. Rebel groups controlled most of the much-degraded road infrastructure and attacked government-contracted trucks at a pace that exceeded Soviet replacement efforts. Up until 1989, an average of 45 trucks were destroyed by rebel forces per month, a trend that further intensified in the final years of the Dr. Najibullah government.[402] Almost all of the 17,000 kilometers of wire communications which existed in Afghanistan prior to the revolution were destroyed, very little of which was replaced because of ongoing insecurity.[403] Between 1978 and 1982, customs revenue—one of the primary sources of prewar government income—had declined by 95%, and government efforts to finance the budget deficit by issuing money had increased inflation dramatically in urban centers.[404] Mujahideen forces also targeted the electrical transmission towers and lines that powered the capital city and other urban centers, or otherwise prevented them from being repaired. In September 1984, the capital city experienced a particularly long six-week power shortage after rebel forces, previously bribed not to attack the electrical infrastructure in nearby Sarobi, destroyed some 40 to 80 pylons.[405] Meanwhile, in the southern urban center of Kandahar, power became increasingly scarce because one of the two turbines the the Kajaki hydroelectric power station had ceased to function, and could not be repaired because of insecurity.[406] In 1983, Afghan Prime Minister Sultan Ali Keshtmand underscored the severity of Afghanistan's infrastructural decline when he stated that "the counterrevolutionary bands sent from abroad have destroyed 50 percent of the country's schools, more than 50 percent of our hospitals, 14 percent of the state's transportation vehicles, 75 percent of all communications lines, and a number of hydroelectric and thermal electric stations."[407]

As a consequence of these developments, household incomes declined dramatically throughout much of Afghanistan's communities. In most of Afghanistan's fertile areas, heavy fighting caused agricultural cultivation to contract rapidly. The war between the Soviet Army and the mujahideen fronts destroyed successive harvests and depleted cropland as well as the labor needed to keep them up. Land area under cereal cultivation and production of cereals were contracting at an annual average rate of nearly 3%.[408] Fiber crop land and production contracted by more than

[402] Giustozzi 2000, p. 105.
[403] Soviet author G.P. Ezhov cited in Paul Robinson and Dixon 2013, p. 110.
[404] L. Dupree 1983, p. 134.
[405] Coldren 1985, p. 172.
[406] Amstutz 1986, p. 245.
[407] *Bakhtar*, April 12, 1983
[408] FAOSTAT, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, `http://faostat.fao.org`.

6% per annum.[409] The decline in agricultural production, in turn, had a profound effect on the urban economy. In the first year of PDPA rule, per capita real income declined by approximately 3%, and after 5 years of government administration by the PDPA, per capita production had contracted by more than 10% (see Figure 4.4).[410]

A Defense Intelligence Agency report published in May 1983 provided a representative picture of the rural and urban economies after multiple years of internal dislocation. It reports that the "harvest was especially poor in 1982 with only one-fourth of the 1978 yield and only one-half of the 1981 figure. . .[I]ncreasing wartime shortages of critical energy supplies have resulted in the stoppage of industries with a marked decline in processed goods. . .The average increase in prices of essential commodities (foodstuffs and wood) between September 1981 and September 1982 was 95 percent."[411]

By the second half of the decade, the Afghan economy had become exclusively distributive. As the CPSU official newspaper *Pravda* observed in 1988, the Afghan economy "has been destroyed by the war and cannot meet the basic needs of its population."[412] Furthermore, while mujahideen fronts had put pressure on road transportation throughout the conflict, opposition forces were now interrupting food shipments from the Soviet and Pakistani borders for weeks at a time. The resulting food shortages generated monthly price inflation as high as 20% in Kabul city, raising fears of urban unrest and threatening the survival of the PDPA regime. With the rural and urban economies at a virtual standstill, the government's economic strategy had become almost entirely centered around distributing Soviet sponsored food aid and other commodities to its urban constituencies, while allocating patronage to pro-government militias and the villages that supported them. The Najibullah government resorted to rationing food in Kabul, as illustrated by a contemporary news report: "thousands had to line up for hours daily to get a ration of nan, the flat, oval-shaped bread that is traditional in Afghanistan. The bread price rose

[409]FAOSTAT, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, `http://faostat.fao.org`.

[410]Changes in real per capita GDP clearly do not take into account the emigration or elimination of large numbers of skilled and unskilled people from Afghanistan that took place in the early years of PDPA rule.

[411]Defense Intelligence Agency, *The Economic Impact of Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan (U)*, DDB-1900-32-83, May 1983.

[412]Bradsher 1999, p. 167.

Figure 4.4. *GDP Per Capita, 1950-1995*



Source: Fry 1974; United Nations Statistical Division 2014; author's calculations.
Note: Vertical red lines (approximately) demarcate Daoud coup in July 1973, the PDPA coup in April 1978, and the fall of the PDPA regime in 1992. GDP per capita figures were computed using the real GDP time series from Fry (1974) for 1935 to 1973, and the real GDP time series from the UN Statistical Division (2014) for 1974 to 2013. Given the high level of measurement error in the UN real GDP estimates during the PDPA period, I estimate changes in real GDP (from the UN time series) by smoothing out the amount of real output destroyed under PDPA rule for the period of 1981 to 1994.

by 600 percent, and the cost of other essentials - edible oil, sugar, fuel for cooking - climbed along with it."[413] Increasing economic hardship and the declining territorial control of the central government gave rise to opportunities for rent extraction by both government officials and militias. At highway check points and in food storage centers, Soviet aid was "not being justly distributed...hoarding and bribery have been transformed into a source of wealth for individuals."[414] And at border crossings such as Hairatan, "many of the vehicles that do survive rebel ambushes - most of them after paying heavy tolls to rebel groups - arrive here carrying high-value

[413]Burns, John F., "Rebels Plan Next Hardship for Kabul: Winter Without Food Trucks," *New York Times*, July 27, 1989.
[414]Bradsher 1999, p. 199.

goods like Mercedes-Benz cars and Japanese television sets.[415]

In the final years of the Najibullah regime, the economy was barely able to generate food supplies and other staples necessary to keep the cities running. Even natural gas, a resource that was located near the Soviet border and had been exchanged for hard currency and goods since 1967, exhibited slower production and eventually ceased altogether. Economic planning under the Najibullah government was almost exclusively oriented toward distributing commodities necessary for feeding the cities and paying the wages of militia forces. Distribution became more challenging as domestic production and external resources declined. Kabul and other urban centers experienced a wheat shortage in 1989. The crisis was resolved after Moscow promptly airlifted food to Kabul. A subsequent wheat shortage developed in 1991, but this time Kabul's urgent requests for food supplies from the Soviet Union and India were met with delays, creating a "climate of scarcity" that had "already negatively influenced the credibility of the regime."[416] In the final years of the Najibullah government, the Kabul administration resorted to printing currency, more than doubling the money supply between 1987 and 1989 and generating inflationary pressure on the prices of food items and key commodities. Another consequence of resource scarcity was increasing government corruption. Although embezzlement of food and commodity aid had occurred in prior years, it became more acute in the final years of the PDPA-led government. In party plenums, Najibullah lamented the embezzlement of food and commodity supplies by government officials, which, according to the Soviet newspaper *Pravda*, amounted to one third of all goods supplied by the USSR. Other Soviet analysts claimed that "only 10-15% of Soviet aid actually reached the population, the rest being absorbed by the bureaucracy."[417]

4.3 Organizational Capital and Aid in the PDPA Regime

As Section 4.2 showed, PDPA-led institutions went into rapid decline almost immediately after the April 1978 coup. The new regime had inherited a government army and bureaucracy that, while afflicted by problems of petty corruption and limited budgetary resources typical of relatively poor countries, had nonetheless developed greater capabilities and reach than previ-

[415] Burns, John F., "Rebels Plan Next Hardship for Kabul: Winter Without Food Trucks," *New York Times*, July 27, 1989.
[416] Giustozzi 2000, p. 234.
[417] Ibid., p. 233.

ous administrations in Afghanistan. To explain this institutional decline, this section attributes decline primarily to the critical problem of divisions within the PDPA regime, and to Soviet unwillingness and incapacity to decisively address the organizational dysfunction within the PDPA government. Instead, by the late 1980s Moscow increasingly began to use patronage and the political acumen of its primary beneficiary, Dr. Najibullah, to keep the PDPA-led government in power.

4.3.1 PDPA Dysfunction

This section traces the decline in the strength of the PDPA government to its increasing divisions over time. Divisions between and within the *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions impaired the government institutions inherited by the PDPA government in April 1978. Key security ministries developed multiple lines of command and control, or otherwise became the exclusive domain of the *Parcham* or *Khalq* factions. At the same time, the civilian and development ministries became staffed by junior bureaucrats that had very limited roots in society, constraining their ability to gather information from and negotiate with the communities with which they interacted.

These organizational problems could be seen at the outset of the PDPA regime. Notwithstanding the nominal reunification of the PDPA, the *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions remained effectively divided. In discussions with Boris Ponomarev, Secretary of the CPSU and a candidate member of the Politburo, Nur Mohammad Taraki underscored the effective divide between the two factions in the immediate pre-coup years, a period of relative convergence. As recounted by Ponomarev,

> We – said Taraki – had no confidence in *Parcham* even before the revolution, the union with them was only formalistic. In reality they did not participate in the armed uprising. But after the revolution, the leader of the Parchamists, B. Karmal demanded that the leading posts in ministries and other organizations should be divided equally. He strove to assume a leading role in party-building. He stated, 'The army is in your hands, give us the party matters'. Besides – when we rejected his demands –, he threatened us with breaking out an uprising. We had only one alternative in this situation: either them or us.[418]

[418] "Soviet communication to the Hungarian leadership on the situation in Afghanistan," October 17, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives of Hungary (MOL) M-KS 288 f. 11/4377.o.e. Translated for CWIHP by Attila Kolontari and Zsofia Zelnik. `http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113147`

The events of the coup laid bare the discord between the *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions. The *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions nominally held an equal share of authority in the PDPA regime, but in reality *Parcham* was a junior partner in the post-coup government and, in particular, the army. As Taraki's account shows, the latent rivalry between *Parcham* and *Khalq* had boiled down to an open contest for greater power in the PDPA government.[419] The *Khalqi* faction, under Taraki's leadership, sought to prevent prominent *Parchamis* from occupying positions of power by assigning them to diplomatic posts abroad or domestic posits of limited strategic significance. The *Khalqis* also dominated the army and police, operating as a de facto separate chain of command within both security bodies. This development had the effect of politicizing the security forces such that "[d]iscipline in the army had collapsed by the end of July and only *Khalqi* officers could be relied upon to carry out orders."[420]

Personal competition between the two leading *Khalqi* personalities, President Nur Mohammad Taraki and Foreign Minister Hafizullah Amin, added to the decay of the bureaucracy and security forces. In Amin Saikal's words, "the PDPA leadership continued to be plagued by internecine struggles, with Parchamis trying to stage a comeback, while Taraki and Amin played a deadly game of political musical chairs. The Afghan Army was in disarray and could only conduct defensive operations."[421] By the fall of 1978, the *Khalqi* chain of command had broken down within the army as a direct consequence of the rift between the Taraki and Amin factions. As Mari Broxup observed, "[b]etween September and the Soviet invasion in December discipline was only enforced by pro-Amin Khalqis."[422] Kakar also observers a decline in the integrity of the armed forces as a result of the *Khalqi* split:

> When the Khalqis came to power, they tried to make the army a "Khalqi army," that is, the army of the people. They purged the army of the non-Khalqi officers and promoted their own officers. This was the biggest source of tension, which, along with other problems, led to major abortive uprisings, all of which weakened the army. Added to this was the alienation of many officers, particularly in Division Seven of Rishkhor, who were loyal to President Taraki, replaced by Amin after their differences had led to a confrontation that will be detailed in the next chapter. The pro-Taraki officers rebelled after Taraki was suffocated on 9 October 1979.[423]

[419] Also see M. H. Kakar 1997, pp. 29-31,58-64.
[420] Broxup 1983, p. 94.
[421] Saikal 2006, p. 193.
[422] Broxup 1983, p. 94.
[423] M. H. Kakar 1997, pp. 29-30.

If the PDPA's internal divisions made it unable to carry out a coherent strategy in Afghanistan, its absence of organizational roots in rural Afghanistan inhibited the regime's ability to implement programs in a majority of the national territory. The PDPA was dominated by members of the urban intelligentsia—teachers, journalists, government administrators—who had very limited contact with the rural areas. It was also comprised of young people without substantial professional experience: in the early communist period, nearly 65% of party members were under 30 years old. As a consequence, the policy objectives and implementation of the PDPA were poorly suited for the vast majority of the Afghan citizenry. The party leadership and functionaries lacked an adequate empirical understanding of local conditions, did not possess deep personal linkages with local areas, and often showed an unwillingness to accommodate what were sometimes perceived to be "backwards" communities that would only change by force.[424] This absence of organizational roots had disastrous effects. The government had sought to hastily implement a land reform that aimed reorganize economic and social relations in much of Afghanistan—a preference that in and of itself reflected a poor understanding of the possibilities of change in Afghanistan. The land reform did not in fact address the most important impediments to agricultural development. Water, not land, was the primary constraint on the agricultural economy, but the PDPA government had not made plans to improve irrigation in conjunction with the land reform. Large landholdings were relatively uncommon in Afghanistan, so "there was not enough surplus land to distribute to all of the intended beneficiaries."[425] And the reforms abolished important (if exploitative) sources of agricultural factors—moneylenders for credit, landowners for seeds and draft animals—without providing alternative resources. It also chose to do so through party functionaries who had very limited knowledge and experience in carrying out an extremely contentious redistributive program such as land reform. To carry out the reforms, "groups of armed Khalqi activists were dispatched to the villages, most of them schoolteachers and army officers with no connection to the community."[426] As a result, the content and implementation of the land reforms were not only ignored by large sections of the rural population, they contributed to the dislocation of the agricultural economy and generated violent opposition to the

[424]In a comment that was typical of the early communist period, Hafizullah Amin stated that "[w]e have 10,000 feudals. We shall destroy them, and the question [of carrying out revolution] will be resolved. The Afghans recognize only crude force." Liakhovskii and Zabrodin, *Tainy afganskoi voiny*, p. 42.

[425]Rubin 2002, p. 119.

[426]Ibid., p. 118.

PDPA-led government.

The Soviet invasion effectively suppressed open and violent competition between *Khalq* and Parcham. Moscow had removed Amin and his supporters from the government, installing a joint coalition of *Parchamis* and pro-Taraki *Khalqis*, most prominently including the "Gang of Four" (Gulabzoy, Sarwari, Watanjar, and Mazdooryar). However, the personal and political differences between the *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions remained effectively unresolved. The *Khalqis* had sought to purge the *Parcham* faction from the government and security forces during the Taraki and Amin years. Now, with Karmal and his allies controlling the majority of senior government posts, the *Parchamis* reciprocated. Karmal sought to remove the *Khalqis* from the central ministries, the army leadership, and provincial offices, replacing them with *Parchamis* whom he could trust. In 1980, "fifteen leading Khalqis had been executed for criminal behavior, according to a public announcement. Perhaps a dozen other Khalqi leaders simply disappeared after the Soviet invasion, undoubtedly secretly executed.[427] The Ministry of Education, an almost exclusively *Khalqi* domain prior to the Soviet invasion, became a *Parchami* organization during Karmal's tenure.[428]

Karmal's personnel changes were often met with varying forms of opposition from the *Khalqis*, especially when they concerned the military. "The Parchamis could not resist launching a wide purge of Khalqi officers in the army. This was what the Khalqis had been expecting and many had already abandoned their units, further jeopardizing whatever battle readiness the army still possessed."[429] In May 1980, when Karmal attempted to replace seven Khalqi army commanders with Parchami officers, "the Khalqis simply refused to acknowledge the orders and sent the Parchami officers back lo Kabul."[430] The Khalqi commander of the the 14th Division in Ghazni "led a mutiny against the new Parchami general Karmal sent to relieve him. Karmal's appointee backtracked to Kabul."[431] In Kandahar, the *Khalqi* governor "refused to turn over his office to Karmal's Parchami appointees when he arrived."[432]

Many leading figures in the *Khalq* faction either discounted the authority of newly installed

[427]Amstutz 1986, p. 78.
[428]Ibid., p. 78.
[429]Giustozzi 2000, p. 81.
[430]Amstutz 1986, p. 78.
[431]Tomsen 2011, p. 210.
[432]Ibid., p. 210.

President Karmal or actively tried to remove him from power. Hassan Kakar describes how the *Khalqi* leader Assadullah Sarwari, then the vice president of the Revolutionary Council and deputy premier, had developed a plan to "to dispose of the *Parchami* leaders in their offices by a synchronized action," but was exiled as ambassador to Mongolia in June 1980 when the plan was discovered by the Soviets.[433] The Soviet-installed Minister of Interior Sayyid Mohammad Gulabzoy, a pro-Taraki *Khalqi*, "acted as if he were the head of a state within a state,"[434] reasoning that he had been selected by the Soviets as a key figure in the PDPA government and therefore was Karmal's equal. At the helm of the Interior Ministry, Gulabzoy "made the ministry more a stronghold of his own than a coordinated department of the Parchami government."[435]

Karmal was eager to remove Gulabzoy, Watanjar, and Mazdooryar from the cabinet, but Moscow vetoed such a move. Moscow needed both sides to cooperate in order to keep the PDPA regime in power, but its efforts to engineer collaboration were usually unsuccessful. *Khalq* leaders cited the numerical majority of *Khalqi* officers in the army officer corps,[436] and claimed to also have a larger overall membership than *Parcham*. Eventually, the Soviets intervened in the *Parchami* purge of the army because of its "destructive effects" on the overwhelmingly *Khalqi* dominated organization.[437] By 1983, *Khalqis* continued to make up 65% to 70% of party members in the army, a diminished but nonetheless dominant position in the army leadership.

The Soviet Union could not afford to exclusively side with *Parcham* or *Khalq* during the Karmal years. Moscow's immediate objective was to end the mujahideen insurgency against Kabul, initially through military operations led by the 40th Army and backed by the Afghan armed forces. Moscow had assumed control over all major strategic, economic, and diplomatic affairs in Afghanistan, and was less concerned with the policy formulation capabilities of the Afghan government than in Kabul's ability to implement Soviet guidelines. The Soviet response to the intra-PDPA conflict was to tolerate the sorting of the *Khalq* and *Parcham* factions into separate ministries. The intelligence service, Khidmat-e Aetela'at-e Dawlati (KHAD), became a *Parcham* domain, while the *sarandoy* became a predominantly *Khalq* organization. The army, meanwhile, continued to function as a *Khalqi*-majority institution, although with intermittent

[433]M. H. Kakar 1997, p. 67.
[434]Ibid., p. 67.
[435]Ibid., p. 185.
[436]In 1979, 90% of army officers were affiliated with *Khalqi* in 1979. See Giustozzi 2000, p. 82.
[437]Ibid., p. 82.

clashes between the two factions.

While the Soviet intervention contained open confrontation between the two sections of the Marxist movement in Afghanistan, Moscow was still not able to unify the PDPA around a common strategy of regaining government authority prior to its withdrawal. By the late 1980s, the PDPA was undergoing greater polarization between the *Khalq* and *Parcham* factions, and among smaller splinter groups that had emerged and receded in the late 1960s but now came into fuller form, including one faction under the influence of Zahir Ofuq, a former *Khalqi* supporter, and a group of particularly extreme *Khalqis* from Paktia province who were followers of Dr. Abdul Karim Zarghun, a *Khalqi* leader who had been killed in 1979. Perhaps more problematically, entirely new factions were emerging within and across the *Khalq* and *Parcham* camps. "As soon as 1987, according to one of the *Khalq* leaders, Panjsheri, there were 200 groups and factions within the party, including the emergence of at least one faction of Karmalites."[438]

This trend toward institutional disintegration became acute in the latter years of the Najibullah administration. The formation and expansion of pro-government militias provided authority and resources to militia leaders who, in turn, could independently shape security and development outcomes in their home areas. In some instances, the militia commanders were able to establish basic order. For example, the militia forces led by Sayyid Mansur Naderi had largely secured the Pul-e Khumri, the provincial capital of Baghlan, by the late 1980s, making it one of the more "normal" towns in Afghanistan, with a functional health system and other public services.[439] But the militia strategy also relied critically on the availability of patronage resources, which were increasingly scarce after the Soviet withdrawal. Moreover, it created strong incentives for regime officials to cooperate with the militias in an environment of increasing unpredictability and resource scarcity. Senior *Parcham*- and *Khalq*-affiliated security officials who had once identified with the improbable objectives of rapid social and economic modernization in Afghanistan had become more concerned with parochial objectives of surviving the possible collapse of the PDPA regime. By 1990, for example, *Khalqi* Minister of Defense had aligned with Hekmatyar, while *Parcham*-affiliated officers Momin and Dostum had developed ties with Ahmad Shah Massoud. These relationships were a reflection, not a cause, of institutional decay during the PDPA

[438]Giustozzi 2000, p. 84.
[439]Ibid., p. 224.

period, but they hastened the unraveling of the regime once the Soviet Union, and the patronage it had provided, came to an end.

4.3.2 Soviet Aid During Wartime

This section evaluates the ways in which Soviet aid was used in Afghanistan and the impact of this assistance on government capabilities. Soviet support, in the form of military equipment, economic aid, technical assistance, and direct firepower was indispensable to the survival of the PDPA regime in the increasingly chaotic final months of 1979, although it did not by itself address the organizational origins of institutional decay in Afghanistan. This conundrum was never fully resolved. By the late 1980s, Moscow had effectively abandoned efforts to build up institutions in Afghanistan, instead seeking to use patronage to keep the PDPA-led government in power long enough to outlive the insurgency.

The Soviet Union was particularly well suited to support Afghanistan. It shared a border and decades of experience working with Afghan institutions and the PDPA officials that staffed them. Its interests were also clearly and powerfully aligned with the new PDPA regime, as was its paradigm of economic and political development.[440] Nevertheless, Soviet assistance to Kabul was predicated on the expectation of a relatively short and inexpensive intervention in Afghanistan and was therefore divorced from the increasingly unstable politics of the PDPA. As Artemy Kalinovsky observed, "Soviet leaders did not expect a protracted and costly involvement in Afghanistan when they approved the Soviet military intervention in December 1979."[441]

As a consequence, Soviet development planning largely proceeded as it had prior to the coup. Moscow continued to sponsor potentially productive projects that could expand small-scale industry, improve physical infrastructure, and generally increase the authority of the government. Moscow's development strategy, however, did not, in practice, take into account the collapse of the agricultural economy and the decline in the territorial control of the government. Soviet aid activities included projects that could produced targeted benefits for urban dwellers—a bread factory in Kabul (1981), a flour mill in Pul-e Khumri (1982), a flour mill (1982), bakery plant (1982),

[440]This does not mean that the Soviet Union was the only entity that sponsored the Afghan government. Indeed, the Warsaw Pact states and, to a lesser extent, the international financial institutions, provided various forms of development assistance to the DRA.

[441]Kalinovsky 2009, p. 51.

and grain elevator (1985) in Mazar-e Sharif, an olive processing plant in Jalalabad (1984). Moscow also sought to develop energy and transportation links along the northern Afghan provinces abutting its southern border, including the construction or improvement of a gas drilling facility in northern Sherberghan (1980), oil reservoirs at Hairatan (1981), Mazar-e Sharif (1982), and Pul-e Khumri (1983), and the first stage of 220 KW electric power transmission line from the Soviet border in the area of Sherkhan to Kunduz (1986).

However, the deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan made many completed projects extremely unproductive, while making other, prospective plans infeasible. Soviet development programming depended critically on internal order to be successful. These were long-dated, highly visible projects that required high levels of operation and maintenance and skilled- or semi-skilled labor. They were also exposed to attacks by mujahideen forces and the gradual decline in skilled workers. These problems also afflicted facilities developed prior to the April 1978 coup. In Kandahar, two textile factories were not fully functioning because the power line from the HAVA-constructed dam to the city was repeatedly sabotaged.[442] The power lines connecting the NVA-constructed Naghlo dam to Kabul city were also frequently destroyed.[443] In an account from a former chief administrator of Afghanistan's largest textile mill in Bagram (north of Kabul), only 1,800 of the prewar workforce of 4,000 remained, and production had declined to 15,000 meters of fabric per day from 80,000 meters. Of the factory's original fleet of 33 trucks, nine were destroyed by the resistance and two captured.[444]

As early as 1980, Moscow began to cancel several planned projects primarily because of insecurity. In the summer of 1980, Moscow scrapped several projects in the unstable province of Herat. It also cancelled the construction of cotton factories in Baghlan, Balkh, and Takhar because the cotton-growing areas of these provinces had become too insecure. A project that would extend power lines from the Naghlo hydroelectric station to Jalalabad was cancelled because these lines had already been sabotaged multiple times. In 1983, a prospective multichannel phone line from Mazar-e-Sharif to Hairatan was cancelled for the same reason. Of 75 major prospective development projects budgeted between 1979 and the end of 1985, 36 were cancelled. As a result of these initial disruptions, Soviet assistance became more discriminating over time, with projects

[442] Paul Robinson and Dixon 2013, p. 123.
[443] Dorronsoro and Lobato 1989, p. 104.
[444] Amstutz 1986, p. 245.

Figure 4.5. *Soviet Military and Economic Assistance, 1980-1990*



Source: Giustozzi 2000, p. 260; Paul Robinson and Dixon 2013; author's calculations.

increasingly centered in defensible urban centers and northern border areas. However, Soviet aid remained heavily weighted toward industrial development throughout the Karmal period, a strategy that rested critically on a stable security environment—a precondition that was clearly lacking. Soviet development planners recognized the importance of agricultural development in enhancing rural livelihoods and improving the image of the PDPA regime. But Soviet agricultural programming either focused on mechanized equipment that most ordinary farmers could not afford, such as tractors, or was obstructed by insecurity. Moscow, for example, sought to develop a large-scale irrigation system using water from the Kochba River, but this project never advanced because of insecurity.[445]

Beginning in 1986, the Soviet Union began to shift its aid activities from one of developing government capacity to one of distributing increasingly large levels of fungible assistance to the central government as well as non-governmental organizations (see Figure 4.5). Moscow had

[445] Paul Robinson and Dixon 2013, p. 102.

long recognized that its industrial assistance was poorly suited for the security environment in Afghanistan, but the ascent of Gorbachev as CPSU General Secretary and his commitment to withdraw Soviet combat forces prompted Soviet planners to abandon the project of improving the productive potential of the economy or the institutional capabilities of the regime. Under Najibullah's regime and in particular after the completion of the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989, Moscow started to increase its transfers of food, fuel, weaponry, hard currency, and other forms of fungible assistance for purposes of patronage. This was a logistically difficult undertaking. Kabul and other cities were increasingly cut off from the Soviet Union by mujahideen forces,[446] which controlled much of the northern road network, prompting a humanitarian crisis in Kabul through the winter of 1988 and 1989. During this time, the Soviet Union "shipped an average of 250,000 tons of wheat per year... and also furnished other essential commodities, including kerosene for cooking and heating, tea, sugar, oil, soap, and footwear"[447]—a resourcing strategy that former ambassador to Afghanistan Theodore Eliot recognized as "an essential element in the regime's survival."[448] At the height of the Soviet post-withdrawal resourcing, Kabul was "receiving weapons, foodstuffs, and fuel from the Soviet Union worth between $250 and $300 million a month, an assistance that helped it remain in place."[449] To move these supplies, Moscow chartered between 25 and 40 Ilyushin Il-76 aircraft, each carrying up to 45 metric tons of supplies, to Kabul city every day.[450] It also dispatched thousands of trucks each month through the Kushka and Termez border crossings. From mid-February to the end of December 1989, over 48,000 vehicles transported 340,000 tons on the Termez-Kabul highway alone, and 5,280 air sorties delivered another 71,000 tons of aggregate cargo into Afghanistan.[451] Moscow began to hand over its infantry fighting vehicles, personnel carriers, MiG fighter aircraft, and other military equipment to Kabul. Between 1988 and 1990, more than 8 billion rubles of military equipment and other forms of assistance had been delivered to PDPA regime.

[446]While estimates of manpower on both sides of the Afghan conflict were clearly imprecise, the aggregate number of anti-government fighters either rivaled or exceed that of government forces in the post-withdrawal period. See Giustozzi 2000, pp. 266,279.

[447]Rubin 2002, p. 170.

[448]Eliot 1990, p. 160.

[449]M. H. Kakar 1997, 272. See also Al Kamen, "Afghan Aid Questioned in Congress," *Washington Post*, March 12, 1990.

[450]Burns, John F., "In Kabul, Huge Soviet Airlift Brings Everything From Bread to Weapons," *New York Times*, May 24, 1989

[451]Giustozzi 2000, p. 104.

Soviet planners continued to design development programs for Afghanistan in the final years of the Soviet occupation, but these plans were clearly divorced from the political situation in Afghanistan or the Soviet Union. In a series of agreements between Moscow and Kabul throughout 1988, the Soviet Union pledged assistance to the Najibullah regime in areas of agriculture, geology, energy, communications, and the training of government bureaucrats. But the 1988 development plans barely got off the ground. Soviet development planning had clearly not taken into account the problems of security, logistics, and economic viability in programming aid for an unstable security environment where Soviet forces no longer had a substantial presence. Soviet planners also ignored the inability of Afghan government institutions to effectively coordinate aid. By the end of 1988, even relatively straightforward shipments of food and fuel had become a challenge. In November 1988, "1,000 wagonloads of goods donated by Soviet republics and oblasts were sitting at Termez rail junction," some "as long as eighteen months,"[452] This was both because of the inability of the PDPA government to organize transportation resources to move Soviet assistance from the border to Kabul, and because of a lack of security for transport columns.[453]

By the time of the Soviet withdrawal in April 1988, the Najibullah government had become a patronage machine. The PDPA regime had become almost exclusively dependent on Moscow for meeting its short-term resource needs. Afghan trade and aid almost entirely originated in the Soviet Union, and both of these economic flows had begun to rapidly decline. When Soviet assistance came to an end, the Najibullah government ended with it.

4.4 Alternative Explanations

How else can we make sense of the collapse of institutional capabilities in Afghanistan under successive PDPA governments? It is clear that the revolt against the PDPA did not motivate a more capable set of government institutions. The army and bureaucracy, throughout the conflict, remained afflicted by incompetence and politicization stemming from the factional conflict between *Parcham* and *Khalq*. While conflict clearly did not generate institutional consolidation in Afghanistan, two more plausible alternative explanations could help to account for institutional

[452] Paul Robinson and Dixon 2013, p. 146.
[453] Ibid., p. 147.

outcomes during the PDPA period: foreign occupation, ideology, and state policy.

4.4.1 Foreign Occupation

The decay of government institutions during the PDPA period is often explained in terms of foreign occupation. According to this account, the PDPA-led government unraveled because the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan generated a mass insurgency that it could ultimately not overcome without external support. This argument, however, does not make sense of the sequence of events that led to the Soviet invasion. The army and bureaucracy had reached a crisis stage *before*, not after the Soviet invasion. The bureaucracy had lost most of its talented staff in the purges, executions, and exodus of the educated classes that immediately followed the April 1978 coup. The civilian institutions had become staffed by young, inexperienced ideologues with limited knowledge about the conditions of the rural communities under their remit. The army was faced with large-scale defections in key garrisons, most notably in Herat, and very few military officers remained that could manage military operations and specialized weaponry. While the situation in Herat and other regional centers had stabilized somewhat by the end of 1979, the PDPA regime had lost control over the vast majority of the national territory, failed to build up a wider base of support for the regime, and faced major deficits in human capital in the military because of purges, defections, and distrust within the military. These problems led both Taraki and Amin to repeatedly request the introduction of Soviet forces into Afghanistan to stabilize the regime during 1979. In March 1979, Taraki reported to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin that the situation in Herat was "bad and getting worse" and requested tanks and aircraft along with Soviet "Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens in civilian clothing" to defeat the rebellion in Herat. When Kosygin asked Taraki to locate the hundreds of Afghan officers that had received training in the Soviet Union to operate tanks and mortars, Taraki responded: "Most of them are Moslem reactionaries. We are unable to rely on them, we have no confidence in them."[454] In July 1979 Amin requested "8-10 helicopters with Soviet crews,"[455] and made a subsequent request for a Soviet military presence in August 1979, stating that "the arrival of Soviet troops will significantly raise our moral spirit,

[454]Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and Afghan Prime Minister Nur Mohammed Taraki, March 17, 1979. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113262.

[455]Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan A.M. Puzanov and H. Amin, July 21, 1979. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113275.

will inspire even greater confidence and calm."[456]

While the Soviet invasion increased the scope and intensity of the insurgency against the PDPA-led government, the crisis of government in Afghanistan had emerged well before the introduction of large numbers of Soviet forces in December 1979. The army did not appear to be independently capable of regaining the territory it had rapidly lost since April 1978. The bureaucracy had been hollowed out, and incapable of functioning autonomously. And the PDPA political leadership was divided along personal and political lines, and did not show interest in substantially broadening the base of the regime. The Soviet intervention did not durably improve the performance of the army and bureaucracy, but this was largely because of the organizational weaknesses of the PDPA regime prior to and during its occupation.

4.4.2 Ideology and State Policy

Another plausible set of alternative explanations for political decay under successive PDPA governments center on ideology and state policy. First, there is the argument that the ideology of the PDPA regime was so alien to much of Afghan society that it generated an insurmountable backlash against the regime. A second argument is that state policy, particularly the marriage and land reforms of 1978, were so unappealing to most sections of Afghan society that it increased popular support for the insurgency against the government. Both of these explanations are clearly related to one another. State policy was, in part, an outcome of the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the PDPA, and the (largely negative) results of these policies subsequently influenced the beliefs of PDPA leaders.

It is probably impossible to disentangle the ideas and policies of successive PDPA governments, and it is clear that some combination of these factors was at work in generating the insurgency against Kabul. However, while ideology and policy have some explanatory power in the decline of the PDPA system, both of these factors in part stem from the limited organizational capital of the PDPA. The party's ideology and policy were alienating in large part because the PDPA had very limited roots in Afghan society. The *Khalq* and *Parcham* factions developed in the fringes of the educated classes of Kabul and other urban centers, and had drawn on other

[456] Conversation of the chief of the Soviet military advisory group in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Gorelov, with H. Amin, August 11, 1979. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110028.

Marxist parties throughout the region for inspiration, political support, and knowledge. It is therefore not surprising that the first major set of policies carried out by the *Khalqi* government led by Taraki was rejected by most of the rural areas. The policy, and the Marxist ideology behind it, were informed by assumptions about the agricultural economy (that land inequality was the primary cause of rural inequality and poverty, and that peasant households would accept uncompensated reclamations of land) and customary practice (that customs could be dictated away) that were widely off the mark. The successive *Parchami* governments of Karmal and Najibullah refrained from carrying out these relatively intrusive, unfamiliar policies, and even watered down the Marxist character of the PDPA regime. But the PDPA-led government continued to exhibit very limited organizational capital, which was the primary constraint to minimal institutional enhanced during this period. The army and bureaucracy remained largely urban institutions staffed by party members at the upper and middle ranks. And the party itself began to fracture along new lines of division, making the regime increasingly dependent on Soviet patronage that abruptly came to a halt in December 1991.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to demonstrate and explain the rapid decline of the quality of the bureaucracy and army under the PDPA rule. Specifically, it showed that in spite of inheriting a standing army of more than 100,000 soldiers and an intact bureaucratic structure, the PDPA regime underwent a dramatic contraction in institutional competencies, presence, and effects during the 1970s. This was in large part because of the internal characteristics of the new regime. Polarization between the *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions, and the remote relationship between the revolutionary government and society, played a critical role in the loss of human capital, institutional dysfunction, and spread of violent insurgency prior to the Soviet invasion. It also demonstrates that the substantial Soviet economic and military assistance kept the PDPA regime in power, but did not effectively improve or sustain the capabilities of the government because it did not address the conflict within the regime. Organizational dysfunction within the PDPA increasingly led the Soviet planner and the Najibullah government to abandon efforts to build capable government institutions and to use patronage to establish control over key regional centers and transporta-

tion routes. While Soviet support largely kept the regime together by providing a direct flow of economic and military assistance to Kabul, it became indispensable to the day-to-day survival of the PDPA regime. As a consequence, when the Soviet Union itself disintegrated, the PDPA government fell apart with it.

In the next chapter, we will examine a successive period of intervention: the international intervention in Afghanistan after 2001. The post-2001 experience, however, was different in many ways from the PDPA period. Much of the government apparatus had collapsed in the intervening years of civil war, and institutions would need to be reconstructed on top of a large refugee population, a broken economy, and the political overhang of successive internal wars. The intervention would look different, too. The intervention was led by the United States, but involved a large coalition of military and economic donor countries operating under a UN Security Council mandate. We will investigate how government institutions fared under inauspicious initial conditions and a diverse international intervention.

5 Reconstructing Government Institutions, 2001-2014

> "[The Afghanistan intervention is] a double decker bus. The internal parties on the upper deck. The external parties on the lower deck. And a UN driver with American gasoline. And that is maybe one bright metaphor to bring an internal and external settlement to light."
>
> - David Miliband[457]

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks brought Afghanistan from a position of obscurity to widespread recognition. Much had happened during the twelve years that followed the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan—the collapse of the state apparatus, the emergence of a multi-party, internationalized civil war, the rise of the Taliban movement and inflow of numerous extremist groups—with major power attention restricted to the threat of terrorism posed by Al Qaeda's presence in the country. By December 2001, however, intervention in Afghanistan had become the leading item on the international agenda. The United States was leading a multinational military campaign in Afghanistan to defeat Al Qaeda and overthrow the Taliban government, which had refused to hand over the Al Qaeda leadership to the United States. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had authorized the establishment of an international peacekeeping force charged with maintaining security in the capital city and its environs. Aid, technical specialists, and diplomatic staff began to flow into Afghanistan, reversing the trend of international indifference that had characterized much of the prior decade.

Renewed international engagement with Afghanistan gave rise to new domestic and external

[457]David Miliband, "Afghanistan: Mending it Not Just Ending It," MIT: Starr Forum, April 13, 2011.

relationships. The intervention brought together a diverse group of Afghan elites, many of whom had known one another for decades, into a governing coalition. While not representative of all sections of Afghan society,[458] this coalition constituted perhaps the most varied group of interests to have ever collectively participated in Afghan politics in modern history. The intervention also brought together a diverse constellation of external powers, international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in support of the stabilization and development of Afghanistan. Thousands of foreign personnel from a wide array of organizations would eventually descend on the capital city and major provincial centers, producing an elaborate international presence throughout the country.

These domestic and international coalitions presented potential benefits for the intervention in Afghanistan. The diverse composition of the post-Bonn Afghan government marked a more inclusive form of Afghan politics than had existed in prior decades, which could exert a stabilizing effect on the country. Moreover, the wide array of external organizations backing the post-2001 order brought with it the promise of extensive development assistance and technical expertise, the legitimacy that came with a coalition constituting the vast majority of world economic and political power, and the hopeful expectation that regional countries would not engage in the forms of violent proxy competition that had characterized the preceding two decades, when great power involvement in Afghanistan was either conflictual or absent.[459] These favorable prospects notwithstanding, intervention also risked the possibility of falling into endemic collective action problems. While the Afghan political networks and donor countries that participated in the post-2001 order shared the same general preference for stability in Afghanistan, each of these groups also possessed their own parochial goals that, if activated, could undermine the development of capable government institutions in Afghanistan.

This chapter examines these conditions of diverse domestic and external participation in the Afghanistan intervention after 2001. Since the Bonn settlement, government institutions have made little progress despite the allocation of substantial levels of material and human assistance to Afghanistan. In many areas of government activity, notably security provision and development planning, state structures have grown in size and reach while exhibiting very limited

[458]Ruttig 2006.

[459]One nominal affiliate of the international intervention that, in practice, accommodated the subsequent Afghan Taliban insurgency against ISAF and the post-2001 Afghan system was Pakistan. For more detail, see Nadiri 2014.

autonomy and effectiveness. How can one make sense of this pattern, given the high levels of external involvement and resourcing in nominal support of political stability and economic development in Afghanistan? Answering this question is important because existing accounts of intervention have offered differing explanations for the limited progress of security and development in Afghanistan after 2001. In particular, four sets of explanations emerge from existing studies of post-2001 Afghanistan. One set of explanations emphasize the absence of information by Western countries, particularly the United States, about the conditions of Afghan society and politics in the early years of the intervention.[460] Other explanations highlight resistance to foreign occupation as the principal cause of the limited development of Afghan political institutions.[461] And yet other arguments suggest that Afghan society is not capable of producing or tolerating functioning state institutions because of a domestic culture that emphasizes local autonomy over central rule and coercion over deliberation as a means of resolving conflict. A final explanation is that exclusion of politically dislocated groups from civilian and military institutions caused growing instability in Afghanistan.

I find that each of these alternative explanations—foreign ignorance, foreign occupation, domestic culture, and political exclusion—do not make sense of the trajectory of government institutions in post-Bonn Afghanistan. Instead, this chapter shows that the development of the Afghan government after 2001 was impeded by the increasing practice of personalist governance, the absence of coordination among international donors, and divergent international security and development objectives in Afghanistan. Personalist governance was, in part, a legacy of the successive wars that had emerged and evolved in Afghanistan since 1979. But it was also the result of an electoral system that systematically obstructed the emergence of cross-cutting, interest-aggregating political parties, and a strategy of patronage adopted by President Karzai to acquire greater influence within it. Personalist governance, in turn, gave way to a political system in which offices, contracts, and other resources were distributed in exchange for political support. The disorganized ways in which external resources were allocated to Afghanistan accentuated the prevalence of patronage. Poor donor coordination and incompatible short-term security objectives and long-term development goals increased the costs of monitoring and evaluating

[460] Stewart and Knaus 2011, p. 71.
[461] Collard-Wexler 2013; Ferwerda and Miller 2014.

aid expenditure. These problems remained unresolved despite increased US and international resources and attention devoted to Afghanistan as part of the "surge" of military and civilian assistance starting in 2009.

This chapter is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes the parties and precursors to the December 2001 political settlement in Bonn, Germany. Section 5.2 documents the changes in civilian and military institutions after Bonn, and Section 5.3 examines whether and how organizational capital and external coherence influenced these developments. Section 5.4 evaluates the domestic culture, foreign ignorance, foreign occupation, and political exclusion explanations for post-Bonn institutional outcomes. Section 5.5 concludes.

5.1 The Bonn Agreement

This section briefly describes the historical antecedents to the United Nations-sponsored meetings held in Bonn, Germany in December 2001 to negotiate the institutional setup in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The Bonn process has often often been described as a negotiated settlement between internally homogenous blocs with unitary and fixed interests, but as this section shows, the negotiations in Bonn were comprised of a diverse collection of individuals loosely connected to one another and negotiating in an environment of uncertainty about the political future of Afganistan. The Bonn negotiations therefore marked the beginning of an ongoing process of domestic and external alliance-making that prevailed throughout the post-2001 period and that did not neatly align with the group boundaries observed during the civil war.

Completed in December 2001, the Bonn Agreement outlined a sequence of steps toward the establishment of permanent government institutions in Afghanistan. The first, and immediate, phase was the formation of an Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) that would govern the country for a period of six months. This period of administration was to be followed by the convening of an Emergency Loya Jirga, which was to elect an Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) that would remain in place for two years. Within one year after the formation of the ATA, a new constitution was to be prepared and presented to a Constitutional Loya Jirga for ratification. And in the months leading up to the dissolution of the ATA, national elections would be held to select a government in accordance with the constitution. The Bonn Agreement also provided

for the establishment of an international security force for Afghanistan authorized by the United Nations Security Council. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), as it would later be called, was to be responsible for maintaining security in Kabul and its surrounding areas after the withdrawal of Afghan forces from the capital city.

The discussions at Bonn established a coalition between four loosely constituted delegations,[462] each comprised of a set of heterogeneous figures and groups. The bloc that emerged with the most significant proportion of national power, *Jabha-ye Muttahed-e Islami-ye Melli bara-ye Nejat-e Afghanistan* (United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan or UF) had taken control over much of the country, including the capital, and key areas of the north, west, and east. Commonly known as the Northern Alliance, this was a loosely-organized confederation of different politico-military fronts. Many of these groups had previously fought one another during the civil war of the middle 1990s, but formed an alliance in collective opposition to the Taliban. While most of the UF parties were primarily rooted in the Persian-speaking areas of the country, the UF also included commanders originating in the predominantly Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, including Mullah Naqibullah, a leading *Jamiat-e Islami* (*Jamiat* for short) commander based in Kandahar, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the political leader of *Ittehad-e Islami* (*Ittehad*), Abdullah Laghmani,[463] a former *Jamiat* intelligence operative from the predominantly Pashtun province of Laghman, and Haji Abdul Qadir of the Jalalabad-based Arsala clan, formerly allied with Yunus Khales. Differences, moreover, existed among and between the Persian-speaking groups within the UF. The predominantly Hazara Shia *Hezb-e Wahdat* (*Wahdat*), for example, was divided into competing factions associated with different territorial areas and orientations toward political Islam.[464] The *Wahdat* factions shared a particularly contentious wartime history with the predominantly Sunni cadres of *Jamiat* and *Ittehad*. The primarily Uzbek *Junbesh-e Melli* (*Junbesh*), led by Abdul Rashid Dostum,[465] had not yet overcome a split between Dostum and

[462] A fifth delegation had been formed to represent a number of secular democratic groups that had previously been in contact with the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA), the primary UN liaison to the various Afghan political groupings until its closure in May 2001. The official status of this secular democratic delegation was, however, rescinded at the last moment following the change in UN leadership from Personal Representative of the Secretary General Francesc Vendrell to Special Representative of the Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi. See Ruttig 2006, pp. 15-16.

[463] It should be noted that Laghmani, despite originating in the predominantly Pashtun Laghman province, was an ethnic Tajik. He was killed in a suicide bombing in September 2009.

[464] Ibrahimi 2009.

[465] Former military commander in the PDPA government of Dr. Najibullah.

a set of former *Junbesh* military commanders, most notably Malik Pahlwan, during the Taliban siege of the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif.

The other blocs present at Bonn—the Rome group, the Cyprus group, and the Peshawar group—were also, to varying degrees, heterogeneous in composition. These groups represented distinct, preexisting peace initiatives that brought together a diverse cross-section of figures from the Afghan diaspora. The Rome group descended from a political process initiated by former king Zahir Shah in 1993 to end the conflict in Afghanistan. Headquartered in Rome, where Zahir Shah resided in exile, this initiative sought to organize support in Afghanistan and abroad for an emergency Loya Jirga that would negotiate a ceasefire among the various civil war participants and determine the contours of a postwar political system. The Rome process drew on the support of intellectuals, religious figures, patrimonial elites, and former military officers with ties to the Mohammadzai monarchy, cutting across all of the major ethnic groups in Afghanistan. The Cyprus group stemmed from a separate peace process organized by Homayun Jarir, reportedly a relative of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and an inactive member of Hekmatyar's *Hezb-e Islami*, and Dr. Jalil Shams, a Herat-born former Kabul University economics professor and *Bank-e Melli* representative, that was reportedly backed by the Khatami government in Iran. This initiative was based in Nicosia and supported by a group that included constitutionalists, members of *sayyid* lineages (including the Sunni Gailani family and Shia Balkhi family), and associates of *Hezb-e Islami*, and was believed to be a competing process because of its emergence after the Rome initiative. And the Peshawar Group originated out of an August 2001 initiative by the patriarch of the Gailani family, Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani, and other, predominantly Pakistan-based exiles under the banner of the *Mahaz-e Melli Islami Afghanistan* party to oversee peace negotiations in Afghanistan. Because the Peshawar process was established by the Gailani family, a constituency that had been associated with King Zahir Shah in the past, this initiative was interpreted by some observers to have a diminishing effect on the longer-lived Rome process. The background and territorial base of the Peshawar process also suggested that it was primarily oriented toward mobilizing the support of eastern Afghanistan, which possessed close links with the Peshawar community, and that it was more accommodating toward the Pakistani political establishment. Despite the predominantly Sunni *sayyid* and Pashtun composition of the Peshawar group, the delegation also included Hafizullah Mohseni, the son of the Kandahari Shia cleric and leader

of *Harakat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan* Asef Mohseni.[466] Yet another offshoot of the Rome process was an initiative known as the Bonn process, organized by Dr. Abdul Sattar Sirat beginning in 2001.[467]

Personal ties also connected figures across blocs at Bonn. Dr. Abdullah and Massoud Khalili, members of the *Jamiat* party and confidantes of Ahmad Shah Massoud, belonged to families that were closely connected to leading figures from the Afghanistan's *ancien régime*. Dr. Abdullah's step-father, Ghulam Muhiuddin Zimaryani, a member of the upper house in the 1969 parliament, was a personal friend of former King Zahir Shah. And Massoud Khalili's father, the renowned poet Khalilullah Khalili, was a longstanding confidante of the former king. Familial ties also cut across the negotiating parties at Bonn. Members of the Arsala family could be found in the UF and the Rome group. Some Gailani family members participated in the Peshawar process, while others, notably Ishaq Gailani, supported the Cyprus process. The head of the Rome delegation and an ultimately unsuccessful contender for the chairmanship of the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA), Abdul Sattar Sirat, was the brother in-law of Yunus Qanuni, a political officer in the UF-allied *Shura-ye Nazar*.[468] And Rome delegate Hamid Karzai, the future chairman of the AIA and, later, president of the first post-Taliban government, had working relationships with many of the prominent figures in the UF, Cyprus, and Peshawar groups. Karzai was a member of a prominent Kandahari family with personal ties to the royal family; he had subsequently served as an official of Sebghatullah Mojadidi's *Jabha-ye Nejat-e Melli*, a mujahideen party allied with the UF, and later the mujahideen government led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, where he worked under Pir Sayyid Gailani in the foreign ministry; and as a member of the Rome process during the late 1990s, he had maintained contact with UF commanders in Afghanistan and the exile communities in Pakistan and the United States.[469] As a result, the groups participating in the Bonn negotiations were less cohesive and mutually exclusive than their nominal distinctions might

[466]Like many of the Kandahari Shia, Mohseni belongs to the Qizilbash ethnic group, a community that descended from Turkic soldiers that conquered much of present day Afghanistan on behalf of Safavid king Nader Shah during the middle 18th century.

[467]See Omar Samad, "Meeting Between Loya Jirga and 'Cyprus' Processes Yields no Results Discord Centers on Political Objective and Mechanism," Azadi Afghan Radio News, April 2001. Sitar's Bonn process was apparently unrelated to the negotiations that took place in Bonn after the ouster of the Taliban government.

[468]Sirat had strong royalist connections. He is of mixed Uzbek and Mohammadzai descent, and was a Minister of Justice during the New Democracy period.

[469]This flexibility on the part of Karzai in part explains his ability to preside over diverse coalitions of political figures in subsequent years.

have suggested. At the same time, they had many more areas of commonality across negotiating groups than the bloc distinctions ostensibly indicated. In reality, politics during and immediately after Bonn consisted of a much more fluid set of bargains about the composition and behavior of future Afghan governments.

But the outcome of the Bonn negotiations were shaped by more immediate military developments in Afghanistan and US interests in the post-Taliban political system. By the end of November 2001, UF-allied forces had taken control over a majority of the country, and the late Ahmad Shah Massoud's predominantly Panjsheri *Shura-ye Nazar* forces,[470] led by Qasim Fahim, had occupied Kabul along with Sayyaf's *Ittehad* after the city was abandoned by the Taliban. The decision to move into Kabul clearly went against Fahim's earlier commitments to Washington, but also reflected the reality that *Shura-ye Nazar* was more organized and proximate to Kabul than other Afghan political forces. *Shura-ye Nazar's* dominant military position in Kabul meant that it possessed a particularly strong hand in the Bonn negotiations. After ten days of demanding negotiations,[471] the Bonn talks produced an interim administration in which many of the prominent portfolios were allocated to *Shura-ye Nazar*. The defense portfolio went to Qasim Fahim, *Shura-ye Nazar's* military leader, while foreign and interior affairs went to the organization's political officers Dr. Abdullah and Yunus Qanuni, respectively. Most of the other key portfolios were allocated to members of the Rome Group. The chairmanship of the interim government was allotted to Hamid Karzai and the finance portfolio to Hedayat Arsala, both Rome group members. The assignment of the "power" portfolios—defense, foreign affairs, and interior affairs—to *Shura-ye Nazar* led some UF delegates, notably Haji Qadir and Karim Khalili, to walk out of the Bonn discussions before the signing of the resulting agreement took place. Other leaders affiliated with the UF, notably the Uzbek commander Adbul Rashid Dostum, took issue with the limited representation of ethnic Uzbeks at Bonn.[472] Moreover, Abdul Sattar Sirat was disappointed in the absence of adequate representation by the Rome group, a position that was reinforced by his unsuccessful candidacy for the chairmanship of the Afghan Interim Administration.

With support from a plurality of the Afghan participants in the Bonn process and the backing

[470]Established in 1984, *Shura-ye Nazar* (Supervisory Council) was a network of military commanders with close ties to Massoud, many with familial origins in the Persian-speaking areas north of Kabul.

[471]Dobbins 2008.

[472]Sharan 2011, p. 116.

of key regional and international powers, particularly the United States, Hamid Karzai was selected as the chairman of the AIA.[473] Karzai did not enjoy the unanimous support of the Afghan delegates at Bonn—notably, Rome delegates Abdul Sattar Sirat and Azizullah Wasefi did not believe that was Karzai had the personal capabilities necessary to lead the first post-Bonn administration. The selection of Karzai, who would subsequently head the ATA and two government administrations, had an important, idiosyncratic impact on the trajectory of government institutions after Bonn. But, as shown in greater detail below, a series of domestic and international factors would subsequently influence the behavior of Karzai and other political elites in ways that increased the prevalence of patronage in post-Bonn institutions.

5.2 Reconstructing Institutional Capabilities After 2001

By 2002, Afghanistan was the poorest country in Asia and the fifth most impoverished place in the world in terms of real per capita income. Its physical infrastructure was either destroyed or severely degraded. Almost all of the country's practicing doctors, engineers, economists, agriculturalists, and military officers had fled or been killed over the course of successive wars, and millions of refugees living in Iran and Pakistan were expected to return to the country without guarantee of obtaining housing or employment. Large numbers of small arms and powerful weaponry were in the hands of military commanders who had fought on different sides of Afghanistan's conflicts. These commanders had regained influence over substantial sections of rural Afghanistan, presenting a challenge to the establishment of an integrated national army and government. This section documents the trajectory of post-Bonn government capabilities from these inauspicious initial conditions. Specifically, it examines two critical areas of government activity: the provision of security and the development of the domestic economy.

5.2.1 Security Sector Formation and Development

In the years immediately following the Bonn agreement, the formation and training of government security forces proceeded slowly and with great difficulty. The first battalions of the Afghan

[473] A large majority of the delegates from the Rome group, of which Karzai was a member, had voted for Abdul Sattar Sirat to lead the AIA. However, a plurality of the delegates at Bonn ultimately voted for Karzai, based in part on the understanding "that the Americans wanted Mr. Karzai." See Onishi, Norimitsu, "A Nation Challenged: War in South; G.I.'s Had Crucial Role In Battle for Kandahar," *New York Times*, December 15, 2001.

National Army (ANA) were formed and trained beginning in 2002, largely drawing on men recruited through Afghan military commanders allied with the United States. These initial battalion groups were generally of low quality and held in common a highly localist orientation that became problematic prior to and during deployment.[474] A ten-week instruction program and poor compensation,[475] moreover, did little to ameliorate these problems. Desertion, limited motivation, and indiscipline were prevalent among the initial ANA battalions, prolonging the security vacuum that existed throughout the country, particularly in the southern and eastern areas most vulnerable to Taliban infiltration. By the end of 2002, approximately 2,000 ANA soldiers had received training from US and British forces.[476] And at end of 2003, between 6,000 and 9,000 soldiers had undergone training from international forces, out of whom no less than 2,000 had reportedly deserted.[477] Desertion was a continual problem, with estimates of desertion rates ranging at various points in time from 20%[478] to as much as 50%.[479] James Dobbins, then the US special envoy for Afghanistan, reported that, "American soldiers trained then tens of thousands of recruits [*Shura-ye Nazar* commander] Fahim and other warlords supplied, but nearly all of these deserted as soon as they finished their course of instruction."[480] In subsequent years, desertion rates continued to be high among former militiamen recruited into the ANA. In late 2004, when the newly formed 205th ANA corps deployed to the increasingly unstable province of Kandahar—this was the first unit of the army to be deployed outside Kabul—approximately half of the force deserted. Between September 2004 and June 2005, between 1,200 and 1,500 soldiers quit the force in the face of poor material conditions and growing Taliban violence.

The ANA also performed poorly in the years that immediately followed the intervention. When deployed into combat, ANA units often exhibited poor discipline and quality,[481] and were not able to operate independently from international military forces. Even among relatively ca-

[474]See Elliot Blair Smith, "US helping create an army in Afghanistan," *USA Today*, November 27, 2002. The article notes that "One batch of recruits offered by Herat warlord Ismael Khan was deemed so unfit that base commander Gen. Ghulam Sakhi Asifi says he returned the men and demanded 12 new men in their place."

[475]Paul Watson, "Losing Its Few Good Men," *Los Angeles Times*, November 27, 2003.

[476]Jeff Sallot, "Canada offers $11.3-million to rebuild Afghanistan; Promised money will go toward funding; a new national army and legal system," *The Globe and Mail*, December 3, 2002.

[477]Watson, "Losing Its Few Good Men," *Los Angeles Times*.

[478]Pamela Constable, "An Army in Progress; Building of Afghan Force Proves Difficult," *The Washington Post*, October 7, 2003.

[479]Dobbins, McGinn, et al. 2003, p. 137.

[480]Dobbins 2008.

[481]For example, the ANA reportedly performed poorly US led Operation Warrior Sweep in July 2003

pable ANA units, attrition remained a significant problem, in part a reflection of the minimal resources that the international community had allocated toward the army. Poor compensation, housing, and equipment, and the need for soldiers to physically transport their wages back to their home villages all contributed to temporary and permanent desertion.[482] In some areas of operations, however, the ANA performed more effectively. The ANA's performance in stationary security operations and regional forward deployments was comparatively strong. Particularly notable was Kabul's use of the ANA against regional commanders Ismael Khan in Herat, Abdul Rashid Dostum in Mazar-e Sharif, and Pacha Khan Zadran in Gardez.[483]

The early cadres of the police force were also characterized by problems of desertion and underperformance. In 2002, the Ministry of Interior was formally staffed by thousands of police officers who had been recruited during the prewar and civil war eras and claimed to be in employment of the Ministry of Interior Affairs. In practice, however, it was a poorly functioning amalgamate of wartime networks with overlapping areas of territorial authority and differing educational backgrounds. In early 2003, at least five senior officials in the Ministry of Interior Affairs held positions with overlapping responsibilities for policing of the capital city and the provinces.[484] The Kabul police force comprised of older cohorts who had received training in civilian policing during the Daoud presidency and PDPA period, police officers recruited under the *mujahideen* government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, and a large influx of fighters allied with different UF constituencies, particularly *Jamiat*. Illiteracy, poor discipline, cross-cutting lines of authority, and an absence of prior policing training and experience characterized large sections of the beginning police force. In 2003, only 120 out of 3,000 officers in Kandahar province had previously received training, which had occurred one decade earlier. In Bamiyan, half of the 700-strong police force had previously attended a training program, and in Karukh district of Herat province, only six of the 120 policeman were educated in policing, have received training before the Taliban government.[485] Military commanders with ties to the anti-Taliban parties had assumed province- and district- level leadership positions in the police force, which produced a patchwork system of internal security. The problem of "ghost" police, where commanding

[482]D. P. Wright 2010, p. 300.

[483]Carlotta Gall, "Threats and Responses: Warlord Is Said to Be Ready to End Standoff With Kabul," *New York Times*, January 19, 2003.

[484]International 2003, p. 8; Giustozzi and Reuter 2011, p. 2.

[485]International 2003, p. 9.

officers reported fictions personnel in order to pocket their salaries, was "widespread."[486] And command and control within the MOI was extremely weak. As Giustozzi explains,

> Even at the national level, personal relations – usually along factional lines – determined the responsiveness of the system to orders coming from the top. At the provincial level, command and control depended on the personal status of the chief of police; in areas where he had full control because he had staffed the police with his own men, he could issue orders and expect obedience in the districts (that is assuming he was able to communicate, given that in 2002 the police was not equipped with UHF radios and phones did not work). But if the police force at the provincial level had been divided among factions and strongmen as part of the division of the spoils following the collapse of the Taleban, then even the provincial chief of police would not be able to exercise much control and friction often occurred.[487]

Recently trained police officers, moreover, were not entirely reliable. According to a German police official, "a lot of [patrol officers] left the police shortly after completing their training to work for security companies, private persons and in the worst case for the Taliban because all of them pay much better wages. Unfortunately most of them take along their equipment including the weapons."[488] In Balkh, ordinary citizens as well as government officials, including governor Atta Mohammad Noor,[489] recognized that high-level and petty corruption remained a problem in the police force, and contributed toward insecurity within the provincial capital Mazar-e Sharif and surrounding areas.[490] In southeastern Afghanistan, American officials reported survey findings of "only 1,200 officers at work in an area where Afghan commanders claimed 3,300 officers were serving,"[491] allowing commanders to collect the salaries of nonexistent "ghost" officers for their personal benefit. In Uruzgan province, truancy within the ANP remained a persistent problem.[492] In Panjwai district of Kandahar province, auxiliary police units recruited through the United States exhibited poor discipline and limited competence, including inadequate gun handling and inconsistent lines of authority.[493] In Kabul, ten high-ranking police officials in the counter-narcotics police unit were alleged to have embezzled funds from salaries, stipends and

[486] Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2011, p. 12.
[487] Ibid., p. 13.
[488] Feilke 2010, p. 8.
[489] Former commander of the Jamiat-e Islami party based in the northern areas. In 2003, the commander of the 7th Army Corps in Mazar-e Sharif.
[490] Sayed Yaqub Ibrahimi, "Afghan Police Part of the Problem," *Institute of War and Peace Reporting*, June 6 2006.
[491] David Rohde, "Overhaul of Afghan Police Is Expensive New Priority," *The New York Times*, October 18, 2007.
[492] See Carlotta Gall, "Taliban Threat Is Said to Grow in Afghan South," *New York Times*, May 3, 2006.
[493] *Canadian Press*, "Afghan police training frustrating and slow," October 13, 2006.

logistical expenses."[494]

The security forces commanded by Kabul also faced challenges from within the political system. The political equilibrium that had incrementally and tenuously formed in Kabul had not taken place in much of Afghanistan's provinces. Regional elites violently contested territory in the north, west, and south of the country, employing both formal offices and and informal political alliances with elites in the center. A growing conflict in the north set into motion between Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Mohammad Noor escalated into large-scale violence in 2003 and 2004. By April 2004, the provincial capital and multiple districts of the northern province of Faryab were seized by ANA personnel loyal to Abdul Rashid Dostum. In response, Kabul deployed ANA forces based in the capital city into Faryab. Soldiers from Atta Mohammad Noor's 7th Army Corps were also dispatched to Faryab from Mazar-e Sharif, underscoring the extent to which informal turf battles and formal structures have overlapped in the post-2001 period. In the western provinces, the governor of Herat and powerful regional commander Ismael Khan came into increasing confrontation with more junior military commanders reportedly sponsored by Kabul. In April 2004, Kabul-allied military commander Zahir Nayebzada killed Mirwais Sadiq, Ismael Khan's son and a cabinet member, prompting heavy fighting between the two sides and the deployment of the Afghan National Army from the capital to Herat. Several months later, clashes broke out between men loyal to Ismael Khan and troops commanded by Nayebzada and other pro-Kabul commanders Amanullah Khan and Dr. Ibrahim. The ANA subsequently intervened, effectively suspending further violence but also freezing the gains made by the forces opposed to Ismael Khan. In November of that year, the Afghan army moved to disarm the police force in Qalat, the capital of Zabul province, leading to clashes between the two forces.[495]

Moreover, the limited level of peacekeeping forces and committed Afghan army and police personnel created a security vacuum throughout much of the country. This was a serious and immediate problem because key leaders of the Taliban movement had located or relocated themselves in Pakistan's sparsely populated border geographies and urban areas, where they began to raise recruits and finance for a war against the newly established Kabul administration and its

[494] *Pajhwok Afghan News*, "Afghan police detain 10 officers on embezzlement charges," November 26, 2007.
[495] Morning Star, "Afghan army takes on police force," November 2, 2004.

international sponsors.[496] Together, the deficit of international and domestic forces and Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan provided advantageous conditions for the expansion of a violent insurgency against the newly formed administration in Kabul, especially in the border provinces of the south and southeast. In these areas, there were between two and six international expeditionary combat battalions in the first four years of the intervention, although these forces were primarily oriented toward locating and engaging Al Qaeda forces remaining in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), not establishing local security or preventing Taliban infiltration.[497] In this context, the primary providers of day-to-day security in the southern provinces were a series of poorly paid and equipped police units outnumbered by Afghan Taliban forces. In Uruzgan, the 347-strong police force, comprised of 45 men deployed in each of five districts, faced an estimated 300 to 1,000 armed members of the Taliban. Uruzgan governor Abdul Hakim Munib estimated an average of 300 armed insurgents in each district.[498]

These initial difficulties prompted the US to allocate more resources and training effort to the ANA in 2005. Improved equipment, an increased number of trainers, and a slower rate of training produced incremental gains in military capabilities. In Kabul, the National Military Academy (established in 2005) recruited and trained relatively capable officers in military and non-military subjects over the course of four years.[499] At the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) and seven newly developed regional military centers (established in 2007) located throughout the country,[500] enlisted soldiers developed individualized and platoon-level infantry skills. Improved oversight and the introduction of an electronic payment system within the MOI and MOD reduced the prevalence of "ghost" policeman and soldiers, as did the establishment of the donor-controlled Law and Order Trust for Afghanistan (LOTFA) to distribute salaries, but inspections still took place within the chain of command, "leaving room for manipulation."[501] Still, the ANA frequently lacked the tangible and intangible capabilities necessary to perform effectively and independently. Even as the ANA gradually became a larger fighting force with basic skills,

[496] Giustozzi 2008c; Nadiri 2014.

[497] In the months immediately following the intervention, much of the Al Qaeda leadership and rank and file had either fled to northwest Pakistan, or otherwise been captured or killed. See Krause 2008.

[498] Carlotta Gall, "Taliban Threat Is Said to Grow in Afghan South," *New York Times*, May 3, 2006.

[499] Hopkins, Nick"Afghanistan: Bin Laden is gone, but will the west now stay the course in Kabul?: Security will be handed to the Afghans in 2014, but it will take years and billions more dollars before they can stand alone, generals and senior diplomats tell Nick Hopkins," *The Guardian*, May 11, 2011

[500] These training centers are located in Kandahar, Herat, Gardez, Mazar-e-Sharif, Konduz, Bamyan and Jalalabad.

[501] Giustozzi 2015, p. 158.

it remained critically dependent on the support capabilities of international forces. In particular, the logistics of the force—including close-air support, artillery support, and medical evacuation flights—remained a key vulnerability.[502]

While training efforts improved basic competencies in the security forces, especially the army, they did not improve the effectiveness of government forces in proportion to the growing Taliban insurgency in the southern and eastern provinces. This development prompted the United States and allied countries to expand the size of the ANA and, in particular, the ANP. In April 2007, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), an international commission of comprised of the Afghan government and donor organizations to address collective interests in Afghanistan, authorized a large increase in the ANP force, expanding the force from 49,700 to 75,000 men on duty. The 50% increase in ANP manpower, which was implemented in less than one year, took place after two years of very limited efforts to alter the strength and operations of the police. While the ANP expansion meant that the Ministry of Interior could field a larger number of police officers in the insecure provinces of the south and east, the quality of the expanded force remained inadequate. Most of the new ANP cadres were recruited on the basis of personal ties to wartime networks and offered very little monetary compensation, which meant that the least skilled and disciplined men selected into the police force. "Little or no effort went into improving meritocracy within the MoI" and, as a consequence, patronage provided the most efficient way of rapidly expanding the ANP force given the heightened priority of policing after 2006.[503] And monthly wages of $70, barely covering living expenses in the urban and peri-urban areas of the country, attracted poor and illiterate men with few job prospects and limited commitment to participating in a full-fledged insurgency. As a result, new ANP cadres lacked either the social or economic motivation to participate in the everyday forms of "high-risk" action that came with policing on behalf of the central government, and absenteeism and underperformance remained serious problems in the ANP. In Uruzgan, for example, a joint Dutch and Afghan patrol discovered police officers cultivating poppy within their compound.[504] Less than two years later, Minister of Interior nominee Hanif Atmar reported that the annual absentee rate for the

[502]Eric Schmitt, "Where Armies Must Be Built, It's Slow (Iraq) and Even Slower (Afghanistan)," New York Times, September 25, 2005.

[503]Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2011, p. 3.

[504]C.J. Chivers, "US Taking Long View on Afghan Police and Army," *New York Times*, May 3, 2007.

ANP was approximately 20 percent.[505]

Under these conditions, the expansion of the security forces, especially the police, corresponded with greater corruption. Between 2002 and 2009, more than 18,000 police personnel or 20% of the regular police force were accused of abuse of power or corruption in approximately 10,500 cases of misbehavior recorded by the Attorney General's Office. Thirty of these cases involved generals.[506] Although these figures were not validated by an external organization, given the political incentives of the government leadership to keep this information private, there is good reason to believe that it is representative of the general scale of corruption in the police force. A survey carried out by UNAMA in 2007 found "negative information—including assertions of involvement in drug trafficking, corruption and assaults—on 939 (38 percent) of 2,464 officers it reviewed."[507]

The American drive to expand the police force also consisted of efforts to supplement Afghan policing capabilities through irregular forces. Beginning in 2006, the United States and Afghan authorities initiated the first of several large-scale programs to establish irregular forces that could supplement the efforts of the regular police.[508] The first of these more formal initiatives, the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), was established in late 2006 to recruit village-level forces that could provide community policing for their home areas. The ANAP program, which was first established in Zabul and other provinces in the south and southeast, quickly ran into problems. In these pilot provinces, government officials used the ANAP program to "regularize" armed groups that had previously worked as unofficial guard forces for the ANP by providing them with force-specific uniforms, arms, and salaries. Many of these men did not come from the provinces to which they were assigned and did not actively interact with local communities (would-be ANAP forces were mainly engaged in the protection of highways, road construction projects, and mobile phone towers). More problematically, these forces were often an extension of commanders with long histories of participation in Afghanistan's wars and parochial interests in acquiring greater political influence and wealth—interests well-served by participation in the

[505] Group 2008, p. 3.

[506] "Crime by Afghan Police Rises 'Ten-Fold' since 2002," *Kabul Weekly*, July 1, 2009.

[507] Pratap Chatterjee, "Policing Afghanistan: Obama's New Strategy," *CorpWatch*, March 23, 2009.

[508] Prior to 2006, the US military had recruited a series of *ad hoc* irregular Afghan forces, known variously as the Afghan Guard Forces, the Afghan Security Guards, and the Afghan Security Forces, to support military campaigns in the southern and eastern border areas.

ANAP program. Training was limited to an 80-day program on subjects in human rights and the rule of law but not the practical elements of community policing. And the MOI and NDS officials responsible for vetting recruits were either unable or unwilling to verify the backgrounds of prospective recruits in the remote and dangerous provinces of the south and southeast. As a result, ANAP forces immediately exhibited poor motivation and discipline, leading to the quiet closure of the program in 2008. The next iterations of irregular policing began in 2009 with the Afghanistan Public Protection Program (informally known as "AP3") and a series of other programs developed in conjunction with the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy emerging within the Obama administration.[509] Sponsored directly by US special forces, the AP3 was developed in March 2009 to induce the support, through official uniforms, arms, and salaries, of communities that had either sided against the Afghan government or declined to actively support it.[510] However, the program exhibited similar problems to that of ANAP. Inadequate vetting, political capture by controversial commanders, and personal and organizational conflicts between the formal and informal branches of the police quickly undermined the effectiveness of the AP3 program. Similar problems emerged with many other irregular forces hastily organized by US special forces throughout 2009. While these forces were charged with defending the areas from which they were recruited, they frequently engaged in various abuses of rival communities and interests.[511] President Karzai sought to bring these various independent programs under a new national program managed by the MOI, the Afghan Local Police (ALP), in 2010. However, even under the direct supervision of Kabul, the ALP soon became a mechanism for patronizing allies of the central government. Nor was the MOI capable of effectively monitoring the behavior of the ALP in all areas of its presence, or resolving conflicts between irregular forces of the ALP and the regular security forces.

The counterinsurgency strategy adopted by the Obama Administration in 2009 gave new impetus to security sector development in Afghanistan. For US planners, the Afghan security forces

[509]Other irregular forces included the Local Defense Initiative (previously known as the Community Defense Initiative), the Critical Infrastructure Police in the north, the Community Based Security Solutions in the east, and the Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure in the south west.

[510]The AP3 program was funded and organized through the Department of Defense Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, not the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) that sponsored most of the regular Afghan national security forces.

[511]See, for example, Matthew Rosenberg and Alissa J. Rubin, "Afghanistan to Disband Irregular Police Force Set Up Under NATO" *New York Times*, December 26, 2011.

served two distinct purposes: first, they acted as a junior partner in the American counterinsurgency campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban; second, they were a crucial component of the announced US exit from Afghanistan. The resulting training effort significantly expanded the presence and manpower of the ANA and ANP. Between March 2009 and December 2011, the ANA and other forces controlled by the Ministry of Defense increased in manpower from approximately 83,000 to 180,000, an increase of 117%; Ministry of Interior forces (including regular and irregular forces) increased from 80,000 to 144,000, constituting a change of 80%. While the new training effort greatly expanded the quantitative strength of both forces, it did not address the deep-seated problems of patronage, attrition, and corruption present in the security forces, particularly the ANP. New developments in police training efforts, notably the integration of US-led OEF training mission (CSTC-A) into the NATO-led ISAF training effort (NTM-A), provided for more consistent forms of training across army and police units, but largely ignored the prevalence of patronage occurring in the upper echelons of the police or alter incentives of police officers to underperform or break the law. Two close observers of past and contemporary forms of paramilitary policing in Afghanistan noted that "no system of meritocratic promotion from the ranks of a new generation of senior police officers was in place or being effectively developed."[512] Despite growing evidence of police abuse, both MOI officials and international donors were not primarily focused on developing internal control over corruption and other forms of police misbehavior. This was both because the main objective of donors and much of the MOI was the quantitative expansion of the size and technical capabilities of the ANP. Moreover, the COIN strategy placed police officers on the front lines of the insurgency, exacerbating preexisting problems of desertion and creating new ones. The ANP were increasingly trained as a paramilitary force based in garrisons located throughout the country, obstructing the development of closer ties with communities in the insecure provinces of the south and east. Heavily armed and stationary, the ANP was poorly prepared to develop interpersonal connections with the communities they were charged with policing while also vulnerable to Taliban sieges in particularly insecure provinces. In areas bordering major roads, for example the highway stretches between Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat, ANP regularly extorted money from commercial trucks and ordinary citizens. ANP commanders also frequently used their subordinates to intimidate

[512] Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2011, p. 2.

political rivals.

By the end of 2014, the Afghan national security forces were more technically skilled, equipped, and quantitatively numerous than a decade prior. But the selection and promotion of security force personnel, particularly the ANP, remained motivated by political connections, undermining the quality and autonomy of the security sector. At the same time, the expedient rush to grow the security forces in response to Taliban gains meant that donors were reluctant to monitor and disrupt the patronage process that enabled corruption in the army and police.

5.2.2 Reconstruction and Development Planning

Economic reconstruction took an imbalanced and fitful path in post-2001 Afghanistan. In the years immediately following the fall of the Taliban government, reconstruction assistance was comparatively limited. Much of the economic aid that began to flow into Afghanistan was allocated toward humanitarian relief and "quick impact" projects targeting vulnerable communities, but was not embedded in a larger effort to address the rehabilitation of the relatively productive sectors of the economy. In 2002 and 2003, approximately $210 million or only 25% of American assistance was allocated toward longer-term reconstruction efforts. It was not until 2005 that efforts to identify and plan the prospective development of the Afghan economy began with the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). Initiated as an effort to address the problem of widespread poverty in Afghanistan, the ANDS process was based on the premise that Afghanistan's underdevelopment was attributable to a set of social, political, and economic problems that were invariably connected with one another. The ANDS process therefore drew on consultations with a variety of Afghan domestic constituencies, including businessmen, clergy, and community representatives in all areas of the country, as well as donor country officials. The resulting product outlined a strategy for improving security, governance, and economic and social progress and identified a wide range of benchmarks—comprising substantially all areas of government activity—that Kabul sought to fulfill over the next two decades.

The ANDS process was also designed to organize the international community around a common set of objectives and raise financing for their attainment. By 2006, 64 countries, 10 international organizations, and multiple NGOs had made commitments to advance stability and development in Afghanistan, presenting both a potentially significant development opportunity

and and a monitoring and coordination challenge. In order to meet this challenge, the Afghan government along with the United Kingdom arranged the London Conference on Afghanistan in January 2006, which produced a series of benchmarks based on the ANDS process in areas as diverse as transportation, health, agriculture, counter-narcotics, banking, and gender. The Afghanistan Compact, as this set of benchmarks was called, won the support of a wide variety of donor countries and international organizations that participated in the London Conference. It also established a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), a committee chaired by both representatives of the Afghan government and the international community, to oversee and coordinate the implementation of the benchmarks outlined in the Afghanistan Compact. While extremely ambitious and silent on questions of development and political strategy, the Afghanistan Compact was intended to demonstrate Kabul's commitment to development and its fear of abandonment.

In part because of Kabul's efforts to engage international donors on the economy, the Afghan economy expanded rapidly in the post-2001 era. Between 2002 and 2008, Afghanistan recorded an average real growth rate of 7.3%, and a per capita growth rate of 3.8%. Driving this growth were both consumption and high levels of fixed investment in physical infrastructure and real estate. Refugees residing in Pakistan and Iran had begun to return to Afghanistan in the millions, and large numbers of foreign diplomats, aid workers, and military personnel had established operations in the capital city, greatly increasing demand for a wide range of largely imported products. Textiles, generators, automobiles, construction materials, household products, and other goods flowed into Kabul and other cities, supplying both household and business demand. Meanwhile, donor governments and international organizations increasingly began to address Afghanistan's physical infrastructure, which had been almost entirely destroyed during the Soviet occupation and subsequent civil war.[513] The construction of highways, bridges, and hospitals became a significant contributor to the expansion of the Afghan economy, making up nearly 20% of national income throughout the post-intervention period.

Notwithstanding this expansion in physical infrastructure and consumption demand, severe

[513] USAID estimated that, as of 2001, only 50 kilometers of paved roads covered Afghanistan's land area of more than 650,000 square kilometers. See US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs, USAID Accomplishments in Afghanistan, 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 11, 2006. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACH904.pdf.

imbalances developed early on it in the post-2001 period. Investment expenditure in key production areas also consistently fell short of their long-term productive potential. In general, agriculture did not become substantially more productive in the years following the international intervention because of insignificant investments in human capital, production, storage, and transport, and the return of large numbers of unskilled refugees to Afghanistan's rural areas. Despite widespread recognition of the importance of agriculture to Afghanistan's recovery, real agricultural value added per worker, as estimated by the World Bank, declined by nearly 30% between 2002 and 2008, recovering to its initial level in 2013.

Figure 5.1. *Agricultural Share in GDP and Value Added Per Capita, 2001–2013*



Source: Central Statistics Office; World Development Indicators; author's calculations.

The agribusiness and light industry sectors, which had generated substantial domestic revenue and foreign exchange reserves during much of the 20th century, also performed relatively poorly during much of the post-2001 period. Dried fruit, carpets, cotton, and karakul wool were product groups for which Afghanistan possessed the raw inputs and basic skills to produce in small

numbers, but lacked the financing, physical infrastructure, and institutional support necessary to develop in greater scale. Yet these potential export opportunities were largely ignored for nearly a decade after the international intervention, and inadequately supported when they eventually became recipients of foreign assistance. Accounting for approximately 2.5% of GDP as of 2002, exports became a more prominent driver of economic growth between 2002 and 2008. But the export contribution to the expansion of the Afghan economy declined in subsequent years, ultimately reverting back to its 2002 level. Dried fruits, which accounted for a substantial share of the world market as of the 1970s, declined in relation to national GDP after 2002. Exports of wool products, which had historically constituted a large share of world consumption,[514] increased in the years immediately following the international intervention, but became a less consequential and predictable export product after 2006. And carpet exports, as a share of GDP, increased by ten-fold between 2002 and 2005, but declined in relative importance by the end of the decade.

But much of the post-2001 economic expansion became increasingly concentrated in investments in security-related services and construction, especially after the increase in the American and international military presence in 2009. Between 2009 and 2013, the real economy expanded by a growth rate of 10.4% in aggregate and 7.7% in per capita terms, to a significant degree because of the growth in transportation, security, and construction services. These were areas of expenditure that were generally not sustainable. They also did little to improve the productive capacity of the economy. Moreover, the contracts upon which this sector was based were clearly contingent on the transitory presence of international military forces. As soon as these forces reduced in size, so would demand for the security personnel, transportation convoys, storage services, and housing that these contracts generated. Perhaps most significantly, businesses in security and construction services became deeply enmeshed in domestic and donor politics. In one well-known example, a consortium of politically connected contractors in Afghanistan won large parts of the $2.16 billion Host Nation Trucking (HNT) contract (one of the largest US-sponsored contracts in Afghanistan), which they used to pay protection money to local commanders and "monthly bribes to nearly every Afghan governor, police chief, and local military unit whose territory the company passed."[515] HNT contractors also bribed US military personnel in return

[514]Between 1932 and 1963, the relative share of karakul wool exports from Afghanistan in world consumption was, on average, more than 30%. Kayoumy 1969, p. 222.

[515]Majority Staff 2010, p. 41.

Figure 5.2. *Contributions to GDP of Leading Exports from Afghanistan (2002 = 100), 2002–2014*

(a) *Major Exports*



(b) *Major Exports Excluding Carpets*



Source: Central Statistics Office; author's calculations.

Figure 5.3. *Scatterplot of Real Per Capita Growth in Transportation Services and GDP, 2002–2014*



Source: Central Statistics Office; author's calculations.

for "steering contracts to the company and for creating fake missions."[516]

The transportation services sector (and the political side effects it generated) expanded rapidly in the post-2001 period. This was especially the case after 2006, when international combat forces began to increase in size. As seen in Figure 5.3, growth in transportation services took off in 2007, increasing from approximately 130% (of its 2002 base) in 2006 to 300% in one year alone. Real growth in this sector was not a significant driver of the aggregate economy between 2002 and 2006, but strongly correlated with income growth after 2007. By 2007, transportation, logistics, and security services alone made up about one-third of agricultural output, and by the end of 2012, almost three quarters.

Tax revenue grew in ways that were consistent with the imbalanced development of the economy. Domestic revenue increased rapidly in the years following the international intervention, growing from only 3% of national income in 2002 to approximately 11% by 2014. But the tax

[516]See Matthieu Aikins, "The Bidding War" *The New Yorker*, March 7, 2016.

effort was concentrated in the least demanding areas of revenue raising. Taxation of rural households made up an extremely small section of domestic revenue. Within the urban sector, much of the growth in domestic revenue was attributable to taxes on income as well as goods and services in the urban sector. The expansion of consumption expenditure and company earnings, both tied to the international presence, provided the basis for the growth in government revenue. Increasing income from urban households and foreign citizens and, in particular, the growing volume of construction, security, and transportation contracts (through the Business Receipts Tax) increased the size of taxable activity in the cities. Income taxation, for example, grew from a non-existent base in 2002 to almost 4% of GDP in 2014, generated from a small group of large individuals and corporate taxpayers. By contrast, the more corruption-prone activity of customs administration did not experience substantial growth during the post-2001 period. Although international trade provided a relatively accessible source of government finance, customs revenue did not change substantially during the post-2001 period. By 2004, customs revenue had grown to approximately 3.5% of national income, but increased little thereafter despite the increased volume of trade. Tax efficiency was not a high priority of the Karzai administration from the perspective of the Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, corruption had become a problem in the senior ranks of the revenue directorate of the MOF. Several staff members in the customs and revenue department were involved in embezzlement of customs revenue, as evidenced by the dismissal of 40 senior MOF staff members for corruption or inefficiency in 2015.[517] Furthermore, the police force charged with monitoring the customs effort remained under the control of the MOI, a particularly corrupt government agency, despite repeated calls to move the jurisdiction of the customs police to the relatively capable MOF.

Similar to the security sector, efforts to rebuild the educational system focused much more on quantity instead of quality. In 2001, the need for schooling was enormous. Out of an estimated school-age population of 5 million, less than one million children, almost all of them boys, were enrolled in general schools, and a very small proportion of the population was literate.[518] The 21,000 teachers that had remained in their positions during the Taliban government were largely

[517] Byrd and Payenda 2016.

[518] According to the 2003 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, 37% of males and 10% of females of age 6 or older were reported as literate (reading and writing capabilities). World Food Programme and Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development 2004.

Figure 5.4. *Domestic Revenue Raising, 2002–2014*

(a) *Domestic Revenue Raising and Specified Sources of Taxation, 2002–2014*



(b) *All Sources of Government Revenue, 2002–2014*



Source: Central Statistics Office; author's calculations. Note: CSO revenue data for 2002 does not indicate the

under-educated. And most rural schools did not have elemental school supplies, and in many instances, even a school building. Efforts to improve the educational system, mainly financed by the multi-donor Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) administered by the World Bank, made significant gains in the quantity and, to a lesser extent, quality of schooling in Afghanistan. By 2013, primary and secondary school enrollment had increased to 8.7 million, of which 36% were girls. A system of 16,000 schools had developed, staffed by 187,000 teachers, many of them trained in education.[519] Net attendance rates increased by 20 percentage points among primary school aged children between 2005 and 2012 (from 43% to 64% for males, and from 29% to 48% for females), and by 17 percentage points among secondary school aged children (from 22% to 42% for males, and from 10% to 23% for females).[520] Amongst youth (15-24 years of age), female literacy increased from 20% in 2005 to 32% in 2012, and male literacy from 40% to 62% over the same period.[521] Nevertheless, many dimensions of educational quality did not show substantial improvement, especially in provincial areas where security, governance, and the supply of capable teachers were more limited. Approximately one half of all schools did not have intact buildings, and more than one half of all school teachers had not graduated from high school.[522] Low salaries and difficult working conditions continued to make teacher absenteeism a problem. In 2012, an government-sponsored study estimated that approximately 68% of school teachers (117,000 teachers) did not meet the minimum qualifications for professional teachers (a high school education plus two years in a teacher training college), varying from 30% in Kabul City to 99% in Daikondi province.[523] In the provinces, headmaster and teacher appointments quickly became employed as patronage in the post-2001 period. By 2011, the MOE had sent staff to the provinces because of concerns that less qualified individuals were hired over new graduates or more qualified people in provincial schools.[524] In the rural areas, qualified teachers and textbooks were in short supply because of insecurity. Around 500 schools in 10 insecure provinces (equivalent to 15% of all schools in the provinces where school closures occurred) were

[519]World Bank, *Afghanistan Country Snapshot*, October 2015. See url-http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview.

[520]Organization 2014.

[521]Ibid.

[522]World Bank, *Afghanistan Country Snapshot*, October 2015. See url-http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview.

[523]Bethke 2012.

[524]Ibid.

shut down because of insecurity by 2011.[525] Non-attendance, absenteeism, and dropout rates were especially high in these areas.

Other areas of development activity, notably health, were relatively successful in the post-2001 era. In 2002, none of Afghanistan's provinces met the minimal WHO standard of 1 bed for every 1,000 people, and almost all of the large health facilities with specialized services were located in Kabul and other major urban centers (especially Jalalabad, Herat, Kandahar). While most health facilities were in acceptable physical condition, nearly half of facilities had poor or nonexistent access to electricity and water. The maternal mortality ratio, estimated at 1,600 per 100,000 live births, was the highest ever recorded.[526] The average person lived until 55 years, according to United Nations estimates. The infant and child mortality rates of 165 and 257 per 1000 live births, respectively, were some of the highest in the world. And access to health services, defined as living within one hour walking of a health facility, in 2001 was limited to less than 10% of the population.[527] To address these deficiencies, the Ministry of Public Health developed a Basic Package for Health Services (BPHS) in 2003 that established the administrative architecture to contract with a growing system of public, private, and NGO-run health facilities. The BPHS set up an organizational system that effectively coordinated donors (primarily the European Community, USAID, and World Bank), MOPH staff, and health NGOs in service of a series of geographic targets (mainly underserved communities) and health objectives across a small number of basic services (e.g., maternal and newborn health, child health and immunization, communicable diseases, etc.). By 2015, average life expectancy had increased to approximately 60.5 years.[528] Maternal mortality had declined by almost 80% to 327 per 100,000 live births in 2010. Infant and child mortality rates had both declined by more than 50% to 77 and 97, respectively, per 1000 live births.[529] On a range of other indicators, the health system improved dramatically during the post-2001 period, not only because of donor resources and technical advice, but also because the MOPH was not a polarized agency like much of the security institutions; because it had devised a means of coordinating donor resources and reaching local communities through the BPHS; and identified discrete and achievable targets early on in the intervention.

[525] Bethke 2012.
[526] Bartlett et al. 2005.
[527] Newbrander et al. 2014.
[528] World Health Organization, Global Health Observatory (GHO) data.
[529] Newbrander et al. 2014.

5.3 Explaining Institutional Outcomes in Post-2001 Afghanistan

How does one account for the uneven pattern of institutional documented in the previous section? This section argues that limited organizational capital arising from personalist governance as well as incoherent external resourcing obstructed the development of capable government institutions. Personalist politics were, in part, a legacy of the successive wars that had emerged and evolved in Afghanistan since 1979. But they were also an extension of a postwar electoral system that obstructed the emergence of cross-cutting, interest-aggregating political parties and a strategy of patronage adopted by President Karzai to consolidate influence within it. Personalist governance, in turn, gave way to a distributional political system in which offices, contracts, and other resources were dispense in exchange for political support.

Incoherent donor objectives and poor coordination accentuated this distributional equilibrium in Afghanistan. The primary sponsors of the international intervention, most prominently the United States, failed to identify a coherent set of end-state objectives for national institutions and a strategy for achieving them in Afghanistan. At the same time, donors did not coordinate their various aid and training activities in Afghanistan, making it difficult to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of aid programming. This problem persisted throughout the US military and civilian "surge" into Afghanistan beginning in late 2009, when the Obama administration announced a counterinsurgency strategy to defeat the Taliban. Despite widespread recognition that the war Afghanistan required a new strategy, the surge did not by itself reconcile international objectives in Afghanistan or fully address problems of poor donor coordination.

This combination of limited organizational capital and incoherent external resourcing, in turn, generated a distributional equilibrium that rewarded individuals directly and indirectly connected to factions operating within the central ministries. In this environment, connections (*rawabit* or personal relations) usually trumped merit (*zawabit* or principles) in processes of recruitment and retention, and development projects were programmed in Afghanistan without identifying how they complemented existing or ongoing development projects, who would operate and maintain these projects after completion, and how these projects would be overseen. In this section, I show the processes by which each of these factors, limited organizational capital and external incoherence, impeded the development of government institutions after Bonn.

5.3.1 Limited Organizational Capital

The Bonn Agreement marked both a continuation and change in the wartime politics of Afghanistan. On the one hand, the distribution of political power continued to reflect patterns of military control. *Shura-ye Nazar* forces under the command of Qasim Fahim were deployed throughout the Kabul area but especially concentrated in the city center and the largely Tajik northern neighborhoods of Kabul. The predominantly Hazara neighborhoods of Afshar, Kart-e Sakhi, and Pol-e Sokhta were under the control of *Hezb-e Wahdat* cadres loyal to Karim Khalili. In Paghman, Qargha, Maidan Shahr, and other areas west and southwest of Kabul, forces loyal to Sayyaf, a close Fahim ally, had taken control. Farther afield, other UF-allied commanders had taken control of different regional centers. Ismael Khan had returned to his political base of Herat; Haji Qadir, the leader of the Arsala clan, contended with Pashai commander Hazrat Ali for control over Jalalabad; and Mazar-e Sharif quickly became an object of contention amongst forces under the control of the Ustad Atta, Dostum, Mohammad Mohaqqeq,[530] and others.

At the same time, the Bonn Agreement marked a departure from Afghanistan's wartime past. The settlement at Bonn paved the way for more plural politics that included Mohammadzai-era technocrats and patrimonial elites, former members of the *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions of the PDPA, the Maoist *Shola-ye Jawed* (Eternal Flame) organization, social democrats and constitutionalists, educated youth, and women's rights activists.[531] These diverse political networks formed old and new connections with one another in the years immediately following the Bonn Agreement, including several unsuccessful efforts to establish a programmatic and moderate political organization in Afghanistan. AIA chairman Karzai (through his brother Qayyum Karzai) explored efforts to establish a "moderate and reformist" political force in Afghanistan that included members of the National Front for Democracy in Afghanistan (*Jabha-ye Melli bara-ye Demokrasi-ye Afghanistan*), a coalition of democratic activists, Hazara intellectuals, Rome group members, youth groups, and former leftists Rangin Dadfar Spanta, Najib Roshan, and Azam Dadfar. Dr. Abdullah and Yunus Qanuni of *Shura-ye Nazar* sought to establish a reformist political party with

[530] Mohaqqeq is a Hazara political leader and former military commander in the Khomeinist *Nasr* organization who became a senior member of *Wahdat* after its formation in 1990.

[531] While secular and democratic forces did not initially hold any direct influence in the political system, individual members of these groups became more powerful in subsequent years. For insightful detail, see Ruttig 2006.

Hamid Karzai that could transcend ethnic lines.[532] This prospect gained momentum in late 2003, when a number of Karzai-affiliated technocrats, *Shura-ye Nazar* leaders, and Karim Khalili's section of *Wahdat* discussed the establishment of *Nohzat-e Melli* as a reform-oriented umbrella party. Karzai ultimately declined to pursue opportunities to build platform-based party coalitions with other political forces, opting instead for a more fluid, opportunistic form of alliance-making after the 2004 presidential elections that, in many ways, his opponents emulated. Karzai justified his opposition to new political parties by arguing that the (armed) parties of the past were directly implicated in the civil war violence of the 1990s—a common view in Afghanistan.[533]

While the early years of the intervention (2002-2005) were characterized by platform and coalition building, the following years became politically polarized and personalist. Two factors contributed to this development. First, the adoption of the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) electoral system in February 2005 systematically obstructed the development of political parties that could aggregate interests and elicit participation in Afghan politics, reinforcing the chilling effect of Karzai's categorical and early opposition to political parties on the possibility of programmatic politics. Although the electoral system was initially designed to follow a proportional representation (PR) format, President Karzai reportedly directed that it be changed to an SNTV format during an early 2004 cabinet meeting.[534] Despite opposition from UNAMA, the SNTV design became law in May 2004 and was confirmed by the cabinet in February 2005.

The consequences of the SNTV were far-reaching. Because the SNTV format rewards individual candidates, not party lists, with the greatest number of votes in each constituency, it provided strong disincentives to cooperate with politicians who share similar interests or ideas. Furthermore, by frequently resulting in small margins between winners and losers, the SNTV system presented particularly strong incentives for vote-buying and corruption. Candidates were also restricted from displaying any party affiliation on the ballot during the 2005 parliamentary elec-

[532] Dobbins 2008.

[533] In an interview, Karzai stated that "Afghanistan was destroyed, tormented, put through lots of suffering because of the bickering, because of the in-fighting, because of the political agendas of the parties that were not national. Afghanistan needs to have a day off on that. . .I don't know if I will lead a political party, but definitely a movement amongst the people." BBC, Hamid Karzai: Talking Point Special, May 10, 2002. See `http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/1940038.stm`

[534] The SNTV electoral system is uncommon. It had previously been used for parliamentary elections in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, but was subsequently abrogated. At present, it is used in Jordan, the Pitcairn Islands, and Vanuatu.

tions, further discouraging party development.[535] As a consequence, the SNTV system has served to "retard the development of a stable party system, accentuate the fragmentation of politics in Afghanistan, and leave national legislation dependent on a parliament characterised by unstable, unaccountable factions and personality politics."[536] In the 2005 parliamentary elections, only sixteen percent of the approximate 2,800 candidates were registered with political parties, and these party candidates (most of whom were only loosely integrated into party structures) won less than a third of the seats in the lower house.[537] In the next round of parliamentary elections in 2010, more than two thirds of the parliamentary seats were allocated to candidates without any party affiliation.[538] The weakness of the party system, in turn, meant that both parliament and executive institutions have had very limited lines of accountability to the electorate. In place of disciplining mechanisms within the electorate and parties themselves, the central government and legislature became increasingly corrupt and clientelistic.

A second, and more complicated, determinant of the personalized trajectory of Afghan politics centered on the related strategies of political consolidation and institution building adopted by AIA chairman Hamid Karzai. In 2002, Karzai lacked a strong political base as well as capable institutions of government. Almost all of the key cabinet portfolios and much of emerging security structure were controlled by wartime networks affiliated with the UF, especially the *Shura-ye Nazar* forces that had taken control over the capital city after the fall of the Taliban government. The AIA chairman had developed a working relationship with Qasim Fahim,[539] who presided over a core group of *Shura-ye Nazar* commanders as well as secondary networks of other *Jamiat* (of which *Shura-ye Nazar* was a part) and *Ittehad* commanders. Karzai also formed a strong working relationship with the *Wahdat* leader Karim Khalili, who held influence over the central Hazara territories. Together, Fahim, Khalili, and other military commanders lent political support to the fledgling administration in Kabul, while also deriving significant benefits from joining the post-2001 state. The resulting cabinet, as shown in Table 5.1, was a coalition

[535]This problem was partially addressed in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Candidates were permitted to display their party symbols on ballots, but not the names of their party affiliations.

[536]Reynolds 2006.

[537]Wilder 2005.

[538]Ibid.

[539]Curiously, Karzai and Fahim had a complicated past. As deputy foreign minister in 1994, Karzai was detained and arrested by men under the command of Qasim Fahim, who was then the security chief for Ahmad Shah Massoud. Coll 2004.

of wartime networks in which most members had high patronage demands and limited prior specialization. One glaring exception to this rule were the security portfolios held by *Shura-ye Nazar* figures Fahim, Abdullah, and Qanuni, who had informally performed similar roles in wartime, but nonetheless had very high patronage demands. Another exception was the small number of émigré specialists without a political base (Fayez, Farhang, Arsala, Sediqi, and Amin) who occupied portfolios that were technical in nature and involved a high degree of international exposure.

Karzai clearly needed the support of the UF groups to stay in office, and these groups were willing to work with Karzai because he enjoyed strong international support, and therefore could influence access to government offices and external resources. But he was also confronted with relatively strong political allies and weak institutions of government. The AIA chairman sought to simultaneously address these distinct challenges by increasingly co-opting potential rivals while bringing educated émigrés and youth into the government. Beginning in 2003, Hamid Karzai began to develop a coalition of both mujahideen and reform-oriented figures, simultaneously breaking up the political networks formed during the Soviet conflict and incorporating the pre-war elite and youth educated in neighboring countries. Karzai had developed a more prominent political profile within Afghanistan and, critically, retained the near unanimous backing of the international community. With the quiet support of the UN, European donors, and to some extent the US, Karzai dropped several major commanders from the ATA cabinet—Qasim Fahim, Mustafa Kazemi, Mohammad Mohaqqeq, Hussein Anwari,[540] Gul Agha Sherzai, and Dostum's representatives.[541] Many of these military commanders retained significant formal or informal authority in the Afghan government: some were transferred to governorships (Sherzai, Anwari) or maintained an extensive number of allies or clients in the central and line ministries (Fahim, Dostum, Mohaqqeq, Kazemi). However, the moves appeared to signal the beginning of a concerted institution building effort by newly elected President Karzai. As shown in Table 5.3, many of the figures that joined the government possessed educational or professional backgrounds in their area of responsibility and did not have their own political bases in Afghanistan, reducing the scope for patronage.

[540] Anwari was a military commander aligned with Asef Mohseni's *Harakat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan*.

[541] In this respect, Karzai was aided by the newly established constitutional stipulation that cabinet ministers must have higher education, which many of the wartime commanders clearly did not have.

Karzai had also begun to bring into the government émigré specialists with strong international reputations and limited political bases, including Ashraf Ghani in the MOF and Ali Jalali in the MOI. Ghani, an anthropologist who had worked in academia and the World Bank for many years, was well versed in the technical and political aspects of institution building in the MOF—during his tenure, he issued a new currency and established a single treasury account, and undertook more political tasks such as the centralization of customs revenue.[542] And Jalali, who had served in the prewar military and closely followed military developments in Afghanistan during the Soviet war, was well positioned to reform the police force, which was emerging as the weakest section of the Afghan national security forces. Amrullah Saleh, the newly appointed chief of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and former protégé of Ahmad Shah Massoud, was appointed to improve the intelligence service's capacity to counter the growing Taliban insurgency based in Pakistan. Amin Fatemi, the newly appointed health minister, and Amirzai Sangin, the new communication minister, brought with them decades of experience in their respective portfolios.

While President Karzai supported the UN led disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process and the removal of the least competent and reputable officers in the security forces, he was not willing to fully support the removal of corrupt or incompetent but politically connected officers that could be found throughout the army and police force, effectively blocking the development of a merit-based security force. This included Karzai's political base of Kandahar, where President Karzai's brother Ahmad Wali and other political allies Abdul Raziq (Achakzai), Abdul Raziq Sherzai (brother of Gul Agha Sherzai), and Haji Gulalai (a childhood classmate of Sherzai) controlled most of the security forces and development resources in the province and surrounding areas. In Kandahar, the security forces and political establishment had developed an especially pronounced reputation for corruption involving resources gained from opium trafficking, customs embezzlement, and development assistance, and the selling of offices and positions for bribes. Indeed, by 2005 the momentum for political reform in the Afghan government had begun to peter out. President Karzai opted to split the difference between merit and patronage, appointing reform-oriented figures to key cabinet positions while continuing to countenance

[542] Most notably, Ghani travelled to Herat in May 2004 to obtain unsettled customs revenues raised from the customs house, then under the control of Ismael Khan. See Carlotta Gall, "Kabul Announces Push to Gain Revenue and Combat Corruption," *New York Times*, May 24, 2003.

problematic patronage appointments to upper- and middle-level civilian and military offices. Patronage appointees in Takhar were discovered to be moving large quantities of heroin through northern Afghanistan.[543] In Helmand, ANP commanders were known to confiscate substantial shares of subordinates' wages and take bribes in exchange for prematurely releasing accused criminals.[544]. By the end of 2005, Jalali had left the government unable to carry out merit reform at the upper echelons of the interior ministry. Dr. Abdullah, who as Foreign Minister had sought to rationalize a bloated ministry and enlist international support for reform and reconstruction, was dropped from the cabinet in favor of Rangin Dadfar Spanta, a more ideological figure who would need to depend heavily on Karzai's patronage to stay in office.

Karzai also sought to simultaneously break up the patronage networks and extend his personal influence in the army officer corps. In 2004, he had appointed political ally Rahim Wardak, a former military officer and mujahideen commander, in place of Qasim Fahim as Minister of Defense with the objective of balancing the extensive network of *Jamiat* commanders in the army. Although Wardak was perhaps more oriented toward reforming the army in favor of merit, he lacked significant influence within the military. This was partly because Wardak did not possess the military record and charisma required to win the support of senior officers more amenable to reform; it was also because Fahim's network was deeply embedded in the army. Of a total 100 generals appointed by Qasim Fahim in 2002, 90 reportedly belonged to *Shura-ye Nazar*.[545] By the end of 2005, Wardak had overseen more than 4,000 new officer appointments, "but the patronage networks were far from crushed."[546] Moreover, Wardak's efforts to reform the ministry were impeded by his poor personal relationship with the Chief of Army Staff and former *Jamiat* commander Bismillah Khan Mohammadi. Wardak did not get along with Mohammadi, which meant that his efforts to improve the quality of the officer corps were seen as inherently conflictual. The ANA soon became divided into competing networks, with Mohammadi retaining the loyalty of a large majority of the officer corps—in 2008, a reported "6 out of 11 brigade commanders and 12 battalion commanders of 46."[547]

[543]Scott Baldauf, "Inside the Afghan drug trade," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 13, 2006.

[544]For example, see David Rohde, "Afghan Symbol for Change Becomes a Symbol of Failure," *New York Times*, September 5, 2006.

[545]Giustozzi 2015, p. 132.

[546]Ibid., p. 133.

[547]Ibid.

By 2006, Karzai had primarily incorporated into his government either (1) loyalists who were dependent on his patronage, (2) relatively apolitical figures with specialized, usually technical skills and relatively strong international reputations, and (3) influential mujahideen figures who could provide significant political support in exchange for autonomy in government. Karzai was now coming into his own as a leading figure within Afghan politics. He had cultivated a political base in Kandahar through his extended family, skillfully enlisted major donors in support of his government, and built a carefully calibrated coalition of mujahideen and reform-oriented figures that resulted in the decisive electoral defeat of Yunus Qanuni in the 2004 election. However, it soon became clear that Karzai was not willing to put his own political standing at risk through sustained reforms of the Afghan government, particularly in the security forces. Karzai was not prepared to endanger his domestic position by disrupting the patronage networks in the government ministries and contractor economy, especially when much of his family and political base in Kandahar were becoming deeply involved in these networks. This calculation was reinforced by developments in the Middle East. By 2004, the US intervention in Iraq had begun to spin out of control, and as a consequence American and international attention to Afghanistan had rapidly declined. With US resources and attention tied up in Iraq, Karzai was less sanguine about the prospects of cracking down on corruption within the Afghan government. In 2004, for example, donor countries had contributed only $11.2 million of $65 million requested by the Afghan government to fund police salaries. As a result, the police units based in Kabul "went unpaid for months, a situation that resulted in petty corruption that undermined public confidence."[548] In this context of limited resources, Karzai was reluctant to enforce a crackdown on the police, which would have disproportionately affected the lower echelons of the force while endangering his political standing in Kabul.

If President Karzai had already adopted a "mixed" form of governance that combined merit and patronage in the government, the run-up to the 2009 presidential elections would swing Karzai's politics more decisively toward personalist politics. By the spring of 2009, Karzai had sought to co-opt mujahideen and religious personalities that could produce votes for his election campaign, at the same time weakening the capacity of political rivals to mobilize votes along ethnic lines. By May 2009, Karzai dropped Ahmad Zia Massoud in favor of Marshal Fahim,

[548] Perito 2009, p. 5.

who could more effectively generate votes among the northeastern Tajik communities on behalf of the presidential ticket.[549] Karzai's electoral ticket, along with the financial contributions his campaign reportedly received from Kabul Bank (described below), represented an acceleration in the use of patronage in the Afghan government. President Karzai's increasing employment of patronage, which had begun to develop by the end of the first Karzai government, was beginning to accelerate.

Changes in the American posture toward Afghanistan tended to accentuate Karzai's political strategy. US foreign policy toward Afghanistan had not fundamentally changed—the Obama administration sought to support the functioning and durability of the post-Bonn political system, even if Karzai was unwilling or unable to crack down on patronage appointments to the extent that most donors desired. But the tenor of American support had, unsurprisingly, become more business-like. The Obama administration had indicated that its working relationship with the Afghan government would be more contractual than it had been in previous years. The newly inaugurated administration was much less willing to accommodate corruption in the Afghan government than had been the case during the Bush years, and its dealings with Kabul would begin to reflect this expectation.

Whereas Washington had offered unqualified support for Karzai in the 2004 presidential election, it had now adopted a much more circumspect line toward his candidacy in 2009—as had the UN and other international partners. But the actions of key American officials dealing with Kabul had begun to suggest, from Karzai's perspective, that the Obama administration was not simply neutral—that it was collectively aligned against his candidacy. The newly appointed Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Richard Holbrooke, as well as US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, had independently initiated discussions with Karzai's rivals in which he had encouraged them to run for the presidency.[550] In Kabul, "rumors circulated about politicians that had been encouraged by Holbrooke to challenge Karzai. The rumors included ministers as well as prominent politicians in the opposition."[551] US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, barely a month into his term, "made a point of showing up at news conferences with

[549]The reunification of Karzai and Fahim was reportedly facilitated by their respective brother and half-brother, Mahmoud and Hasin. See Adam B. Ellick and Dexter Filkins, "Political Ties Shielded Bank in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, September 7, 2010.

[550]Eide 2012, p. 127; Gates 2014, p. 358.

[551]Eide 2012, p. 127.

other presidential candidates, including Ghani and Abdullah."[552] The newly appointed Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Afghanistan, Peter Galbraith, who also frequently met with opposition candidates, sought to restrict the number of polling centers in the upcoming presidential election to relatively secure areas, a move that would hurt Karzai's candidacy.[553] While some of the actions taken by Holbrooke, Eikenberry, and Galbraith were not by themselves unusual—it was common practice for foreign government officials to engage with all of the presidential candidates—their frequency and publicity was interpreted by Karzai and other Afghan political elites as a US move to unseat him.

In reality, there was confusion in the Obama administration about how to approach Karzai, and Holbrooke's maneuvering was in part reflection of this confusion.[554] The politics of Washington and Kabul were rapidly changing, and Holbrooke likely saw an entrepeneurial opportunity to shape US and Afghan government policy at the same time. In any case, Holbrooke's actions further pushed Karzai in favor of patronage politics. Karzai would ultimately prevail over his primary opponent, Dr. Abdullah, in a electoral contest characterized by extensive fraud, insecurity, and uncertainty. But, perhaps more importantly, it decisively reversed Karzai's already flagging willingness to reform government processes of appointments and procurement at the heart of corruption in the government. The problem of patronage was compounded by what many described as President Karzai's hands-off leadership style. While Karzai kept a close eye on the political dimensions of the coalition he had assembled, he took a much less active interest in management and human resources problems so critical to day-to-day governance.

The post-election bargain involved a hands-off posture toward corruption within central and line ministries. Karzai's strategy of personalist government had placed allied political networks in high- and middle-level positions throughout the government agencies and security forces. As part of this exchange, President Karzai and his senior allies would not actively pursue one another's subordinates for corrupt behavior or other forms of malfeasance. By 2009, corruption had become firmly entrenched in the Afghan political system. It was the price of a political strategy that simultaneously shattered the opposition and stabilized national politics, accruing power to President Karzai. The security ministries, in particular the Ministry of Interior, were at the

[552] Elizabeth Rubin, "Karzai in His Labyrinth," *New York Times*, August 4,2009

[553] Karzai drew support from many of the relatively insecure areas in Kandahar and southern Afghanistan.

[554] On American confusion toward Afghanistan, see M. Yusuf, H. Yusuf, and Zaidi 2011.

center of the distributional equilibrium in Afghanistan. One MOI official described the appointments process in transactional terms. "Karzai has to bribe these power brokers. . .otherwise he will not survive. It is not only in the Interior ministry, it is everywhere. It is in the Defense ministry, it is in the [Afghan National] Army." Patronage appointments were especially prevalent in the Ministry of Interior. Ghulam Ali Wahdat, a Khalili client, was appointed in the key position of Deputy Minister of Interior for Administrative Affairs, which he used to distribute positions to *Wahdat* loyalists. Lieutenant General Yunus Noorzai, the uncle of Kandahari commander Aref Noorzai (a brother-in-law of President Karzai), was appointed as head of the Afghan Border Police (ABP). Yunus Noorzai, along with Aref Noorzai, were reportedly implicated or directly involved in poppy smuggling and customs embezzlement at the Spin Boldak border crossing in Kandahar province, which they used to maintain control over the southern region.[555]

Personalist governance, and the absence of organizational capital that it represented, was problematic because it undermined the cohesion of the security services at the center and, at times, at the local level. Within the MOI and, to a lesser extent, the MOD, factionalism at times obstructed officials from reporting organizational problems to peers or immediate superiors. In Herat, for example, "[f]actionalism reinforced conflict and rivalry within the police force and undermined its cohesion. Since the survival of police officers depended on the strength of the political factions they belonged to, officers tried to strengthen the position of their faction within the police and MoI while undermining other factions. This factional competition exacerbated mistrust and undermined cohesion and cooperation. For instance, in many cases a district police chief and his deputy belonged to different factions and, instead of working as a team, they refrained from supporting and cooperating with each other.[556] Limited organizational capital was also problematic because it provided incentives for factional leaders to promote loyalist junior officers at faster rates than relatively capable but unconnected officers. Incompetent commanders were often retained because they enjoyed the support of political allies or familial relatives in the senior ranks of the police or the army. Despite emerging a problem in the early years of the intervention, by 2014 no procedure had been put in place to objectively evaluate and reward officers on the basis of merit.

[555]Peter Graff, "US troops leave border to Afghan boss accused of graft." Reuters, March 17, 2010.
[556]Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2011, p. 32.

Patronage was also prevalent in ministries that provided basic services—including the ministries of education, agriculture, water and energy, as well as the court system. These government agencies had a relatively large number of provincial staff and frequent contacts with ordinary citizens. And with limited donor visibility over provincial appointments in these areas, patronage appointments were very common, as was corruption. In the Ministry of Education, the largest employer in the Afghan government, not just provincial and district heads of education but also legislators routinely promoted relatives and political allies in the school system instead of more qualified teachers and principals. According to reported findings by the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, a government watchdog, education officials, provincial council members, and parliamentarians, colluded together in allocating patronage appointments. The committee's executive director reported that "[i]n some cases, there appears to be quota or everybody has got a share in the appointment."[557] Yet another problem was that patronage appointments tended to favor their own home districts. When provincial education officials were situated in their home province, they at times directed the preponderance of resources to their home district, ignoring other districts in the province.[558]

The post-Bonn distributional equilibrium was also based on access to government contracts and property. Family members and associates of the government leadership, and sometimes senior officials themselves, traded their political connections for lucrative construction or security contracts and access to land. Hasin Fahim, a half-brother of Qasim Fahim, was an early beneficiary of the emerging security economy. Fahim was a shareholder in Strategic Security Services International (SSSI), which had won contracts to provide security for the Afghanistan International Bank (2004),[559] Fluor Corporation (2004),[560] and USAID (2009),[561] as well as the Serena Hotel. Fahim also owned the Zahid Walid company, which expanded by winning high-profile international and domestic contracts.[562] In the central province of Bamiyan, Nabi Khalili, owner

[557] *1TV*, "Over half of teachers in Afghanistan unfit for position: anti-corruption watchdog," August 23, 2015.

[558] Giustozzi 2010, p. 23.

[559] Business Wire, "ING Bank Group Selects Secure Risks' Strategic Security Solutions to Provide Security for Afghanistan International Bank," July 14, 2004.

[560] PR Newswire, "Fluor Selects Secure Risks' Strategic Security Solutions to Provide Security for Afghanistan Reconstruction Projects," November 3, 2004.

[561] See `http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacw231.pdf`.

[562] Zahid Walid won international contracts to pour concrete for a NATO base and rebuild portions of the American embassy. Domestic projects included the reconstruction of the Kabul airport, and several projects sponsored by the Ministry of Water and Energy to supply diesel fuel.

of the Gholghola Group and brother of Second Vice President Karim Khalili, was awarded with a contract to build a 20 kilometer section of the road connecting Bamiyan to Kabul—using asphalt materials that "won't last much beyond three or four years at the most."[563] Hamed Wardak, the owner of security company NCL Holdings and the son of Minister of Defense Rahim Wardak, won an award under the DOD-sponsored Host Nation Trucking (HNT) contract, despite possessing no direct experience in managing transportation services before this contract.[564] Ahmad Rateb Popal and Ahmad Rashid Popal, cousins of Hamid Karzai and principals of Watan Risk Management, were awarded with contracts to provide convoy security for seven out of the eight prime contractors under the HNT contract, covering approximately 3,500 US supply trucks every month. Watan's contract was, in turn, sub-contracted to a private Kandahar-based militia controlled by a distant relative, Rohullah. After a US investigation found that militia men controlled by Watan had frequently bribed Afghan government officials, used heavy weapons prohibited under their contract, and reportedly made protection payments to the Taliban,[565] US Army officials unsuccessfully sought to ban Watan (and another company, Compass Security, that also provided transportation security services) from doing business with the American government. The Army opted "instead for an administrative agreement that says the [Watan] company may not bid on any convoy security contracts paid for with U.S. tax dollars for the next three years."[566] Other politically connected security firms were owned by Sadiq Mojadidi (son of Sebghatullah Mojadidi), Jalaluddin Rabbani (son of Burhanuddin Rabbani), Lotfullah (a former commander under Sayyaf), and Wahidullah Frozi (brother of Khalillulah Frozi, the Chief Executive Officer of Kabul Bank).[567]

Perhaps the most prominent example of economic patronage in the post-2001 period was Kabul Bank and its principal beneficiary, the Afghan Investment Company, ventures that brought together members of the Karzai and Fahim families and several politically connected business

[563] Jochen-Martin Gutsch, "The Road to Bamiyan: A Public Works Debacle that Defines Afghanistan," *Der Spiegel*, September 30, 2014.

[564] Majority Staff 2010, p. 13.

[565] Reportedly, Watan denied making payments to the Taliban, but it did not deny the use of bribery or heavy weapons. See Associated Press, "US officials to face questions about decision not to ban corrupt Afghan company," September 15, 2011. Also see Dexter Filkins, "Convoy Guards in Afghanistan Face an Inquiry," *New York Times*, June 6, 2010.

[566] Associated Press, "US officials to face questions about decision not to ban corrupt Afghan company," September 15, 2011.

[567] See `http://tkg.af/english/reports/political/234-top-leaders-tied-to-security-companies`.

groups: the Dawi Oil Group, the Azizi Group, the Ghazanfar Group, the Gulbahar Group, the Afghan Wireless Communication Company, and former Minister of Agriculture Obaidullah Ramin, together with Kabul Bank Chairman Sherkhan Farnood and CEO Khalilullah Ferozi. Capitalized in 2004, Kabul Bank expanded on the basis of winning a $1.5 billion annual contract to administer the ARTF-financed salaries of approximately 80% of government employees. With an increasingly large deposit base, Kabul Bank shareholders made undocumented, interest-free "loans" without repayment schedules to fund their own personal and commercial expenses. Farnood purchased Pamir Airways and more than a dozen villas on or near Dubai's Palm Jumeirah on behalf of a range of political and economic elites.[568] Hasin Fahim borrowed at least $121 million for a house in the Palm Jumeirah and a bottled gas venture by the name of the Gas Group, while Mahmoud Karzai borrowed money for a Palm Jumeirah home as well.[569] All told, almost $1 billion in loans went to 16 shareholders, making up the vast majority of Kabul Bank's loan book.[570] After many of the Dubai property investments soured and news of Kabul Bank's financial troubles came out, prompting a bank run, the Afghan government was compelled to provide $825 million to bail out the bank—more than 5% of GDP and approximately equal in size to total reserves.

By the end of the second term of the Karzai administration, political patronage through the distribution of offices, and economic patronage, through the award of contracts and concessions to allies, had become widespread. The consequence of this was uncontrolled corruption, in which a wide variety of political elites and government functionaries were able to accept bribes or commit fraud with little repercussion. It also meant that critical areas of government activity, security provision and the welfare of the economy, were critically dependent on the sustained flow of international assistance, both because of the costs growing insecurity and the limited investment in revenue generating sectors of the economy.

[568]See Molly Hennessy-Fiske, "Relatives of 2010 Afghan Air Crash Victims Lobby for Redress," *Los Angeles Times*, April 29, 2011. See also Matthew Rosenberg and Maria Abi-Habib, "Afghan Officials Probed Over Bank," *Wall Street Journal*, February 1, 2011; Dexter Filkins, "The Afghan Bank Heist," *New Yorker*, February 14, 2011; Andrew Higgins, "Banker feeds crony capitalism in Afghanistan," *Financial Times*, February 22, 2010.

[569]Andrew Higgins, "Banker feeds crony capitalism in Afghanistan," *Financial Times*, February 22, 2010.

[570]See Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, "Unfinished Business: The Follow-Up Report on Kabul Bank," October 2, 2014.

Table 5.1. *Afghan Interim Administration, December 2001-July 2002*

Position	Name	Bonn Affiliation	Political Base	Specialized Background
Chairman	Hamid Karzai	Rome	South (limited)	–
Defense (+ Vice Chair)	Qasim Fahim	UF	*Jamiat*	Yes
Foreign Affairs	Abdullah Abdullah	UF	*Jamiat*	Yes
Interior Affairs	Yunus Qanuni	UF	*Jamiat*	Yes
Finance (+ Vice Chair)	Hedayat Amin Arsala	Rome	–	Yes
Justice	Abdul Rahim Karimi	UF	*Jamiat*	Yes
NDS	Aref Sarwari	UF	*Jamiat*	Yes
Education	Abdul Rasul Amin	Rome	East (limited)	Yes
Higher Education	Sharif Fayez	UF	–	Yes
Public Health	Sohaila Seddiqi	Rome	–	Yes
Communications	Abdul Rahim	UF	*Jamiat*	No
Reconstruction	Amin Farhang	Rome	–	Yes
Transport	Sultan Hamid Sultan	UF	*Wahdat*	No
Water & Electricity (+ Vice Chair)	Shaker Kargar	UF	*Junbesh*	No
Information & Culture	Raheen Makhdoom	Rome	–	Yes
Commerce	Sayyid Mustafa Kazemi	UF	*Wahdat Melli*	No
Planning (+ Vice Chair)	Mohammad Mohaqeq	UF	*Wahdat*	No
Public Works	Abdul Khaleq Fazal	Rome	–	No
Agriculture	Sayyid Hussein Anwari	UF	*Harakat*	No
Rural Development	Abdul Malik Anwar	UF	*Jamiat*	No
Urban Development	Abdul Qadir	UF	East	No
Mines & Industries	Mohammad Alem Razm	UF	*Junbesh*	No
Small Industries	Aref Noorzai	UF	South	No
Labour & Social Affairs	Mirwais Sadeq	UF	West	No
Air Transport & Tourism	Abdul Rahman	Rome (ex *Jamiat*)	–	No
	Zalmai Rassoul	Rome	–	No
Hajj and Awqaf	Mohammad Hanif Balkhi	–	–	Yes
Martyrs & Disabled	Abdullah Wardak	UF	*Ittehad*	No
Refugees	Enayatullah Nazeri	UF	*Jamiat*	No
Irrigation	Mangal Hussain	Peshawar	*Hezb-e Islami*	No
Border Affairs	Amanullah Zadran	Rome	East (limited)	Yes
Women's Affairs (+ Vice Chair)	Sima Samar	Rome	–	Yes

Sources: Government press releases; news reports; interviews; author's assessments.

Note: "Political base" indicates whether an officeholder belongs to a political organization (e.g., *Wahdat*) or otherwise a regional politica
"Specialized background" has a narrow interpretation here. It indicates whether or not an officeholder possesses sustained educational or i
in a given issue area. Because the chairman/president and vice-chairman/vice-president positions are not specific to a portfolio, specialized b
positions.

Table 5.2. *Afghan Transitional Administration, July 2002-December 2004*

Position	Name	Bonn Affiliation	Political Base	Specialized Background
President	Hamid Karzai	Rome	South	–
Vice President	Abdul Karim Khalili	UF	*Wahdat*	–
Vice President	Hedayat Amin Arsala	Rome	–	–
Vice President	Nematullah Shahrani	–	–	–
Defense (+ Vice President)	Qasim Fahim	UF	*Jamiat*	Yes
Foreign Affairs	Abdullah Abdullah	UF	*Jamiat*	Yes
Finance	Ashraf Ghani	–	–	Yes
Interior Affairs	Ali Ahmad Jalali	–	–	Yes
Justice	Abdul Rahim Karimi	UF	*Jamiat*	Yes
National Security Advisor	Zalmai Rassoul	Rome	–	No
NDS	Aref Sarwari	UF	*Jamiat*	Yes
Education	Yunus Qanuni	UF	*Jamiat*	No
Higher Education	Sharif Fayez	UF	–	Yes
Public Health	Sohaila Seddiqi	Rome	–	Yes
Communications	Masoom Stanekzai	–	–	No
Reconstruction	Amin Farhang	Rome	–	Yes
Transport	Said Mohammad Ali Jawid		*Harakat*	No
Water and Electricity	Shaker Kargar	UF	*Junbesh*	No
Information and Culture	Raheen Makhdoom	Rome	–	Yes
Commerce	Sayyid Mustafa Kazemi	UF	*Wahdat Melli*	No
Planning	Mohammad Mohaqeq	UF	*Wahdat*	No
Public Works	Abdul Ali	UF	*Wahdat*	?
Agriculture	Sayyid Hussain Anwari	UF	*Harakat*	No
Rural Development	Hanif Atmar	UF	–	Yes
Urban Development	Yusuf Pashtun	–	South	Yes
	Gul Agha Sherzai	–	South	No
Mines and Industries	Juma Mohammad Mohammadi	–	–	Yes
Small Industries	Mohammad Alem Razm	UF	*Junbesh*	No
Labour and Social Affairs	Noor Mohammad Qarqin	–	*Junbesh*	No
Air Transport and Tourism	Mirwais Sadeq	UF	West	No
Hajj and Awqaf	Mohammed Amin Naziryar	–	–	Yes
Martyrs and Disabled	Abdullah Wardak	UF	*Ittehad*	No
Refugees	Enayatullah Nazeri	UF	*Jamiat*	No
Irrigation	Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani	Rome	–	No
Border Affairs	Aref Noorzai	UF	South	Yes
Women's Affairs	Habiba Sarabi	Rome	–	Yes

Sources: Government press releases; news reports; interviews; author's assessments.

Note: "Political base" indicates whether an officeholder belongs to a political organization (e.g., *Wahdat*) or otherwise a regional politica
"Specialized background" has a narrow interpretation here. It indicates whether or not an officeholder possesses sustained educational or i
in a given issue area. Because the chairman/president and vice-chairman/vice-president positions are not specific to a portfolio, specialized b

Table 5.3. *Government of Afghanistan, End of 2004*

Position	Name	Political Base	Specialized Background
President	Hamid Karzai	South	–
First Vice President	Ahmad Zia Massoud	*Jamiat*	–
Second Vice President	Abdul Karim Khalili	*Wahdat*	–
Defense	Abdul Rahim Wardak	*Mahaz*	Yes
Foreign Affairs	Abdullah Abdullah	*Jamiat*	Yes
Finance	Anwar ul-Haq Ahady	–	Yes
Interior Affairs	Ali Ahmad Jalali	–	Yes
Justice	Sarwar Danish	*Wahdat*	Yes
National Security Advisor	Zalmai Rassoul	–	No
NDS	Amrullah Saleh	*Jamiat*	Yes
Education	Noor Mohammad Qarqin	*Junbesh*	No
Higher Education	Amir Shah Hasanyar	–	Yes
Public Health	Mohammad Amin Fatemi	*Jabha-ye Nejat*	Yes
Communications	Amirzai Sangin	–	Yes
Economy	Amin Farhang	–	Yes
Transport	Enayatullah Qasimi	–	No
Water and Electricity	Ismael Khan	West	No
Information and Culture	Raheen Makhdoom	–	Yes
Commerce	Hedayat Amin Arsala	–	Yes
Public Works	Sohrab Ali Safari	–	Yes
Agriculture	Obaidullah Ramin	–	Yes
Rural Development	Hanif Atmar	–	Yes
Urban Development	Yusuf Pashtun	South	Yes
Mines and Industries	Mir Mohammad Sediq	–	Yes
Labour and Social Affairs	Sayyid Ekramuddin Masoomi	*Jamiat*?	No
Hajj and Awqaf	Nematullah Shahrani	–	Yes
Martyrs and Disabled	Sediqa Balkhi	–	Yes
Refugees	Azam Dadfar	–	Yes
Border Affairs	Abdul Karim Barahui	*Jamiat*	Yes
Women's Affairs	Masouda Jalal	–	Yes
Youth	Amina Afzali	*Jamiat* (Afzali)	No

Sources: Government press releases; news reports; interviews; author's assessments.
Note: "Political base" indicates whether an officeholder belongs to a political organization (e.g., *Wahdat*) or otherwise a regional politica
(e.g., southern Afghanistan). "Specialized background" has a narrow interpretation here. It indicates whether or not an officeholder
sustained educational or informal/formal professional experience in a given issue area. Because the chairman/president and vice-chair
president positions are not specific to a portfolio, specialized background is blank for these leadership positions.

Table 5.4. *Government of Afghanistan, Early 2010*

Position	Name	Political Base	Specialized Background
President	Hamid Karzai	South	–
First Vice President	Qasim Fahim	*Jamiat*	–
Second Vice President	Abdul Karim Khalili	*Wahdat*	–
Defense	Abdul Rahim Wardak	*Mahaz*	Yes
Foreign Affairs	Zalmai Rassoul	–	No
Finance	Omar Zakhilwal	–	Yes
Interior Affairs	Hanif Atmar	–	Yes
Justice	Habibullah Ghaleb	*Jabha-ye Nejat*	Yes
National Security Advisor	Rangin Dadfar Spanta	–	Yes
NDS	Ibrahim Spinzada	–	?
Education	Ghulam Farooq Wardak	*Hezb-e Islami*	No
Higher Education	Sarwar Danish	*Wahdat*	Yes
Public Health	Soraya Dalil	–	Yes
Communications	Amirzai Sangin	–	Yes
Economy	Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal	*Hezb-e Islami*	No
Transport	Daoud Ali Najafi	*Wahdat*	No
Water and Electricity	Ismael Khan	West	No
Information and Culture	Raheen Makhdoom	–	Yes
Commerce	Anwar ul-Haq Ahady	–	Yes
Public Works	Abdul Qudus Hamidi	*Junbesh*	Yes
Agriculture	Obaidullah Ramin	–	Yes
Rural Development	Hanif Atmar	–	Yes
Urban Development	Sultan Hussain		Yes
Mines and Industries	Wahidullah Shahrani	–	Yes
Labour and Social Affairs	Amina Afzali	*Jamiat* (Afzali Front)	No
Hajj and Awqaf	Mohammad Yusuf Niazi	*Ittehad*	Yes
Refugees	Abdul Rahim	*Jamiat*	No
Border Affairs	Assadullah Khalid	–	?
Women's Affairs	Husn Banu Ghazanfar	*Junbesh*	No
Counter Narcotics	Zarar Ahmad Moqbel Osmani	*Jamiat*	No

Sources: Government press releases; news reports; interviews; author's assessments.
Note: "Political base" indicates whether an officeholder belongs to a political organization (e.g., *Wahdat*) or otherwise a regional politica
(e.g., southern Afghanistan). "Specialized background" has a narrow interpretation here. It indicates whether or not an officeholder
sustained educational or informal/formal professional experience in a given issue area. Because the chairman/president and vice-chair
president positions are not specific to a portfolio, specialized background is blank for these leadership positions.

5.3.2 External Incoherence

While elite factionalism provided the basis for patronage politics in Afghanistan after 2001, external assistance accentuated its depth and prevalence in the Afghan system. Despite sharing the same general objectives of stability and the defeat of Al Qaeda, the US and other major donors never reconciled the security and development dimensions of the international effort in Afghanistan. Nor did donors coordinate their efforts until many of the major sources of institutional weakness—most notably, the development of patronage politics—had set into motion. These early problems led donor countries, IGOs, and NGOs to take an improvisational and disorganized approach to the Afghanistan intervention that limited the effectiveness of assistance to Afghanistan and at times resulted in conflicting forms of international engagement.

The leading external actor in Afghanistan, the United States, was reluctant to become actively involved in the development of Afghanistan's nascent government institutions. Washington's strategy of employing the anti-Taliban political factions to unseat Mullah Omar's government had been quite effective. But this initial military success led the US to take a much more passive political and development role in the months that followed the fall of the Taliban government—a development that compounded the Bush administration's initial skepticism of building institutions abroad. Moreover, as the Special Envoy for Afghanistan James Dobbins recalled, very few domestic constituencies in the US were concerned with the postwar US strategy in Afghanistan:

> In 2002, President Bush was not under any pressure. He had just won the most popular war in American history. The military campaign in Afghanistan had gone unbelievably well, as had the diplomatic effort to install its successor government. His administration faced no demands to show results on Afghan reconstruction. Instead the public was supportive, the press was laudatory, and Congress was docile. The president and his closest advisers felt they were at the top of their game. Insofar as Afghanistan was concerned, they believed that the hard part was over. They were moving on to other issues and planning the next [military campaign] in the war on terror.[571]

This absence of American attention and resources to Afghanistan had a lasting effect on the ends and means of external assistance in the years that followed. Despite early indications that the US intended to undertake an ambitious reconstruction program in Afghanistan,[572] the Bush Admin-

[571] Dobbins 2008.

[572] In an April 17, 2002 speech at the Virginia Military Institute, President George W. Bush compared the US role in

istration committed very limited high-level attention and reconstruction funds to Afghanistan after Bonn. Reflecting the limited US interest in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, the Office of Management and Budget allocated only $40 million to aiding Afghanistan in the 2002 fiscal year. It was in this context of limited American engagement that the so-called "lead nation" system of assisting Afghanistan developed. This arrangement divided security sector reform into five components, with a different lead nation responsible for overseeing each area. Under the lead-nation system, the United States was responsible for overseeing the development of the army; Germany, the police; Italy, the justice system; Japan, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of non-state armed groups; and the United Kingdom, anti-narcotics efforts. The Bonn process also resulted in a territorial division of labor. Each of Afghanistan's provinces would come under the responsibility of a ISAF member state, and each of six territorial zones would be coordinated by a lead nation. Turkey was to oversee Kabul; the United States, the east, the south, and the southwest; Germany, the north; and Italy, the west.

Each donor brought its own political orientation and interests to its respective area of oversight. Germany established a training program in civilian policing methods (for example, criminal investigation, patrolling, traffic management) that, drawing on its own bureaucratic tradition, was technical in orientation but that did not address the deficit of domestic or international security forces in the years immediately following 2001. The United States, by contrast, pursued a largely *ad hoc* police training mission that sought to rapidly build up the Afghan National Police with little attention paid to the selection and the professional development of recruits. Developed in response to growing insecurity, the US effort was oriented toward functions that departed from the German civilian policing model—initially, the protection of buildings and other fixed structures, and later paramilitary operations.

The international approach toward poppy cultivation was equally incoherent. The United States and the United Kingdom sponsored an eradication campaign that destroyed poppy cultivation through manual eradication by Afghan security forces,[573] after initial plans for aerial and ground spraying were rejected by the Afghan government. Other efforts led by the UK

Afghanistan to the $13 billion, multi-year American reconstruction effort in Western Europe after World War II. The comparison of the American reconstruction effort in Afghanistan to the Marshall Plan, as the US economic program in postwar Europe was known, nonetheless rested on a poor understanding of the American role in postwar Europe. See De Long and Eichengreen 1991.

[573]Manual eradication involves slashing or knocking over poppy stalks.

provided cash compensation to Afghan farmers to destroy their poppy crops, often without subsequently evaluating whether the crops had indeed been destroyed. The Alternative Livelihoods program, sponsored by USAID, the UK's Department for International Development, and the European Commission, approached the poppy problem by compensating farmers for cultivating legal crops. At the same time, the World Food Program took an approach that distributed wheat cultivated outside of Afghanistan to farming communities throughout the country, effectively decreasing the incentive to grow legal crops.

International efforts to build Afghanistan's justice sector were equally incoherent. Italy, the designated lead nation for the justice sector, drew on its own civil code system in designing its various legal training programs in Afghanistan. The United States, which had become the largest donor to the Afghan justice sector by 2006, simultaneously applied its own common law tradition in training seminars for judges, prosecutors, and other Afghan justice personnel. Differences also emerged between the Afghan government and justice sector donors over the design of legal training programs in Afghanistan. Kabul believed that Washington did not draw on the input of Afghan authorities and did not systematically evaluate for effectiveness.

Attempts to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate (DDR) Afghanistan's various civil war parties were equally incoherent. The leading external actors in the DDR process, the United States and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), were in practice less than willing to fulfill their mandate of demilitarizing post-Bonn politics. The Bush Administration, and in particular the Department of Defense, did not see security sector reform in Afghanistan as a vital American interest. At the same time, Washington was concerned that an intensive demobilization process would alienate its erstwhile allies in the UF, who continued to provide security in the absence of a countrywide international peacekeeping force and to assist the US campaign to kill or capture members of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. While UNAMA preferred a more activist DDR process,[574] the absence of US interest in security sector reform effectively precluded such a process from gaining momentum. The resulting DDR process exempted most of the UF groups from demobilization by directly transferring wartime commanders and militiamen into the reconstituted national police force without significant vetting or subsequent training. It also allowed Minister of Defense Marshal Fahim and other senior security officials discretion over

[574]Sedra 2003, p. 44.

whom would be directly absorbed into the police force, a key means of patronage in the early post-Bonn period. In Antonio Giustozzi's words, the DDR process in Afghanistan constituted a "bureaucratic façade" that formally demilitarized the leading UF organizations while informally preserving and, to some extent, augmenting their control over military resources. The DDR process in Afghanistan was also characterized by unpreparedness and poor inter-organizational coordination, particularly in its reintegration component. A variety of external sponsors participated in the DDR process without an overarching set of objectives for the reintegration of demobilized fighters back into Afghan society, and therefore a coordinated strategy of how to get there. The UNDP and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) carried out parallel demobilization programs that focused on adults and children, respectively, while the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Japanese Embassy in Kabul developed different approaches to the design and implementation of the DDR process.

Even greater differences emerged between the approximately 30 implementing partners contracted to carry out the reintegration component of the DDR process. The reintegration of excombatants was organized along sectoral lines and carried out by a diverse cross-section of organizations, including government institutions (Afghanistan's Ministry of Education), international agencies (the International Organization for Migration, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Food Program, the UN Office for Project Services, the Mine Action Program for Afghanistan), domestic and international NGOs (Association of Experts in the Fields of Migration and Development Cooperation), and private firms (Roshan). Demobilized fighters, in consultation with the UNDP, would select a sector of economic specialization among several pre-defined options (including, for example, agriculture, small business operations, professional services, de-mining, education). Reintegration implementing partners, in turn, contracted with the UNDP to train and prepare demobilized fighters in different sectors and geographical regions. While specialization was expected to minimize overlap, in practice the reintegration process resulted in duplicate and often incoherent efforts. Multiple implementing partners, each with differently conceived objectives and protocols,[575] were active in the same communities, effectively wasting resources and inhibiting the development of more systematic information gathering and development planning. As Giustozzi has observed,

[575] See Rossi and Giustozzi 2006, fn43, fn47.

> [t]he lack of coordination among the different agencies and organisations involved in the reintegration programme hindered any systematic planning for the activation of local development strategies. Insufficient preparation, logistical capacity and bureaucratic flexibility led to long gaps between the demobilisation and reintegration phases. The absence of technical studies, of market analysis, of feasibility studies and indeed understanding of the complexity of rural livelihoods meant that the advice given by the agencies to the reintegrating ex-combatants was often largely arbitrary.[576]

The deep roots of this economic disorganization was an insufficient degree of international attention to an end state in Afghanistan. Donor countries and development organizations entered Afghanistan without precise medium- or long-term political and economic objectives and a general strategy of achieving them. The disorganized character of the intervention was, in large part, due to the ambivalence of the largest coalition partner, the United States, toward the nature and scope of its involvement in Afghanistan, and how US interests diverged from its allies. For the United States, intervention in Afghanistan was a predominantly military concern centered on defeating Al Qaeda, with less priority devoted to addressing the post-intervention fate of the Taliban or the political and economic conditions in which the Taliban had emerged in the first place. Moreover, the US military campaign in Afghanistan was to some extent incompatible with the development objectives it was increasingly pursuing. USAID broadly sought to build the capabilities of civilian institutions of government in Afghanistan, even as the US military and intelligence organizations sought to maintain good relations with the political factions that underlaid the post-2001 administration—a deeply political decision that meant preserving significant military autonomy and patronage decisions to the UF groups. Other leading military coalition partners and donor countries, primarily in Europe, took a different approach to the Afghanistan intervention. For these governments, the Afghanistan intervention represented a largely technical stabilization and development mission that centered on the implementation of government tasks without interceding in post-Bonn politics. Moreover, most of the European countries sought to limit the presence of their military forces participating in the UN-mandated ISAF mission, initially declining to deploy soldiers outside of the capital city and subsequently garrisoning military and civilian personnel to provincial reconstruction teams based in provincial capitals throughout Afghanistan.

[576] Giustozzi 2008b, p. 71.

The upstream absence of clear post-intervention objectives in Afghanistan had downstream effects on the programming, coordination, and monitoring of resources. It also gave rise to a proliferation of development programs that were based on short-term time horizons and that did not cohere into a larger, collective whole. This was especially the case in the area of policing. Lieutenant General Abdul Hadi Khalid, a former Deputy Minister of Interior for Security, described how differing US and European approaches to policing led to confusion within the ANP during his tenure as Deputy Minister of Interior for Security (2006-2008):

> Another issue I had to deal with was the starkly differing approaches from within the Western military alliance on how the ANP's training should be conducted and how an Afghan policeman's job should be carried out. The EU member states believed the ANP's duties should be restricted to civilian policing like their counterparts in Europe. Some Europeans even said the ANP men should not carry pistols! I told the Europeans that if your police can go to Ghazni with no weapons and come back alive then we would consider disarming our police. The Americans, for their part, had completely the opposite idea. They saw the ANP as the lesser-armed and prepared "step-brother" of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The Americans view the ANP as a fellow frontline force in our counterinsurgency war while the Europeans strongly proposed that the ANP be removed from the conflict altogether. The Americans are soldiers that do not understand the fundamentals of policing communities and feel the ANP should be proper security forces. We had Germans who were training our police (the German Police Project Office) at the Kabul Police Academy several years ago but they did not do a good job because they put too many limitations on their mandate. They could train police inside the police academy but not outside of it in real situations.[577]

The Afghan government and major donors sought to address the absence of international coordination, in part, by establishing the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), multi-donor trust funds in the development and security spheres, respectively. The ARTF was established in 2002 as a World Bank administered fund for pooling budget support and development assistance to Afghanistan.[578] A steering committee comprised of donor governments (as well as the World Bank and MOF) was responsible for collectively setting ARTF policy and overseeing its operations, while a management committee composed of the MOF and four multilateral bodies (World Bank, Asian De-

[577] At the Center of the Storm: An Interview with Afghanistan's Lieutenant General Hadi Khalid - Part One, The Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2009.

[578] The ARTF built on the Afghan Interim Authority Fund established in early 2002 to administer the payment of government salaries and training. See United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, *UNAMA Fact Sheet*, September 2002.

velopment Bank, United Nations Development Program, and Islamic Development Bank) was tasked with reviewing and selecting funding proposals, as well as managing fund finances. This institutional setup was well designed to orchestrate planning, coordination and oversight of development expenditure and provided a relatively clear mechanism of donor accountability and leverage. Moreover, the ARTF provided for some national ownership, even if the development projects that it funded were off-budget items implemented outside of government systems. The ANDS office and MOF were both actively involved in identifying development priorities, selecting and designing project selecting projects (the MOF had the sole responsibility for proposing projects), and managing ARTF finances. In its first six years, ARTF received cumulative contributions of approximately $1.7 billion (and an approximate $4.4 billion in the following six years), much of which was used to reimburse recurring operating budget expenses or to invest in relatively successful programs in agriculture (such as the National Solidarity Program) and education (such as the Education Quality Improvement Program). The LOTFA was established in 2002 by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) along with UNAMA and the German government to oversee and pool budget support for the operations of the police forces. Similar to the ARTF, the LOTFA was well positioned to enhance policing capabilities in Afghanistan because it concentrated donor attention on the functioning of the fledgling ANP. And in a selected number of areas, LOTFA served as an effective mechanism of reform. Most notably, LOTFA contributed to pay and rank reform within the MOI, in which the bloated ANP officer corps was reduced from 17,796 to 9,018 officers, and the number of generals was reduced from 319 to 159 and colonels from 2,712 to 310. At the same time, salaries were increased across the board to align with the cost of living and salaries paid to the Afghan military.[579]

However, both of these multi-donor trust funds were ultimately inadequate mechanisms of addressing external incoherence in development and security planning. The ARTF was quite successful in identifying, launching, and coordinating relatively successful development schemes such as the NSP, but its impact was ultimately constrained by a limited time horizon and larger, parallel bilateral programs in agriculture, health, and education. The LOTFA, meanwhile, was not able to reconcile parallel and conflicting US training efforts. In both cases of the ARTF and LOTFA, moreover, bilateral donors were either unwilling or unable to consistently use their

[579]Perito 2009, p. 12.

leverage to actively intervene in personnel decisions. As shown above, Washington sought to expand the ANP and other, irregular forces as a stopgap measure against growing insecurity, and as a result the quality of policing was not a priority for one of the LOTFA's most important donors. The quantitative strength of the police force, moreover, still remained a question: by November 2008, a UN validation team could not verify 30,000 personnel on the MOI payroll.[580] The development funds allocated to the ARTF (as distinct from the funds used to pay government salaries) were never a large proportion of total development assistance to Afghanistan. Moreover, the ARTF was initially set to expire within 4 years of its creation, setting an arbitrary and abbreviated time horizon on large-scale development projects. This had a negative impact on projects such as the NSP that depended critically on engaged and resilient elected councils (or community development councils). As Sultan Barakat describes, "a long-term, institution-building project was collapsed into an abbreviated period of time, which often resulted in the need to compress the most significant and time-intensive part of the process, facilitating and building the capacity of CDCs."[581] The initial ARTF closing date of June 2006 was extended to June 2010, and then rescheduled to 2020—in part a reflection that the short time horizons of earlier iterations of the ARTF had been counter-productive.[582]

The US and allied countries also took steps to improve the security environment in Afghanistan by reconfiguring the byzantine design of international military forces in Afghanistan. These steps followed an earlier decision to provide an international institutional foundation, in the form of NATO, for the reconstruction and stabilization efforts that were part of the ISAF mandate. Under NATO command, ISAF was to expand beyond its initial presence in Kabul through a series of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). Several US PRTs, established as part of OEF, were already in existence. By the end of 2003, NATO member countries began to take over these posts under the ISAF banner and develop new PRTs in other provinces. The expansion of the ISAF presence began with Kunduz and other provinces falling under the regional command in charge of the north (2004), before successively expanding to the western (2005), southern (July 2006), and eastern provinces (October 2006), as shown in Table 5.5.

[580] Office 2009, p. 22.
[581] Barakat 2009, p. 119.
[582] Margesson 2010, p. 9.

Table 5.5. *PRT Expansion and ISAF Incorporation*

PRT Location	Opening Date	Establishing Nation	ISAF Transfer	ISAF Lead Nation
Gardez	February 2003	USA	October 2006	USA
Bamyan	March 2003	USA → New Zealand	October 2006	New Zealand
Kunduz	March 2003	USA	December 2003	Germany
Mazar-e Sharif	July 2003	UK	July 2004	UK → Sweden
Bagram	November 2003	USA	October 2006	USA
Herat	December 2003	USA	April 2005	Italy
Jalalabad	December 2003	USA	October 2006	USA
Kandahar	December 2003	USA → Canada	July 2006	Canada
Asadabad	February 2004	USA	October 2006	USA
Ghazni	March 2004	USA	October 2006	USA
Khost	March 2004	USA	October 2006	USA
Qalat	April 2004	USA	July 2006	USA
Maimana	July 2004	UK	July 2004	UK → Norway
Faizabad	September 2004	Germany	September 2004	Germany
Farah	September 2004	USA	May 2005	USA
Lashkar Gah	September 2004	USA	July 2006	USA → UK
Sharan	September 2004	USA	October 2006	USA
Tarin Kot	September 2004	USA	July 2006	Netherlands
Pul-e Khomri	October 2004	Netherlands	October 2004	Netherlands → Hungary
Mehtarlam	April 2005	USA	October 2006	USA
Qala-e Naw	May 2005	Spain	May 2005	Spain
Chaghcharan	June 2005	Lithuania	June 2005	Lithuania
Panjshir	October 2005	USA	October 2006	USA
Maidan Shahr	October 2006	Turkey	October 2006	Turkey
Qala Gush	November 2006	USA	October 2006	USA
Mahmud-e Raqi	December 2007	USA	December 2007	USA
Pul-e Alam	March 2008	Czech Republic	October 2006	Czech Republic
Sheberghan	July 2010	Turkey	July 2010	Turkey
Charikar	January 2011	South Korea	January 2011	South Korea

Sources: ISAF press releases; news reports.

It soon became clear that the territorial expansion of ISAF alongside a parallel, US-led OEF mission required military coordination. In October 2005, Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR) James Jones brokered an arrangement that partially integrated the (US led) OEF mission into the (UN mandated) ISAF mission by placing an individual American officer within both chains of command. This "dual-hatted" American officer would simultaneously carry out OEF operations and serve as one of three deputies to the COMISAF exclusively in charge of security. However, institutional redesign did not have a significant impact on security provision or development because it did not address the incoherence of interests among leading external actors in Afghanistan. Even as OEF and ISAF operations became more coordinated, the overarching strategies of the two campaigns remained distinct from and incompatible with one another. NATO remained committed to a training and stabilization mission in Afghanistan that included building ANA and ANP capabilities and extending security, governance, and economic development to the provinces through PRTs.[583] By contrast, the US led OEF campaign remained primarily centered on capturing or killing members of Al Qaeda and, later, Taliban cadres using both American forces and allied Afghan militias. Moreover, while the expansion of ISAF was a predetermined process intended to extend ISAF control over substantially all military and development activities in the country, it was nonetheless fraught with differences over strategy and burden sharing among NATO member countries. The American model of PRT management located relatively small numbers of staff (50-100), primarily military personnel, with combat units upon which they could rely for fire support. The American PRTs were primarily oriented toward countering the growing Taliban insurgency by carrying out a range of security and stability operations, including monitoring, influencing, and mediation efforts, in tandem with "quick impact projects" in a wide range of sectors. As primarily military organizations, US PRTs did not have the development personnel or capabilities necessary to program sophisticated development projects. Even within American PRTs, commanders and civilians lacked a clear set of interagency guidelines on individual roles, missions, and job descriptions. As a consequence, it "took time and trial and error to achieve a common understanding of mission priorities."[584] In the north and subsequently, the southern provinces, the British PRT model was characterized

[583]Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2005, pp. 2-5.
[584]Perito 2005, p. 11.

by comparatively larger numbers of personnel and close civilian-military cooperation, and emphasized security sector reform and the resolution of conflict between rival militias. And in the relatively secure northern provinces, Germany developed a PRT model that included large numbers of personnel, a rigid bifurcation of military and civilian activities, and a relative emphasis on addressing problems of underdevelopment and weak government institutions—reflecting a belief that criminality and poor governance were more significant drivers of instability in the north than Taliban violence.

Beginning in late 2008, the US government would carry out a series of reviews of American strategy in Afghanistan. Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, led an assessment of the security environment in the border areas between Afganistan and Pakistan.[585] US Central Command, led by General David Petraeus, would conduct its own review of American military engagement in Afghanistan and its wider command area.[586] And the National Security Council, under the direction of Douglas Lute, completed an interagency study of the state of the state of the Afghanistan war. While the emphases of the Mullen, Petraeus, and Lute reviews differed from one another, all of them arrived at the common conclusion that the Afghanistan war lacked an identifiable strategy and sufficient diplomatic and material resources to achieve basic security objectives in Afghanistan.

The incoming Obama administration would arrive at a similar conclusion. President Obama and his national security advisors had argued during the 2008 presidential election process that the Iraq war had diverted attention and resources away from Afghanistan, contributing to growing insecurity throughout the country.[587] To identify a way forward, the new administration would commission its own set of assessments of the Afghanistan war strategy. Bruce Riedel, a former intelligence official, would begin a review on behalf of the White House, also drawing on input from teams led by Holbrooke, Lute, Mullen, and Petraeus.[588] This review produced a set of prospective policy changes that largely accorded with the assessments conducted in the final year of the Bush Administration: integrate US aid and military activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan into a single theatre, scale up the capabilities of the Afghan national security forces (ANSF),

[585]Robert Burns, "Bush Review Favors Bigger Afghan Army," *Associated Press*, November 8, 2008.
[586]Karen DeYoung, "Obama Administration Faces Grim Specifics on Afghan Policy," *Washington Post*, February 3, 2009.
[587]Broder, John M., "Obama and McCain Duel Over Iraq," *New York Times*, July 16, 2008.
[588]Steve Coll, "The New Afghanistan Strategy," *New Yorker*, March 29, 2009.

actively engage Afghanistan's near and far neighbors to support stabilization in Afghanistan, and employ aid and diplomacy to influence Pakistan's accommodation of the Afghan Taliban. A second assessment would later be conducted by Stanley McChrystal, the newly appointed COMISAF and Commander of US Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A). The various Afghanistan reviews ultimately culminated in the Obama Administration's decision to authorize a surge in military and civilian assistance to Afghanistan that would "deny al Qaeda a safe haven. . .reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. . ." and "strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future."[589] The Obama Administration authorized an additional 30,000 troops to carry out a counterinsurgency (COIN) war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda—on top of a 21,000 troop increase authorized prior to the completion of the Riedel review—and called for more effective strategies of improving governance in Afghanistan and addressing Pakistani support for the Afghan Taliban. Just as importantly, the White House announced the beginning of a withdrawal of US forces in July 2011. The troop surge would nonetheless represent a major expansion of the international military presence in Afghanistan, increasing the relative number of foreign forces from one soldier for every 1,000 Afghan citizens in early 2009 to 5 at the height of the international presence at the end of 2010 (see Figure 5.5).

However, while the much discussed Riedel or McChrystal assessments that guided the new US strategy identified many of the drivers of instability in Afghanistan, they largely elided the internal contradiction between American counter-terrorism and development activities in Afghanistan, as well as the broader question of what kind of minimal political and economic environment should remain in Afghanistan to ensure stability after the US presence receded. Moreover, neither the Riedel or McChrystal reviews were mandated to address the incompatibility of military and development activities across the many international actors involved in Afghanistan. This meant that Washington would ignore the differences in strategy and implementation among the more than 40 parties that then participated in the ISAF mission.

Even after international military operations were placed firmly within the NATO chain of command, coordination between member states remained poor. This was, in part, because of

[589]The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan," December 1, 2009.

Figure 5.5. *International Military Forces in Afghanistan, 2001–2014*

(a) *Aggregate Forces*



(b) *Aggregate Forces Per 1,000 People*



Source: ISAF press releases; author's calculations.

Note: Vertical lines indicate the timing of announcements by the Obama administration (March 2009 and May 2010) to increase the size of American combat forces in Afghanistan.

the problem of military caveats—"restrictions placed upon a contingent anticipating what they will be asked to do and setting rules for those circumstances."[590] There were between 50 and 80 explicit national caveats on area of responsibility, the use of force, and operational size, in addition to an unknown number of informal or unstated caveats, that restricted the command and control of NATO operations in Afghanistan.[591] As a consequence, while the size and territorial presence of ISAF operations expanded between 2009 and 2010, the effectiveness of new forces did not necessarily increase. For example, "some of the biggest additions [came] from countries with the most significant restrictions (Germany and Italy),"[592] limiting the strength of international forces in areas in which Taliban infiltration was then growing.[593]

Just as importantly, development programming remained improvisational in nature even as the US and allied countries increased their overall aid expenditure in Afghanistan—a problem that was exacerbated by the Obama Administration announcement to begin withdrawing U.S. combat forces in the summer of 2011. The ambiguity of medium- or long-term donor objectives in Afghanistan resulted in limited oversight over the expenditure of aid. Bilateral and multilateral donors did not systematically document their own aid disbursements, and therefore were unable to systematically monitor the aid activities of their own agencies and other organizations, and the results of various aid projects. According to Kai Eide, former United Nations Special Representative to Afghanistan (March 2008-March 2010), this deficit of information further inhibited the formation of a coordinated international development agenda in Afghanistan:

> But we had not addressed the really important parts of the problem: What were we going to coordinate? Nobody seemed to really know the amount of aid flowing into Afghanistan, and nobody knew where it was spent and for what purposes. How were we supposed to coordinate when such fundamental facts were missing? And how could we coordinate when there were no agreed priorities for the entire development effort and each donor was left to set its own? Several years had passed since the last national programs[594]

As a consequence, even as the level of international assistance to Afghanistan expanded in absolute and per capita terms between 2009 and 2011, the coordination of assistance did not

[590] Auerswald and Saideman 2014, p. 6.
[591] Saideman and Auerswald 2012.
[592] Ibid.
[593] Giustozzi and Reuter 2011.
[594] Eide 2012, pp. 42-43.

change substantially (see Figures 5.6a and 5.6b). Aid fragmentation, measured as a Herfindahl index of all donors (bilateral and multilateral) at the recipient- and sector-levels,[595] did not decline after 2008. Bilateral donors were not more likely to channel greater aid through multilateral channels, as Figure 5.6a indicates. Furthermore, we do not see evidence of greater pooling aid within sectors, as suggested by the trend of sectoral aid fragmentation.

Moreover, the increased international attention on Afghanistan that came with the surge did not result in substantially longer project timelines, as Figures 5.7a and 5.7b show. The duration of an average development project in Afghanistan (weighted by project commitment value), changed from approximately one year in 2008 to a peak of 1.1 in 2011. This development followed significant increases in project horizons in education and agriculture (which was more than offset in other sectors) as major ARTF projects were renewed and expanded (for example, the National Solidarity Program in agriculture and the Education Quality Improvement Project in education). This variation in project timelines converged between 2008 and 2010 to a mean project period of approximately one year. The mean project duration subsequently declined to approximately 0.7 years as the US withdrawal set into motion. A boxplot of average sectoral project periods, as shown in Figure 5.7b, indicates that the median project increased in duration between 2008 and 2010, but here, too, we see a contraction of planned project periods in 2011.

External incoherence, along with patterns of organizational capital, can help to explain variation in development outcomes across issue areas. The health system made significant strides during the post-Bonn period, despite modest amounts of assistance—approximately 5% of total development aid between 2003 and 2012 (see Figure 5.8). First, as a relatively technical issue area, it was less exposed to patronage politics than other areas of government activity. And second, the BPHS architecture set up in 2003 provided an institutional foundation to orchestrate donor efforts in achieving a discrete and observable set of health outcomes in the following years. Organizational capital and aid also explain why the educational system did not fare as well, despite receiving a similar level of resources than the health system. Development assistance for the educational system, while initially a small share of total assistance, was relatively successful in expanding access to primary education. However, donors were primarily concerned with expanding primary school inputs (buildings, teachers, materials, and textbooks), and less so on educational quality.

[595] See 6 for a more specific definition.

Figure 5.6. *Development Aid and Donor Fragmentation in Afghanistan, 2002–2014*

(a) *Aggregate Development Aid*



(b) *Development Aid Per Capita*



Notes: Vertical lines indicate approximate starting dates of international conferences on foreign assistance to Afghanistan. These include the Tokyo I Conference (January 2002), the London I Conference (January-February 2006), the Paris Conference (June 2008), the London II Conference (January 2010), and the Tokyo II Conference (July 2012). Donor-sectoral fragmentation is an average of sector-level fragmentation scores weighted by sector-level aid totals.

Figure 5.7. *Average Project Duration by Commitment Year, 2003–2012*

(a) *Project Duration by Selected Sectors*



(b) *Project Duration Boxplot*



Note: Boxplot shows minimum, first quartile, median, third quartile, and maximum of the average project duration in Afghanistan. Excludes one sector outlier (tourism) with an average project duration of 7 years in 2005.

This left the educational system relatively exposed to patronage politics in the provinces, where insecurity and inadequate monitoring of donor resources were recurring problems. In the agricultural sector, organizational capital and external resources account for the under-productivity and limited export of key cash crops. Subtle but significant differences in agricultural strategy among donors emerged early on in the post-Bonn period. American aid programming took a market-oriented approach to agriculture that emphasized commercial crop development for export (and an alternative livelihood program intended to incentivized the cultivation of licit crops as an alternative to opium in poppy-growing areas, although often encouraging poppy cultivation to move to adjoining areas), while European donors tended to take a more "developmental" approach that emphasized community-driven development and goods provision. Yet other, older perspectives originated within the bureaucracy emphasized food self-sufficiency and security over commercialization or rural development. These differing approaches manifested themselves in programs that did not complement one another. The National Solidarity Program, developed by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development in 2003, offered a relatively successful community-driven development program that allocated block grants for projects selected by elected village councils. By contrast, the USAID-funded Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program (RAMP) and follow-on programs (the Accelerated Sustainable Agriculture Program and the Alternative Livelihood Program) worked directly with farming households to expand cultivation, quality, and packaging and transport operations of various (mainly cash) crops. While the some of these programs, notably the NSP, were individually successful, and rural development were allocated to the National Solidarity Program (NSP) "donor efforts [were] not well coordinated" in "broader agricultural development," precluding potential complementarities and long-term planning in the agricultural sector.[596]

The problems of patronage and external incoherence were compounded by the fact that most development and security assistance was implemented by private contractors, not US government personnel. This was especially the case with regard to American aid. Within the US government, oversight of American aid expenditure was extremely poor. As development assistance increased during 2009 and 2010, it increasingly flowed through private and not-for-profit contractors. According to USAID, approximately 75% of all US American assistance to Afghanistan was carried

[596]Bank 2013, p. 7.

Figure 5.8. *Aid Shares of Selected Sectors, 2003–2014*



Source: AidData; author's calculations.

out by non-government contractors between 2008 and 2011. At the end of March 2010, USAID oversaw more than 32,000 contractors in Afghanistan, compared to a *total* number of employees of direct hire employees of approximately 3,200—a 10 to 1 ratio (see Figure 5.6). In the context of abundant aid, relatively short timelines, and poor independent monitoring of project outcomes, development contractors could underperform without consequences.

Security assistance was also primarily carried out primarily by contractors. In the 2012 fiscal year, contractors made up 49 percent of the DOD workforce in Afghanistan—101,789 DOD contractors compared with approximately 104,900 U.S. military personnel.[597] According to a 2011 Congressional Research Service report, there were not nearly enough DOD contracting personnel in Afghanistan to conduct adequate oversight.[598] Moreover, contracting personnel frequently had no specialized experience in the sectors to which they were assigned, a problem that was exacerbated by a constant rotation of personnel in and out of Afghanistan.

[597]Office 2011.
[598]Schwartz 2011.

Table 5.6. *DOD, DOS, and USAID Contractors by Nationality as of March 31, 2010*

Nationality	United States	Third Country	Afghanistan	Unknown	Total
Defense	16,081	17,512	78,499	0	112,092
State	1,240	1,389	7,055	35	9,719
USAID	625	1,000	30,734	0	32,359
Total	17,946	19,901	116,288	35	154,170

Source: Office 2011

Table 5.7. *Department of Defense Contractors by Nationality, 2008-2014*

Time Period	United States	Third Country	Afghanistan	Total
August 2008	4,724	4,121	32,387	41,232
August 2009	10,036	11,806	51,126	73,968
September 2010	19,103	14,984	73,392	107,479
October 2011	23,190	27,912	50,687	101,789
October 2012	31,814	39,480	38,270	109,564
October 2013	27,188	28,677	29,663	85,528
October 2014	17,477	13,787	14,085	45,349

Sources: United States Central Command, Quarterly Contractor Census Rep

By the end of the surge, these problems of poor alignment between international political and development objectives in Afghanistan had not been resolved. In particular, American security objectives of rapidly expanding regular and irregular security forces with limited oversight was inconsistent with its own development objectives (as well as the objectives of European and multilateral donors) of controlling corruption, enhancing human capital, and expanding the productivity of the agricultural sector. At the same time, the capacity of donor countries and organizations to assess the effectiveness of assistance to Afghanistan at the sector level was limited, in large part because of a very limited effort to coordinate and monitor aid flows into the country.

5.4 Alternative Explanations

In the previous section, I showed how elite divisions and external incoherence inhibited the development of more capable government institutions in Afghanistan. It may be possible, however, that both of these variables are confounded by alternative explanatory factors. To evaluate this possibility, this section considers three leading alternative explanations for limited institutional development in post-2001 Afghanistan: domestic culture, foreign ignorance, occupation, and political exclusion as alternative explanations for the trajectory of government institutions in Afghanistan after 2001.

5.4.1 Domestic Culture

One frequently cited explanation for the stunted development of Afghan political institutions after 2001 is culture. According to the cultural argument, Afghanistan has always been a divided society in which patronage and conflict are commonplace. Any attempt to rebuild the Afghan economy and security sector would therefore tend to result in corruption and internal violence.

This explanation, however, does not agree with both the historical and contemporary record of political development in Afghanistan. As shown in Chapter 3, while Afghanistan had many problems during the middle 20th century, it was not a conflictual or highly corrupt society. Petty bribery and small-scale conflicts occurred, but not nearly at the scale and frequency that cultural arguments tend to suggest. Moreover, while this period saw several episodes of internal conflict, these conflicts occurred for reasons that had little to do with specific aspects of culture: conflicts typically developed along lines of urban and rural interests, and later along lines of class. Furthermore, survey evidence from the post-2001 period show strong preferences for rule-bound government and security in Afghanistan. National surveys conducted by the Asia Foundation (AF), ABC News (WP), and Democracy International (DI) show that ordinary civilians have routinely cited insecurity or poor governance as the most significant national problems or causes of concern in Afghanistan since 2005. These data indicate that insecurity, the economy, and corruption have been consistently cited as major problems in Afghanistan. While there has been some variation in perceptions of national problems across time—notably, corruption has become a more commonly identified problem—these perceptions have been fairly stable.

Table 5.8. *Popular Perceptions of Major Problems in Afghanistan, National Surveys*

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Survey	**AF**		**AF**	**AF**	**AF**	**AF**	**AF**	**AF**	**AF**	**AF**	**AF**
Unemployment/Weak Economy	51		56	46	48	55	39	33	38	35	37
Insecurity/Taliban	43		27	46	36	36	37	38	28	30	34
Corruption/Weak Govt	13		19	16	14	17	27	21	25	26	28
Sample Size	804		6,226	6,263	6,593	6,406	6,467	6,348	6,290	9,260	9,271
Survey			**ABC**	**ABC**		**ABC***	**ABC**				
Unemployment/Weak Economy			42	33		67	58				
Insecurity/Taliban			74	75		53	56				
Corruption/Weak Govt			36	33		23	27				
Sample Size			1,036	1,377		1,534	1,691				
Survey								**DI**	**DI**		
Unemployment/Weak Economy								36	37		
Insecurity/Taliban								45	51		
Corruption/Weak Govt								21	27		
Sample Size								8,620	4,000		

*Represents an average of surveys conducted on January 12, 2009 and December 23, 2009.
Note: Shares represent the percentage of respondents that identified a particular category as the *biggest or second biggest* problems in Afghanistan. AF = Asia Foundation; ABC = ABC News; DI = Democracy International.
Source: Asia Foundation, *A Survey of the Afghan People*, various years; ABC News/BBC/ARD/Washington Post Poll, *Afghanistan: Where Things Stand*, various years; Democracy International, *A Survey of Public Perception on Elections and Civic Education*, April 2013; Democracy International, *Survey on Political Institutions, Elections, and Democracy in Afghanistan*, November 2012.

5.4.2 Foreign Ignorance

Another prominent explanation for institutional weakness in Afghanistan is the inability of foreign interveners, in particular the United States, to understand the country's society and politics. According to this line of reasoning, the US and other donor countries lacked the information to devise appropriate policies for the Afghanistan intervention and were incapable of addressing new problems as they arose.

This explanation is appealing because society and politics in Afghanistan had been complicated prior to the Soviet invasion, and had become even more difficult to understand since its descent into war. The relationship between various armed groups and civilians, the social and political salience of tribe, ethnicity, and religion, popular preferences for the structure and role of government, and other issues were largely unknown in late 2001. Moreover, the United States, along with other international and regional powers, had not been actively engaged with Afghanistan for many years. The US government had not maintained an official presence in Afghanistan since 1989, and had not cultivated expertise in Afghan politics and languages for an

even longer period of time. Very few Afghanistan area specialists were still active by 2001, and almost all of them were employed outside of the government. As a result, US policymakers had very limited analytical insight into social and political dynamics in Afghanistan when making critical decisions

While intuitively attractive, this argument is not consistent with the intervention process as it unfolded in the years following the fall of the Taliban government. As early as 2002, Washington was informed of a series of key political issues that would persist throughout the international intervention, but that it would choose not to effectively address. In particular, three endemic problems were largely ignored by American decision makers throughout the intervention. First, the US chose not to intervene in the DDR process and related recruitment efforts in Afghanistan, despite knowledge that a partial DDR process would limit the development of formal security structures and potentially other areas of political and economic development. Second, the US and allied countries declined to address increasing evidence of Pakistani state support for the Afghan Taliban, which was using sanctuaries in Pakistan to raise money and manpower to attack both Afghan government and international forces. As early as 2002, US and other western officials observed that the Pakistan Army had either acquiesced to or purposefully provided sanctuaries to the Taliban insurgency in western Pakistan, but did not identify a strategy that would address continued Pakistani accommodation of the Taliban.[599] Finally, the international community generally failed to address the problematic features of its economic assistance to Afghanistan. As early as February 2002, the Bush Administration was aware of the potential limitations of its light footprint strategy in Afghanistan during the initial years of the intervention. At that time, Secretary of State Colin Powell argued that limited resourcing and, just as importantly, infrequent attention to Afghanistan would not be sufficient to stabilize the country. Powell developed a proposal for American troops to "join the small international peacekeeping force patrolling Kabul and help Mr. Karzai extend his influence beyond the capital," echoing appeals by prominent Afghan and European officials.[600] In informal discussions with European capitals, Director

[599]See, for example, Dexter Filkins, "US Might Pursue Qaeda and Taliban to Pakistan Lairs," *New York Times*, March 21, 2002; Steven R. Weisman, "Resurgent Taliban Threatens Afghan Stability, US Says," *New York Times*, November 19, 2003. David Rohde, "Pakistan Vows to Stop Taliban; Westerners Just Scoff," *New York Times*, August 24, 2004; Nadiri 2014.

[600]David Rohde and David E. Sanger, "How a 'Good War' in Afghanistan Went Bad," *New York Times*, August 12, 2007.

of Policy Planning Richard Haass had concluded that a "force of 20,000 to 40,000 peacekeepers could be recruited, half from Europe, half from the United States."[601] The Powell proposal could have prospectively signaled to both Kabul and foreign capitals a strategic and long-term interest in building basic institutions in Afghanistan, altering the incentives of Karzai and other Afghan politicians to engage in distributive politics, and for Pakistan to accommodate the Taliban leadership. The Powell proposal would face strong opposition from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, effectively putting it to an end. Ultimately, the US would deploy a force of 8,000 troops in 2002 to conduct counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda and, to a lesser extent, the Taliban, not to carry out peacekeeping and reconstruction activities as Powell's proposal envisioned.

Another key period in American decision-making on Afghanistan occurred during the Riedel, McChrystal, and White House strategy reviews undertaken in the first year of the Obama administration. While these assessments differed from one another in many respects, they all readily recognized that the Afghanistan intervention had been under-resourced during the Bush administration and that an absence of cooperation from regional countries, particularly Pakistan, had contributed to growing instability in Afghanistan. The strategy reviews of 2009, and subsequent assessments, consequently centered on the level of resourcing of military and civilian efforts in Afghanistan and achieving greater cooperation from Islamabad in countering Afghan Taliban cadres based in Pakistan.[602] But they did not address *how* American resources were to be allocated, channelled, and monitored to achieve greater stability in Afghanistan or cooperation from Pakistan, effectively leaving important strategic decisions in the hands of US personnel in Afghanistan; how the US would prospectively coordinate its activities with European capitals that, despite operating under a common ISAF umbrella, retained autonomy over national military and aid activities; or, more fundamentally, what kind of mutually acceptable end state could be achieved for the institutions in Afghanistan that would remain after the intervention had ended. Even as the US counterinsurgency strategy allocated greater manpower and resources toward enhancing development and security during 2009 and 2010, it failed to identify their in-

[601] Rohde and Sanger, "How a 'Good War' in Afghanistan Went Bad."

[602] In the words of Jeff Eggers, former Senior Director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the National Security Council and a participant in the McChrystal review, each of the seven strategy review processes on Afghanistan during the Obama administration "have typically been almost entirely about specific US troop levels." See Jeff Eggers, "More Boots Isn't Enough to Save Afghanistan," *Politico*, October 16, 2015.

stitutional objectives in Afghanistan, and specifically how these resources would be expended in ways that meet these objectives.

5.4.3 Foreign Occupation

Yet another set of explanations for the development of brittle government institutions in post-2001 Afghanistan center on the presence of international military forces. These explanations make the argument that foreign occupation both precipitated the Taliban insurgency and undermined the development of civilian and military capabilities in Afghanistan. Some evidence suggests that the behavior of international military forces has shaped civilian support for the Taliban and the level of Taliban violence. For example, ISAF tactics that result in civilian casualties or property destruction have been found to reduce popular support for ISAF and increase civilian support for the Taliban.[603] There is also evidence indicating that airstrikes increase insurgent attacks relative to non-bombed locations in Afghanistan whether or not such strikes result in civilian casualties.[604]

Nonetheless, there is limited evidence that the presence of foreign forces was by itself a cause of the Taliban insurgency or of limited government capacity to contain the insurgency. This is because the introduction of large numbers of foreign military forces followed, not prided, the expansion of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Beginning in 2002, Taliban cadres began to move from Pakistan into the areas of Zabul, Kunar, and Paktika, circumventing the southern (Kandahar, Helmand) and eastern locations (Paktika) where American forces were initially based. As shown in Figure 5.9, the geographical bases of OEF battalions in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2005 were limited to the Kabul and Kandahar areas.[605] As Giustozzi has shown in detail, the insurgency began as a strategy of infiltration by committed Taliban cadres against both the nascent Afghan interim administration and its external supporters, not as a reactive and spontaneous uprising against foreign forces. The Taliban leadership sought to "create in an organised way a rear support area in the NWFP and in Baluchistan"[606] in December 2001; by 2002, Mullah Omar "proceeded to launch a recruitment drive among madras students in Baluchistan and in Karachi, dispatching

[603] Lyall, Imai, and Blair 2013.
[604] Lyall 2015.
[605] While there were clearly American and allied troops active in southeastern Afghanistan, these were temporary missions largely in pursuit of Al Qaeda fighters.
[606] Giustozzi 2008c, p. 37.

Figure 5.9. *Year-End Deployment of International Military Forces, 2002-2005*



(a) *2002*

(b) *2003*

(c) *2004*

(d) *2005*

Source: Press reports, various years.

Figure 5.10. *Year-End Deployment of International Military Forces, 2006-2009*



(a) *2006*

(b) *2007*

(c) *2008*

(d) *2009*

Source: Press reports, various years.

Mullah Dadullah and Mawlawi Dadiq Hameed to find fresh flesh for the battlefield."[607] Taliban cadres, in turn, developed inroads into Afghanistan primarily through areas bordering Pakistan where there was a limited Afghan government or international military presence. In southeastern and eastern Afghanistan, "small teams of ten to twenty insurgents were already infiltrating the Afghan countryside with the purpose of identifying villages that could provide hospitality and support...These groups were able to cross the border undetected throughout 2002-6, although they had to downsize from 60-100 members in 2003 to five or less in 2005 as interdiction efforts by the Coalition strengthened."[608] While some degree of civilian support for (or acquiescence of) the Taliban insurgency was necessary for the insurgency to expand within Afghanistan, it was the *absence* of Afghan government or international military forces that allowed the insurgency to expand in the first place, which in turn had a negative impact on the development of the economy and government institutions. And when the Afghan government began to rapidly deploy the ANP in large numbers to the southern areas after 2006, incompetence, bribery demands, and narrow recruitment on the part of the police force contributed to communal support for the Taliban in these areas.

5.4.4 Political Exclusion

Yet another set of explanations for institutional outcomes in Afghanistan highlight the exclusion of social or political groups from the government and armed forces. These explanations have taken on two forms. First, there is the argument that ethnic Pashtuns (a diverse group in and of itself) have been disproportionately excluded from holding positions in Afghan civilian and military institutions at all levels, leading much of the Pashtun population in Afghanistan to mistrust or resent the Afghan government. Because ethnic Pashtuns are widely believed to constitute at least a plurality of the Afghan population,[609] their purported exclusion from political participation is thought to create a significant rift between much of Afghan society and governing institutions.

As shown above, ethnicity was not a salient determinant of political behavior by Afghan

[607] Giustozzi 2008c, p. 37.
[608] Ibid., p. 100.
[609] Because a census has never been fully enumerated in Afghanistan, the ethnic distribution of the population, and other demographic characteristics, are unknown.

government officials. Before Bonn, personal relationships had often cut across ethnicity. And after Bonn, political and economic patronage relationships regularly occurred between elites of different ethnic backgrounds. Furthermore, popular support for the Taliban did not appear to follow an ethnic motivation. Communities sympathetic to the Taliban were motivated not by the ethnic composition of the government, but rather by problems of poor governance or political rivalries.[610] A closer look at the composition of the cabinet and security forces, moreover, does not provide support for the argument of ethnic imbalance. Between 2002 and 2014, ethnic Pashtuns (a categorization that could be broken down into multiple dimensions of region and class) consistently occupied a plurality of cabinet positions in the Afghan government and in key security portfolios, as shown in Tables 5.9a and 5.9b, respectively. In both tables, the ethnic distribution of government officeholding remained consistent across time despite significant changes in patterns of political alliance-making and in the domestic position of President Karzai. Among all cabinet positions and key security portfolios, the share of offices held by ethnic Pashtuns never fell below 30%, and this share steadily increased throughout 2014. With the exception of the Hazara share, moreover, patterns of officeholding are fairly stable across most ethnic categories.[611]

In the security forces, ethnic Pashtuns were somewhat under-represented in the years that immediately followed Bonn, but this began to change in later years. Between 2001 and 2004, ethnic Pashtuns collectively occupied 37% and 39% of senior positions in the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, respectively, shares that are either consistent with or below estimates of the proportion of ethnic Pashtuns in the Afghan population (see Figure 5.11). It can also be seen that ethnic Tajiks collectively occupied similar shares of 36% and 38% of senior MOD and MOI positions, respectively, proportions that are likely greater than the proportion of the Tajik population in Afghanistan.

However, the share of ethnic Pashtuns in the security forces, especially the ANA, began to increase substantially over the post-Bonn period (see Figure 5.12a). The majority of the ANA candidate officers that had begun training in 2003 were ethnic Pashtuns, and the first batch of candidates selected for NCO training were predominantly Pashtun. As Giusttozi reports, "be-

[610] See, for example, Crews and Tarzi 2008; Giustozzi 2008c.

[611] The category "Herati Farsi Zaban" is distinguished from "Tajik" because this community from western Afghanistan has long had its own regional identity and politics.

Table 5.9. *Ethnic Composition, Cabinet-Level Positions*

(a) *All Cabinet-Level Positions*

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Pashtun	32.3	33.3	33.3	32.3	29.0	33.3	30.0	36.7	36.7	36.7	36.7	40.0	41.4	44.8
Tajik	22.6	21.2	21.2	25.8	29.0	16.7	20.0	13.3	13.3	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.7	17.2
Tajik-Pashtun	3.2	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.3	3.4	3.4
Herati Farsi Zaban	6.5	6.1	6.1	3.2	3.2	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	6.9	6.9
Uzbek	3.2	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.2	10.0	10.0	13.3	13.3	10.0	10.0	6.7	6.9	6.9
Uzbek-Tajik	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4
Turkmen	3.2	6.1	6.1	6.5	6.5	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4
Aimaq	3.2	3.0	3.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hazara	9.7	9.1	9.1	19.4	19.4	16.7	20.0	16.7	16.7	13.3	13.3	10.0	10.3	10.3
Qizilbash / Other Shia	9.7	9.1	9.1	-	-	3.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sayyed	3.2	3.0	3.0	6.5	6.5	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4
Nuristani	3.2	3.0	3.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

(b) *Cabinet-Level "Power" Positions*

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Pashtun	40.0	50.0	50.0	57.1	42.9	42.9	42.9	57.1	57.1	57.1	57.1	57.1	42.9	42.9
Tajik	40.0	33.3	33.3	14.3	28.6	28.6	28.6	14.3	14.3	28.6	28.6	28.6	42.9	42.9
Tajik / Pashtun	20.0	16.7	16.7	14.3	14.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Herati Farsi Zaban	-	-	-	-	-	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	-	-	-	-	-
Hazara	-	-	-	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3

Sources: interviews; various news reports; author's calculations.
Note: "power" positions portfolios include presidency, vice presidencies, foreign affairs, defense, interior, and finance.

tween 2004 and 2008 there was indeed a massive increase of Pashtun officers, at a time when the number of Pashtuns among enlisted staffed declined considerably; such increase came mainly at the expense of Tajiks."[612] Between 2007 and 2014, ethnic Pashtuns on average constituted 43%, 47%, and 43% of the officer, NCO, and enlisted ranks of the ANA, respectively, while ethnic Tajiks were slightly less prevalent in each rank of the army.[613] It should be noted that, within the Pashtun category, recruitment from southern Afghanistan (as opposed to Pashtun-majority east) was persistently low, and within this region there substantial variation in recruitment pat-

[612] Giustozzi 2009.

[613] Notably, ethnic Tajiks held, on average, a larger share of the officer corps than the NCO and enlisted ranks. This top-heavy distribution is partly a reflection of the outsized influence of Marshal Fahim and subordinate commanders in security affairs after 2002.

Figure 5.11. *Ethnic Composition of Key Ministries, 2001–2004*



Source: Sharan 2011.

terns.[614] This suggests that local factors, including grievances, political rivalries, and the presence of the Taliban were probably more salient than ethnicity. In the ANP, ethnic Tajiks appear to be over-represented in the officer and, in particular, NCO corps, but even here the proportion of ethnic Pashtuns is not greatly inconsistent with the ethnic distribution in the population at large (see Figure 5.12b). While the demographic characteristics of the Afghan population are unknown, it appears to be the case that ethnic Hazaras and Uzbeks—not Tajiks or Pashtuns—are highly under-represented in the ANP.

A second argument makes the claim that the exclusion of the Taliban movement from the Bonn negotiations and post-Bonn government institutions led the Taliban leadership to inaugurate its insurgency against Kabul. Clearly, the political exclusion of the Taliban movement from the Bonn negotiations and the immediate post-Bonn period was a necessary condition for the Taliban insurgency,[615] and therefore the incorporation of the Taliban could well have averted a

[614] Department of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, various years.

[615] Another necessary condition for the rise of the Taliban insurgency was clearly Pakistan's accommodation of the movement's leadership after the fall of the Taliban government.

Figure 5.12. *Ethnic Composition of the Afghan National Security Forces, 2007–2014*

(a) *Afghan National Army, 2007–2014*



(b) *Afghan National Police, 2007–2014*



Source: Department of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, various years.

highly destructive war. However, political exclusion was by itself an insufficient condition for instability. It remains unclear whether all or part of the Taliban movement would have participated in Bonn, and if Pakistan would have prevented dissenting Taliban figures from organizing attacks in Afghanistan.[616] Furthermore, the inclusion of the Taliban movement in the Bonn negotiations would not have addressed the problems of limited organizational capital and external incoherence outlined in this chapter. The incorporation of the Taliban may well have reduced the prospect of insurgency against the Afghan government, but it would not necessarily have produced less corrupt and stable institutions of government.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter showed why and how post-Bonn institutions in Afghanistan began to decay shortly after the international intervention in 2001. Decay was not inevitable. Initial coalition building efforts by Hamid Karzai's government resulted in institutional gains in some areas, notably health and the formation of the army, and to a lesser extent education and agriculture. But these initial gains rapidly gave way to institutional decay in the form of widespread corruption, patronage appointments, and an imbalanced, narrow economy. This was in part attributable to a political strategy employed by Hamid Karzai to simultaneously undercut his opposition and stabilize national politics through patronage appointments of political rivals. It was also due to the incoherence of international assistance for the Afghan government. Low levels of resources, poor aid coordination, and limited alignment between donor political and economic objectives undermined the early development of Afghan institutions. The increase in resources and manpower that came with the surge of 2009 and 2010 did not address the problems of coordination and misalignment—nor did it shape Karzai's strategy to reverse the patronage coalition he had put together—limiting its impact on institutional outcomes.

[616]Some senior figures in the Taliban, including Mullah Dadullah, had reportedly incorporated foreign fighters affiliated with al-Qaeda and anti-Shia Pakistani groups, and were therefore not easily reconcilable. Dadullah, moreover, had adopted particularly extreme positions of organizing mass killings of Hazara civilians in response to agitations against Taliban rule in Bamiyan province in 2001. On both points, see Ahmed Rashid, "Taliban Destroy Town that was Rebel Stronghold," *The Daily Telegraph*, June 13, 2001. Other Taliban figures, notably Jalaluddin Haqqani, maintained close links with Al Qaeda and the Pakistan Army, suggesting that a reconciliation between Haqqani and moderate forces in Afghanistan would have been difficult, and that accommodation within Pakistan would have been forthcoming. For more detail, see Brown and Rassler 2013.

6 Beyond Afghanistan: Evidence from Cross-Country Statistical Tests

In the preceding chapters, I closely examined the origins of institutional development and decline in a single case—Afghanistan—across time. This empirical strategy was useful for generating and carefully testing insights into "big, slow moving, and invisible" processes that often characterize institutional change. But sampling several episodes in one case clearly has its limitations. It restricts the external validity of any resulting conclusions to a single country. And perhaps more importantly, the criteria by which cases are selected may limit the internal validity of any insights it generates. The characteristics of institutions in selected cases may differ from unselected cases in ways that are not observed, generating unreliable inferences about the relationships that are observable—a problem known as endogenous sample selection or, more commonly, selection bias.

A common strategy of generating external validity and potentially addressing selection bias is to widen the scope of analysis to a small set of case studies.[617] But this strategy is often limited for a different, additional reason. In small-*N* research, it is relatively difficult to make Mill-based "most similar" or "most different" comparisons between selected cases without making dubious assumptions about the similarity (or dissimilarity) of cases across multiple dimensions.[618] Researchers commonly make comparisons of two cases based on the assumption that they are relatively similar on every dimension except for some treatment variable, ignoring potentially non-trivial differences between them. But as a large body of methodology literature has shown, matching "control" and "treatment" cases is often unreliable or impossible in small-sample obser-

[617] Note that this strategy does not necessarily address selection bias. If additional cases are selected on the basis of the dependent variable, selection bias will remain a potential threat.

[618] Mill [1843] 2002.

vational studies because cases differ substantially on matching variables, or because there are too many matching variables to find substantially similar cases.

This chapter aims to address these real or potential problems of external validity, case selection, and conditions of comparability by drawing on a large cross-section of countries. Specifically, I conduct two sets of tests, each separately centered on the impact of organizational capital and aid fragmentation on institutional performance. Because both of these explanatory factors are highly endogenous, each set of tests attempts to identify the exogenous variation in the explanatory factor. I first estimate the long run impact of organizational capital on institutions drawing on a cross-section and a panel dataset of developing countries from 1975 to 2014. I then attempt to identify the effect of aid fragmentation on institutional development *conditional* on the preceding level of organizational capital, drawing on an instrumental variables two-stage least squares (IV 2SLS) strategy.

In the next section, I introduce the data and the measures that will be used in both sets of tests. In Section 6.2, I discuss and present the results of the tests examining the long run impact of organizational capital on institutions. And In Section 6.3, I evaluate the conditional effect of aid fragmentation on institutional development. I conclude in Section 6.3.

6.1 Measures and Data

The data studied in this chapter are principally organized around two sets of data, each corresponding with a different explanatory variable. The data on institutional outcomes and organizational characteristics come from the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) project, an international and multi-institutional effort to generate new data on democracy and government institutions for all countries since 1900.[619] Data on aid fragmentation and other aid characteristics come from the AidData database, a multi-institutional effort to collect project-level aid data from multiple sources, including the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, official data from individual donor governments, and aid recipient systems.[620] The definitions and sources of these data and other covariates are presented in Table 6.1.

[619] See Coppedge et al. 2016.
[620] Tierney et al. 2011.

Table 6.1. *Variable Definitions and Sources*

Variable	Definition	Source
Public corruption	Extent of institutional corruption	VDEM
Organizational capital	Mean score of elite consultation and local party presence	VDEM
Aid fragmentation	Herfindahl index of donors	AidData
Government effectiveness	Composite score of institutional quality and independence	WGI[621]
Control over corruption	Composite score of institutional corruption and capture	WGI
Logged GDP	Log of GDP per capita (constant 2005 international $)	WDI[622]
Population density	People per km^2 of land area	WDI
Trade	Trade (% of GDP)	WDI
Net oil + gas exports	(Fuel exports - Fuel imports) / Total exports	WDI
Democracy	Mean score of civil liberty and political rights	Freedom House[623]
Ethnic fractionalization	Herfindahl index computed from *Atlas Narodov Mira*[624]	Fearon and Laitin[625]
Mountainous Terrain	Log of % Land Area Mountainous	Fearon and Laitin

6.1.1 Measures

INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY

To measure long-run institutional development, I primarily rely on an annual measure of public corruption ($v2x\_pubcorr$ in the VDEM dataset). Corruption in the public sector characterizes both how individuals are recruited and retained in government; it also describes the processes by which government officials design and deliver public goods in central banking, regulation, infrastructure, policing, and other areas of activity. Corruption is also prevalent in many contexts, including upper-income countries, and is a strong predictor of important cross-country outcomes, including economic growth and political violence.[626]

The public corruption measure is constructed as the average of the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model where the factors are public sector bribery and embezzlement ($v2excrptps$ and $v2exthftps$, respectively, in the VDEM dataset). The public corruption index answers the question:

> To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or

[621] World Governance Indicators. `http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi`.

[622] World Development Indicators. `http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators`.

[623] House 2013

[624] *Atlas Narodov Mira* 1964.

[625] Fearon and Laitin 2003

[626] Mauro 1995; Walter 2014.

misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?[627]

One shortcoming of the VDEM data is that many of its measures are derived from subjective assessments by country experts. Such measures may be problematic if they are based on inconsistent coding across items or on biases specific to one or more coder. Perhaps more problematic is the prevalence of measurement error in concepts that are intrinsically difficult to measure with precision. The VDEM data directly address these measurement error problems of inconsistency, bias, and mistaken enumeration by aggregating multiple (5 or more) expert assessments of the same country using using a Bayesian item response theory (IRT), a class of latent variable models.[628] These models use cross- and within-coder item scores to estimate levels of item consistency for a given coder and levels of bias across coders for a particular item. They subsequently construct estimates of the latent concept, in this case public corruption, adjusting for estimates of consistency and bias.

Figure 6.1 plots the geographic distribution of the VDEM measure of public corruption using the mean value across the entire time period of 1950 to 2014 (Figure 6.1a) and across the period of 2010 to 2014 (Figure 6.1b). Together, both maps suggest several different trends in the prevalence of corruption. First, public corruption has increased across time in the majority of countries, although several modest exceptions exist (for example, Brazil, Ethiopia, Namibia, South Korea, Tanzania, Thailand). Second, there is a substantial degree of cross-sectional variation in corruption. As seen in Figure 6.1, we see especially high levels of public corruption in central Africa and many of the Soviet successor states in Central Asia and Eastern Europe.

To account for possible measurement error specific to the public corruption measure, I draw on other, non-VDEM measures of institutional performance. Specifically, I use two measures from the World Governance Indicators: government effectiveness and control over corruption. Both of these measures constructed using existing indicators that of the concepts they are meant to measure.[629]

[627] Coppedge et al. 2016.

[628] Latent variable models are based on the concept that the observed (or "manifest") response variable is actually driven by a set of unobserved (or "latent" variables). While these latent variables are not observable, their influence can be estimated using other variables that vary with them.

[629] Government effectiveness measures "perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Control over corruption measures "perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption,

Figure 6.1. *Geographic Distribution of Public Corruption*

(a) *1950-2014*



(b) *2010-2014*



Source: Coppedge et al. 2016; author's calculations.

As discussed in Chapter 2, organizational capital is composed of two dimensions. The first dimension, elite cooperation, measures the degree to which national political elites cooperate with one another through party building, through shared social and political relationships, or through other mechanisms of consultation. The second dimension, embeddedness, characterizes the extent to which political interests are channeled through political parties or other grass-roots organizations.

Data on both of these dimensions come from the VDEM dataset. Elite cooperation is measured by the range of consultation at elite levels when important policy changes are being considered (*v2dlconslt* in the VDEM dataset). The scores that underlie this measure follow an ordinal scale that ranges between 0 and 5, where 0 indicates negligible consultation between a country leadership and other elites, and 5 indicates extensive consultation between executive leaders and elites from from all parts of the political spectrum. This measure adjusts for cross and within-coder inconsistency and measurement error using a Bayesian item response theory model, producing a relative indictor usually ranging between -5 and 5, with 0 approximately representing the mean for all country-years in the sample.

Embeddedness is measured by the number of parties that have permanent local party branches, adjusted for cross- and within-coder inconsistency and measurement error (*v2prbrch* in the VDEM dataset). This indicator is a somewhat limited measure of *institutional* embeddedness. If some or all parties have an extensive presence at the local level, this does not necessarily mean that executive institutions are deeply rooted in society. However, local party presence is likely to be correlated with institutional embeddedness. When local political organizing is possible, government institutions are likely to be present, independent of other country characteristics such as regime type or income. This means that local party presence can serve as a proxy for institutional embedddedness, but it will likely be subject to (random) measurement error, biasing the OLS coefficients downwards. This measure of embeddedness is clearly inadequate for another reason, but in a way that is not problematic for this analysis. Absolute monarchies and other systems in which political parties are prohibited clearly do not have any party offices at any level. But the

as well as 'capture' of the state by elites and private interests." For more detail, see `http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi`.

exclusion of upper-middle and high-income economies discussed above already results in their removal from the sample. It is worth noting that the measure of local party presence covers almost all of the wider authoritarian world. Authoritarian governments have used political parties as a key instrument of regime stability and power projection, some much more intensively than others.[630] The local party indicator captures a substantial range of variation on this dimension. The Communist Party of China, for example, has maintained an elaborate party and administrative presence throughout the coastal areas and expansive inland of mainland China. By contrast, the Communist Party of Cuba has followed a relatively elitist path that has deemphasized extensive dependence on public opinion.

Using these measures of elite cooperation and embeddeness, I construct a simple and composite measure of organizational capital by taking their average:

$$ORG_{it} = (CONSLT_{it} + BRANCH_{it}) * 0.5 \tag{6.1}$$

where i indexes for countries and t indexes for time periods. The components of the organizational capital measure vary considerably within and across countries, as shown in Figure 6.2. It is easy to see that while elite cooperation and party branch presence are correlated, they do not always go together. For example, Botswana exhibits a relatively high level of elite cooperation but shows a limited degree of party presence throughout the country. By contrast, Uzbekistan shows a comparatively low level of elite cooperation and high degree of political party penetration. One can also see that both dimensions of organizational capital vary substantially across countries, even among countries with comparable regime types. In the democratic Dominican Republic, cooperation between elites is much more limited than in similarly democratic Costa Rica. Among autocracies, elite consultation is substantially higher in Vietnam than in the contentious political system of Myanmar (Burma). Party presence also varies substantially. Political parties have an extensive, deeply-rooted presence in India's electoral democracy, whereas party organizations are not especially embedded in democratic Serbia. The CPC has an extensive presence in Chinese society, whereas the New Azerbaijan Party has a comparatively limited presence in Azerbaijan.

[630] See, for example, Brownlee 2007.



Figure 6.2. *Heatmap of Organizational Capital*

Figure 6.3 plots the geographic distribution of organizational capital using the mean value across the entire time period of 1950 to 2014 (Figure 6.3a) and across the period of 2010 to 2014 (Figure 6.3b). The composite measure of organizational capital, like public corruption, exhibits trends across time and geography. In general, there is a greater tendency towards higher levels of organizational capital across time, especially in Latin America. However, some regions, particularly the Middle East, do not exhibit major temporal changes in organizational strength. We also see substantial variation in organizational capital across regions and geographically proximate countries. Unsurprisingly, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa show lower levels of organization than East Asia and South America. Within regions, proximate countries exhibit wide variation in organizational capital. For example, India shows a generally higher level of organizational capital than neighboring Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh, despite having in common the historical legacy of British colonial rule. Likewise, South Africa and Botswana both record a greater level of organizational capital than neighboring Zimbabwe or Mozambique.

Aid Fragmentation

Aid fragmentation is measured as a Herfindahl index of bilateral donors at the recipient-year level, using official development assistance adjusted to exclude aid amounts that never leave the donor country.[631] Three restrictions are placed on the Herfindahl index used here. First, it excludes projects that cut across multiple sectors or that are vaguely classified (constituting less than 0.5% of the total sample). Second, it draws on aid commitments instead of disbursements. Records of aid disbursements are frequently characterized by greater data missingness and measurement error because donor governments do not systematically track the flow of disbursed funds to aid recipients, particularly those with multi-year projects or programs. Furthermore, there is substantial variation in the quality of disbursement reporting relative to commitment reporting across donors. Finally, the Herfindahl index only includes *bilateral* donors—government aid agencies such as USAID, the Agence Francaise de Développement, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency—and does not include multilateral organizations or funds. As discussed in greater detail in Section 6.3, this measure more closely accords with the explanation developed

[631] Specifically, this adjustment excludes donor administrative costs, debt relief, imputed student costs, and assistance toward refugees in donor countries.

Figure 6.3. *Geographic Distribution of Organizational Capital*

(a) *1950-2014*



(b) *2010-2014*





Source: Coppedge et al. 2016; author's calculations.

in Chatper 2 and is better suited for the instrumental variable strategy developed to estimate the impact of aid fragmentation.

The Herfindahl index is computed, first, by obtaining observations of d_{jit}, the aid share of bilateral donor j in recipient country i in year t, which are squared and then summed for each recipent-year:

$$af_{it} = \sum_{jit=1}^{J} a_{jit}^2 \tag{6.2}$$

Next, the Herfindahl index is transformed by subtracting it from 1 so that higher values of the resulting index correspond with greater aid fragmentation.

$$AF_{it} = (1 - af_{it}) \tag{6.3}$$

Equation 6.3 forms a fragmentation index that varies between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate greater fragmentation. Values for this index increase with the number of donors or with the equality of aid shares, which would indicate the absence of a dominant donor country. Averaged over 1990 and 2013, the fragmentation index ranges from 0.16 for Nauru to 0.88 for Mozambique.

Control Variables

The empirical tests also account for time-varying covariates endogenous to institutional performance. The tests control for *logged real per capita income*, as higher income makes economic and human resources available for institutional upgrading, and likely generates higher expectations of government performance. They control for the level of *democracy* in the recipient country because democracies are often associated with more accountable and predictable institutions than autocratic countries. Moreover, democracy is an important control variable here because organizational capital may be more of a proxy for democratic institutions than an independent source of variation. The tests control for *natural resource rents*, measured as net oil and gas exports relative to total exports.[632] Oil and gas rents, in particular, have been identified with greater corruption, lower bureaucratic quality, and poor public revenue management.[633] The estimations

[632] Ross and Voeten 2016.
[633] Ross 2015.

also control for *trade* as a share of GDP, based on the conjecture that trade-based exposure to technology, skills, and taxable resources provides for more capable institutions. Finally, the empirical tests control for *population density* because there may be economies or diseconomies of scale to developing effective institutions. The sources of these covariates are described in Table tab:sources.

6.1.2 Sample

The data studied in this chapter consist of one cross-sectional sample and one unbalanced panel of aid-receiving countries. Several restrictions are made to the sample. First, the data exclude economies that were classified as either upper-middle or high-income by the World Bank in the first ten years in which the ratings are available. Second, the tests estimating the conditional impact of aid fragmentation (Test 2) are restricted to the years of 1990 and beyond. This is because the assistance data from AidData exhibits high levels of missingness in the period between 1973 and 1989, and the quality of this data subset is also open to question.[634]

In the panel data, the various measures of performance discussed above result in different samples. Public corruption, the primary and most rich measure of institutional performance covers the 1975 to 2014 period, whereas the auxiliary measures cover shorter periods of time. The World Bank measures of government effectiveness and control over corruption, for example, cover the 1995 to 2014 period.

[634]A substantial portion of the pre-1990 AidData comes from the OECD CRS data, which is likely subject to substantial measurement error. As one OECD document reports, "

u

ntil the early 1990s, most data submissions were made on paper and reconciliation was a tedious task." Economic Cooperation and Development 2011.

Table 6.2. *Descriptive Statistics, Cross-Sectional and Panel Samples*

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Cross-Sectional Sample					
Public Corruption	107	0.57	0.20	0.11	0.96
Gov't Effectiveness	107	-0.47	0.59	-1.71	1.21
Control Over Corruption	107	-0.52	0.52	-1.60	1.43
Organizational Capital	107	0.06	0.72	-1.82	2.02
Elite Consultation	107	-0.12	0.82	-1.54	2.88
Party Branches	107	0.23	0.98	-2.27	2.60
Aid Fragmentation	107	0.57	0.14	0.23	0.84
Log Per Capita Income	107	7.03	1.03	5.08	9.14
Pop. Density	107	72.97	102.69	1.25	774.95
Democracy	107	4.48	1.28	1.47	6.90
Trade / GDP	107	70.61	32.01	18.84	153.48
Net Oil + Gas Exports / Exports	107	-4.19	27.11	-64.95	101.71
Ethnic Fractionalization	107	0.53	0.24	0.04	0.95
Share Mountainous Terrain	107	19.91	23.93	0.00	94.30
Panel Sample					
Public Corruption	644	0.59	0.23	0.04	0.97
Gov't Effectiveness	365	-0.36	0.59	-1.72	1.23
Control Over Corruption	365	-0.44	0.55	-1.45	1.51
Organizational Capital	642	0.47	0.85	-2.13	2.74
Elite Consultation	642	0.39	1.13	-2.67	3.71
Party Branches	642	0.55	0.95	-2.80	2.72
Aid Fragmentation	569	0.61	0.19	0.00	0.90
Log Per Capita Income	583	7.25	1.03	4.97	9.60
Pop. Growth	584	95.46	149.02	1.37	1,268.33
Democracy	584	4.01	1.60	1.00	7.00
Trade / GDP	580	70.73	35.15	12.88	205.54
Net Oil + Gas Exports / Exports	547	-2.56	33.79	-114.57	187.79

6.2 Estimating the Long-Run Effect of Organizational Capital

The first part of this chapter estimates the long-term effect of organizational capital on institutional performance. Drawing on both cross-sectional and panel data, this set of tests attempt to identify the impact of both the horizontal and vertical components of organizational capital on various measures of institutional performance. The data studied in this section comprises of (1) a cross-section and (2) an unbalanced panel covering the time period of 1975 to 2014, both covering approximately 115 countries.

The first set of tests are applied to a cross-sectional sample of recipient countries using averages of the 1975 to 2014 period. The main estimation equation is of the form:

$$INST_{ir} = \alpha + \lambda ORG_{ir} + \beta \boldsymbol{X}_{ir} + \eta_r + u_{ir} \tag{6.4}$$

where i indexes for countries and r indexes for regions.[635] The second set of tests are applied to a panel data set covering the 1975 to 2014 period. The panel data set is constructed using time period averages of 5-, 10- and 15-year windows that smooth out transitory changes in the data. The main panel estimation equation is of the form:

$$INST_{irt} = \alpha + \lambda ORG_{irt-1} + \beta \boldsymbol{X}_{irt-1} + \rho_i + \phi_t + \gamma_{rt} + u_{irt} \tag{6.5}$$

where t indexes for time periods. The dependent variable, $INST_{irt}$, is a continuous variable that measures the level of institutional quality in country i, region r, and time period t. The primary explanatory variable of interest, ORG_{irt}, measures the level of organizational capital in country i, region r, and time period t. Equation 6.6 includes a vector of lagged covariates, denominated by $\boldsymbol{X_{irt-1}}$, that are introduced in Section 6.1. It also incorporates country fixed effects, indicated by ρ_i, that control for time-invariant differences between recipient countries, period fixed effects, denominated by ϕ_t, that control for common shocks to aid recipients, and region-period effects that absorb region-specific shocks to aid recipients in each time period. Standard errors are clustered at the region-period level.

[635] The region classification that I use is taken from the World Bank and consists of the following groups: East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Cross-Sectional Estimates

Before presenting the cross-sectional estimates, it is useful to observe the unconditional relationship between organizational capital and institutional performance. Figure 7.2 shows the bivariate distributions of the organizational capital variable and various measures of institutional strength. It is easy to see that organizational capital shows a positive and substantively large relationship with government effectiveness (Figure 7.2a) and the control over corruption (Figure 7.2b); it exhibits a large, negative association with public corruption (Figure 7.2c) and positive relationship with government authority over the surrounding population (Figure 7.2d).

Figure 6.4. *OLS Relationships between Organizational Capital and Measures of Institutional Quality*

(a) *Government Effectiveness*



(b) *Control of Corruption*



(c) *Public Corruption*



(d) *State Authority over the Population*



We can also see the relationship between the dimensions of organizational capital and the VDEM measure of public corruption in Figure 7.1. Countries with higher (lower) levels of elite cooperation are located in the right (left) hand side of the figure, and these cases tend to exhibit lower (higher) levels of corruption. Moreover, countries with a higher number of party branches (particularly in combination with elite cooperation) show lower levels of corruption, although this dimension does not appear to predict corruption to the same extent as elite cooperation.

Figure 6.5. *Scatter Plot of Elite Consultation, Local Party Presence, and Public Corruption*



Source: Coppedge et al. 2016; author's calculations.
Notes: Countries with greater public corruption are (darker) red; countries with less public corruption are (darker) blue.

We can also see that organizational capital is a significant predictor of regime survival. A

Kaplan-Meier survival analysis shows that countries below the median level of organizational capital are significantly more likely to undergo institutional breakdown than those that are above the median, especially after 30 years.

Figure 6.6. *Kaplan-Meier Survival Plot of Regime Survival, by Level of Organizational Capital*



Source: Geddes, J. Wright, and Frantz 2014; Coppedge et al. 2016; author's calculations.

These cross-sectional relationships are examined in a regression framework in Table 6.3, which shows the OLS estimates of Equation 6.4. Column 1 shows the association between the composite measure of organizational capital and public corruption, controlling for a range of country-level covariates of institutional quality. The estimate is statistically and substantively significant: a one point increase in elite consultation is associated with a more than 12.5% decline in corruption for the average country in the sample. The specification in Column 2 includes the constituent components of the organizational capital measure as regressors instead of the composite measure. The elite cooperation variable has a statistically and substantively significant negative association with public corruption. It indicates that a one point increase in elite consultation is associated with a more than 16% decline in corruption for the average country

in the sample. By contrast, the embeddedness measure has a positive but imprecise and substantively less significant point estimate. Column 3 adds the interaction between elite cooperation and embeddedness, but its point estimate is neither statistically nor substantively significant. In Columns 4 and 5, I estimate the specification from Column 1 but use government effectiveness and control of corruption (both from the WGI), respectively, as the dependent variable. The organizational capital variable is positively associated with government effectiveness and control over corruption, although both point estimates are imprecise.

Table 6.3. *OLS Cross-Sectional Estimates*

	Corruption	Corruption	Corruption	Effectiveness	Control Corruption
Organizational Capital	-0.071*			0.112	0.115
	(0.038)			(0.082)	(0.095)
Elite Consultation		-0.101**	-0.100**		
		(0.040)	(0.041)		
Party Branches		-0.000	-0.001		
		(0.013)	(0.015)		
Elite Consultation * Party Branches			0.006		
			(0.014)		
Log Per Capita Income	-0.081**	-0.072*	-0.072*	0.357***	0.331***
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.085)	(0.096)
Pop. Density	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Democracy	-0.006	-0.024	-0.024	-0.149**	-0.041
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.065)	(0.081)
Trade/GDP	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.002
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Net Oil + Gas Exports	0.002***	0.001***	0.001***	-0.006**	-0.006**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.175*	0.184*	0.185*	-0.230	-0.274
	(0.094)	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.317)	(0.253)
Share Mountainous Terrain	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.004*	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	107	107	107	107	107
R^2	0.536	0.578	0.578	0.721	0.583

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Note: All columns include region fixed effects and standard errors clustered by region.

Panel Data Estimates

While the cross-sectional estimates presented in Table 6.3 provide evidence that is consistent with the theory developed in this paper, these estimates were imprecise and possibly biased because of measurement error or reverse causality. In order to address these threats to inference, I estimate a difference-in-difference model drawing on panel data covering the 1975 to 2014 period. By accounting for unobserved, time-invariant differences between countries, as well as country-invariant differences across time periods, the difference-in-difference strategy offers a more credible estimate of the effect of organization on institutional quality.

Table 6.4. *OLS Panel Data Estimates*

	Corruption	Corruption	Corruption	Gov't Effect	Control Corruption
Organizational Capital	-0.041***			0.002	0.033
	(0.015)			(0.056)	(0.055)
Elite Consultation		-0.033***	-0.032***		
		(0.010)	(0.012)		
Party Branches		-0.005	-0.007		
		(0.013)	(0.014)		
Elite Consultation * Party Branches			-0.003		
			(0.008)		
Log Per Capita Income	-0.049	-0.045	-0.042	0.242**	0.271**
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.109)	(0.105)
Pop. Density 0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Democracy	0.010	0.006	0.006	-0.057**	-0.040*
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Trade/GDP	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Net Oil + Gas Exports	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	644	644	644	365	365
R^2	0.877	0.878	0.878	0.960	0.944
Clusters	87	87	87	59	59

Note: All columns include country, period, and region-period fixed effects and standard errors clustered by region-period.

Table 6.4 shows the difference-in-difference estimates. The specification in column 1 shows the association between the organizational capital variable and public corruption, controlling for a vector of covariates and country, period, and region-period fixed effects. The point estimate for organizational capital indicates a negative and statistically significant association between organization and public corruption: a one point increase in organizational capital is associated with a 7% decline in corruption for the average country included in the sample. Column 2 includes

the constituent components of organizational capital. The coefficient of elite cooperation is negative and statistically significant, but the coefficient of embeddedness is imprecise. Column 3 includes the interaction between elite cooperation and embeddedness, but the coefficients of the embeddedness variable and the interaction are statistically insignificant. In Columns 4 and 5 the dependent variable is government effectiveness and control over corruption, respectively, with the same specification tested in Column 1. In each of these tests, the coefficient on organizational capital has the expected positive sign but is statistically insignificant.

6.3 Estimating the Conditional Effect of Aid Fragmentation

Aid fragmentation has become an increasingly prominent feature of the international economic system since the end of the Cold War, despite periodic efforts to harmonize the management of development assistance,[636] This development is in large part attributable to the expansion of major donor organizations into countries and sectors to which they had not previously made commitments of aid. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, real annual commitments of ODA by advanced industrialized countries and multilateral organizations have trended upward, increasing cyclically from a level of $100 billion to $150 billion (in constant U.S. dollars) between 1990 and 2013, as shown in Figure 6.10.

While many of the leading sponsors of development assistance at present, including the World Bank, IMF, United States, Japan, and Germany, have remained the largest donors over time, their respective aid activities have expanded to include new countries and new sectors over the past twenty years, as Figure 6.8 indicates. The mean number of recipients to which donors have extended aid has increased from approximately 30 in 1990 to 70 in 2013, as shown in Figure 6.9. Donor countries and multilateral organizations, moreover, were present in an average of 2 sectors per recipient country in 1990, whereas the average sectoral presence was 4 sectors in 2013. As a consequence, as the aggregate level of ODA extended to the developing world has increased, so

[636] Advanced industrialized countries and multilateral organizations have increasingly called for greater harmonization in the management of development aid. Since the 2003 conclusion of the High-Level Forum on Harmonization in Rome, aid coordination has become a leading agenda item for the donor community. The declaration adopted in Rome, and in subsequent conferences on aid effectiveness, have cited the multiplicity of donor objectives, procedures, standards, and operations as a systematic obstacle to political and economic development in aid-receiving countries. As plainly stated at the conclusion of the most recent successor to the Rome conference, the "excessive fragmentation of aid at global, country or sector level impairs aid effectiveness." See Economic Cooperation and Development 2008

has the fragmentation of the aid system. Measured at both the level of the receiving country and sector, aid fragmentation has increased by 25% and 65%, respectively, between 1990 and 2012.[637]

Figure 6.7. *Aggregate Annual ODA and Aid Fragmentation, 1990-2013*



Note: Aid fragmentation scores and aggregate annual ODA constructed using real aid commitments by both bilateral and multilateral donors, and exclude commitments with vague sectoral allocations.

[637]For a definition and measurement of aid fragmentation, see Chapter 2.

Figure 6.8. *Cumulative Official Development Assistance by Donor, 1990-2013*



Note: Cumulative ODA and average annual ODA growth constructed using real aid commitments by both bilateral and multilateral donors, and exclude commitments with vague sectoral allocations.

Figure 6.9. *Average Number of Recipients and Recipient-Sectors per Donor, 1990-2013*



Note: Average number of recipients and recipient-sectors per donor constructed using nominal aid commitments by both bilateral and multilateral donors, and exclude aid commitments with vague sectoral allocations.

In Chapter 2, I made the argument that the effect of two characteristics of foreign aid—resource alignment and donor coordination—have an impact on institutional performance, depending on the initial conditions of recipient countries. If recipients are characterized by highly polarized elites and unembedded political organizations, then aid fragmentation is expected to attenuate the quality of institutions. However, where political elites effectively cooperate and preside over rooted political organizations, then institutions in aid-receiving countries can mitigate the potentially adverse consequences of aid fragmentation. The logic of this contingent effect is rooted in the organizational ability of both donor and recipient governments to reconcile, coordinate, and evaluate resources in service of a coherent set of interests. When aid is characterized by poor resource alignment and coordination, donors cannot readily reconcile the various objectives of their assistance programs, nor can they coordinate their various activities

with one another. This tends to produce ambiguous donor objectives, extremely poor visibility of resource flows, and a limited donor ability to evaluate the effectiveness of their assistance. It is also especially likely to result in duplicative efforts and corruption in the aid receiving country, especially for recipients with limited organizational capital.

This sets of tests uses aid fragmentation as a measure of both resource alignment and donor coordination. It measures donor coordination because a less concentrated distribution of donors implies multiple sets of donor objectives, procedures, and organizations, making donor coordination more costly. It can also serve as a somewhat imperfect indicator of resource alignment. This is because countries with a greater share of bilateral aid tend to have a greater number of bilateral donors, as shown in Figure 6.10. When a recipient country receives a greater share of aid from bilateral donors, it tends to come from new or smaller donors. This is suggestive of a competitive motivation to bilateral aid allocation, as bilateral donors have the alternative option of channelling assistance through multilateral aid budgets or trust funds.

There is also a great deal of evidence that non-altruistic motivations—commercial, political, security—continue to shape bilateral aid allocations in ways that decrease the alignment of development and non-development objectives. Javed Younas, for example, shows that commercial motivations tend to underlie aid decisions. Specifically, he finds that developing countries that import capital goods (from donor countries) receive significantly greater assistance than countries that do not, suggesting a commercial motivation to aid allocation.[638] This motivation is especially prevalent when multiple bilateral donors are active in a recipient country. Stephen Knack, for example, estimates a negative relationship between aid concentration and aid tying, which occurs when a donor conditions its aid on purchases from contractors based in the donor country. Donors with a greater concentration of aid to a particular recipient tie a lower proportion of this aid, suggesting that they have "a stronger incentive to maximize the development impact of [their] aid instead of pursuing commercial or other non-development objectives.[639] Political motivations also underlie aid decisions and, when prevalent, tend to result in greater aid fragmentation. For example, developing countries that assume non-permanent, rotating membership of the UN Security Council receive an increase amount of aid from a greater number of bilateral

[638] Younas 2008.
[639] Knack and Smets 2012.

donors than in prior or subsequent years.[640] Other research has found that strategically important countries have received greater donor interest than economic need would justify, suggesting greater aid fragmentation than would otherwise be the case.[641]

Figure 6.10. *Bilateral Aid Share and Donor Fragmentation*



Source: Tierney et al. 2011; author's calculations.

Aid fragmentation, then, can serve a measure for both the alignment and coordination dimensions of foreign aid. When aid is more fragmented, we can expect lower alignment between donor political and development objectives, and lower coordination. The argument tested here, then, is that the impact of aid fragmentation depends on the level of organizational capital in the aid-receiving country. The structural equation that evaluates this expectation is therefore:

[640] Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009, Non-permanent members also receive a greater number of World Bank projects, although they do not receive more aggregate World Bank aid.

[641] Fleck and Kilby 2010.

$$INST_{irt} = \alpha + \lambda ORG_{irt-1} + \theta AF_{irt-1} + \psi ORG * AF_{irt-1} + \boldsymbol{\beta X_{irt-1}} + \rho_i + \phi_t + \gamma_{rt} + u_{irt} \quad (6.6)$$

where i indexes countries, r indexes regions, and t indexes time periods. The outcome $INST_{irt}$ and key regressor ORG_{irt-1} are the same variables that appear in Equation 6.5. AF_{irt-1} measures the level of aid fragmentation in recipients with a level of organizational capital equal to o, and $ORG*AF_{irt-1}$ is an interaction between aid fragmentation and organizational capital. The time-varying covariates $\boldsymbol{X_{irt-1}}$ are the same as those included in Equation 6.6, but also include the *share of ODA in GDP* to partial out the potential volume effect of aid from its composition.

Under the assumption of causal identification, $\hat{\theta}$ is the estimated unconditional effect of an additional point in aid fragmentation (as measured by the Herfindahl index) on recipient institutional performance, and $\hat{\psi}$ is the estimated differential effect of an additional point in aid fragmentation conditional conditional on recipient organizational capital. Given that the dependent variable is measured as public corruption, then if $\hat{\theta}$ is positive and $\hat{\psi}$ is negative, this means that aid fragmentation has a damaging effect on institutional quality, but this impact becomes less pernicious with greater organizational capital in recipient countries.

Two primary empirical difficulties in estimating this relationship stem from reverse causality and omitted variables. Specifically, it may be that recipient countries with limited organizational capacity tend to receive aid from a wider universe of donors than more organizationally robust countries. This would suggest that the OLS estimate of the impact of aid fragmentation on institutional performance would be biased downwards. At the same time, it is also possible that political, economic, or humanitarian crises can induce minor or uncommitted donors to reduce their exposure to the aid recipient because they anticipate further political dislocation, thereby decreasing aid fragmentation in the recipient country. Such a possibility would generate an upward bias in the OLS estimation of interest. Yet another threat to identification is the possibility of an omitted variable that exerts a causal impact on both aid fragmentation and institutions, systematically biasing the OLS estimation.

In order to identify a consistent estimate of the impact of aid fragmentation on institutional

performance conditional on recipient organizational capital, the tests below employ an Instrumental Variables Two Stage Least Squares (IV 2SLS) strategy. Specifically, the tests use donor income fragmentation as an instrument for aid fragmentation. Since the end of the Cold War, the secular de-concentration of incomes in the advanced industrialized world has corresponded with a greater number of bilateral sponsors of official development assistance. But, as documented below in the first stage regressions, this trend has correlated with differential changes in aid fragmentation at the recipient level. This is because fluctuations in donor GDP have correlated with changes in aid allocations in pre-existing recipients, generating recipient-specific changes in the distribution of aid receipts. Donor income fragmentation is also plausibly exogenous to recipient institutional performance because differential patterns of growth in donor countries are unlikely to have a direct impact on internal institutional changes in aid receiving countries, conditional on other recipient characteristics. It follows that if donor income fragmentation is a robust predictor of aid fragmentation and is orthogonal to changes in institutional performance in recipient countries, then the IV 2SLS estimates of $\hat{\theta}$ and $\hat{\psi}$ provide consistent estimates of the unconditional and conditional effect of aid fragmentation. The key counterfactual, here, is the difference in institutional performance between extending aid through multiple donor channels instead of a limited number of donors for countries of varying levels of organizational capital.

First Stages Estimates

The first stages of the IV 2SLS estimation separately regress the aid fragmentation and the interaction between organizational capital and aid fragmentation on the donor income fragmentation instruments. The IV 2SLS first stage relationships are of the following form:

$$AF_{irt} = \alpha + \lambda ORG_{irt} + \psi IF_{irt} + \psi ORG * IF_{irt} + \boldsymbol{\beta X_{irt-1}} + \rho_i + \phi_t + \gamma_{rt} + u_{irt} \quad (6.7)$$

$$ORG * AF_{irt} = \alpha + \lambda ORG_{irt} + \psi IF_{irt} + \psi ORG * IF_{irt} + \boldsymbol{\beta X_{irt-1}} + \rho_i + \phi_t + \gamma_{rt} + u_{irt} \quad (6.8)$$

Where IF_{irt} is the level of donor income fragmentation for recipient i in region r and time period t, and $ORG * IF_{irt}$ is the interaction between donor income fragmentation and organizational capital. The first stage estimates of Equations 6.7 and 6.8 are shown in Panels B and C, respectively, of Table 6.5. In each of the unconditional and conditional first stage regressions, the relevant instrument (IF_{irt} in Panel B, and $ORG * IF_{irt}$ in Panel C) has the expected positive sign. In Panel B, income fragmentation is a strong positive predictor of aid fragmentation, and in Panel C, the interaction of income fragmentation and organizational capital is a robust correlate of the interacted aid fragmentation variable. Both panels have an R^2 that exceed 0.85, suggesting that the instruments are strong predictors of aid fragmentation.

OLS and IV 2SLS Panel Estimates

Table 6.5 presents the OLS and IV 2SLS estimates of the unconditional and conditional associations between aid fragmentation and institutional performance. The first column shows the unconditional association between aid fragmentation and public corruption, controlling for a vector of covariates (including organizational capital) and country, period, and region-period fixed effects.

The point estimate for aid fragmentation indicates a positive and statistically significant association between aid fragmentation and corruption. Column 2 includes both the unconditional aid fragmentation variable and its interaction with organizational capital. The results indicate that aid fragmentation is positively correlated with public corruption, but there is no differential effect at higher levels of organizational capital. The following two columns present the IV 2SLS estimates of the unconditional and interacted equations. In Column 3, the IV 2SLS point estimate of aid fragmentation is positive, statistically significant, and larger in magnitude than the analogous OLS estimate in Column 1. In Column 4, the unconditional and conditional estimates have the expected positive and negative signs, respectively. The unconditional estimate

Table 6.5. *OLS and IV 2SLS Panel Data Estimates*

	Corruption OLS	Corruption OLS	Corruption 2SLS	Corruption 2SLS	Effectiveness 2SLS	Control Corruption 2SLS
Panel A: Structural Equation / Second Stage Estimates						
Aid Fragmentation	0.074**	0.069*	0.116***	0.122***	-0.248**	-0.078
	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.116)	(0.155)
Aid Fragmentation * Org Capital		0.007		-0.027	0.410**	-0.090
		(0.032)		(0.037)	(0.165)	(0.110)
Organizational Capital	-0.024	-0.028	-0.025	-0.009	-0.271**	0.081
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.118)	(0.082)
Aid / GDP	0.003*	0.003*	0.003**	0.003**	0.012***	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Log Per Capita Income	-0.044	-0.044	-0.040	-0.042	0.280***	0.253***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.081)	(0.074)
Pop. Density	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Democracy	0.013	0.013	0.014*	0.014*	-0.042***	-0.029*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Trade/GDP	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001*	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Net Oil + Gas Exports	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	457	457	457	457	356	356
R^2	0.930	0.930	0.929	0.929	0.957	0.944
Clusters	75	75	75	75	58	58
Panel B: First Stage Estimates, DV = Aid Fragmentation						
Income Fragmentation			0.642***	0.531***	0.621***	0.621***
			(0.156)	(0.147)	(0.135)	(0.135)
Income Fragmentation * Org Capital				0.168	0.112	0.112
				(0.105)	(0.143)	(0.143)
First Stage R^2			0.879	0.881	0.903	0.903
*Panel C: First Stage Estimates, DV = Aid Fragmentation * Org Capital*						
Income Fragmentation				-0.619***	-0.468***	-0.468***
				(0.162)	(0.153)	(0.153)
Income Fragmentation * Org Capital				1.142***	0.917***	0.917***
				(0.206)	(0.191)	(0.191)
First Stage R^2				0.973	0.979	0.979

remains positive, statistically significant, and large in magnitude. The conditional estimate is substantively significant but somewhat imprecise. While the conditional estimate is not statistically significant, the estimate is consistent with the expected relationship between aid fragmentation and corruption for relatively low levels of organizational capital (at the lowest levels of organizational capital the relationship is imprecise) as shown in Figure 6.11a. At relatively low levels of organizational capital, aid fragmentation increases public corruption, and at a comparatively high level it does not have a statistically significant impact. The last two columns estimate the specification in Column 4 except the dependent variable is specified as government effectiveness and control over corruption. In Column 5, the unconditional and conditional estimates have the expected signs and are substantively and statistically significant. Aid fragmentation has a negative relationship with government effectiveness at lower levels of organizational capital, and a positive impact at higher levels of organizational capital. This conditional relationship is plotted in the marginal effects plot in Figure 6.11b. The specification with in which the dependent variables is measured as control over corruption is neither substantively nor statistically significant.

Conclusion

This chapter tested the impact of organizational capital and aid fragmentation on a wider universe of cases. Specifically, it first estimated the long run impact of organizational capital on institutional quality drawing on a cross-section and a panel dataset of developing countries from 1975 to 2014. It then aimed to identify the effect of aid fragmentation on institutional development *conditional* on the level of recipient organizational capital, drawing on an instrumental variables two-stage least squares (IV 2SLS) strategy.

The results of the first set of tests indicate that organizational capital, and in particular the elite consultation component of organizational capital, is associated with lower levels of public corruption, controlling for a range of country characteristics (income, population density, level of democracy, trade/GDP, net oil and gas exports) and country, period, and region-period fixed effects. This result is consistent with the explanation developed in Chapter 2. When elites are divided, we expect to see relatively politicized institutions that tend to hire personnel based on loyalty or factional identification and that do not coordinate information, providing ample

Figure 6.11. *Marginal Effect of Aid Fragmentation Conditional on Organizational Capital*

(a) *DV = Public Corruption*



(b) *DV = Government Effectiveness*



opportunity for corruption. This relationship between organizational capital and public corruption, however, does not carry over to other indicators of institutional quality.

The second set of tests estimate the effect of aid fragmentation on institutional outcomes using donor income fragmentation as an instrument. The results of these tests indicate that aid fragmentation has a positive impact on public corruption in countries with low levels of organizational capital, but either has a null or a positive effect on institutional quality in organizationally robust countries. This can be seen in Figures 7.3a and 7.3b, which show the marginal effect of aid fragmentation on public corruption and government effectiveness, respectively, *conditional on organizational capital*. At relatively low levels of organizational capital, aid fragmentation increases public corruption, while at higher levels of organization its impact is statistically indistinguishable from a null effect. This differential impact of donor fragmentation is more precise when the dependent variable is measured as government effectiveness. At relatively low levels of organizational capital, the impact of aid fragmentation on government effectiveness is negative and statistically significant, and at high levels of organizational capital its impact is positive.

7 Conclusion

7.1 Summary and Main Findings

This dissertation was motivated by the puzzling record of contemporary institutional development in countries with limited human and material resources, and the rule of law. In particular, it examines Afghanistan, a country that has largely defied expectations of existing understandings of institutional development. External or internal conflicts have clearly not motivated successive Afghan governments to develop more robust institutional structures. Ethnic differences have often not given rise to institutional dysfunction or conflict. And government ideology and policies have, in many instances, not influenced whether societal actors cooperate with or contest the government. These observations motivated an explanation that centers on *organizational capital* and features of *external coherence*. When institutions are insulated from elite polarization and embedded in society, they are more likely to recruit and promote officials on the basis of merit, to coordinate information more effectively, and to formulate and implement mutually agreeable policies at the grass roots level. Moreover, when external support is aligned between political and development objectives, and coordinated among donor organizations, institutional upgrading in recipient countries is more likely to take place because the costs of programming, monitoring, and objectively evaluating such assistance is lower.

Together, organizational capital and external support help to make sense of the haphazard path of institutional development in Afghanistan. In general, when Afghan elites have been cohesive, as was the case during the middle 20th century, they have been able to develop increasingly merit-oriented and productive institutions of government. While the army and bureaucracy have never been deeply embedded in the predominantly rural society of Afghanistan—these institutions were almost exclusively based in towns or cities and have drawn primarily on urban

dwellers—they were capable of challenging significant military threats and carrying out concentrated infrastructure projects during the early monarchy. When elite cooperation began to break down, as happened during the late monarchy, the communist period, and the post-Bonn governments, both the army and bureaucracy became vulnerable to politicization, setting the stage for coups, insurgencies, and institutional dysfunction.

External donors have also contributed to institutional outcomes in Afghanistan through the alignment and coordination of their assistance. Alignment between security and development objectives and relative coordination of foreign aid provided for institutional upgrading of both the army and bureaucracy during the early monarchical period. However, the rise of US-Soviet geopolitical competition in Afghanistan decreased aid effectiveness and produced politicization in government institutions in the final decades of the monarchy, providing the conditions for the republican and communist coups d'état of 1973 and 1978, respectively. The subsequent Soviet and post-2001 interventions in Afghanistan did not resolve this problem of divergent security and development objectives, which impeded the development of government institutions over time. The case-level findings are summarized in greater detail below.

7.1.1 Monarchical Rule

Chapter 3 shows that that the capabilities, reach, and effects of government institutions increased substantially during the monarchical period. In order to explain this pattern of institutional development, I demonstrate that the expansion of institutional strength under the monarchy originated in (1) kinship and other personal ties centered around the royal court and (2) the employment of external assistance by the government to enhance human capital and develop integrated lines of production in key export areas. Personal relationships grew dramatically around the royal court over the course of early 20th century, extending to include increasingly distant members of the royal clan and eventually, the urban intelligentsia and other social groups originating in communities outside of the royal lineages. The expansion of the monarchical network provided the organizational basis for institutional upgrading by incrementally incorporating capable figures into senior administrative positions without threatening the familial cohesion that underpinned monarchical rule. At the same time, monarchical governments increasingly drew on foreign aid to enhance the capabilities of the bureaucracy and army. This allowed the govern-

ment to extend its administrative reach to new territorial and functional areas in Afghanistan. Together, the expansion of the monarchical network and foreign aid contributed significantly to the increase in institutional capabilities.

However, even as the competencies and territorial presence of Afghan institutions expanded over time, political control over institutions of government began to decline after the 1950s. The growing number of commoner figures incorporated into government institutions—most with meritocratic paths to higher government—and the expansion of the government's presence and basic capabilities made the patrimonial nature of the monarchy untenable. This contradiction between familial rule and increasingly meritocratic government became acute by the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in persistent instability within the educated classes that constituted the political elite. Geopolitical competition between the US and USSR in Afghanistan also contributed to institutional decline by channelling aid to projects that offered the greatest political returns but that did not always address the key constraints to economic and institutional development in Afghanistan. The US and USSR contended for the support of different sections of the Afghan elite—the latter providing a natural channel for the more disgruntled commoner figures that had participated in the government—contributing to the instability that animated 1970s Afghanistan. Together, declining organizational capital and resource competition established the conditions for the coups of 1973 and 1978.

7.1.2 PDPA Rule

Chapter 4 demonstrates that the coup of April 1978 and subsequent inauguration of a PDPA government gave way to a rapid and immediate decline in the quality of the bureaucracy and army, well before the Soviet intervention. Despite inheriting a standing army of more than 100,000 soldiers and an intact bureaucratic structure, the competencies, presence, and effects of the PDPA government declined dramatically, in large part because of the internal characteristics of the new regime. Specifically, this chapter shows that organizational dysfunction between the *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions of the PDPA played a critical role in the rapid deterioration of Afghan government authority prior to the Soviet invasion. It also demonstrates that Soviet support, in the form of military equipment, economic aid, technical assistance, and direct firepower, largely kept the regime together by providing a direct and concentrated flow of economic and military assistance

to Kabul. However, Soviet assistance did not by itself address the organizational dysfunction within the PDPA regime—this conundrum was never fully resolved. By the late 1980s, Moscow had effectively abandoned efforts to build up institutions in Afghanistan, instead seeking to use patronage to keep the PDPA-led government in power long enough to outlive the insurgency. Soviet assistance became indispensable to the day-to-day survival of the PDPA regime. As a consequence, when the Soviet Union itself disintegrated, the PDPA government fell apart with it.

7.1.3 Post-Bonn

Chapter 5 examines conditions of diverse domestic and external participation in the Afghanistan intervention after 2001. After the Bonn settlement, government institutions made limited progress despite the allocation of substantial levels of material and human assistance to Afghanistan. In many areas of government activity, notably security provision and development planning, state structures grew in size and reach while exhibiting limited autonomy and effectiveness. This chapter makes sense of this puzzling set of developments by showing that the formation of Afghan institutions was impeded by the increasing practice of personalist governance, the absence of coordination among international donors, and divergent international security and development objectives in Afghanistan. Personalist governance was, in part, a legacy of the successive wars that had emerged and evolved in Afghanistan since 1979. But it was also the result of an electoral system that systematically obstructed the emergence of cross-cutting, interest-aggregating political parties, and a strategy of patronage adopted by President Karzai to acquire greater influence within it. Personalist governance, in turn, gave way to a political system in which offices, contracts, and other resources were distributed in exchange for political support. The disorganized ways in which external resources were allocated to Afghanistan accentuated the prevalence of patronage. Poor donor coordination and incompatible short-term security objectives and long-term development goals increased the costs of monitoring and evaluating aid expenditure. These problems remained unresolved despite increased US and international resources and attention devoted to Afghanistan as part of the "surge" of military and civilian assistance starting in 2009.

7.1.4 Cross Country Statistical Tests

Chapter 6 quantitatively evaluates the impact of organizational capital and donor fragmentation in a wider universe of cases. Specifically, it first estimates the long run impact of organizational capital on institutional quality drawing on a cross-section and a panel dataset of developing countries from 1975 to 2014. It then attempts to identify the effect of donor fragmentation on institutional development *conditional* on the preceding level of organizational capital, drawing on an instrumental variables two-stage least squares (IV 2SLS) strategy.

The first set of tests evaluates the relationship between organizational capital and institutional quality.[642] Figure 7.1, which shows the distribution of elite cooperation, embeddedness, and institutional quality, provides preliminary evidence for the positive relationship between organizational capital and institutional quality. A set of statistical tests provide more systematic support. The results of these tests indicate that organizational capital, and in particular the elite consultation component of organizational capital, is associated with lower levels of public corruption, controlling for a range of country characteristics (income, population growth, level of democracy, trade/GDP, net oil and gas exports) and country, period, and region-period fixed effects. This is partially consistent with the explanation developed in Chapter 2. When elites are divided, we expect to see relatively politicized institutions that tend to hire personnel based on loyalty or factional identification and that do not coordinate information, providing ample opportunity for corruption. This relationship between organizational capital and public corruption does not carry over to other measures of institutional quality. As shown in Figure 7.2, while organizational capital corresponds with greater government authority, government effectiveness, and control over corruption, these relationships are imprecise.

The second set of tests estimate the effect of aid fragmentation on institutional outcomes using donor income fragmentation as an instrument. The results of these tests indicate that aid fragmentation has a positive impact on public corruption in countries with low levels of organizational capital, but either has a null or a positive effect on institutional quality in organizationally

[642] Organizational capital is measured as an index constructed from one indicator for elite cooperation and one for institutional embeddedness. Both of these indicators are obtained from the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) project, an expert survey that adjusts for cross-expert disagreement and measurement error. Elite cooperation is measured as the range of consultation among political elites. Institutional embeddedness is measured as the number of political parties that have permanent local branches. The primary measure of institutional quality is the level of corruption in all government institutions and is collected from the VDEM dataset.

robust countries. This can be seen in Figures 7.3a and 7.3b, which show the marginal effect of aid fragmentation on public corruption and government effectiveness, respectively, *conditional on organizational capital*. At relatively low levels of organizational capital, aid fragmentation increases public corruption, while at higher levels of organization its impact is statistically indistinguishable from a null effect. This differential impact of donor fragmentation is more precise when the dependent variable is measured as government effectiveness. At relatively low levels of organizational capital, the impact of aid fragmentation on government effectiveness is negative and statistically significant, and at high levels of organizational capital its impact is positive.

Figure 7.1. *Scatter Plot of Elite Consultation, Local Party Presence, and Public Corruption*



Source: Coppedge et al. 2016; author's calculations.
Notes: Countries with greater public corruption are (darker) red; countries with less public corruption are (darker) blue.

Figure 7.2. *OLS Relationships between Organizational Capital and Measures of Institutional Quality*

(a) *Government Effectiveness*



(b) *Control of Corruption*



(c) *Public Corruption*



(d) *State Authority over the Population*



Figure 7.3. *Marginal Effect of Aid Fragmentation Conditional on Organizational Capital*

(a) *DV = Public Corruption*



(b) *DV = Government Effectiveness*



7.2 Shortcomings, New Questions, and Future Research

This dissertation developed an explanation of institutional consolidation and decay from a close examination of case studies from Afghanistan before quantitatively evaluating the validity of this explanation across a wider universe of cases. This empirical strategy provided for theoretical depth and external validity, but it closely scrutinized only one country context. This is a shortcoming because organizational capital and external support may work differently than expected in other country contexts when examined in close detail. It is also a shortcoming because the Afghanistan cases do not exhibit any variation in social embeddedness, restricting inferences about its potential effects. One line of future research, therefore, may include additional case studies that "pair" with each of the monarchical, communist, and postwar cases studied in this dissertation with relatively similar cases farther afield. Such a strategy could not only evaluate the potential impact of institutional embeddedness across country contexts, but also test the effects of the other arguments about organizational capital and aid developed in this dissertation. For example, Botswana offers a potential comparison with monarchical Afghanistan. Initially a British protectorate and traditional monarchy, Botswana underwent rapid institutional development as a republic after independence in 1966. Post-independence Tanzania can offer an (imperfect) comparative case to the PDPA. Led by a dominant socialist political party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM),[643] Tanzania has experienced incremental institutional gains in economic planning and, more recently, in the provision of social services. And the experiences of El Salvador, Mozambique, or Rwanda may provide useful comparisons to the experience of postwar institution building in Afghanistan after 2001. Together, these cases can offer useful comparative insights into the causal impact of different levels of organizational capital and foreign aid in structurally similar (but not identical) circumstances. They can also provide insight into the potential impact of institutional embeddedness, because some of these possible cases (notably Tanzania) exhibit institutions that are actively involved in public matters at the local level.

There are a number of new comparative questions generated by this study. This research examined the effect of organizational capital on institutional development, but it did not closely

[643] Following a 1977 merger between the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and the Zanzibar-based Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP).

study the origins of organizational capital. Organization can come in different forms—patrimonial ties, social movements, anti-colonial campaigns, revolutions, for example—and each of these sources of capital may have different effects. One of the findings from Chapter 3 was that familial ties fail to produce durable levels of organizational capital in the presence of increasing meritocratization. Future research could investigate whether other forms of organization may provide for institutional strengthening over extended periods of time. Another question generated by this research centers on whether different characteristics of foreign aid matter across sectors. It might be the case, for example, that donor fragmentation may not have a detrimental effect in sectors that require less hierarchy, for example the health and education sectors, relative to those that involve coordinated planning, such as the rule of law or infrastructure development. Future research can investigate where and when donor fragmentation matters.

There are also a number of Afghanistan-specific questions generated by this research. First, this study raises the question of how durable forms of organizational capital can be generated in Afghanistan, given the limited levels of elite cooperation and and the near absence of local institutional embeddedness in much of the country. While Afghanistan has many characteristics that work against its future development, one supporting set of features is (1) the prevalence of reform-oriented tendencies across regions and constituencies, even among those who participated in Afghanistan's successive wars during the 1980s and 1990s, and (2) the experience of elites and non-elites in areas outside of their home provinces. Together, these features make the possibility of cross-cutting efforts to reform government institutions more likely than in areas in which ethnic or regional divisions are much more entrenched and major political factions do not show any reformist tendencies. Future research could explore whether the institutional rules in Afghanistan can be amended or external conditions can be applied to support programmatic policy coalitions in Afghanistan. With a more limited international footprint and discussions about the constitutional design and implementation on the national agenda in Afghanistan, the opportunities to generate elite cooperation around incremental reform and credibly support institutions of government are greater. Whether these opportunities can be realized and have an effect on institutions in Afghanistan, however, remains open to question.

7.3 Implications for Policy and Analysis

The findings of this research present a number of implications for practitioners interested in institution building, foreign aid, international intervention, and the future of Afghanistan. These implications are important because many of the wrong lessons have been learned from international interventions in recent years, including the experience of Afghanistan. There is little debate that the intervention in Afghanistan has been extremely messy and costly. But the conventional explanation for this outcome—that conscious external efforts to develop more capable, accountable, and merit-oriented institutions are intrinsically unproductive—is the wrong lesson to be learned from the Afghanistan case. As this dissertation has shown, the post-2001 Afghanistan intervention was characterized by a series of largely predictable errors: excessive expenditure on quick-impact development projects, poor monitoring of development and institutional outcomes, underinvestment in the primary sector of the economy, half-hearted security sector reform, and excessive cooperation with civil-war era commanders on security and economic matters.

As Chapter 5 of this dissertation shows, the post-2001 experience in Afghanistan was less a crisis of ambition than one of expediency. While the initial years of the Afghanistan intervention were framed in maximalist terms that emphasized security, governance, rule of law, human rights, economic and social development, and even the invocation of the Marshall Plan as a model for reconstruction in Afghanistan by US President Bush,[644] the reality is that very little thought and effort was dedicated to building up foundational institutions before the country had once again descended into violence. In the initial years of the Afghanistan intervention, the US, as the leading international actor in Afghanistan, was primarily oriented toward short-term, *ad hoc* planning to address key security and development challenges. As these minimal initial efforts proved to be insufficient, Washington and allied governments increased the level of resourcing without identifying the objectives and strategy of the international presence in Afghanistan. Even after the Obama administration's efforts to turn around the course of the Afghanistan intervention by through a resource-intensive counterinsurgency strategy, the US remained oriented toward achieving relatively short-term security and economic returns, an objective it achieved by

[644]Speaking at the Virginia Military Institute on April 17, 2002, Bush would remark: "By helping to build an Afghanistan that is free from this evil and is a better place in which to live, we are working in the best traditions of George Marshall." See James Dao, "Bush Sets Role for U.S. in Afghan Rebuilding," *New York Times*, April 18, 2002.

rapidly increasing allied manpower and expenditure in Afghanistan. However, the less tractable, long-term problems of corruption, patrimonalism, and incompetence in sections of the Afghan security forces and civilian institutions were largely seen as secondary, as were the potential consequences of a rapid expansion in manpower and expenditure on institutional outcomes.

This experience is likely to hold lessons for other contexts. In Afghanistan and a range of crisis countries in the Middle East (Iraq, Libya, Syria), Africa (Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia), Asia (Burma, Cambodia), and Europe (Ukraine), addressing problems of institutions are essential to the resolution of active or latent political conflicts. While the types of large-footprint military interventions seen in Afghanistan and Iraq are likely to be a feature of the past, the United States and other major powers will continue to face the types of institutional dysfunction and breakdown seen in Afghanistan. This research offers ten distinct lessons for these kinds of circumstances.

Implications for the US and other major powers

1. *Timing matters: early, targeted interventions have a higher return than late, inexact interventions, even if these late interventions employ high levels of effort and assistance.*

   The Afghanistan case suggests that early investments in understanding and addressing institutional deficits in Afghanistan could have minimized subsequent material and human costs expended by donor countries. This is especially prevalent in the post-2001 case, in which the United States and other governments informally allied themselves with civil war era military commanders while underinvesting in government institutions. By identifying key institutional problems early on—including security sector patronage, government manpower and human capital needs, underinvestment in the agricultural sector—and developing a realistic and resourced strategy to address and monitor these problems, the US and its partners would likely have been able to weaken the growing Taliban insurgency and minimize its economic and security commitments to Afghanistan in later years.

2. *Consider multi-donor trust funds and other forms of pooling development assistance, despite political incentives to maintain bilateral assistance programming.*

   This research has shown that coordinating donor resources can increase aid effectiveness,

especially in countries least likely to become more institutionalized over time. In practice, this can take many forms, including ad hoc arrangements such as multi-donor trust funds or increased commitments to multilateral development institutions. These types of pooling arrangements can serve as central repositories of information and decision-making bodies that can hold aid-receiving institutions more accountable than individual bilateral donors.

3. *Consider aid conditionality.*

   While this dissertation did not directly consider the question of aid conditionality, it does suggest that aid recipients like Afghanistan have not faced significant incentives to perform because donors have not been particularly motivated to systematically understand the outcomes of their assistance programs and unwilling to withhold aid based on outcomes. In Afghanistan after 2001, the US and other major donors frequently declined to make resourcing decisions on the basis of the dynamics and behavior of recipient country institutions. As a consequence, the political leadership have had very limited incentives to make appointments on the basis of merit and develop policies that are programmatic in character.

4. *Institutionalize efforts to reconcile potentially conflicting security and development objectives in crisis countries.*

   Critics of military interventions rightly point out that these interventions result in "mission creep," in which intervening countries are drawn into increasingly ambitious commitments that cannot be fulfilled. While this general observation is borne out in the Afghanistan case, it is incomplete and, by extension, misleading. The Soviet and US-led military interventions in Afghanistan became unsustainably ambitious because they were largely improvised. As a consequence, both interventions lacked an overarching strategy of achieving stability in the medium- or long-run, instead pursuing a series of short-term military-centric tactics that ultimately did not address the deeper sources of institutional dysfunction. The US and other intervening countries ought to therefore first resolve the potential contradictions of the security and development dimensions of its involvement before intervention.

5. *Invest in efforts to collect and disseminate data on institution building efforts.*

The post-2001 case study also shows that both donors and Afghan government officials neglected to systematically measure institutional outcomes, limiting the recognition of institutional underperformance and its proximate causes until too late. Otherwise accessible types of quantitative data—development expenditure and individual and institution-level performance in key ministries, for example—were not obtained, undermining an objective assessment of the development of the Afghan government. Where possible, donor governments can and should partner more actively with aid recipients to collect data on not just project performance, but also the the degree and quality of participation by recipient institutions.

Implications for internal reform in Afghanistan and weakly institutionalized countries

6. *Prioritize institutional rules that deter personalist politics and ad hoc electoral formation.*

   The post-Bonn experience showed that personalism (or, put differently, an absence of elite cooperation) over a sustained period of time was a leading cause of institutional dysfunction in Afghanistan. Clearly, the leadership characteristics of President Karzai played a part in the development of personalism in post-2001 Afghanistan. But a closer look at the history of Afghanistan and other cases of personalist politics shows that personalist politics thrives in the absence of institutional rules that provide for organization building. This was clearly the case during the monarchy, during which time political parties were not legal. It was also the case during the post-2001 period, when the SNTV electoral system systematically disincentivized organization building. Domestic policymakers (with assistance from external organizations) need to design a set of institutional rules that incentivize long-lived political organizations that represent and aggregate interests more effectively. While Afghan political elites tend to emphasize the personal characteristics of this or that leader, for any long-term progress in security and development matters to be made, leaders must be embedded in stable political parties.

7. *Privilege both meritocracy and inclusion in the government formation process, while recognizing that some degree of patronage provision is difficult to entirely avoid.*

   This research has shown that leaders in developing states face very strong incentives to pursue patronage as an effective mechanism of political survival, even if this practice clearly

corrodes government institutions over the long run. While this tradeoff is problematic, it does not mean that political leaders must adhere to either unrestricted patronage or meritocracy. External and domestic actors ought to focus their efforts on identifying on merit-oriented coalitions that cut across ethnic and regional groups, while recognizing that patronage appointments are a necessary practice of making coalitions work. While difficult to pull off, this type of coalition making can incorporate capable individuals into government institutions who are more likely to cooperate on substantive issues of security and development. As a necessary part of the coalition making process, patronage appointments ought to be concentrated in less significant government positions.

8. *Processes of institutional reform are more likely to be successful if sustained over time; partial reform can be destabilizing.*

   As seen in Chapter 3, partial reform can be destabilizing if not sustained. Without clear rules and mechanisms for managing political competition among elites, partial institutional reform can lead to unmanageable conflict over the type and pace of reform, as well as who can most effectively govern. While disagreements over the "rules of the game" are inevitable, for these disagreements to be manageable and for reform to ultimately be successful it needs to be followed through.

Implications for US policy toward neighboring and regional powers

9. *Neighboring and regional states stand to individually benefit more from cooperation than conflict in fault-line states.*

   As seen during the communist period in Afghanistan, neighboring and regional states can increase the intensity and duration of conflict in institutionally weak countries, not only destroying these countries' social institutions, human capital, and physical infrastructure, but also generating long-term costs for the international community—the expansion of terrorist or militant groups, refugee flows, and foregone future economic and political possibilities. Regional and international competitors can and should learn from the Afghanistan experience and other recent crises in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen by engaging in early diplomatic arrangements that may not result in an unambiguous military victory by preferred proxy groups, but that preserve government institutions that maintain basic order.

These kinds of diplomatic efforts, for example, can specify a phased exit from political power by the ruling family or faction and a transition to a mutually agreeable multi-party electoral system. While difficult to implement in practice, the initiation of talks at an early stage can reduce the possibility of deeply polarized conflicts and institutional breakdowns.

10. *Recognize and address incompatibilities with neighboring countries as early as possible.*
One of the primary reasons for the rise of the Taliban insurgency in post-2001 Afghanistan was Pakistan's accommodation of the Taliban leadership and followership in major Pakistani urban centers.[645] Pakistan's posture of accommodation provided the Taliban movement critical access to funds, recruits, and safe territory, allowing the insurgency to endure and expand in the face of American and allied firepower. While it is difficult to know whether Islamabad would have adopted a less accommodative posture toward the Taliban under different circumstances after 2001, the long period of time in which the US and allied governments ignored the problem certainly did not benefit the international intervention. As early as the Bonn conference, the US should have actively explored prospects of engagement and coercion to influence Pakistani policy. At this time, Pakistan was both internationally isolated and (perhaps) more motivated to achieve a diplomatic solution than in subsequent years, when the conduct of the war in Afghanistan had convinced the Pakistani security establishment that a partial or full Taliban military conquest was possible. The lesson here is that, in the resolution of internationalized civil wars, engaging neighboring countries early and actively can prevent them from becoming spoilers in subsequent years. By employing both carrots and sticks toward neighboring countries, the US can achieve durable political solutions to cases of institutional breakdown.

[645] Nadiri 2014.

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MOP	Survey of Progress, Ministry of Planning, Various Years
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States

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Chapters in Edited Volumes

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Selected Presentations

2015 "Interpersonal Networks and State Formation in Prewar Afghanistan." Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association.

2015 "Disorganizing Power: Elite Coalitions, Divided Donors, and Institutions in Post-2001 Afghanistan." Annual Convention, International Studies Association.

2014 "Old Habits, New Consequences: Explaining Pakistani Foreign Policy Behavior in Post-2001 Afghanistan." King's College London.

2014 "Aid as Problem and Solution? Donor Fragmentation and the Organization of State Capacity." Annual Convention, International Studies Association.

2014 "Lineages of the Urban State: Locating Continuity and Change in Post-2001 Kabul." Indiana University, Bloomington.

2012 "Explaining Institutional Trajectories in Contentious Political Systems: Evidence from Afghanistan."
Crossing Boundaries: Merging Eurasian Insights with the Study of Afghanistan. The George Washington University and Social Science Research Council.

2012 "Explaining Institutional Trajectories in Contentious Political Systems: Evidence from Afghanistan." Research in Progress Seminar. The Johns Hopkins University.

Honors, Awards, and Fellowships

2015	Travel Grant, International Studies Association Annual Convention
2012	Fall Travel Grant, The Johns Hopkins University
2012	Summer Research Grant, The Johns Hopkins University
2011	Distinction, Comprehensive Examination in South Asian Politics
2011	Summer Research Grant, The Johns Hopkins University
2010-2014	Graduate Fellowship, The Johns Hopkins University
2007	C.V. Starr Foundation Graduate Fellowship
2007	Emma and Lloyd Pollish Graduate Fellowship
2006-2008	Graduate Fellowship, The Johns Hopkins University

Additional Academic Training

2012 Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan

2011 Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research, Syracuse University

Teaching Experience

Instructor, Econometrics (Graduate), The Johns Hopkins University

	Evaluation
FA 2016	4.8/5.0
SU 2016	4.8/5.0
SP 2016	4.9/5.0
FA 2015	4.6/5.0
SU 2015	4.4/5.0
SP 2015	4.8/5.0
SU 2014	5.0/5.0
SP 2014	4.5/5.0
SU 2013	4.6/5.0

Teaching Assistant, Econometrics (Graduate), The Johns Hopkins University

	Evaluation
FA 2012	4.8/5.0
SP 2012	4.9/5.0
FA 2011	4.9/5.0

Professional Activities

Manuscript reviewer for *International Security*

Research Skills

Languages

Farsi/Dari (advanced), Spanish (advanced), Pashto (novice), Urdu (novice), Hindi (novice)

Statistical Programming

R, Stata, Python, Matlab, SAS, JAGS

Geographic and Network Analysis Programming

ArcGIS, UCINET, Pajek

Other Professional Positions

V-Dem Project
2015-2016 *Country Expert*

RAND Corporation
Acquisition and Technology Policy Center + International Security and Defense Policy Center
2011- *Adjunct Scholar*
2005-2006 *Research Analyst*

Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.
2008-2010 *Associate, Healthcare Investment Banking*

Council on Foreign Relations
2003 *Research Assistant, Center for Geoeconomic Studies*